Judgment : Of the five accused who have been convicted and sentenced, accused Nos.1, 2 and 5 have filed this appeal. 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 9. 1984 at about 3.15 p.m. on credible information, the Special Tahsildar, Civil Supplies, Tuticorin with his party inspected the house bearing Door No.78, Valayalkarar Compound, Anna 1st Street, Tuticorin belonging to A-1and A-2. At that time A-1 and A-2 were found in the act of mixing duplicate powder with genuine cement with the assistance of A-3 to A-5. Thus, they were manufacturing adulterated cement for sale which was below the prescribed standard. Therefore A-1 to A-5 have committed an offence of contravention of the provisions of Clause (3) of Cement (Quality Control) Order, 1962 read with Sec.3 of the Essential Commodities Act punishable under Secs.7(1)(2) and 8 of the Essential Commodities Act. Accordingly, a charge was framed against all the accused. 3. The accused denied the charge. 4. The learned Special Judge under the Essential Commodities Act, Tirunelveli, on consideration of the evidence adduced in the case found all the accused guilty of the charge and therefore they were convicted but punished with diverse sentences of imprisonment and fine. A-1 has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.200 in default to undergo R.I. for one month; A-2 has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 3 months and a fine of Rs.100 in default to undergo R.I. for one month; and A-5 has been sentenced to undergo R.1 for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs.100 in default to undergo R.I for one month. 5. Now in the appeal it is contended that the prosecution has not proved satisfactorily that the cement of which sample was taken and sent for testing was adulterated one. Now the test reports are Exs.P-5 and P-6. It is on the basis of these reports the accused were charged for adulteration. Mr.K.V.Sreedharan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused submits that the two test reports arc deficient in the sense that as per the definition of the cement under Clause 2(a) of the Cement (Quality Control) Order there are ten varieties of prescribed standards of cement. It is on the basis of these reports the accused were charged for adulteration. Mr.K.V.Sreedharan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused submits that the two test reports arc deficient in the sense that as per the definition of the cement under Clause 2(a) of the Cement (Quality Control) Order there are ten varieties of prescribed standards of cement. The test report Ex.P-5 shows that test has been made only with regard to one prescribed standard of cement, i.e. I.S.269 of 1976 and it is stated that the cement is adulterated while there are nine other prescribed standards of cement. Similarly, Ex.P-6 shows that test has been made only with regard to one prescribed standard of cement, i.e. I.S.1489 of 1976 and it is stated that the cement is adulterated when as aforesaid, there are nine other prescribed standards of cement. Therefore, only on the basis of the Test Reports Exs.P-5 and P-6 it cannot be said that the cement of which the sample was taken is adulterated as alleged. I think that this submission of the learned counsel is sound and has to be accepted. 6. When there are ten prescribed standards varieties of cement, only stating that the sample in question does not conform with one prescribed standard, it cannot be said that the cement is adulterated and it is not in evidence that the accused had been licensed to manufacture cement of any particular variety or varieties only. This being the case, only on the basis of Exs.P-5 and P-6 test reports, it cannot be said that the accused manufactured adulterated cement. This proposition has been well settled in a number of decisions, viz. (i) Rangaraj v. State by C.B.C.I.D., Madras, 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 424, (ii) Rajagopal and seven others v. Inspector of Police, Civil Supplies, C.I.D., Mambalam, 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 166 and Elumalai and four others v. State represented by Inspector of Civil Supplies, C.I.D., Madras, 1992 L.W. (Crl.) 492. Therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants-accused cannot be sustained. 7. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentences are set aside. If any fine amount had been paid by any of the appellants it shall be returned to them..