Judgment : S.P. Srivastava 1. BEING aggrieved by the grant of release of the accommodation in dispute under the tenancy of the petitioner in the proceedings under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act, 1972, (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the Prescribed Authority vide the order dated 19-1-91 which has been affirmed in appeal by the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 16-2-93 the petitioner-tenant has now approached this Court for redress seeking the reversal of the impugned orders, 2. THE facts of the case shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. THE landlord-respondent initiated proceedings for the release of the accommodation in dispute which was in the tenancy of Shyam Sunder, the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners by filing an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. In the aforesaid application which had been filed in the year 1,985, it was asserted that the accommodation in dispute which had been purchased on 16-11-81 was genuinely required for residential purpose by the landlady and her family. THE landlady asserted that the need for the accommodation in dispute was bonafide and pressing. It was also asserted that the requisite notice contemplated under the first proviso to section 21 (1) of the Act was sent to Shyam Sunder which had been served on him and inspite of the service of the notice he had failed to vacate the premised which necessitated the initiation of the proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for his eviction. It was also asserted that the landlord was likely to suffer greater hardship as compared to the tenant on the rejection of the application. It appears that although the release application had been filed in the year 1985 and notices thereof had been served on Shyam Sunder, he did not file any written statement or counter-affidavit. During the pendency of the proceedings Shyam Sunder died in the year 1986 and thereafter his successor-in-interest the present petitioners-filed a written statement on 30-9-88 wherein denying the allegations of the landlady, it was asserted that the notice sent by the landlady was neither received by Shyam Sunder deceased nor he had refused to accept the same. During the pendency of the proceedings Shyam Sunder died in the year 1986 and thereafter his successor-in-interest the present petitioners-filed a written statement on 30-9-88 wherein denying the allegations of the landlady, it was asserted that the notice sent by the landlady was neither received by Shyam Sunder deceased nor he had refused to accept the same. It was asserted that the release application could not proceed and was not maintainable in the absence of the service of the notice. The Prescribed Authority after carefully considering the evidence and the materials on the record came to the conclusion that the need of the landlady for the accommodation in dispute was bonafide and genuine. It was also found that apart from the accommodation in dispute the landlady had no other accommodation which could be utilised for the, purpose for which release was sought. It was also found that the landlady was residing in a rented accommodation paying Rs. 200/-per month as rent. According to the landlady, the petitioners were paying only Rs. 6/- per month as rent in respect of the accommodation in dispute. The Prescribed Authority also found that the landlady was likely to suffer greater hardship as compared to the tenant in the event of the rejection of the application for release. On the question of the service of the notice, the trial court recorded a clear cut finding that the notice in question had been sent by registered post, the postal receipt whereof had been filed and the assertion of the successors-in-interest of the deceased-tenant about the non-service of notice were not liable to be accepted. Consequently, the release of the accommodation in dispute as sought for was granted. 3. AGGRIEVED by the aforesaid decision of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioners filed an appeal. The "appellate authority after carefully considering the evidence and materials on record came to the conclusion that the evidence given by the landlord in connection with the service of the notice sent through registered post was sufficient and the mere denial of service of notice by the scccesssors in interest of the deceased tenant who had been impleaded as a respondent in the release application was not sufficient to rebut the presumption about service of the notice on Shyam Sunder. The appellate Authority endorsed and affirmed all the findings of the Prescribed Authority upholding the claim of the landlady about the need for the accommodation, in, dispute being genuine, bonafide and pressing. The Appellate Authority also affirmed the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority on the question of relative hardships. It also noticed that the tenants bad not made any effort whatsoever to get any other accommodation on rent which factor also tilted the balance of relative hardships in favour of the landlady. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. 4. THE learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously challenged the concurrent finding on the question relating to the service of the notice asserting that the denial of service of the notice by the successors in interest of deceased tenant Shyam Sunder was more than enough to rebut the presumption relating to the service of notice and in the circumstances of the case in the absence of the examination of the postman concerned or other evidence having been led by the landlady to prove the actual service of the notice on Shyam Sunder, deceased, the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority acted with manifest illegality in proceeding on the basis that the notice in question had been duly served on the basis of the presumption. This Court in its decision in the case of Ganga Ram v. Phulwati decided by a Full Bench and reported in 1970 ALJ 336 had clarified that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by registered post by producing the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him and that a presumption regarding service of such notice can be made not only under section 114 of the Evidence Act in favour of the landlord but the presumption regarding service of such notice has also to be made under section 27 of the General Clauses Act. This would, however, be a rebuttable presumption. 5. IN its decision in the case of Gujarat Electricity Board v Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433 , the Apex Court had observed that there is a presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. 5. IN its decision in the case of Gujarat Electricity Board v Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433 , the Apex Court had observed that there is a presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the Court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service. The Supreme Court was emphatic in its decision while observing that mere denial made by the respondent may not be sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of the registered cover. 6. IN another decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, AIR 1989 SC 630 , it was observed that all that a landlord can do to comply with the provision relating to service of a notice is to post a prepaid registered letter containing the tenant's correct address. Once he does this, and the letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it. It is then presumes to have been delivered to the addressee under section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the post office, the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorised by him. Such a person may either accept the letter or decline to accept it, IN either case, there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on, and receipt by, the addressee. After considering various aspects, it was observed by the Apex Court that a more reasonable, effective, equitable and practical interpretation would be to read the word 'served' as 'sent by post', correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word 'receipt' as the tender of the letter by 'he postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. After considering various aspects, it was observed by the Apex Court that a more reasonable, effective, equitable and practical interpretation would be to read the word 'served' as 'sent by post', correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word 'receipt' as the tender of the letter by 'he postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. The Apex Court observed that no other interpretation, 'will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a registered letter sent by him gets served on the tenant, or is, received by, the tenant. The Supreme Court in that case found the despatch of the notice by registered post to be sufficient compliance with the requirement on the part of the landlord. It was also clarified that a landlord must be held to have complied with the statutory requirement by sending a notice correctly addressed to the tenant by a registered post. The contention of the tenant in that case that the statute postulates a factual service of the notice on, and the actual receipt of it by. the tenant and that being not the position in that case no eviction could have been decreed was negatived by the Apex Court. In the present case, from the materials on record it is apparent that the notice had been sent through registered post on a correct address. The tenant had never disputed at any stage that the address on which the notice had been sent was incorrect in any manner.,, Shyam Sunder the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners had never disputed the assertion of the landlady about the service of the notice. Long after his death the present petitioners-his successor in interest-raised a dispute about the service of notice on Shyam Sunder deceased asserting that the notice had neither been tendered to him nor he had ever refused the same. Apart from this bare denial no evidence whatsoever had been led. The prescribed Authority on the, appraisal of evidence on the record has rejected the claim of the present petitioners. The finding of the prescribed Authority that the presumption relating to the service of the notice cannot be taken to have been rebutted on the materials on record has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. The prescribed Authority on the, appraisal of evidence on the record has rejected the claim of the present petitioners. The finding of the prescribed Authority that the presumption relating to the service of the notice cannot be taken to have been rebutted on the materials on record has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. Taking into consideration the observations made in the decisions of the Apex Court referred to hereinbefore and the materials on record, I am inclined to agree with the aforesaid finding which does not appear to suffer from any legal infirmity. 7. THE learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously urged that denial of receipt of the notice by the petitioners was sufficient to rebut the presumption of service of notice. THE learned counsel has tried to draw support for this submission from a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ram Rati v. Fakira;, 1988 (14) ALR 158 and another decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Shri Pal Singh v. District Judge, Hardoi, 1990 (16) ALR page 443. I have perused the aforesaid decisions. Besides being distinguishable on facts, I find that the implications arising under the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Gujrat Electricity Board and M/s Madan and Company (supra) have neither been taken notice of nor considered in either of the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case in the light of the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to hereinbefore the petitioners cannot derive any advantage out of the decisions of the learned Single Judge referred to herein before and they cannot come to their rescue. 8. THE learned counsel for the petitioners has further urged that the respondent-authorities have not taken into consideration the effect of the existence of the alternative accommodation available to the land lady which has resulted in manifestly erroneous conclusions. In this connection it has been asserted that the husband of the landlady has an ancestral house in Qasba Bisauli, which according to the petitioners themselves is situate at a distance of about 35 K. M. from City Budaun. According to the petitioners the alleged need of the landlady could be satisfied by the a for said accommodation. In this connection it has been asserted that the husband of the landlady has an ancestral house in Qasba Bisauli, which according to the petitioners themselves is situate at a distance of about 35 K. M. from City Budaun. According to the petitioners the alleged need of the landlady could be satisfied by the a for said accommodation. THE landlady had denied the assertions made by the petitioners in this regard. It had been indicated in the affidavits filed by her that the ancestral house was a very small house in which her husband had only 1/9th share which, too was not in his actual possession and it was not possible to obtain possession even on a portion of the house without any partition having been effected. THE trial court had accepted the evidence tendered by the petitioners and had negatived the claim of the tenant about the availability of any alternative accommodation. THE Prescribed Authority has observed that the landlady was right in asserting that even if the 1/9th share of her husband was got separated, in that event he could get only a very small portion of the house measuring only a few feet obviously meaning thereby that it could not satisfy the need set up by the landlady. In any case once it is established that immediate possession of an accommodation cannot be obtained and further that there is no right in exercise where of a person can get immediate recovery of possession of an accbmmodati6n in that even such an accommodation cannot be deemed to be available as an alternative accommodation so as to defeat the right of a landlord or a tenant and cannot have any - impact either on the questions relating to bonafide need or comparative hardships. THE Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have concurrently found that the landlady could not be deemed to have any alternative accommodation which could satisfy the need set up by her. In the circumstances of the case and the materials brought on record, I do not find any justification for any interference in these findings. The learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to assail concurrent findings recorded by the respondent-authorities on the questions relating to the need of the landlady being bonafide and genuine and the relative hardships. In the circumstances of the case and the materials brought on record, I do not find any justification for any interference in these findings. The learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to assail concurrent findings recorded by the respondent-authorities on the questions relating to the need of the landlady being bonafide and genuine and the relative hardships. These findings are findings on questions of fact which have been arrived at after appraisal of evidence on the record. I do not find any such infirmity therein which may call for any interference by this Court while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. IN view of the conclusions indicated hereinbefore, this writ petition is clearly devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. 10. THE parties shall, however, bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.