Judgment : This civil revision petition is directed against the Order in I.A.No.816 of 1986 in O.S.No.319 of 1974 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. 2. Short facts are: The second respondent has unufractuarily mortgaged the suit property to the first respondent. Later, she sold the suit property to the revision petitioner subject to the usufructuary mortgage. The revision petitioner filed the suit for redemption. Preliminary decree was passed on 19. 1978 giving one month time for payment of the amount. One month time would come to end by 110. 1978. The revision petitioner did not deposit the amount within the one month time. He filed I.A.No.816 of 1986 for passing final decree on 4. 1986 and during the pendency of the same, he deposited the amount fixed under the preliminary decree in court on 19. 1986. The petition filed by the revision petitioner was resisted by the first respondent on many grounds inter alia contending that the petition is barred by time. After enquiry, learned subordinate Judge had held that the petition is barred by time inasmuch as it was not filed within three years from the date of expiry of one month time, namely from 110. 1978and that Art.137 of the new Limitation Act is applicable to this case and taking that view of the matter has dismissed that petition. Aggrieved by this Order of dismissal, the petitioner in the court below has come forward with this civil revision petition. 3. Mr. V.Raghavachari, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that this is a usufructuary mortgage and that after passing of the preliminary decree and even after passing of the time fixed under the preliminary decree, still the plaintiff has got right to deposit the amount fixed under the preliminary decree till this claim was foreclosed and in this case this contingency had not occurred, and so, the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation. Per contra, Mr. V.Vivekanandan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the revision petitioner had not prayed for extension of time under the provisions of 0.34, Rule 7(2), Civil Procedure Code and while so, the period of three years fixed under Art.137 of the Limitation Act would come into play. The order of the court below rejecting the petition as time barred is correct. 4. The order of the court below rejecting the petition as time barred is correct. 4. I have carefully considered the submissions made by rival counsels, Mr.Raghavachari relied upon Angammal v. V.K.M.Muhammad Sulaiman Lebbai, (1945) 2 M.L.J. 239 : A.I.R. 1946 Mad. 38: 58 L.W. 492:1945 M.W.N. 578: 224 I.C. 543. The facts in that case are: "A preliminary decree for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage was passed on the 110. 1935, and the time fixed for payment was 11. 1936. The plaintiff did not deposit the amount on or before that date and did not ask for extension of the time under 0.34, Rule 7(2). She deposited the amount towards the end of 1942 and filed I.A.No.93 of 1943 on the 2. 1943, under 0.34, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure asking the court to pass a final decree with a direction to the defendant to deliver the mortgaged property to her. The trial court dismissed the petition and on appeal the Subordinate Judge confirmed the decree of the trial court and so second appeal was filed." This Court had held that the petitioner was entitled to remedy asked for by her in the petition. The outer limit beyond which payment under Rule 8, Sub-rule (i) cannot be made is the passing of a final decree debarring the plaintiff from all right to redeem the mortgaged property or the confirmation of a sale held under Rule 8(3) of 0.34 of the Code. In this case before me, the two contingencies, viz., passing of final decree debarring the plaintiff from all right to redeem the mortgaged property or the confirmation of a sale held under Rule 8(3) of 0.34 of the Code have not occurred. Those two contingencies were the outer limit as per the ruling of this Court in the said decision in Angammal v. V.K.M.Muhammad Sulaiman Lebbai, (1945)2 M.L.J. 239 .A.I.R. 1946 Mad. 38:58 L. W. 492:1945 M. W.N. 578:224 1.C. 543. 5.Mr. Raghavachari would further rely upon Azim v. Sultan, I.L.R. 1945 Pat. 575, in which it was held that a preliminary decree in a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage may, under Clause (c)(i) of Rule 7(1) of 0.34, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, fix a time for payment of the amount declared due under the decree. 5.Mr. Raghavachari would further rely upon Azim v. Sultan, I.L.R. 1945 Pat. 575, in which it was held that a preliminary decree in a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage may, under Clause (c)(i) of Rule 7(1) of 0.34, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, fix a time for payment of the amount declared due under the decree. But default in making the payment of the amount declared under the decree within the time fixed does not operate to debar the plaintiff-mortgagor from all right to redeem the mortgaged property. He would further rely upon Sivan Pillai v. Anbayyan, 89 L. W. 449. That was a case where no time limit was fixed in the preliminary decree for redemption. 6. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by this Court in Angammal v. V.K.M.Muhammad Sulaiman Lebbai, (1945)2 M.L.J. 239 :AIR. 1946 Mad 38.-58 LW. 492:1945 M.W.N. 578:224 I.C. 543. The facts of the case are almost similar. When that is applied, the order of the court below rejecting the petition as barred by time because the petition for final decree was not filed within three years from the date of expiry of the time fixed under the preliminary decree, cannot hold good, and hence on that ground the order of the court below is liable to be set aside. 7. In view of the above, the civil revision petition is allowed setting aside the order of the court below in I. A.No.816 of 1986 and consequently, the I.A.No.816 of 1986 in O.S.No.319 of 1974 shall stand allowed. No costs.