JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—This revision arises out of an order passed on 1st June, 1991 by Rent Controlle, Shimla allowing the respondents application under section 15 of the H P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and ordering the eviction of the petitioner. 2. The admitted facts are that the premises in question comprising two rooms, one glazed verandah, kitchen, latrine and bath on the first floor of Ellingham Lodge, Cart Road, Shimla have been in occupation of foe petitioner through Superintendent, Railway Mail Service, H. R. Division, Ambala Cantt as tenant since 1969 pursuant to an agreement Ex. P-5. It is also not in dispute that the respondent was employed as a Lecturer in English language in Education Deptt. of Himachal Pradesh Government and retired on attaining the age of superannuation w. e. f. 31st of October, 1988. Premises in question were purchased by him from its previous owner Smt. Chander Kaur on 4th August, 1989, 3. Claiming himself to be a specified landlord, the respondent on 1st September, I989 presented a petition under section 15 of the Act seeking petitioners eviction on the ground that the premises in question are requires bonafide by him for the purpose of his residence. After having put in 28 years of service he retired on 31st of October, 1988 and purchased the premises from its previous owner for his bonafide use. He has been residing in the tenanted accommodation in Bansal Bhawan, Cart Road, Shimla, which accommodation he got on rent after surrendering government allotted accommodation. The rented accommodation is un-suitable and insufficient for his requirement and as such, his requirement was bonafide. 4. After the petitioner had been granted the requisite leave to contest the petition and reply was filed, the Rent Controller proceeded to record evidence of the parties and allowed the landlords petition holding the respondent to be a specified landlord, the premises to be residential and need of the respondent as bonafide. It is this order of Rent Controller which is under challenge in this revision. 5. The primary question arising for determination is as to whether on the admitted facts, the respondent can be held to be a specified landlord, so as to avail the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act for seeking petitioners eviction from the premises in question in summary jurisdiction. 6. 5. The primary question arising for determination is as to whether on the admitted facts, the respondent can be held to be a specified landlord, so as to avail the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act for seeking petitioners eviction from the premises in question in summary jurisdiction. 6. Specified landlord has been defined in sub-clause (1) of section 2 of the Act to mean a person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of a building on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. 7. On such a specified landlord, the Act confers a right to recover immediate possession of the premises. Possession can be obtained on two eventualities, one of which is provided for in sub-section (I) of section 15 and the other in sub-section (2) of section 15. Relevant portion of section 15 is extracted as follows;— "15 (1) Where a person who being in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government, the State Government or any local authority is required by, or in pursuance of, any general or special order made by the Central or State Government or local authority, as the case may be, to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that he or his spouse or dependent child owns, within the urban area, residential accommodation there shall accrue, on and from the date of such order, to such a person notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or any other contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary, right to recover immediate the possession of any premises let out by him : Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed as conferring a right the person, who himself or whose spouse or dependent child owns, within the urban area, two or more dwelling houses, to recover the possession of more than one dwelling house, and it shall be lawful for such person to indicate the dwelling house, the possession of which he intends to recover. (2) Where a specified landlord, at any time within one year prior to or within one year after the date of his retirement or after his retirement but within one year of the appointed day whichever is later, applies to the Controller, alongwith a certificate from the authority competent to remove him from service indicating the date of his retirement and his affidavit to the effect that he or his spouse does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside or to start his own business, to recover possession of one residential building for his own occupation, there shall accrue on and from the date of such application to such specified landlord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied) custom or usage to the contrary right to recover immediate possession of such residential building or any part or parts of such building if it is let out in part or parts... ......" 8. The petitioner claimed that on and from the date of purchase of the property by him from its previous owner/landlord Smt. Chander Kaur namely, 4th of August, 1989, he stepped in her shoes and became entitled to receive rent in respect of the building on his own account and it was permissible for him to have sought the petitioners eviction from the premises within the next on year from the date of his retirement, by filing a petition namely on or before 31st of October, 1989. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in order that a person should be covered by the definition of a specified landlord, he should be entitled to receive rent in respect of a building on his own account as on the date when cause of action arises to him to seek eviction, namely, date of retirement. In case a person was not the owner of the building or was not the landlord on the date of his retirement, he would not be covered by the definition of a specified landlord. 9. In case a person was not the owner of the building or was not the landlord on the date of his retirement, he would not be covered by the definition of a specified landlord. 9. Similar definition of a specified landlord, contained in section (2) (hh) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Punjab Act) has been judicially interpreted by the Apex Court in D N. Malhotra v Kartar Singh, 1958 (1) RCR 177, wherein similar right is given to a specified landlord under section 13-A to seek tenants eviction within one year prior to or within one year after the date of retirement of a specified landlord or after his retirement but within one year of the commencement of the Act whichever is later. Construing the definition of specified landlord, it has been held that the same refers to a person in service of the Union, who is a landlord at the time of his retirement from the public service or post in connection with the affairs of the Union or State. Jt cannot, in any manner, include any ex-serviceman, who was not a specified landlord qua the tenant and the premises on or before the date of his retirement from the service of the Union. In holding so, reliance was placed on an earlier decision in Mrs, Winifred Ross and another v. Mrs Ivy Fonseca and others, 1984 SC 458. In Mrs. Winifred Rosss case provisions of section 13A-1 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 were considered in which the question, which had arisen, was as to whether benefit of the summary procedure prescribed in section 13 A-l could be availed of by a landlord, who was a retired army officer and had acquired premises subsequent to the date of his retirement, which premises were already in occupation of a tenant. It was held that in order to get the benefit of eviction of the tenant in a summary way, the ex-serviceman must be a landlord qua the premises as well as qua the tenant at the time of retirement from the service. It was held that in order to get the benefit of eviction of the tenant in a summary way, the ex-serviceman must be a landlord qua the premises as well as qua the tenant at the time of retirement from the service. The Court in para 9 of the judgment observed: "Since a liberal interpretation of section 13-A1 of the Act is likely to expose it to a successful challenge on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution, it has to be read down as conferring benefit only on those members of the Armed Forces who were landlords of the premises in question while they were in service even though they may avail of it after their retirement. Such a construction would save it from the criticism that it is discriminatory and also would advance the object of enacting it, namely, that members of the Armed Forces should not while they are in service feel worried about the difficulties of a long drawn out litigation when they wish to get back the premises which they have leased out during their service. Persons in the position of the landlord in the present case cannot, therefore, maintain a suit under section 13-A1 of the Act." 10. In Dr. D. N. Malhotrtfs case (supfa) the aforementioned proposition of law was reiterated as follows : "On a conspectus of the decisions referred to hereinbefore more particularly the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Mrs. Winifred Ross and another v. Mrs Ivy Fonseca and others (supra) it is well settled that in order to get the benefit of eviction of the tenant in a summary way the ex-serviceman must be a landlord qua the premises as well as the tenant at the time of his retirement from service. The ex-serviceman is not competent to make an application to the Rent Controller to get possession of his house by evicting the tenant in a summary way unless and until he satisfies the test that he is a landlord qua the premises and the tenant at the time of his retirement or discharge from service.” (Emphasis supplied). 11. The ex-serviceman is not competent to make an application to the Rent Controller to get possession of his house by evicting the tenant in a summary way unless and until he satisfies the test that he is a landlord qua the premises and the tenant at the time of his retirement or discharge from service.” (Emphasis supplied). 11. The definition in the Act of a specified landlord is also clear and explicit which requires two things to be established before a person can be termed as a specified landlord, namely, (a) he should be a person who is entitled to receive the rent in respect of building on his own account and (b) he should be a person who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in connection with the affairs of Union or of a State. 12. Right to seek eviction of a tenant both under clause (1) of section 15 and clause (2) of Sec. 15 can be availed by a specified landlord for which purpose, the person seeking eviction should be a specified landlord as on the relevant date, namely, the date of retirement. Thus, he should be a specified landlord both qua the premises as well as qua the tenant, which in this case would be the date of respondents retirement. 13. Since the respondent was admittedly not a landlord either qua the premises or qua the petitioner on the date of his retirement, which is the date of accrual of cause of action to him to seek the tenants eviction in summary jurisdiction, in view of the two judgments quoted above and in view of the clear definition of a specified landlord, he was not entitled to seek petitioners eviction, since he is not covered by the definition of a specified landlord. In this view of the matter, without going into the other questions, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 14. Consequently, the revision petition is allowed. The order under revision is quashed and set aside and the application filed by the respondent is dismissed as not maintainable. Parties are left to bear their respective costs. Revision petition allowed.