DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 30th August, 1979 in Revision application No. TEN. B. A. 1220 of 1978 is under challenge in this petition under art. 227 of the Constitution of India. By its impugned decision, the Tribunal upset the common order passed by the Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeal) at Kheda (The Appellate authority for convenience) on 17th September 1978 in Tenancy appeals Nos. 353 and 335 of 1977-78. By his aforesaid order, the appellate authority set aside the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands tribunal at Khambhat (the first authority for convenience) on 28th October, 1976 in Tenancy Case No. 12 of 1969. By his aforsaid order, the first authority partly accepted the application made by present respondent No. 1 under Sec. 32-T read with Secs. 31 and 29 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Act for brief) and awarded to him the possession of half the northern portion of survey No. 523 admeasuring 2 acres situated in village Khambhat, district kheda (the disputed land for convenience ). ( 2 ) THIS litigation has a somewhat chequered history. The petitioner was the tenant of the disputed land. It originally belonged to the father of respondent No. 1 herein. The original land-holder appears to have breathed his last prior to 1st January, 1952. He was survived by his three sons including respondent No. 1 herein. The names of the three brothers including present respondent No. 1 were, therefore, mutated in the revenue records with respect to the disputed land as its occupants. According to respondent No. 1 the properties left behind by his deceased father were partitioned amongst the three brothers and the disputed land came to his share and he became its sole occupant. The necessary entry in the revenue record in that regard was posted on 25th January, 1958. Its copy is at Annexure-D to this petition. It appears that as its sole occupant he applied for an exemption certificate under sec. 88-C of the Act. He was granted the necessary certificate thereunder. He thus became a certified landlord as is commonly known in the tenancy law parlance. I shall hereinafter refer to him as the landlord for convenience. Its copy is at Annexure-D to this petition. It appears that as its sole occupant he applied for an exemption certificate under sec. 88-C of the Act. He was granted the necessary certificate thereunder. He thus became a certified landlord as is commonly known in the tenancy law parlance. I shall hereinafter refer to him as the landlord for convenience. He appears to have made his application for possession of the disputed land from the petitioner herein (the tenant for convenience) under Sec. 32-T read with Secs. 31 and 29 of the Act after serving to the tenant the required notice as provided under Section 32-T thereof. That proceeding came to be decided against the landlord on the ground that the notice served to the tenant was not legal and valid. The landlord failed in his appeal before the appellate authority and in his revision and review before the Tribunal. He thereupon approached this Court by means of Spl. C. A. No. 184 of 1969. That petition was accepted and the notice in question was held to be legal and valid. The matter was remanded to the first authority for restoration of the proceeding instituted by the landlord to file and for decision afresh according to law. On remand, the proceeding appears to have been renumbered as Tenancy Case No. 12 of 1969. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his order passed on 28th October 1976 in Tenancy Case No. 12 of 1969, the first authority accepted the case set up by the landlord and awarded the northern half portion of the disputed land to him. An extract of the aforesaid order is at Annexure-C to this petition. It appears that the aforesaid order passed by the first authority aggrieved both the landlord and the tenant. Both of them, therefore, carried the matter in appeal before the appellate authority. The appeal of the tenant came to be registered as Tenancy Appeal No. 335 of 1977-78 and that of the landlord as Tenancy Appeal No. 353 of 1977-78. By his common order passed on 17th September, 1978 in the aforesaid two appears, the appellate authority accepted the tenants appeal and dismissed the landlords appeal. The result was that the aforesaid order passed by the first authority awarding possession of the northern half portion of the disputed land to the landlord came to be quashed and set aside. By his common order passed on 17th September, 1978 in the aforesaid two appears, the appellate authority accepted the tenants appeal and dismissed the landlords appeal. The result was that the aforesaid order passed by the first authority awarding possession of the northern half portion of the disputed land to the landlord came to be quashed and set aside. A copy of the aforesaid appellate order is at Annexure-B to this petition. That obviously aggrieved the landlord. He, therefore, invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal by means of his Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1220 of 1978. By its decision rendered on 30th August 1979, the Tribunal accepted the revisional application and set aside the appellate order at Annexure-B to this petition and restored the order passed by the first authority at Annexure-C to this petition. A copy of the decision rendered by the Tribunal is at Annexure-A to this petition. That obviously aggrieved the tenant. He has thereupon knocked the doors of this Court by means of this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of india for questioning the correctness of the impugned decision at Annexure-A to this petition. ( 3 ) THE legality and validity of the notice given by the landlord to the tenant has already been decided by this Court in the previous proceeding between the parties. The legality and validity of the decision of the Tribunal will have, therefore, to be tested on the touchstone of Sec. 32-T (5) of the Act as rightly submitted by kum. Shah for the petitioner. That statutory provision prescribes certain conditions for exercise of the right of a certified landlord to terminate a tenancy thereunder. The relevant clause is Clause (c) thereof. It reads :" (C) that the land leased stands in the Record of Rights or in any Public record or similar revenue record on the 1st day of January, 1952 and thereafter until the commencement date in the name of the landlord himself, or of any of his ancestors but not of any other predecessor-in-title from whom title is derived by an assignment or Court-sale or otherwise, or of a joint family of which the landlord is a member. "it cannot be gainsaid that the condition prescribed in sub-Sec. (5) of Sec. 32-T of the Act are cumulative in effect. "it cannot be gainsaid that the condition prescribed in sub-Sec. (5) of Sec. 32-T of the Act are cumulative in effect. It would mean that all the conditions are required to be fulfilled or satisfied if the landlord wants successfully to terminate tenancy of the tenant for the purpose of obtaining the desired relief thereunder. Clause (c) as reproduced hereinabove prescribes one such condition for the purpose and it has also to be found fulfilled in the instant case if the landlord wants to succeed in resisting this petition. ( 4 ) A bare reading of Clause (c) as reproduced hereinabove would show that two conditions are prescribed for appearance of the name of the certified landlord in the record of rights pertaining to the land involved in the litigation instituted under Sec. 32-T of the Act. The first condition is that his name should appear in the revenue records on 1st January, 1952 and it should continue to remain thereon till the commencment date, that is, the date of the commencement of the Bombay tenancy and Agricultural Land (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1960. It is not necessary that his name should be there in his individual capacity all throughout. His name may figure in the record as member of the joint family or it could be in the name of his ancestors. The condition in Clause (c) as reproduced hereinabove would stand satisfied if the name of his ancestors figures in the revenue records on the relevant date in question, as the case may be. That condition would be found satisfied even if his name figure inter alia as a member of a joint family. It has become necessary to ascertain whether or not this condition is found satisfied in view of the rival submissions urged before me by the contesting parties. Kum. Shah for the pertitioner submits that the aforesaid condition is not fulfilled in the present case whereas Shri Buch for respondent No. 1 asserts to the contrary. ( 5 ) IT transpires from the extract of the revenue record at Annexure-D to this petition that the entry of the disputed land was mutated in the name of the landlord alone on 25th January, 1958 in view of the partition of the joint properties amongst the brothers including respondent No. 1 herein. It transpires from the record that the partition had taken place in 1950. It transpires from the record that the partition had taken place in 1950. This would prima facie show that when respondent No. 1 figured in the revenue records along with his two brothers as the occupants of the disputed land on 1st January 1952, the family of the three brothers was a joint family. This is what he has stated in his evidence as well. Kum. Shah for the petitioner has further urged that the entry at Annexure-D to this petition is false. According to her, the petitoner has clearly stated so in para 3 of this petition and that fact has remained unchallenged and uncontroverted. Besides, she has shown to me a certified copy of the deposition of respondent No. 1 herein recorded in the proceeding before the first authority after remand wherein he has stated that he was fined for posting the aforesaid false entry, that is the entry at Annexure-D to this petition. Relying on this fact-situation on record, it has been urged that the entry at Annexure-D to this petition deserves to be ignored. If that be so, runs her submission, the position as reflected on 1st January, 1952 would prevail and that would show that the disputed land belonged to the joint family and the joint family was never a certified landlord as the certificate under Sec. 88- c of the Act was obtained by respondent No. 1 herein in his individual capacity and not as a member of or on behalf of the joint family. ( 6 ) I think Kum. Shah for the petitioner is right in her aforesaid submission. If the entry at Annexure-D to this petition is ignored on the ground that it is a false entry, the point of law as canvassed by her will have to be accepted. The fact situation obtianed from the record as on 1st January, 1952 was to the effect that the disputed land was shown to be in occupation of the three brothers. It was the case of the landlord himself in his evidence before the first authoriry after remand that the three brothers constituted a joint family and the disputed land came to his share on partition of the joint-properties amongst the three brothers. The entry at annexure-D to this petition also shows that such partition took place sometime in 1950. It was the case of the landlord himself in his evidence before the first authoriry after remand that the three brothers constituted a joint family and the disputed land came to his share on partition of the joint-properties amongst the three brothers. The entry at annexure-D to this petition also shows that such partition took place sometime in 1950. That would prima facie show that respondent No. 1 obtained the certificate under Sec. 88-C of the Act in his individual capacity and not as member or on behalf of the joint family. In that view of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the joint family of the three brothers including respondent No. 1 was the owner of the disputed land on 1st January, 1952 and it was never a certified landlord for the purpose of Sec. 32-T thereof. ( 7 ) KUM. Shah for the petitioner has urged that the entry at Annexure-D to this petition is ex facie false for the simple reason that, if the partition amongst the three brothers including Respondent No. 1 was effected in 1950, the disputed land would not have remained mutated in the name of the three brothers on 1st January, 1952. At present I do not propose to decide the merits on this contention for the reason recorded hereinafter and hereinbelow. ( 8 ) SHRI Buch for respondent No. 1 has submitted that the falsity of the entry at annexure-D to this petition has been canvassed for the first time before this Court and, since it is a pure question of fact, the plea based thereon cannot be entertained in this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. Shri Buch for respondent no. 1 is partly right in his submission but his submission cannot wholly be accepted. It is true that the point based on the falsity of the entry at Annexure-D to this petition does not appear to have been canvassed before any of the three authorities below. However, that plea goes to the root of the matter. As pointed out hereinabove, the complexion of the whole proceeding would change if the entry at Annexure-D to this petition is found false. However, that plea goes to the root of the matter. As pointed out hereinabove, the complexion of the whole proceeding would change if the entry at Annexure-D to this petition is found false. As pointed out hereinabove, in his desposition after remand respondent No. 1 has stated before the first authority that he was fined for posting that false entry, that is the entry at Annexure-D to this petition. It would not be open to me in exercise of limited jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the constitution of India to enter into question whether or not the entry at Annexure- d to this petition is false. It would be for the fact-finding authority to dilate upon that question and to give his decision thereon. It would, therefore, be in the fitness of things to remand the matter to the first authority for restoration of the proceeding under Sec. 32-T of the Act to file for his fresh decision according to law keeping in mind the question whether or not the entry at Annexure-D to this petition is genuine or false. It is obvious that the question is to be decided only with respect to the northern half portion of the disputed land as awarded by the first authority to the landlord as the decision of the Tribunal at Annexure-A to this petition to the extent it is against the landlord has not been challenged before this Court. ( 9 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned decision at Annexure-A to this petition deserve to be quashed and set aside as also the impugned orders at Annexures B and C to this petition. The matter will have to be remanded to the first authority for restoration of the proceeding instituted by respondent No. 1 herein under Sec. 32-T of the Act to file and for his decision afresh in the light of this judgment of mine. ( 10 ) IN the result, this petition is accepted. The impugned decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 30th August, 1979 in Revision Application No. TEN B. A. 1220 of 1978 at Annexure-A to this petition is quashed and set aside. The impugned orders passed by the Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeal) at Kheda on 17th September, 1978 in Tenancy A. Nos. The impugned decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 30th August, 1979 in Revision Application No. TEN B. A. 1220 of 1978 at Annexure-A to this petition is quashed and set aside. The impugned orders passed by the Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeal) at Kheda on 17th September, 1978 in Tenancy A. Nos. 353 and 335 of 1977-78 October, 1976 in Tenancy Case No. 12 of 1969 are also quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal at Khambhat for restoration of the proceeding instituted by respondent No. 1 herein under Sec. 32-T of the Act to file and for his decision afresh according to law in the light of this judgment of mine. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. .