Judgment : N.L. Ganguly, J. 1. THIS writ petition arise out of an order dated 15-5-93 passed by the XII Addl. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar in Rent Appeal No. 22 of 1992 rejecting the application moved by the tenant before the appellate court for rejecting all the evidence adduced by the landlord in proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972. The ground for requesting to reject all evidence adduced by the landlord on affidavit, was that the evidence by affidavit is not covered by the definition of the word "evidence" as defined in the Evidence Act. 2. AN application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, hereinafter- referred as the Act, was filed by the landlord Laxmi Narain Gupta seeking a relief of release of a commercial accommodation namely premises no. 43/234 Meston Road, Kanpur Nagar. A copy of the application for release has been annexed with the writ petition as Annexure 2 which shows that the landlord opposite party had prayed for release of the shop room for engaging the landlord Narain Prasad Gupta himself and settling his sons namely Nand Kishore and Brij Kishore so that they may jointly do some business in the shop room in question. The landlord had pleaded in his application that he himself is not employed at present. The applicant stated that he is Bania by cast and the family have sufficient experience of the business and are capable of doing business. There is no other alternative or there is no other job except to enter into business and carrying on business. The landlord opposite party had pleaded that he has a big family and the income of the family is very meagre and the two sons were not employed. They wanted to start the business of hotel and restaurant in the shop room in question. The need of the landlord for settling himself and his son in business was genuine, bonafide and hard pressing. The landlord had given in the petition reference to a big house with the tenant-petitioner which was residential and commercial as whole. They wanted to start the business of hotel and restaurant in the shop room in question. The need of the landlord for settling himself and his son in business was genuine, bonafide and hard pressing. The landlord had given in the petition reference to a big house with the tenant-petitioner which was residential and commercial as whole. The petitioner was said to have filed application under Section 21 of the Act in respect of another accommodation at 108/8 P. Road,1 Kanpur and the shop occupied by Hind Trading has been sought to be released by the petitioner in the court below and the proceedings are pending. The petitioner-tenant filed the written statement and contested the application of the landlord, filed affidavit and other documents controverting the case of the landlord. The application under section 21 of the Act was dismissed by an order dated 9-1-92 by the Prescribed Authority, under the Act, Kanpur Nagar. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the landlord opposite party filed an appeal before the appellate court, Kanpur Nagar under Section 22 of the Ad. 3. THE application for rejecting the evidence of the landlord tendered on affidavit was prayed to be rejected on the ground that the evidence of an affidavit is no evidence according to the definition of evidence in the Evidence Act, being not relevant admissible in evidence on record. THE said application was moved after about 14 months from the date of filling j of the appeal. THE said application for rejecting the evidence on affidavit by the landlord was rejected after hearing the petitioner and the opposite party landlord by the order impugned dated 15-5-1993. 4. THE learned counsel for the petitioner before this court submitted that the evidence on affidavit is no evidence as per the definition of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It was submitted that the averments on affidavit may be treated as evidence after the court have sufficient reason passes on order under Order 19 rules 1 or 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. THE learned counsel cited Smt Sudha Devi v. Narayanan, AIR 1988 SC 1381 in support of his submission that the averments on affidavit without an order under O. 9 R. 1 or 2 of CPC is no evidence within the meaning of the definition, Such affidavits could-not be admitted in evidence and are liable to be ignored by the appellate court. THE learned counsel for the petitioner placed the provisions of Section 34 of the Act which is quoted as under : "34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them : (1) THE District Magistrate, the Prescribed authority or any (appellate or revising authority) shall for the purpose of holding any inquiry or hearing (any appeal or revision) under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, (1908 Act No. V of 1908) when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters namely :- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath : (b) receiving evidence on affidavits : (c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation : (d) requiring the discovery and production of documents : (e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any party or requiring security for costs from any party : (f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance there with. (g) any other matter which may be prescribed. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that perusal of Section 34 of the Act adopts the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus the compliance of provisions of Order 19 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC also becomes mandatory. He submitted that any affidavit taken on record and relied by the Court, in absence of order under Order 19 rule 1 CPC is wholly illegal and unwarranted. He submitted that the prescribed authority under the Act dealing with the application under Section 21 of the Act, has all the powers of civil court and in fact acts as a civil court, which makes it necessary for strict compliance and adherence to provisions or Order 19 rule 1 CPC. 5. SRI Siddheswari Prasad, Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision M/s. Usha International Limited, Agra v. IV Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, 1991 Vol. II ARC 215. The learned counsel specifically placed reliance on the paras 13 and 15 of the Said judgment. 5. SRI Siddheswari Prasad, Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision M/s. Usha International Limited, Agra v. IV Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, 1991 Vol. II ARC 215. The learned counsel specifically placed reliance on the paras 13 and 15 of the Said judgment. A perusal of the judgment 1991 (2) ARC (supra) shows that, the learned Single Judge refused to entertain in the petition under Art. 226 on the, ground that the plea of non admissibility of affidavits filed in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act, was rejected by him on the ground that no objection what so ever was raised before the Prescribed Authority in the proceedings under section 21 when the affidavits were filed by the parties. The learned Judge while considering the arguments in the said case, had also referred to and consider the decision reported in 1988 SC 1381 and decision Khandes Spinning and Weiving Mills Co. Ltd. Jalgaon v. Rastriya Grihni Kamgar Sangh, Jalgoan, AIR 1960 SC 572. The perusal of the judgment of AIR I960 SC (supra) shows while the Honourable Supreme Court examining Section 118 of the Bombay Industrial Relation Act, 1946, a provision similar to the 1 contained in Section 34 of the Rent Control Act, vis-a-vis the provisions of Order 19 Rules. 1 or 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as observed under : "For the purpose of holding an enquiry or a proceeding under the Bombay Industrial Relation Act, 1946, section 118 of the said Act confers on the Industrial court the same powers as are vested in courts in respect of- (a) proof of facts by affidavits (b) summoning the enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath (c) compelling the production of documents and (d) issuing commissions for the examinations of witnesses. In courts facts have to be established either by oral evidence or by documentary evidence proved in the manner prescribed by law. But order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the court to have particular facts proved by affidavits. Under rule 1 thereof "any court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such condition as the court thinks reasonable". Under rule 1 thereof "any court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such condition as the court thinks reasonable". But it is subject to the proviso that where it appears to the court that either party bonafide desires the production of a witness for cross examination and that such witness can be produced another shall not be made authorising the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit. Under Rule 2, "upon any application evidence may be given by affidavit, but the court may, at the instance of either " party, order the attendance for cross examination of the deponent." A combind effect of the relevant provisions, is that ordinarily a fact has to be proved by oral evidence but the courts, subject to the conditions laid down in order XIX, may ask a particular fact or facts to be proved by affidavits. Industrial courts may conveniently follow the said procedure." The Supreme Court went on to hold further that- "If they agree to a decision pa affidavits, that course may be followed. But in the absence of an agreement, the procedure prescribed in order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure may usefully be followed by the tribunals so that both the parties may have full opportunity to establish their respective cases." 6. THE learned Single Judge in view of the authority of the Supreme Court and looking at the scheme and object of the Rent Act as also the practice vogue of receiving affidavits, in proof of disputed issues in proceedings under the rent act without a formal order under Order XIX of the code as of rule 1, the learned Judge was pleased to take the affidavit into consideration and treated the affidavits as evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, either on the basis of an express order under Order 19 of the Code or on the basis of an argument between the parties which may be express or implied to get a decision on the basis of the affidavits. The learned caunsel Sri Siddheshwari Prasad submitted that the Prescribed Authority under the Act is Civil Court within the meaning of the provisions of section 34 of the Act and the provision of Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable. Thus, the provisions of Order XIX Rule 1 should have been strictly adhered. This submission of the learned counsel is not correct that the Prescribed Authority under the Act, acts as a Civil Court and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are fully applicable. The provisions, of an Act about the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure has to be examined not from the reading of the Section in question alone. Other provisions in the same Act if also makes similar applicability of the provisions of certain other acts, has to be examined for giving a reasonable interpretation to the arguments about the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure as a whole for deeming the Prescribed Authority as Civil Court. Section 35 of the Act is quoted below : "35 : Application of sections 4, 5 and 12 of Limitation Act 1963-The provisions of sections 4, 5 and 12 of Limitation Act, 1963 (Act no. 36 of 1963) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all proceedings under this Act." A bare perusal of the provision of section 35 shows that the entire sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act made applicable mutatis mutandis to all proceedings under the Act. This shows that these specific provision of the Limitation Act itself has been made applicable in proceedings under the Act. A perusal of section 34 of the Act shows that provisions of Civil Procedure Code as it is in the said code have not been made applicable. It has been stated that the Prescribed Authority or any appellate authority or revising authority "under the Act no. 13 of 1972 shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Courts under the code of civil procedure when trying a suit. The provisions of section 34 (1) (a) to (g) enumerates the powers which the Prescribed Authority/appellate court under the Act may exercise as Civil Court. It does not say that while exercising the powers of cede, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure would strictly apply. The provisions of section 34 (1) (a) to (g) enumerates the powers which the Prescribed Authority/appellate court under the Act may exercise as Civil Court. It does not say that while exercising the powers of cede, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure would strictly apply. In other words, the provisions of code of civil procedure in principle have- been made applicable while interpretating a provision of a particular legislation, it has to be borne in mind to promote the object of the main, purpose of the enactment. The interpretation should be reasonable construction and the approach of the, court must be to give a construction which will produce a workable system. The history of the Rent Control Legislation in the State shows that on account of scarcity of accommodation in tie urban area came into notice at the time of IInd World War. The State in order to combat the difficult situation on account of the pressure in the urban area and also to maintain the pre war level, to stop racket of request evictions of the tenant and extraction of pagri or salami some time call as Nazrana, provisions into the Defence of India Rules were made. Thereafter the U. P. (Temporary) control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance (Ordinance no. 3 of 1946) was promulgated and was in force. The ordinance after the shape of the temporary Act no. 3 of 1947 which continued after new life being given to it from time to time till the endorsement or Act no. 13 of 1972." 7. THE history of the Legislation under the Rent Act shows that the relation of construction of new houses remain very low in comparison to the influx from rural area to urban area and also cause of the growth of people in the urban area themselves. THE situation about the controlling of letting and evicting still continued as a f permanent feature which had necessitated the enactments of Act no. 13 of 1972, as a permanent measure by the Legislation. THE nature of cases arising under the Act no. 13 of 1972 shows that they are either released of the accommodation for use and occupation on the ground of bonafide need by the landlord, eviction of unauthorised occupant at the instance of the bonafide claimant for the accommodation as tenants, declaration of vacancy and release, allotment. THE nature of cases arising under the Act no. 13 of 1972 shows that they are either released of the accommodation for use and occupation on the ground of bonafide need by the landlord, eviction of unauthorised occupant at the instance of the bonafide claimant for the accommodation as tenants, declaration of vacancy and release, allotment. These proceedings are to be decided with a quick pace so that the purpose of the Legislation is solved an effective enforcement of the law be made in shortest possible time. A perusal of the Act and the scheme also shows that the proceedings under the Act are to be taken by special authority created under the Act and specific provisions for procedure also prescribed in the Act and the rules. It becomes abundantly clear that the Act no. 13 of 1972 is an Act which the cases in the summary manner or in other word adopting such procedure which may enable the authority concerned to decide the disputes quickly. In the light of above, if we examine the provisions of section 34 of the Act, it shows that the District Magistrate or the Prescribed Authority or any appellate authority shall have the powers of. civil courts, so that they may enforce the provisions of law for precuring the attendance of any person, for getting evidence on oath or receiving evidence on affidavits, as provided in section 34 (1)(a)to(g). 8. IT would be significant to note that previously under the Act no. 3 of 1947, U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the provisions of the Act, has not provided any such provisions which may confer the powers of a civil court so far the enforcement of orders passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the said Act was not a court within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code and affidavits sworn by the Oath Commissioner appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure was not admissible in those proceedings. The position has changed into the Act no. 13 of 1972 by section 34 (c). It is a well known practice in proceedings under the Act, has been for taking evidence by way of affidavit before the Prescribed Authority. Provisions of section 34 (1) (c) shows that when evidence of affidavit has been filed, application for examining the witness is permissible under the said provisions. 9. 13 of 1972 by section 34 (c). It is a well known practice in proceedings under the Act, has been for taking evidence by way of affidavit before the Prescribed Authority. Provisions of section 34 (1) (c) shows that when evidence of affidavit has been filed, application for examining the witness is permissible under the said provisions. 9. IN Smt. Gulaicha Devi v. Prescribed Authority (Munsif), Basti, 1989 Vol. I ARC 407, Hon. Mr. Justice S. D. Agarwal (as he then was) interpreted the provisions of section 34 of the Act and observed "from the reading of sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act, it is clear that the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority and the revising authority have been given the power to receive the evidence on affidavit. Rule 22 of the Rules framed under the Act, specifically lays down as to which of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable when a case is tried by District Magistrate, Prescribed Authority, appellate authority and the revising authority. Rule 22 as quoted as under : "22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 section 34 (1) (g)- The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under the Act, shall have the same powers, as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely- (a) the power to dismiss an application or appeal for default and to restore it for sufficient cause ; (b) the power to proceed ex parte, and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex parte ; (c) the power to award costs and special costs to any successful party against an unsuccessful party: (d) the power to allow amendment of an application or memorandum of appeal ; (e) the power to consolidate two or more cases of eviction by the same landlord against different tenants : (f) the power referred to in section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to make any order for the ends of of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the authority concerned. 10. HON. Mr. Justice S. D. Agarwal in his judgment referred to the following case laws Pt. 10. HON. Mr. Justice S. D. Agarwal in his judgment referred to the following case laws Pt. Mani Ram Tripathi v. Kamla Devi, 1982 Vo. II ARC 471 : Ram Kumar v. I.A.D.J. Bareilly, 1983 (1) ARC 663 : M/s. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Kanpur v. The Prescribed Authority. Kanpur, 1984 (1) ARC 137 : Radha Kishan v. IV Addl. District Judge, Jalaun at Orai, 1985 (1) ARC 427. The examination of the above case laws shows that the provisions of section 34 (1) (a) of the Act are to be interpreted in a manner so that the object of the Act may not be defeated. The enactments is to provide expeditious hearing of the proceedings contemplated under the Act. Any other interpretation as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner would be disastrous and dispensation of justice would be inordinately delayed, all the pending cases before all the Prescribed Authorities and the Appellate Authority under the Act, shall have to be redecided after fresh opportunity of leading evidence in each and every cases either by examining the witnesses or complying order XIX Rule 1 CPC. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Siddheshwari Prasad at length and perusing the case laws cited by him, I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner had raised no objection before the Prescribed Authority when opposite party filed his evidence on affidavit. It appears that the petitioner also filed affidavit before the Prescribed Authority. Now after the appeal was filed and pending for more than 14 months, the application for rejecting the evidence on affidavit filed in the case and prayer for dismissing the appeal appears to be an attempt to delay the proceedings in the case before- the appellate authority. Since the petitioner had never objected to the filing of the affidavit before the Prescribed Authority by the landlord and he himself had filed affidavit, had also being the practice invoked before the Rent Control Authorities, now the plea that there was no order under Order XIX Rule 1 cannot be entertained at the appellate stage or interfered in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner was not able to show that there was any prejudice caused to the petitioner or either party by receiving the affidavit of the landlord in the case under section 21. To my mind, the grievance of one of an order by the Prescribed Authority under Order XIX Rule 1 at the appellate stage is malafide purposely to delay in disposal of the appeal filed by the respondents. 11. THE writ petition is dismissed summarily. Stay order dated 8-9-93 is vacated. 12. THE registrar is directed to inform the Court below that the stay order passed in the case is vacated by the order of this court dated 29-9-93. Petition dismissed.