VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) THE important question involved in this Revision Application is regarding the interpretation of Sec. 18 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959, (for short act) and in particular, what is the meaning of the phrase distinct subjects appearing in the said section ? To state the above question on the basis of the relevant concrete facts of this case, the same is - "whether in a money suit filed by the Bank against its principal borrower for the recovery of the loan amount in respect of one loan only, where the guarantors are also incidentally joined as parties in the alternative praying to saddle them with the joint and several liabilities, the plaintiff- bank, over and above the normal Court fees which it is required to pay, is also further required to pay additional Court fees qua the claim against each of the guarantors and/or qua the different reliefs prayed for the enforcement of the securities available to the Bank ?" ( 2 ) THE fact situation under which the above question arises is to the effect that - The opponent-plaintiff Bank of India at Bhavnagar, instituted a Special Civil Suit No. 139 of 1992 in the Court of the learned Civil judge (S. D.), Bhavnagar, for recovering Rs. 91,176-96 (Rupees ninety- one thousand, one hundred seventy-six and ninety-six ps. only) from one pravinsinhji Bhavubha in respect of a term loan granted to him and other three defendants, who incidentally became guarantors in respect of the said loan amount. It is the case of the plaintiff-Bank that the defendant No. 1 wanted to purchase a pick-up van for his business purpose and accordingly he applied to the plaintiff-Bank for loan in the necessary amount. Accordingly, the loan amount of Rs. 69,000. 00 (Rupees sixty-nine thousand) as term loan was advanced on 16-12-1992 with the condition that the defendant No. 1 would repay the same in regular installments with interest 12% per annum, to be compounded with the quarterly rests. Towards the satisfaction of the said loan transaction, the defendant No. 1 also furnished two guarantors, who in turn executed Guarantee documents in favour of the plaintiff-Bank. In the course of time, as the defendant No. 1 did not repay the loan amount by instalments, as agreed upon, the plaintiff-Bank ultimately filed a suit for recovering in all Rs. 91,176-96 ps. In the course of time, as the defendant No. 1 did not repay the loan amount by instalments, as agreed upon, the plaintiff-Bank ultimately filed a suit for recovering in all Rs. 91,176-96 ps. together with running interest and costs and also to enforce the securities including the mortgage executed by one of the guarantors, viz. , Rupsing Bhavubha Gohil. It further appears that on examining the record of the case, the Court fees Inspector, Bhavnagar, found that the valuation of the suit was not properly made as the Court fees worth Rs. 3,220. 00 paid by the plaintiff on the plaint was ex-fade insufficient. According to the Inspecting Officer, the plaintiff was also liable to pay the Court fees stamp qua each of the defendants, meaning thereby the plaintiff was liable to pay the Court fees totalling Rs. 9,660. 00. On the basis of this finding, the Court fees Inspectors filed a Court fees reference No. 59 of 1992 in the Court of learned Second Joint Civil Judge (S. D.), Bhavnagar, who in his turn accepted the same after hearing both the sides. By his order dated 24-2-1993, the learned 2nd Joint Civil judge directed the plaintiff to pay the Court fees in all amounting to Rs. 9,660. 00 (deducting the Court fees amounting Rs. 3,220. 00 already paid) within ten days from the date of the order, failing which, the suit shall be dismissed. It is this order granting the Reference, which has been challenged before this Court by the plaintiff-Bank. ( 3 ) MR. J. T. Trivedi, the learned Advocate for the applicant-Bank, while challenging the impugned order submitted that the same was ex-fade misconceived and illegal. Mr. Trivedi further submitted that merely because the guarantors were joined as a party and it was prayed that the joint and several decree be passed against each one of them and further merely because there were several reliefs prayed, over and above the money decree for the enforcement of the security available to the Bank, that by itself was no ground to tax the Court fees on each count. ( 4 ) AS against the above, Mr. ( 4 ) AS against the above, Mr. K. C. Shah, the learned A. G. P. submitted that the defendant No. 1 was the principal borrower and that other three defendants being the guarantors/sureties for him, they stand entirely on a different footing as the different causes of action has arisen against each one of them making them liable to pay the separate Court fees. The learned A. G. P. further pointed out that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 have executed separate guarantee-deeds in their individual and personal capacity in favour of the plain tiff-Bank and given the personal undertaking to the Bank that if the principal borrower commits any default and fails to pay the said amount with interest, then in that event, they would make good the said amount jointly and severally to the Bank. The learned A. G. P. further submitted that since the principal borrower failed to repay the loan amount to the Bank as agreed upon, the plaintiff-Bank was constrained to file the suit not only against the principal borrower, but also against the other defendants who stood as guarantors. The learned A. G. P. further submitted that while deciding the Court fees Reference, the Court is required to address itself on the main point as to what is the nature and subject-matter of the suit, the cause of action and the ultimate reliefs prayed for. The learned A. G. P. further submitted that on reading the plaint, it is quite plain that not only the suit is filed against the principal borrower, but the same is also filed against its guarantors. It was further submitted by the learned A. G. P. that recovery of the loan amount from the principal borrower was one subject and enforcement of the security against the guarantors was entirely dictinct subject, not only that, but even if we peruse the relief clauses also, the plaintiff has prayed for three different reliefs in para 21 of the plaint. The learned A. G. P. submitted that the relief prayed for in para 21 (a) is a pure money decree against all the defendants; para 21 (b) pertains to a decree for sale qua the immovable property under the charge; para 21 (c) pertains to a direction to make an application under Order 34 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, para 21 (d) pertains to the sale of the hypothecated pick-up van, and para 21 (e) pertains to the recovery of the amount through the instrumentality of a Receiver under Order 40 Rule 1 of the C. P. C. etc. The learned A. G. P. further submitted that there is no difficulty whatsoever in appreciating the fact that though apparently the suit is for recovery of money, and yet at the same time, it is based on the distinct subject and in that view of the matter, under Sec. 18 of the Act, the plaintiff should be saddled with the additional Court fees qua each of the reliefs. The learned A. G. P. making good this submission, has invited attention of this Court to Sec. 18 of the Act, which reads as under :"section 18 : Multifarious suits : where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act. Nothing in the former part of this section shall be deemed to affect the power conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Schedule-1, Order-11. Rule 6. " ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties at length, it may be stated at the very outset that the impugned order passed by the learned Judge accepting the Cours fees Reference is exfacie illegal and unjust. It clearly transpires that the learned Judge has not been able to interprete and appreciate Sec. 18 of the Act in its proper perspsctive. It further appears that the learned Judge has also erred in not properly appreciating the ratio of two decisions cited before him, viz. , (1) Cotseeds Corporation, Rajkot v. Cotton Corporation of India, Bombay and Ors. reported in 1988 (2) GLR 1021 ; and (2) Bank of India v. Vinod kumar Bhalla, reported in AIR 1988 Del 79 . It further appears that the learned Judge has also erred in not properly appreciating the ratio of two decisions cited before him, viz. , (1) Cotseeds Corporation, Rajkot v. Cotton Corporation of India, Bombay and Ors. reported in 1988 (2) GLR 1021 ; and (2) Bank of India v. Vinod kumar Bhalla, reported in AIR 1988 Del 79 . In the case of Cotseeds corporation (supra), the plaintiff was a registered partnership firm doing the business of purchase and sale of cotton seeds and cotton, and that it had entered into two separate contracts with the defendant Cotton Corporation of India for the purchase of Manavadar Cotton seeds. It is because of the two separate contracts - meaning thereby, two distinct subjects that this court held that the plaintiff was liable to pay separate Court fees on each of the contracts. Similarly, in the case of Bank of India (supra), the Court ordered to pay Court fees separately on each count because a single suit was filed in respect of three counts in different branches of the Bank. In fact, while deciding the Court fees References, in such type of suits where several reliefs are prayed, what is primarily to be found out is whether the said suit consists of distinct subjects attracting the provisions of Sec. 18 of the Act ? Applying this yardstick to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the question would be whether can it be said by any stretch of imagination that the suit filed by the plaintiff-Bank consists of distinct subjects merely because the same is filed against different defendants, praying for different types of reliefs against each one of them ? Now on screening through the plaint, the fact remains that the plaintiff has filed a suit principally against the loanee-defendant No. 1 to realize the outstanding loan amounting Rs. 91,176-96. Thus, it is quite clear that despite the fact that several defendants are joined as parties, making them jointly and severally liable, praying several relief, by no stretch of imagination, the same can be equated with the facts-situation and the law governing the same, decided in the aforesaid two decisions. 91,176-96. Thus, it is quite clear that despite the fact that several defendants are joined as parties, making them jointly and severally liable, praying several relief, by no stretch of imagination, the same can be equated with the facts-situation and the law governing the same, decided in the aforesaid two decisions. In the instant case, but for the said loan amount not paid, as agreed between the parties, no cause of action can be said to have arisen and when there is no cause of action, there was indeed no question of filing of any suit. Therefore, the foundation stone of the money suit is only the cause of action, viz. , that of the defendant No. 1 not repaying the loan amount to the plaintiff- bank. Of course, it cannot be gainsaid that while filing a suit for recovery of the loan amount, the plaintiff-Bank has also joined the guarantors as defendants and prayed for several reliefs against them. Further, different reliefs also undoubtedly in a way can be said to be a different subject. But for the purpose of application of. Sec. 18 of the Act, the basic difference between the different subjects and distinct subjects is clearly required to be understood. The condition-precedent for application of sec. 18 of the Act is not the different subjects but the same is distinct subjects. The separate reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff is ultimately aimed at realising the principal outstanding Bank dues and whatever reliefs have been ultimately prayed for in the plaint is nothing but the incidental fall-out of the main prayer, viz. , recovery of the suit amount. Thus, under the circumstances, such incidental subjects can never be said to be the distinct subjects in order to saddle the plaintiff with the additional Court fees. On going through the Act, it is very clear that the expression subjects and for that purpose, the distinct subjects appearing in Sec. 18 of the Act is nowhere defined. It is hardly required to be mentioned that right to file a suit is ultimately connected with the cause of the action and in that view of the matter, the word distinct subjects has got to be interpreted in the background of the alleged cause of action. It is hardly required to be mentioned that right to file a suit is ultimately connected with the cause of the action and in that view of the matter, the word distinct subjects has got to be interpreted in the background of the alleged cause of action. It is further got to be appreciated that the liability of the surety is coextensive with that of the principal debtor unless it is otherwise, as provided in Sec. 128 of the Contract Act. It is not disputed before this court that the liability is otherwise provided by the contract. Further, in every money suit filed by the Bank, the guarantors are ordinarily required to be joined as defendants by way of abundant-caution for the simple reason that for whatever reasons, if the principal borrower does not pay the amount, and while filing the suit against the principal borrower, if the guarantors are not joined, then in that case, the plaintiff-Bank would technically find itself quite stranded and in such an awkward and embarrassing position where by virtue of the period of limitation, remedy against the guarantors would be barred under the Limitation Act. Apart this, we all know that when loanee is required to furnish the guarantor, such guarantors are merely assuring party for making good the loan amount to the Bank in case the principal borrower fails to repay the same. They come in picture only and only in the cases where the principal borrower fails to repay the amount. Not only that but in every money suit filed against the principal borrower where the guarantors are also joined as parties, it is a settled legal position that the decree can as well be straightway executed against the guarantors even keeping aside the execution against the judgment debtor. In fact, it is for the same loan for which the collateral securities were given by the guarantors which are being sought to be enforced by suit against all, on the same cause of action. Further, the view that this court is taking regarding the distinct subject stands duly fortified by the decision of Madras High Court, rendered in case of D. Lakshinarayan chettiar and Anr. Further, the view that this court is taking regarding the distinct subject stands duly fortified by the decision of Madras High Court, rendered in case of D. Lakshinarayan chettiar and Anr. , reported in AIR 1954 Madras 594 (FB), wherein in para 38, it has been observed as under :"distinct subjects in Sec. 17, Court-fees Act mean distinct causes of action in respect of which separate suits should be filed but for the enabling provisions allowing them to be clubbed up in one suit. The distinctness or identity of the cause of action is the only criterion for the applicability to the section. "in view of the aforesaid decision, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is very clear that the suit having been filed on the same transaction of the loan, merely because several other reliefs are prayed for and/or the guarantors are also joined to the suit proceedings, that by itself does not make the same a distinct subject. Accordingly, having examined the point involved from all the angles, to say that because that are different defendants and several reliefs, therefore, they constitute different subjects is something which no common sense, apart law, will ever permit. ( 6 ) WHILE parting, it may be stated that this Court is quite conscious of the fact that whenever any question involving public revenue arises, it should be extremely cautious and see that public exchequer does not suffer on account of any superficial view, based on technicalities, in favour of the plaintiff. Bearing in mind this caution and anxiety-for the precious public revenue, this Court still feels that merely because this decision, as submitted by the learned A. G. P. would affect the public revenue, that does not mean that the citizen should be saddled with any illegal and unjust liability by way of asking him to pay the Court fees when the same in fact does exist. Further apart, this being a matter under the fiscal statute, unless the case falls strictly within the purview of Sec. 18 of the Act, no Court fees can ever be levied on the citizen. ( 7 ) IN the result, this Revision Application is allowed. The impugned order passed by the trial Court is hereby quashed and set aside. The Court fees Reference No. 59 of 1982 is rejected. ( 7 ) IN the result, this Revision Application is allowed. The impugned order passed by the trial Court is hereby quashed and set aside. The Court fees Reference No. 59 of 1982 is rejected. It is held that the Court fees paid by the plaintiff is proper and adequate and no additional Court fees are required to be paid. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs. .