JUDGMENT T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. The validity, in whole, or in part, of S.57A and 57B of the Abkari Act 1 of 1077 M.E., is challenged in this batch of writ petitions numbering 91. This Act originally enacted in the erstwhile state of Cochin and applicable to that part of the state of Kerala, was amended and extended to the whole of Kerala by the Cochin Abkari (Extension and Amendment) Act 10 of 1967, which repealed the Travancore Abkari Act IV of "1073, and the Madras Abkari Act 1 of 1886, which were in force in the Travancore and Malabar areas of the state respectively. 2. S.57A and 57B were introduced into the Act by the Abkari (Amendment) Ordinance, 37 of 1983, promulgated by the Governor on November 1, 1983 which was subsequently replaced by the Abkari (Amendment) Act, 21 of 1984, with retrospective effect from November 1, 1983. The Amendment Act was reserved for the consideration of the President and received his assent on December 1, 1984. 3. Since it is the validity of these sections that is in issue, it will be advisable to extract the same: "57A. For adulteration of liquor or intoxicating drug with noxious substances, etc.- (1) whoever mixes or permits to be mixed any noxious substances or any substance which is likely to endanger human life or to cause grievous hurt to human beings, with any liquor or intoxicating drug shall, on conviction, be punishable, if, as a result of such act, grievous hurt is caused to any person, with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees; (i) if, as a result of such act, death is caused to any person, with death or imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees.; (ii) (iii) "in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees. Explanation, For the purposes of this section and S.57B, the expression "grievous hurt" shall have the same meaning as in S.320 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act 45 of 1860). (2) whoever omits to take reasonable precautions to prevent the mixing of any noxious substance or any substance which is likely to endanger human life or to cause grievous hurt to human beings, with any liquor or intoxicating drug shall, on conviction, be punishable, (i) if as a result of such omission, grievous hurt is caused to any person with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees; (ii) if as a result of such omission, death is caused to any person, with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees; (iii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which , shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to twenty-five thousand rupees. (3) Whoever possesses any liquor or intoxicating drug in which any substance referred to in sub-s.(1) is mixed, knowing that such substance is mixed with such liquor or intoxicating drug shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974), no person accused or convicted of an offence under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(3) shall, if in. custody; be released on bail or on his own bond, unless (a) the prosecution has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (b) where the prosecution opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. custody; be released on bail or on his own bond, unless (a) the prosecution has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (b) where the prosecution opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), (a) where a person is prosecuted for an offence under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2), the burden of proving that he has not mixed or permitted to be mixed or, as the case may be, omitted to take reasonable precautions to prevent the mixing, of, any substance referred to in that sub-section with any liquor or intoxicating drug shall be on him; (b) where a person is prosecuted for an offence under sub-section(3) for being in possession of any liquor or intoxicating drug in which any substance referred to in sub-s.(1) is mixed," the burden of proving that he did not know that such substance was mixed with such liquor or intoxicating drug shall be on him. 57B. Order to pay compensation.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974), the court when passing judgment in a case falling under S.57A may, if it is satisfied that death or grievous hurt has been caused sold in any place licenced under this Act, order the licensee of that place, whether or not he is convicted of an offence under the said section, to pay, by way of compensation, such amount as it appears to be just, to the legal representatives of the deceased or to the person or persons to whom grievous hurt has been caused. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-s.(1) may, within ninety days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the High Court: Provided that no such appeal shall lie unless the amount ordered to be paid under sub-s.(1) is deposited in the court which passed such order; Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that. the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the 4. The challenge in almost all these writ petitions is only to the rule of evidence laid down in sub-s.(5) of S.57A and to sub-s.(1) of S.57B. the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the 4. The challenge in almost all these writ petitions is only to the rule of evidence laid down in sub-s.(5) of S.57A and to sub-s.(1) of S.57B. O. P. No. 4364 of 1989 which was treated as the leading case had also challenged only, these provisions in the first instance, but re developed subsequently from stage to stage, and as the arguments proceeded, into a challenge to all the provisions of the two sections. 5. O.P. No. 4364 of 1989 which is by a licensee of arrack shops was treated as the main case. O.P. No. 6799 of 1989 was mentioned as an. example of a foreign liquor retail shop licensee. It was agreed that the facts in these and the other cases were similar. We shall state the facts in O.P. No. 4364 of 1989. 6. The petitioner is the licensee of Group No. 2 arrack shops in the Mattancherry range for the year 1987-88. She states that though she was the licensee, the shops were actually managed by her employees. The arrack distributed in her shops was being supplied, either by the Government distillery, namely the Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., Thiruvalla, or by the Government controlled Chittoor Cooperative Sugars Ltd., Chittoor. She did dot receive arrack from any other source. The Excise Inspector took samples of the arrack sold in. the petitioner's shop at Thoppumpady, and finding on analysis that it contained methanol (methyl alcohol), a noxious substance, he served the petitioner in the first instance, with the notice Ext. P1 informing her about the contamination, and followed it up, with the complaint Ext. P-2 before the Judicial Magistrate at Mattancherry. The petitioner thereupon approached this court with this writ petition, which as stated earlier, challenged S.57A(5) and 57B(1) in the first instance, but subsequently expanded itself periodically into one enveloping all the provisions of S.57A and 57B. 7. The Government has filed a counter affidavit in another writ petition O.P. No. 5663 of 1990 heard along with this, and that has been treated as the counter affidavit in all these cases. 8. O.P. No. 6799 of 1989 is similar, the only difference being that it concerns a foreign liquor retail shop. 9. 7. The Government has filed a counter affidavit in another writ petition O.P. No. 5663 of 1990 heard along with this, and that has been treated as the counter affidavit in all these cases. 8. O.P. No. 6799 of 1989 is similar, the only difference being that it concerns a foreign liquor retail shop. 9. The writ petitions were argued by Sri P. C. Chacko, counsel for the petitioners in O.P.No. 4364 and 6799 of 1989, who spread his arguments on a wide canvas. He was supplemented and supported by Sri S. A. Nagendran, Sri N. N. Sugunapalan and, in reply, by Sri K. Divakaran Nair. Since the provisions are challenged on different grounds, we shall refer to the grounds of challenge as and when we take up each of the sub-sections for consideration, to avoid repetition. 10. Petitioners in all these cases have been charged with offences felling under one or more of sub-s.(1) (2) or (3) of S.57A for either having mixed or permitted to be mixed any noxious substance with liquor, or for failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent such mixing or for being in possession of liquor in which such a noxious substance had been mixed, the noxious substance being one which was likely to endanger human life or to cause grievous hurt to human beings. 11. Most of the writ petitions are by arrack dealers, while a few of them concern foreign liquor retail shops. So far as arrack is concerned, during the relevant years and , till recently i.e. upto April 1, 1993, arrack was being supplied either by the Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., Thiruvalla, or by the Chittoor Cooperative Sugars, Chittoor. Supplies had to be obtained only from these sources and from none other. The supply of foreign liquor was being made by the Kerala State Beverages Corporation Ltd., a Government owned company, which it is stated, supplied the foreign liquor in sealed bottles with stickers, serially numbered. The case of the excise authorities is that the arrack or the foreign liquor dealt with by the various petitioners was mixed with methanol (methyl alcohol) a substance which was likely to endanger human life or cause grievous hurt to human beings, and therefore the petitioners were guilty of offences under sub-s.(1), (2) or (3) of S.57A. 12. The case of the excise authorities is that the arrack or the foreign liquor dealt with by the various petitioners was mixed with methanol (methyl alcohol) a substance which was likely to endanger human life or cause grievous hurt to human beings, and therefore the petitioners were guilty of offences under sub-s.(1), (2) or (3) of S.57A. 12. At this juncture, we may mention that arrack is obtained by adding water to rectified spirit. The arrack to be sold in licenced shops ought to have a strength of 25 degrees U.P. The counter affidavit of the respondents alleges that abkari contractors like the petitioners have a tendency to adopt dubious methods to make undue profits from the sale of liquor. They dilute the liquor with water, with a view to maximise their profit, to such an extent that the required strength is not maintained, and then compensate the dilution, to satisfy the customers with the necessary intoxication ("kick" in akbari jargon), by adding noxious substances like methanol (methyl alcohol), which are injurious to human beings. It is the greed of the abkari contractors to make huge undue profits by hook or by crook that leads to liquor tragedies. 13. 'Mention was made at the hearing of the Punalur and Vypeen tragedies of 1981 and 1982 where a large number of people lost their lives and many others suffered physical disabilities including blindness. The machinery already existing in the Abkari Act was found insufficient to deter such nefarious activities by abkari contractors, and it was in that context that the Ordinance was promulgated on November 1, 1983 introducing S.57A and 57B to deal with those indulging in such malpractices leading to heavy toll of life and life-long disabilities. 14. S.57A, which is the one mainly under challenge, prescribes certain punishments for the offences covered by its sub-s.(1), (2) and (3). Sub-s.(1) provides that whoever mixes or permits to be mixed any noxious substance, or any substance which is likely to endanger human life or to cause grievous hurt to human beings, with any liquor or intoxicating drug shall on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend to Rs. 50,000, if as a result of such act, grievous hurt is caused to any person; and with death or imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years and which may extend to imprisonment for life and with fine which may extend to Rs. 50,000 if as a result of such act, death is caused to any person. In any other case, the person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to Rs. 25,000. Sub-s.(2) deals with cases where a person omits to take reasonable precautions to prevent the mixing of any such substance with any liquor or intoxicating drug. The sentence prescribed is similar, except that where death is caused as a result of the omission, he is not liable to the sentence of death, but only for imprisonment and fine, to the same extent as those mentioned in the corresponding clause of sub-s.(1). Sub-s.(3) provides that whoever possesses any liquor or intoxicating drug in which any substance of the nature referred to in sub-s.(1) is mixed, knowing that such substance-is mixed with such liquor or intoxicating drug, shall on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to Rs. 25,000. Sub-s.(4) of the section imposed conditions for the grant of bail to a person charged under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(3), in that the Prosecutor had to be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and where he opposed the application, the court shall not release the accused on bail unless it was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that he was not guilty of the offence. Sub-s.(5) which was severely under attack provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, where a person is prosecuted for an offence under sub-s.(1) or (2), the burden of proving that he has not mixed or permitted to mix or, as the ease may be, omitted to take reasonable precautions to prevent mixing of the noxious substance with any liquor or intoxicating drug shall be on him, and in cases where he is prosecuted for an offence under sub-s.(3), the burden of proving that he did not know that such substance was mixed with the liquor or intoxicating drug shall be on him. 15. We have already mentioned that the section as a whole is challenged in O.P.No.4364 of 1989 as subsequently amended, while the attack is concentrated on sub-s.(5) in most of the other cases, though in a few cases sub-s.(4) also is under challenge. The challenge to the section as a whole is made on the ground that the provisions thereof conflict with S.272 to 275 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, Chap.18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Chap.7 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and despite the Presidential assent obtained under Art.254(2) of the Constitution, the provisions of S.57A do not have any overriding effect over these Central enactments. The contention is that S.37A will prevail only if it had been reserved for the consideration of the President with reference to particular, named Central enactments, with reference to which the assent should be accorded, in which case, it will prevail over those enactments, and over none others. In the absence of any material to show that the assent of the President had been sought and accorded in relation to the above mentioned central enactments, it is stated that the section has to be struck down as being in conflict with these Central enactments. In this connection, counsel for the petitioners would treat S.57A as falling under Entries 1, 2, 12 and 18 of List III (the Concurrent List) to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which in its turn attracts the applicability of Art.254(2). On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate General Mr. In this connection, counsel for the petitioners would treat S.57A as falling under Entries 1, 2, 12 and 18 of List III (the Concurrent List) to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which in its turn attracts the applicability of Art.254(2). On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate General Mr. V. K. Beeran submits that the Act as a whole is in pith and substance one falling under entry 8 of List II (the State List) read with entries 64 and 65 and incidental trespass, if any, into matters covered by the entries in the concurrent List will not affect its validity. 16. Entry 8 of the State List reads: "Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors." It is not, and it cannot be in dispute that the Abkari Act as such is one falling under this Entry. Vide Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals v. State of Kerala AIR 1981 SC 1863 . But the contention is that S.57A by, itself falls under the above mentioned entries in the concurrent list having regard to the nature of the provisions contained therein, and therefore it must satisfy the test of assent under Art.254(2). 17. We shall consider first whether the learned Additional Advocate General is justified in his submission that S.57A falls within entry 8 of the State List, read with Entries 64 and 65. The said entry as extracted above, deals with intoxicating liquors, including its production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale. Now the entries in the legislative lists only broadly enumerate the heads or fields of legislation demarcating the area over which the respective legislatures may operate. The entries have to be given a liberal construction, a broad and comprehensive meaning, as the allocation of subjects is not by way of scientific or logical definition, but mere enumeration of broad and comprehensive categories. Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1563 and Harakchand v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1453 , among others. It is also well established that the power of a legislature to legislate on a particular topic includes the power to legislate on subjects which are auxiliary or incidental thereto, or for purposes necessary for the proper implementation of the power conferred by the entry. It is also well established that the power of a legislature to legislate on a particular topic includes the power to legislate on subjects which are auxiliary or incidental thereto, or for purposes necessary for the proper implementation of the power conferred by the entry. Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1955 SC 58 , State of Rajasthan v. Ckawla AIR 1959 SC 544 Chaturbhai v. Union of India AIR 1960 SC 124 Baldeo v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1961 SC 736 , and India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1990 SC 85 . The powers of legislation conferred by Art.246 are with respect to the fields of legislation mentioned in the lists and in determining whether an enactment is a legislation 'with respect to' a given power, what is relevant is whether in its pith and substance, it is a law on the subject matter in question. It has therefore been held that if a statute relates in pith and substance to a topic assigned to a particular legislature, it will not be invalidated merely because it trenches incidentally on topics coming within another legislative list. This principle stands firmly rooted in Constitutional jurisprudence since the decision of the Privy Council in Russel v. The Queen (1882) 7 AC 329. The extent of the encroachment on matters beyond its competence may be an element in determining whether the legislation is colourable, that is, whether in the guise of making a law within its competence, the legislature is in truth making a law on subjects beyond its powers. But where that is not the position, the fact of incidental encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. Accordingly, in Subramanyan. Chettiar v. Munuswami Goundan AIR 1941 Fed. Court 47 Gwyer, C. J. observed: "It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the ' enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is 'examined to ascertain its pith and substance', or its 'true nature and character', for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that; (1881) 7 AC 96, (1882) 7 AC 829, (1889) AC 580, 1930 AC 111, 1940 AC 513. In my opinion, this rule of interpretation is equally applicable to the Indian Constitution Act." This principle was re-affirmed by the Privy Council in Prafula Kumar v. Bank of Commerce AIR 1947 PC 60 , where the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 was challenged as invalid in so far as it related to promissory notes. The Privy Council approved the above observations of Gwyer, C. J. and observed that subjects will overlap and where they do, the question must be asked what in, pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list, is its true nature and character to be found. Otherwise, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth and many of the subjects entrusted to the Provincial' Legislatures could never effectively be dealt with. 18. To ascertain the true nature and character of the legislation, the Act has to be considered in its entirety as an integral one, and not by dissecting it into its various provisions and examining each to ascertain under which head of legislation it falls. The Act as a whole has to be tested with reference to its objects and scope to locate the head of legislation into which it fits in. In Gallagher v. Lynn (1937) 3 Al. E.R. 598, Lord Atkin observed: "It is well established by Russel v. The Queen (1882) 7 AC 829 that you are to look at the 'true nature and character of the legislation.... the pith and substance of the legislation.' If on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not invalidated if, incidentally, it affects matters which are outside the authorised field." [This decision has been referred to with approval in ate of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318 ]. In United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum AIR 1941 P.16, the Federal Court observed that when the question is whether an Act is within any of the three Lists, the duty of the court is to consider the Act as a whole and decide whether in pith and substance the Act is with respect to particular categories or not. 19. The matter was further explained by Mukherjea, J. in Lakhi Narayan Das v. Province of Bihar AIR 1957 SC 297 , where he said that to ascertain the class to which a particular enactment really belongs, the court is to look to the primary matter dealt with by it, its subject matter and essential legislative feature. It was therefore held that the offences created and the procedure laid down for arrest and trial of offenders under the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1949 were only ancillary things without which no effective legislation on public order or preventive detention was possible and therefore the Ordinance was covered by the entries in the Provincial List and the question of having recourse to any entry in the Concurrent List did not arise. The Supreme Court summarised the position as follows in A. S. Krishna v. Madras State AIR 1950 Fed. Court 59 (to which we will have occasion to refer again), where certain provisions of the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937 were under challenge as repugnant to the Indian Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. "When a law is impugned on the ground that it is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it, what has to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation. To do that, one must have regard to the enactment as a whole, to its objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. If on such examination it is found that the legislation is in substance one oh a matter assigned to the legislature, then it must be held to be valid in its entirety, even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence. It would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such then disintegrate it into parts, examine under what heads of legislation those parts would severally fall, mid by that process determine what portions thereof are intra vires, and what are not." 20. It would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such then disintegrate it into parts, examine under what heads of legislation those parts would severally fall, mid by that process determine what portions thereof are intra vires, and what are not." 20. As already mentioned, the Act as a whole is one clearly falling within Entry 8 of the State List. The Entry is one of wide import. The words "that is to say" explain or illustrate and do not amplify or limit the words "intoxicating liquors" immediately preceding them and cover the whole field of possible legislation on the subject. Bhola Prasad v. Emperor AIR 1942 PC 17, where Gwyer, C. J. observed that the power to legislate with respect to intoxicating liquors could not well be expressed in wider terms, and State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318 , where the Supreme Court stated that the State Legislature could pass any law inter alia regarding possession and sale of intoxicating ' liquor. It has been recognised all along that there is no inherent right in a citizen to sell liquor and that the control and restriction over the sale of intoxicating liquors was necessary for the preservation of public health and morals and to raise revenue See Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner AIR 1975 SC 1121 . After discussing the earlier decisions on the point, and the dissentient note struck in Krishna Kumar v. State of Jammu and Kashmir AIR 1967 SC 1368 , the court in the above case, went on to observe: "There is no fundamental right to do trade or business -in intoxicants. The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all there manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. In "American Jurisprudence", Volume 30 it is stated that while engaging in liquor traffic is not inherently unlawful, nevertheless it is a privilege and not a right, subject to Governmental control, (page 538). In "American Jurisprudence", Volume 30 it is stated that while engaging in liquor traffic is not inherently unlawful, nevertheless it is a privilege and not a right, subject to Governmental control, (page 538). This power of control is an incident of the society's right to self protection and it rests upon the right of the State to care for the health, morals and welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of pauperism and crime (pp. 539, 540, 541)" In Nashirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1975 SC 360 the Supreme Court cited the police power of the State to enforce public morality and prohibit trades in noxious "or dangerous goods as one of the principal reasons to hold that there is no fundamental right to carry on trade or to do business in liquor. 21. The State is the exclusive owner of rights in regard to intoxicating liquor and its police power extends to prohibition of trades in noxious or dangerous goods. The State is duty bound to protect its citizens against deceptive self destruction by consumption of noxious liquor. The interests of the innocent public require strict control on the sale of liquor lest deleterious stuff finds its way into the market resulting in the killing or disabling of large number of human beings, en masse, which will be beyond repair. The very object of the power of controlling the sale of intoxicating liquors being safety of the public, it must necessarily carry with it the power of prescribing punishments for the same of possession of liquor mixed with noxious substances or for omitting to take reasonable precautions against such mixing. As the absolute owner of all rights in respect of intoxicating liquors, it is also open to the State to impose conditions in public interest on the sale of liquor, including conditions regarding its purity and quality and to provide for condign punishments for endangering human beings by breach thereof. This is a necessary concomitant of the field of legislation covered by Entry 8, which as pointed out in Bhola Prasad AIR 1942 PC 17 and Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318 is couched in the widest possible terms, taking within its ambit every possible legislation on the subject. This is a necessary concomitant of the field of legislation covered by Entry 8, which as pointed out in Bhola Prasad AIR 1942 PC 17 and Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318 is couched in the widest possible terms, taking within its ambit every possible legislation on the subject. This is apart from the fact that Entries 64 and 65 of the State List confer power on the State legislature to deal with such offences, as also the jurisdiction of courts in such cases. The provisions of S.57A arc provisions required for the effective implementation of the provisions contained in the Abkari Act, from the angle of social morals and the safety of the public. It is necessary in the interests of society at large and flows as part of the control vested in the State and assumed under the Abkari Act. We are of the opinion that S.57A, and its sequential provision S.57B are hi pith and substance part of the legislation relating to intoxicating liquors falling under Entry 8 of List II. 22. This is sufficient to reject the contention of counsel for the petitioners that there is a conflict with the Central legislations, referred to. But we shall also deal with the matter from the angle in which counsel for the petitioners presented it before us. We have already adverted to his contention, namely that S.57A will not prevail over the Central enactments unless the Presidential assent has been obtained with particular reference to them. It is pointed out that the State has not disclosed either in the counter affidavit or by production of the file as to the particular enactment over which S.57A was to have overriding effect by obtaining the Presidential assent under Art.254(2). Reliance is placed, in this context, on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh AIR 1985 SC 1394 . 23. In that decision, the competing priorities were between the (Central) Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 and the State enactment, the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953. The Punjab Act had been reserved for the consideration of the President for the specific and limited purpose of Art.31 and 31A of the Constitution. There was no request made, "nor assent given, with reference to Art.254(2). The Punjab Act had been reserved for the consideration of the President for the specific and limited purpose of Art.31 and 31A of the Constitution. There was no request made, "nor assent given, with reference to Art.254(2). In that context Chandrachud, C. J., who wrote the leading opinion, observed that the Act could not be said to have been reserved for the assent of the President within the meaning of clause (2) of Art.254 of the Constitution in so far as its repugnancy with the Central Act was concerned. The assent of the President under Art.254(2) is not a matter of idle formality. The President has, at least to be apprised of the reasons why his assent was sought, if there was any special reason for doing so. If the assent is sought and given in general terms so as to be effective for all purposes, different considerations may arise. But if the assent was sought for a specific purpose, its efficacy will be limited to that purpose and cannot be extended beyond it. 24. We do not find anything in this decision to support the broad proposition propounded by counsel for the petitioners that a State law cannot prevail over a Central enactment unless the law had been reserved for consideration of the President with reference to that Central enactment and received his assent. There is no such specific requirement in Art.254(2). Nor do we find any such requirement of Art.254(2) flowing from the above decision. There are various provisions in the constitution like the erstwhile Art.31(3), Art.31A, Art.31C and Art.304, apart from Art.254(2) requiring the assent/ sanction of the President, to provide efficacy, supremacy or immunity for the laws covered by those Articles. The purpose and the effect of the Presidential assent is different under each of these provisions, and it was therefore that Chandrachud, C. J. observed that if the assent is sought for a specific purpose, (for the purposes of Art.31 and 31 A in that case), the efficacy of the assent would be limited to that purpose and could not be extended beyond it. That this is the limited scope of the ratio of the decision is evident from the opening paragraph of the concurring opinion of Chinnappa Reddy, J. where he reiterated the proposition to be that the assent accorded by the President for the express purpose of Art.31A is not capable of automatic transformation for the purpose of Art.254(2) of the Constitution. The rationale of the decision is quite obvious. The scope of the assent under Art.31A and 31C is to wipe off Art.14 and 19 in relation to the laws concerned, while the purpose of assent under Art.254(2) is to ensure supremacy for a State law over Central enactments covering the same field. But there is no further refinement laid down in Art.254(2), nor recognised by the Supreme Court, that assent under Art.254(2) should be sought with reference to each and every named Central enactment on pain of the State law yielding place to some of them. This will be impracticable and a burdensome task having regard to the plethora of Central legislation and may well stifle or delay desirable State legislation on any subject. Conceive of a situation where the State omitted by oversight or otherwise to seek assent with reference to a particular Central legislation. What is the remedy of the State if it was intended to override that particular Central legislation as well? The Constitution does not provide for a fresh Presidential assent to be obtained. What is required is only assent to an Act repeated or periodical assents are not envisaged. Should the State then repeal the previous enactment and seek Presidential assent afresh in relation to all the enactments? Else the State's power of legislation in relation to a particular topic vis a vis a specified Central legislation will be deprived or postponed till a new legislation is brought. The States are also important participants in the federal polity of India, (which is a Union of States), with a strong Centre, possessing plenary powers of legislation over enumerated fields. They are the best judges of the local requirements and their powers in that regard cannot be eroded by a sidewind as it were by reading a new requirement in Art.254(2). Again, how are the courts, who are to administer the law, to know whether assent in relation to a particular enactment has been accorded or not? They are the best judges of the local requirements and their powers in that regard cannot be eroded by a sidewind as it were by reading a new requirement in Art.254(2). Again, how are the courts, who are to administer the law, to know whether assent in relation to a particular enactment has been accorded or not? Does every Act on a subject in the concurrent list require a footnote enumerating the various Central enactments in relation to which the Presidential assent has been given? Should not the presumption be otherwise that -a statement regarding grant of assent embraces within it all the Central enactments likely to be offended by the State legislation? By insisting on the specification of each and every enactment in relation to which, assent under Art.254(2) is accorded, we think the courts will be adding a new requirement to Art.254(2), thereby vitally affecting the State's power of legislation under Art.246(2). 25. We overrule this contention, though as pointed out earlier, S.57A prevails over the Central enactments concerned as one within the fields of legislation covered by Entries 8, 64 and 65 of the State List in pith and substance. 26. The above decision of the Supreme Court Was interpreted as having the consequence adumbrated by Sri P.C. Chacko, by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras in Kanagaraj v. Government of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1991 Madras 183), and by a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Minvo Framroze Balsara v. Union of India AIR 1992 Bombay 375. In Kanagaraj's case AIR 1991 Madras 182, assent had been obtained for the Tamil Nadu Bill 42 of 1987 in relation to the (Central) Motor ' Vehicles Act, 1939, but after the assent and before the Bill became law, that Act was repealed and replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The contention which found acceptance with the learned Single Judge was that since assent had not been sought with particular reference to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the provisions of Bill No. 42 of 1987, if it became law, will not have overriding effect over the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The contention which found acceptance with the learned Single Judge was that since assent had not been sought with particular reference to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the provisions of Bill No. 42 of 1987, if it became law, will not have overriding effect over the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The learned Single Judge accepted this contention of the learned Advocate General and observed that Art.254(2) of the Constitution will not have application to a case like this, as the factum of inconsistency of the provisions of Bill No. 42 1987 with the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 had not been brought to the notice of the President. 27. In the case before the Bombay High Court, the question was whether the Act extending the duration of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act had overriding effect over "the (Central) Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act when ' the Presidential assent had not been sought with particular reference to the latter Act. Bharucha, J. speaking for the court relied heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court and read it as requiring that the assent of the President within the meaning of Art.254(2) had to be with reference to the repugnancy of specified Central Statutes. 28. We have already pointed out that we are not in a position to read the Supreme Court decision as laying down any such proposition. The Supreme Court was not concerned with the question whether Art.254(2) requires specification of a particular Central enactment with reference to which the assent is sought. The Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether assent granted for the purpose of Art.31 and 31A could do justice for Art.254(2). The Supreme Court was not ad idem in relation to a case Under Art.254(2), and therefore we cannot read the somewhat wide language in the judgment as laying down the proposition which the above two decisions have read into it. In fact, as we mentioned earlier, the scope of the decision of the Supreme Court was pointedly delineated by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in his concurring opinion. We therefore respectfully dissent from the opinion expressed by the Madras and Bombay High Courts in the above two decision on the scope of Art.254(2). 29. We shall now take up the challenge to the various sub-sections. We therefore respectfully dissent from the opinion expressed by the Madras and Bombay High Courts in the above two decision on the scope of Art.254(2). 29. We shall now take up the challenge to the various sub-sections. We shall first deal with sub-s.(5) which is the major target of attack by all the petitioners. This sub-section provides that where a person is prosecuted for an offence under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2), the burden of proving that he has "not mixed, or permitted to be mixed, or that he has not omitted to take" reasonable precautions to prevent the mixing of, any substance referred to in those sub-sections, with any liquor or intoxicating drug, shall be on him; and in the case of a prosecution under sub-s.(3), the burden of proving that he did not know that such substance was mixed with the liquor or intoxicating drug in his possession shall be on the accused. Counsel for the petitioners have mounted their attack on this provision with a strong plea that no burden rests on the prosecution to establish anything, with their duty discharged by the filing of the ,complaint. According to their reading of the sub-section, the entire burden, from beginning to end, of establishing his innocence, falls on the accused, without anything required to be done by the prosecution. This goes against all known canons of criminal jurisprudence, of the accused being presumed to be innocent and of the burden being on the prosecution to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (Dahyabai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat AIR 1964 SC 1563 , Goswami v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 716 . The accepted law of the land, and the Evidence Act, have been given the go-by, by throwing the burden on the accused. A just, fair and reasonable trial is thus denied to the accused persons, resulting in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed , under Art.21 of the Constitution of India, There is also a charge, albeit feeble, of violation of Art.14 and 19(1)(g) though we have been unable to appreciate how these Articles are attracted [see in this connection, Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. Collector of Customs AIR 1957 SC 877 . 30. A perusal of sub-s.(5) does not bear out this grievance of the petitioners. Sub-s.(5) does not absolve the prosecution of leading evidence in support of their case. 30. A perusal of sub-s.(5) does not bear out this grievance of the petitioners. Sub-s.(5) does not absolve the prosecution of leading evidence in support of their case. What the sub-section does is only to direct that matters specially within the knowledge of the accused shall be proved by him. It is not as if the prosecution has no obligation to lead any evidence at all. They have to lay the foundation for the prosecution. They have to prove the actus reus. They must prove that people died of sustained grievous hurt, or suffered some other consequences by the consumption of liquor from the accused's shop. They must also establish that the liquor so consumed was adulterated with some noxious or other substance of the nature referred to in sub-s.(1) and (2). If these facts are established, naturally a prima facie case arises against the accused. The subjection then casts the burden on the accused to establish what is provided for in sub-s.(5), The acts mentioned in sub-s.(1) and (2), which lead to the consequences mentioned therein, namely death, grievous hurt or others, are of such a nature that they will ordinarily take place only within the precincts of the accused, and are evidently within his knowledge. It will be impossible for the prosecutor to bring home these acts to the accused of the actual mixing, or as to how the liquor was dealt with by him within the four walls of his premises. On the other hand, the accused can explain to the court as to how he dealt with the liquor in question, while in his custody. That is why the Legislature spared the prosecutor and cast the burden of proof on these matters, which are specially within the knowledge of the accused himself, on the accused. It may be mentioned here that the burden that lies on the accused is not the same as that on the prosecutor, of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt, and is no higher than that which lay on a party to civil proceedings, namely of balance of probabilities, as we shall presently show. 31. The extreme apprehension voiced by the petitioners on which really their case is founded, that the prosecution has no obligations at all, is thus unfounded and proceeds on a misreading and misunderstanding of the sub-section. 31. The extreme apprehension voiced by the petitioners on which really their case is founded, that the prosecution has no obligations at all, is thus unfounded and proceeds on a misreading and misunderstanding of the sub-section. On the other hand, the accused is called upon to enter on his defence and prove only that which is ordinarily within his knowledge and no more. This is an obligation which is cast on the accused even otherwise, under S.106 of the Evidence Act, as a matter specially within his knowledge.. When the consumption of liquor from the accused's shop has resulted in the consequences mentioned in sub-s.(1) or (2), and when it is found that the liquor so consumed was adulterated with the noxious or other substances, an inference will 'normally follow about the accused's, role in the matter, and it is then upto him to explain how the liquor was handled by him, and how he has not been guilty of any of the acts mentioned in sub-s.(1) or (2). In fact, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1974 SC 1516 the court may, even without the aid of any statutory presumption, presume in such circumstances what may in the ordinary course be the most probable inference. Therefore, and on the terms of sub-s.(5), what the accused is expected to do is to place before court that which is within his special knowledge, about which no offence can be taken. The sub-section does not impose on him any undue or unreasonable burden prejudicing a fair trial. 32. There is a very good social purpose behind this section, as we have already pointed out. It is in the interests of the general public, particularly the poor innocent ones, who are more prone to resort to the cheaper varieties of liquor than others. To cast the burden on the prosecution to prove all the ingredients, including the mixing, or the non taking of reasonable precautions, will be to ask for the impossible, to establish what goes on within the closed walls of the liquor contractor's premises, on which none outside can have any knowledge. A strict liability is therefore cast, with burden on the accused to prove what is essentially within his knowledge. 33. Casting of such a burden is not unknown to Indian law. A strict liability is therefore cast, with burden on the accused to prove what is essentially within his knowledge. 33. Casting of such a burden is not unknown to Indian law. In fact, S.103 and 106 of the Evidence Act themselves envisage such a shifting of the burden. Various statutes particularly relating to economic and social offences have shifted the burden in this fashion. We may refer to S.71 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, S.4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, S.20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, S.14 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, S.32 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930, S.123 of the Customs Act, 1962, and various others, besides S.113A and 113B of the Evidence Act itself. These legislative devices have been accepted by the courts as valid and as not offending the requirement of a just, fair or reasonable trial. We may in this connection refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in A. S. Krishna v. Madras State AIR 1957 SC 297 , where such a presumption raised by S.4(2) of the Madras Prohibition Act was upheld by the Supreme Court. After referring to Rottschaefer's observations in his Constitutional Law that the legislature may establish such rebuttable presumptions if there was a rational connection between what was proved and what was permitted to be inferred therefrom, the court observed that the American law on the point appeared to be based on the due process clause (about the applicability of which to the Indian Constitution, doubt was expressed), but that such presumptions had been upheld as reasonable and not hit even by the due process or equal protection clauses. The court referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Albert J. Adams v. People of the State of New York (1904) 192 U.S. 585, and Robert Hawes v. State of Georgia (1922) 258 U.S. 1. In the first of these cases, a New York law had made it an offence to be knowingly in possession of gambling instruments, and enacted further that possession of such instruments was presumptive evidence of such knowledge. Rejecting the contention that that presumption violated the due process clause, the Court made the following observations which are apposite to explain the rationale behind such presumption. ''We fail to perceive any force in this argument. Rejecting the contention that that presumption violated the due process clause, the Court made the following observations which are apposite to explain the rationale behind such presumption. ''We fail to perceive any force in this argument. The policy slips are property of an unusual character, and not likely, particularly in large quantities, to be found in. the possession of innocent panics. Like other gambling paraphernalia, their possession indicates their use or intended use, and may well raise some inference against their possessor ia the absence of explanation. Such is the effect of this statute. Innocent persons would have no trouble in explaining the possession of those tickets, and in any event the possession is only prima facie evidence, and the party is permitted to produce such testimony as will show the truth concerning the possession of the slips. Furthermore, it is within the established power of the State to proscribe the evidence which is to be received in the Courts of its own Government." The similar provision in S.123 of the Customs Act, 1962 was held not to offend Art.21 of the constitution by the High Court of Karnataka in Shivaji v. State of Karnataka ILR 1985 Karnataka 1455, (Malimath, C. J. and Mahendra, J). We have already referred to Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1974 SC 1516 , where the court observed that even without the aid of a statutory presumption, the court may presume what in the ordinary course is the most probable inference. We need not multiply authorities as the matter was elaborately considered, both on the content of such presumptions as well as on their validity by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Satyanarayana alias Narayana v. Soundaryavalli 1987 (1) Andhra Law Times 762. There the court was dealing with S.113A of the Evidence Act, 1872 which enables the court to raise a presumption of abetment by the husband or his relatives in the suicide of a woman who commits suicide within seven years of her marriage, and it is shown that her husband or relatives had subjected her to cruelty. K. Ramaswamy, J. (as he then was), constituting the Bench along with Jagannadha Rao, J. (present Chief Justice of this court) upheld the validity of the section as justified keeping in view the paramount social interest, and the nature of the offence which was sought to be prevented. K. Ramaswamy, J. (as he then was), constituting the Bench along with Jagannadha Rao, J. (present Chief Justice of this court) upheld the validity of the section as justified keeping in view the paramount social interest, and the nature of the offence which was sought to be prevented. It was observed that the offences dealt with in S.113A are committed within the confines of the conjugal society or marital home of the woman. Therefore "it becomes intractable for the prosecution to place the entire material in the matter". To quote the learned Judge: "As stated earlier, the offences are committed within the confines of marital home of Woman. It is an intractable terrain to others but the exclusive domain accessible to the habitation of the named class of offenders. The inmates have special knowledge of the circumstance Under which the offence of suicide is committed or cruelty or harassment is caused leading to the. commission of suicide. Therefore, the legislature drew presumptive evidence in favour of the prosecution. It does not relieve the prosecution to prove its case on the touch stone of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt'. If some evidence is adduced by the husband or his relatives, it displaces the presumptive evidence; then the presumption is rebutted and the burden is always on the prosecution to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt." 34. More recently, a Division Bench of this court in Paisons v. Intelligence Officer 1991 KLJ (Tax Cases) 557 upheld as perfectly valid a similar provision in S.45A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, laying down that the burden of proving that any person was not liable for the penalty under the section was on such person. The Bench observed that the provision in question was only in the realm of evidence and not a rule of substantive law. The burden had been shifted to the assessee since it was a matter within his own knowledge and the evidence relating to it was also in his own power to produce. 35. The Law Commission of India has, in its Forty-seventh Report on the Trial and Punishment of Social and Economic Offences, advocated the shifting of the burden of disproving mens rea on the accused (section 320) after emphasising two important aspects of social and economic offences, namely gravity of the harm caused to society, and the nature of the offences themselves. The Law Commission of India has, in its Forty-seventh Report on the Trial and Punishment of Social and Economic Offences, advocated the shifting of the burden of disproving mens rea on the accused (section 320) after emphasising two important aspects of social and economic offences, namely gravity of the harm caused to society, and the nature of the offences themselves. "The gravity of the harm is not easily apparent; but is nevertheless undeniable. The nature of the offences is peculiar, in the sense that they are planned and executed in secrecy by shrewd and dexterous persons with sophisticated means. The public welfare is gravely affected, but detection is unusually difficult (Section 312)". 36. Phipson in his treatise on Evidence, Thirteenth Edition, refers to the recent trend in the United Kingdom to cast the burden on the accused, particularly in statutory offences. He enumerates quite a number of such provisions in the footnote to Para.4-14 at page 48. He further proceeds to state that the burden of proof, when it rests upon the accused is merely proof on the balance of probabilities (paragraph 4.34 at page 64). "The burden of proof required is less than that required in the hands the prosecution. It might fairly be stated as not being higher than the burden which rested upon a plaintiff or a defendant in civil proceedings". [R.V. Sodeman (1936) 2 All E.R. 1138]. (See also Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 11, Para.356, 357 at page 175). 37. We may incidentally mention that in Regina v. Edwards (1975) I QB 27 the Court of Appeal held that if, on the true construction of an enactment, it prohibited the doing of an Act, save in specified circumstances, it was not for the prosecution to prove a prima facie case of lack of excuse, for , the onus of proof shifted, and it was for the accused to prove that he was entitled to do the prohibited Act. See also Regina v. Ewens (1967) I QB 322. 38. The Privy Council was recently dealing with the question whether a statutory provision creating an offence, and imposing the burden on the accused in defence violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Art.11(1) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, 1991. See also Regina v. Ewens (1967) I QB 322. 38. The Privy Council was recently dealing with the question whether a statutory provision creating an offence, and imposing the burden on the accused in defence violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Art.11(1) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, 1991. The Privy Council held that exceptions from strict application of the fundamental rule that throughout trial, the burden was on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused were permissible, provided that the responsibility for showing the guilt of the accused remained primarily that of the prosecution. Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Lee Kwong Kut 1993 (1) WLR 329 (PC). 39. We are referring to all this only to show that there is a definite shift in attitudes in modern legislative practice alround to cast the burden of proving innocence on the accused himself in respect of such social or statutory offences and that it has not been frowned upon by the Courts. 40. In the light of the above, and having regard to the object sought to be achieved, it is not possible to accept the case of the petitioners, that sub-s.(5) is violative of Art.14, 19(1)(g) or 21. It does not impose any ' undue or unreasonable burden on the accused. He is only called upon to prove what is essentially within his knowledge. The rule is one of evidence and not one of substantive law. The ordinary rules of criminal law of the presumption of innocence of the accused and of the burden being on the prosecution to establish the guilt, are not absolute rules, departure from which will violate Art.21 of the Constitution. Exceptions become imperative to meet the needs of the times and the sophistication and unscrupulous ness which go with such crimes as those created by S.57A and are liable to be upheld so long as they are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Sub-s.(5), in our opinion, is not unreasonable and it does not affect any of the aforesaid fundamental rights. It doe's not prejudice a fair and reasonable trial to the accused, since the initial burden on the case is always on the prosecution. We therefore overrule the challenge to sub-s.(5). 41. Now we shall come to the challenge to the other sub-section. It doe's not prejudice a fair and reasonable trial to the accused, since the initial burden on the case is always on the prosecution. We therefore overrule the challenge to sub-s.(5). 41. Now we shall come to the challenge to the other sub-section. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.57A are (36) challenged by Sri P.C. Chacko in the writ, petition O.P. No. 4364 of 1989 though there is no challenge as such to 'these sections in most of the other writ petitions. The challenge is mainly to sub-s.(1) on the ground that the imposition of the penalty of death there under is too severe compared to the offence involved, and that offends Art.21 of the Constitution. It is pointed out that it is not merely the person who is guilty of mixing the noxious substance with liquor, but also innocent persons who may be employed by the licensee, that may be convicted and sentenced to death. The other sentences prescribed in sub-s.(1) and (2) are also challenged as disproportionate to the offence alleged. 42. The imposition of death penalty as such under the Indian Penal Code has been upheld as not violating Art.14, 19 or 21 of the Constitution, by the Supreme Court in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. 1973 (1) SCC 20 and Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 1980 (2) SCC 684 [The dissent of Bhagwati, J. in the latter case appears in 1982 (3) SCC 24 ]. The Supreme Court held that imposition of the death penalty and the implementation of the same by hanging has been an accepted , mode of punishment and considered a humane way of administering the sentence. But S.303 of the Indian Penal Code was struck down as violative of Art.14 and 21 in the subsequent decision in Mithu v. State of Punjab 1983 (2) SCC 277 . The court held that the prescription of a mandatory sentence of death for the offence of murder as a second offence merely for the reason that the offender was under the sentence of life imprisonment for the first of such offences, was arbitrary and unreasonable. 43. The court held that the prescription of a mandatory sentence of death for the offence of murder as a second offence merely for the reason that the offender was under the sentence of life imprisonment for the first of such offences, was arbitrary and unreasonable. 43. Sri P.C. Chacko, for the petitioners in O.P. No. 4364 of 1989 supported his contention with reference to S.272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offences of adulteration of food or drink intended for sale, or of drugs, the sale of noxious food or drink, or adulterated drugs, pointing out that they prescribed only terms of imprisonment up to six months or fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000. Even the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which the petitioners contend applies to the sale of liquor [vide the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Prem Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh 1985 (II) F.A.C. 266 provides only for lesser" terms of imprisonment or fine for sale of adulterated articles. It is therefore stated that the offence of selling liquor adulterated with the notions or other substances referred to in sub-sections(1) and (2) should not be in a worse position than those contemplated by the aforesaid provisions, and 'therefore the imposition of death penalty is barbarous, and disproportionate to the gravity of the offence, 44. We have already sketched the reason for the legislation and the necessity for imposition of deterrent punishment on abkari contractors who in their greed and run for amassing easy wealth arc prepared to pledge the life of the people by sale of spurious or adulterated liquor containing poisonous elements which lead to death en masse. The Vypeen tragedy of 1981 left seventy one persons dead besides leaving numerous others with physical disabilities including loss of eyesight. This is not a solitary instance. Even in Kerala, there was the earlier Punalur tragedy in which over thirty people lost their lives, besides disabling numerous others. Other instances of such huge tragedies are legion Daravi, Bangalore, Delhi and so on, with the Cuttack tragedy of May 5, 1992, taking a toll of 124 lives [vide Janamohan Das v. State of Orissa AIR 1993 Orissa 157. Even in Kerala, there was the earlier Punalur tragedy in which over thirty people lost their lives, besides disabling numerous others. Other instances of such huge tragedies are legion Daravi, Bangalore, Delhi and so on, with the Cuttack tragedy of May 5, 1992, taking a toll of 124 lives [vide Janamohan Das v. State of Orissa AIR 1993 Orissa 157. The offence involved is an offence against society, and the quantum of punishment has to be dictated, atleast in part by the larger interests of protection of the public, particularly the poorer sections among the population. They have to be protected against unscrupulous abkari contractors, who resort to the dubious method of diluting the quality of arrack to make undue gain, and compensate it by adding noxious substances. The social element in the prevention of this crime as also the protection of the innocent public, apart from the frequency of such occurrences, has to be taken note of in considering this question. That this was very much in the mind of the legislature is evident from the statement of Objects and Reasons to the Amending Act 21 of 1984, where it is stated: "The State Government understook a number of administrative measures to avoid recurrence of such tragedies. It was also felt necessary to make changes in the Abkari Act I of 1077 to impose very severe penalty on those responsible for adulteration of liquor and its sale. The Government after considering the recommendations of a Committee constituted for the purpose decided to amend the said Act to provide for severe penalty for adulteration of liquor or intoxicating drugs so as to prevent the recurrence of such tragic incidents." 45. The Penal Code of 1860 is no doubt the general penal law of the land, but it is common knowledge that ethical and moral standards, besides accountability to the public, have had a steep fall over the years since 1860. If people nakedly pursue material goals of life with aggressive and questionable practices, at the expense of the innocent general public, the State has to match its wits and arm itself to counteract the evil. Any attempt in this direction cannot be defeated by pegging the low to the 1860 level of punishments. The State is well aware of the needs of the times. Any attempt in this direction cannot be defeated by pegging the low to the 1860 level of punishments. The State is well aware of the needs of the times. The wisdom of a provision which the State makes in exercise of its powers over the subject matter is a matter for the legislature, and this court's jurisdiction will be limited to see whether it offends any of the fundamental rights. We cannot therefore draw inspiration from the Indian Penal Code of 1860 or the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, for the offences in question, when the periodical tragedies that occur call for drastic action in the interests of the public. The offence is not so innocuous as claimed. On the other hand, its deleterious effects on the public, and on their health, and the trail, of misery left behind by those who get killed, or suffered by those who get disabled, is a matter of common concern for the State and the public at large. It needs no reiteration that the consequence of sale of liquor mixed with lethal substances is more widespread and destructive than the consequence of adulteration of a particular food. The experience of Vypeen and Punalur is proof positive that liquor adulteration, can result in massive loss of life, without any hope of redemption, besides damaging vital parts of the body. S.57A deals with very serious offences which lead to death, causing of grievous hurt and the like. It was noticing this fast spreading evil that the Legislature intervened creating offences and prescribing a deterrent punishment 46. Nor can we visualise a macabre procession of abkari contractors marching to the hangman's noose on the law being, enacted, as vividly portrayed by Mr. P. C. Chacko. It is not as if death sentence or imprisonment for life is a mast in every case falling under sub-s.(1) or (2) of S.57A, which gives a wide latitude to the judicial officers to impose appropriate punishment having regard to the facts of the case. P. C. Chacko. It is not as if death sentence or imprisonment for life is a mast in every case falling under sub-s.(1) or (2) of S.57A, which gives a wide latitude to the judicial officers to impose appropriate punishment having regard to the facts of the case. As stated by Krishna Iyer, J. for the Bench in Inderjeet v. State of U.P. AIR 1979 SC 1867 , where the prescription of a minimum sentence of imprisonment under S.16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, was under challenge, a case for judicial review may arise if the mandatory minimum is too cruel to comport with Art.21 or too torture some to be reasonably justifiable under Art.19. We do not find any such vice in S.57A having regard to the serious nature of the offence. The judicial officers who deal with the matter belong to the higher , echelons of the judiciary, experienced and well trained, who are quite conversant with the sentencing policy to be adopted. In fact, the latitude available to the judges varies from punishment of not less than three years to imprisonment for life or death having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be assumed that the judicial discretion will be arbitrarily exercised. The sentence of death is only in the alternative as under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code and is not imperative. In any case, the matter is governed by S.354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. It is also subject to scrutiny in appeal. It is not as if every one of the petitioners is going to be hanged or imprisoned for life for the offence alleged against him. He may suffer various terms of imprisonment if the offence is made out against him and except perhaps in extreme cases, the rarest of the rare cases as the Supreme Court puts it, it is not likely that the death sentence will be imposed on any person as the matter is ultimately governed by S.354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, 47. The imposition of such sentences even in food adulteration cases is not a new phenomenon. The U.P. Legislature has as a matter of fact amended S.272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code to prescribe the sentence of imprisonment for life for the offences under those sections. The imposition of such sentences even in food adulteration cases is not a new phenomenon. The U.P. Legislature has as a matter of fact amended S.272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code to prescribe the sentence of imprisonment for life for the offences under those sections. The first proviso to S.16(1A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, also provides for the sentence of imprisonment for life for a person who imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food or adulterant which when consumed is likely to cause death or grievous hurt. We cannot therefore accept the case of the petitioners that the sentence of death or of imprisonment of life prescribed is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence. On the other hand, the seriousness of the offence, its consequences and the periodicity with which it occurs are so ramified that a deterrent punishment is called for. 48. We may also note that the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 provides deterrent long term punishments for those dealing in narcotic drugs. Spurious or adulterated liquor is as dangerous a substance as narcotic drugs. Dr. Arthur Dean Bevan, a Professor of Medicine and one time President of the American Medical Association has equated liquor with drugs in these words: "Viewed from the standpoint of modern scientific medicine, alcohol belongs to the group of narcotics which consist of ether, chloroform, chloral and similar drugs such as sulphoral and veronal." "Alcohol has been defined from the physiological and medical view point as "an intoxicating, hypnotic, analgesic anaesthetic, narcotic, poisonous and potentially habit forming or addictive drug or chemical" (Andrew G. Ivy, Institute of Scientific Studies, California)'' quoted at page 25 of Liquor Menace in India by Justice Tek Chand. 49. We must also take note of the social purpose behind S.57A. The provision is targeted at protecting the poorer sections of the populace who resort to the cheap varieties of liquor. Liquor and poverty are close companions. "The poor, as everywhere, are the greatest sufferers. It is they who spend what little they earn in buying alcohol instead of buying good food and other necessaries. The provision is targeted at protecting the poorer sections of the populace who resort to the cheap varieties of liquor. Liquor and poverty are close companions. "The poor, as everywhere, are the greatest sufferers. It is they who spend what little they earn in buying alcohol instead of buying good food and other necessaries. It is that wretched poor man who has to starve his family who has to break the sacred trust of looking after his children, if any, in order to drink himself into misery and premature death.'' (Mahatma Gandhi). 50. Liquor itself has become a widespread social menace; spurious or adulterated liquor is all the more so. Liquor is in effect is poison to the human being. Medical books classify it under drugs and poisons, (Though we shall assume with the Punjab and Haryana High Court that it is 'food' for purposes of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act): No text book on nutrition treats alcohol as food. On this, we have the testimony of no less a person than the greatest social reformer Kerala has seen in recent times, Sree Narayana Guru, who administered the telling admonition to his disciples. (Liquor is poison. You shall not make it, supply it or drink it). It was however ironical, that the Vypeen tragedy struck this State on the very day it was celebrating his. Jayanthi in the year 1982. Mahatma Gandhi was no less emphatic about it when he observed: "One of the most greatly felt evils of the British rule is the importation of alcohol, that enemy of mankind, that curse of civilisation in some form or another." Again it is ironic that among the Gandhian tenets consigned to the scrap heap of history is prohibition. As observed by an American temperance leader. Satan could not have fallen on a more potent instrument than liquor with which to threll the world. There is thus a very good social purpose involved in S.57A, which goes to the interests of the poor. Having regard to all this, it cannot be postulated that the sentences prescribed are excessive or barbarous. 51. The sentence of death is awarded only to those who mix the noxious substances with liquor, under sub-s.(1). There is thus a very good social purpose involved in S.57A, which goes to the interests of the poor. Having regard to all this, it cannot be postulated that the sentences prescribed are excessive or barbarous. 51. The sentence of death is awarded only to those who mix the noxious substances with liquor, under sub-s.(1). Those charged under sub-s.(2) for not taking reasonable precautions against such mixing are not subjected to death penalty even if death is caused thereby and the maximum punishment imposed is imprisonment for life. This itself shows the anxiety of the Legislature not to impose the death sentence except in cases where it is really deserved. 52. The contention" of Mr. P. C. Chacko that innocent employees of the licensee may also be caught in the net and sentenced to death does not appear to be sound; for the quantum of the sentence will depend upon the involvement of the accused in the offence, as in any other case, and it is quite unlikely that an employee of the licensee will be sentenced to death or long term imprisonment merely because of his employment. Nor are we impressed with the contention that the prescription of the sentence's under sub-sections(1) and (2) when a part of the burden is cast on the accused under sub-s.(5) makes it cruel or excessive violating Art.21. We have already explained the scope of sub-s.(5) and how it does not cast any unreasonable burden on the accused. The conviction is not based on any presumption but on the totality of the evidence, with the initial burden on the prosecution itself. 53. We hold therefore that the sentences prescribed by sub-s.(1) and (2) are not so severe or disproportionate as to violate Art.21 of the Constitution. 54. The next challenge is to clause (iii) of sub-s.(1) and (2). Counsel equates the offence under these clauses with the one specified in sub-s.(3) and submits that the prosecutor is left with the option at his sweet and pleasure, to proceed under either of these provisions with the consequence that those charged under clause (iii) of sub-s.(1) or (2) have the burden cast on them to prove their innocence under sub-s.(5). This is stated to be discriminatory. 55. We are afraid this contention proceeds on a clear misreading and misunderstanding of these provisions. This is stated to be discriminatory. 55. We are afraid this contention proceeds on a clear misreading and misunderstanding of these provisions. Clause (in) of sub-s.(1) or (2) deals with the residuary class of injuries and consequences not falling under clauses (i) and (ii) of these sub-sections, while sub-s.(3) is concerned with possession of liquor mixed with noxious substances. There is thus no overlapping of the provisions as they operate in totally different fields. No question of the prosecutor choosing any particular provision or his having any option in the matter, arises. Art.14 is not attracted in the circumstances. The challenge fails. 56. There is a vehement challenge by Mr. P. C. Chacko to sub-s.(2) as violating Art.14 of the Constitution. According to him, the section is vague and uncertain. It does not indicate what are the reasonable precautions envisaged thereby. The understanding of the expression "reasonable" will vary from person to person and what is reasonable to one may not be reasonable to another. It falls in the realm of subjective satisfaction and is therefore squarely hit by the decisions of the Supreme Court in A. L. Kalra v. Project Aid Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. 1984 (3) SCC 316 , Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut 1984 (1) SCC 1 . Those were cases where the definition of misconduct in the standing orders of the industrial establishments concerned were nebulous, and insufficient to inform the employee concerned as to what was the standard of conduct expected of him. In that context, Desai, J. speaking in both the cases, observed that where the misconduct entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. These decisions are called in aid to submit that subsequent events backed by hindsight may not entail a charge of absence of reasonable precautions. We do not agree. Sub-section(2) strikes at omission to take reasonable precautions against mixing of any noxious substance with liquor. The expression reasonable is not an unfamiliar one. It has been in vogue, and the subject of consideration over the centuries in the law of Torts and elsewhere with various concepts like reasonable care reasonable man, reasonable opportunity, reasonable time and so on. Sub-section(2) strikes at omission to take reasonable precautions against mixing of any noxious substance with liquor. The expression reasonable is not an unfamiliar one. It has been in vogue, and the subject of consideration over the centuries in the law of Torts and elsewhere with various concepts like reasonable care reasonable man, reasonable opportunity, reasonable time and so on. It is not a new legislative phenomenon occurring for the first time in sub-section (2). The test to decide whether the precautions taken were reasonable or not is an objective one, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. The reasonableness expected under it is that of the ordinary prudent man. There is no vagueness in the sub-section and there is no subjective element in it. It is not possible to define reasonableness with precision as it will depend on the facts of each case. The sub-section itself delineates the standard of care expected by laying down that it is against the mixing of any noxious substance with liquor. We may also observe that the determination of the question as to whether such precautions have been taken is left to the courts. We are therefore unable to agree with Mr. Chacko that there are no guidelines in, sub-s.(2) regarding reasonable precautions and that therefore it violates Art.14. 57. Sub-s.(3) is the nest target of attack by Mr. P. C. Chacko. This sub-section makes it an offence to be in possession of liquor mixed with any noxious substance, if the person in possession knew that it was so mixed. The petitioner's contention is that innocent persons who might have purchased liquor bona fide for consumption may be caught. But we do not foresee any such possibility, as S.13 of the Act permits a person to be in possession of such quantities of liquor as may be prescribed by notifications without a licence, so that the innocent consumer, whose case is canvassed by Mr. Chacko is not likely to be affected. This sub-section is intended to book persons who keep such poisonous liquor in large quantities, thereby raising a presumption that it is intended for sale, and not for bona fide consumption. Further, knowledge that the liquor is mixed with noxious substance is an essential ingredient of the section though the burden of proof of absence of such knowledge is on the person in possession. Further, knowledge that the liquor is mixed with noxious substance is an essential ingredient of the section though the burden of proof of absence of such knowledge is on the person in possession. But the burden can be discharged by the person adducing evidence to show as to how he came into possession of the liquor or as to how he could have had no knowledge of the poisonous nature of the contents. We do not find anything obnoxious in sub-s.(3). Really it is only complementary to sub-s.(1) and (2), necessary for their effective and proper implementation. 58. There was an attack to sub-s.(4) particularly clause (b). This sub-section deals with grant of bail and places some fetters on the grant of bail to persons charged under sub-s.(1) or (3) of S.57A. But it does not absolutely bar the grant of bail. It requires in the first instance that the prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose bail. No objection can be taken to this requirement and in fact none was taken seriously before us. The other requirement is that where the prosecution is opposing the application, the court shall grant bail only if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to hold that the accused as not guilty. This is alleged to be arbitrary. We cannot agree. S.57A itself is a special provision aimed at preventing the adulteration of liquor with noxious substances. The accused should as far as possible be kept away from the scene. He should not be allowed to interfere with the course of investigation. He should not also be allowed to indulge in similar nefarious activity, Bail is not granted as a matter of course but only subject to conditions. The condition imposed that the accused shall not be released unless there are reasonable grounds to hold that he is not guilty, is not an unreasonable condition as to violate either Art.14 or 21 of the Constitution. In fact; the similar provision in section. 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, was held by the Supreme Court to prevail over S.439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Narcotic Control Bureau v. Kishanlal AIR 1991 SC 558 . In fact; the similar provision in section. 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, was held by the Supreme Court to prevail over S.439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Narcotic Control Bureau v. Kishanlal AIR 1991 SC 558 . The decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bimal Kaur Khalsa v. Union of India AIR 1988 P and H. 95 relied on by the petitioners dealt with a different provision in S.20(8) of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, which permitted bail only if the court had reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was not guilty of the offence and that he was not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The Full Bench said that this latter requirement made an impossible demand on the court and was therefore invalid. In fact the Full Bench struck down only this part of the section, and not the part which barred the court from granting bail unless it had reasonable grounds to hold that the accused was not guilty of the offence. That is precisely the position here. 59. Mr. K. Divakaran Nair, counsel for some of the petitioners had a contention that sub-s.(4) as also the other provisions conflict with Chap.18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly S.316 thereof and S.24 of the Evidence Act and are therefore invalid. We are unable to agree. We have already pointed out that the Act is within the legislative competence of the State under Entries 8, 64 and 65 of List II. Assuming that there is any conflict as alleged, S.57A prevails as being one comprehended within the power of legislation under the aforesaid entries. We overrule this contention. 60. We now come to S.57B. The first ground of challenge is to sub-s.(1) which provides that the court may, while passing judgment in a case falling under S.57A, direct the licensee to pay compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased or to the persons who have suffered grievous hurt, if it is satisfied that the death or grievous hurt was caused by the consumption of liquor sold in his shop irrespective of whether he was convicted or not. We do not find anything wrong in this provision. We do not find anything wrong in this provision. When death or grievous hurt is caused after the consumption of liquor in a shop, the normal inference is that the licensee was negligent and responsible for selling adulterated liquor for which he is answerable. At the same time the offence may not be brought home to him, though the liquor consumed was from his shop. The section only recognises this civil liability of the accused which exists irrespective of whether he is found guilty or not. The section is very limited in its operation by casting the liability only on the licensee. It also provides sufficient safeguard by insisting that the court should be satisfied that the death or grievous hurt was caused by consumption of the liquor sold in the licensee's shop. This is quite reasonable and intended for the benefit of the consumer. We do not find any illegality in it. 61. Sub-s.(2) which provides that the accused cannot file appeal against the award of compensation under sub-s.(1) without deposit of the amount of compensation is the next provision under challenge. The right of appeal is a creature of the statute and is not one as of right. There is no inherent right of appeal. It is upto the Legislature to provide a fight of appeal or not, and if such a right is conferred, to prescribe the terms and conditions subject to which the appeal will lie. Sub-s.(2) only provides a conditional right of appeal as under S.35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. (Vide Vijay Prakash and Jawahar v. Collector of Customs AIR 1988 SC 2010 . Imposition of a condition of deposit as a condition precedent for the maintainability of the appeal does not therefore militate against any right of the parties. The fact that there is no power to dispense with the deposit in appropriate cases will not affect the position inasmuch as the right of appeal is itself a creature of the statute, and cannot be availed of otherwise than as expressly provided, This ground of challenge also therefore fails. 62. We have dealt with the various points raised by the petitioners. They had referred to numerous decisions, particularly on Art.14, but we have not referred to all of them as the principles are well established and only the application of those principles arises in these cases. 63. 62. We have dealt with the various points raised by the petitioners. They had referred to numerous decisions, particularly on Art.14, but we have not referred to all of them as the principles are well established and only the application of those principles arises in these cases. 63. Incidentally a complaint was made that S.57A does not contain any provision for chemical analysis as those found in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. But we do not consider that this vitiates the section as such as the initial burden in the case is still on the prosecution, as we have indicated earlier. 64. All the grounds of attack made by the petitioners therefore fail. We hold that S.57A and 57B are not unconstitutional or void. The original petitions are therefore without merit. They are accordingly dismissed. Office will forthwith communicate the fact of dismissal of these original petitions and the vacating of the order of stay of the cases pending in the various courts, by the interim orders passed in these cases, to the respective courts for information, with direction to expedite the trial of those cases, which are fairly old ones.