PRAKASH TEXTILES (GUJARAT) PRIVATE LIMITED,ahmedabad v. STATE
1993-12-24
A.P.RAVANI, D.G.KARIA
body1993
DigiLaw.ai
RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners pray for declaration that their processing houses are not covered by Entry No. 18 in Part I of Schedule I of the minimum Wages Act, 1948 (for short the Act ). Entry No. 18 in Part i of Schedule to the Act relates to employment in any powerloom industry in which any of the processes of winding, warping, beaming, sizing, drawing, reaching, weaving, dyeing, bleaching, calendering, folding, finishing or similar processes are carried on. Therefore, the question required to be considered in this petition is as to whether on admitted and or proved facts the petitioners establishments are covered by the provisions of the act or not ? ( 2 ) THE petitioners procure grey cloth from their principals. They process this ready-made cloth for and on behalf of other textile mills/ merchants on contract basis. Some of the petitioners are proprietory concerns and some are partnership concerns. Some of the petitioners are private limited companies. However, it is an admitted position that all the petitioners are engaged in processing of ready-made cloth. The units run by the petitioners are registered under the Factories Act, 1948 and are covered by the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948. The petitioners are governed by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. According to the petitioners they are not covered by the definition of scheduled Employment read with Entry No. 18 in Part I of Schedule to the Act. ( 3 ) PETITIONER No. 4, i. e. , Uma Textiles, wrote letter dated 22/01/1980 to the appropriate officers of the Department of Labour and Social welfare and Scheduled Caste Development Department. Copy of this letter is not produced on record. However, it appears that the petitioner claimed that it was not covered by the provisions of the Act. In response to this representation the appropriate officer of the aforesaid department informed the petitioner by letter dated 7/05/1980 that in Part I of the Schedule to the Act powerloom industry is included. It is further stated that whether there may be loom or not in the establishment, if any one or more of the processes in this industry (powerloom industry) are carried on, then such establishment would be covered by the provisions of the Act.
It is further stated that whether there may be loom or not in the establishment, if any one or more of the processes in this industry (powerloom industry) are carried on, then such establishment would be covered by the provisions of the Act. After receipt of this letter in all 15 (fifteen) petitioners who are engaged in the business of processing of grey cloth have filed this petition on 10/08/1981 and prayed for relief as stated above. 3a. It is an undisputed position that the petitioners obtain textile or other fabrics from others in ready form, i. e. , woven cloth. As stated in para 5 of the petition, the said cloth is then bleached, dyed and/or printed, depending upon the requirements of the petitioners and/or the requirements of the suppliers. It is further stated that this process is done manually whereas some part of the processing may be done by power driven machines. It is also an undisputed position that the work of processing is done on ready-made cloth. The processing begins with treatment of ready-made cloth. No weaving process is carried on by processing houses run by the petitioners. There are no looms in any of the petitioners establishments. In view of these facts and particularly in view of the fact that there are no looms whatsoever in any of the petitioners establishments it is contended that under no circumstances such processing houses be classified as "powerloom industry". ( 4 ) ON behalf of the Government no affidavit-in-reply is filed. It is submitted that on the basis of the admitted facts the provisions of the Act are applicable. It is further submitted that in this petition the question is of interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act and application of the same to the admitted facts of the case. Therefore, there is no need to file affidavitin- reply and on this basis arguments have been advanced. ( 5 ) AS stated in the Preamble to the Act, the object of the Act is to provide for fixing minimum rates of wages in certain employments. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ministry of Labour and rehabilitation v. Tiffins B. A. and P. Ltd. , reported in AIR 1985 SC 1391 , in para 3 of the reported decision, the legislation is a social welfare legislation undertaken to further the Directive Principles of State Policy.
As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ministry of Labour and rehabilitation v. Tiffins B. A. and P. Ltd. , reported in AIR 1985 SC 1391 , in para 3 of the reported decision, the legislation is a social welfare legislation undertaken to further the Directive Principles of State Policy. The provisions of the Act are intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to workmen employed in the scheduled employments by prescribing minimum rates of wages for them. Therefore, in construing the said provisions, the Court should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of construction (See para 11 of the decision in the case of M. P. Mineral Industry Association v. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), reported in AIR 1960 SC 1068 ). ( 6 ) THE provisions of the Act are intended to work in regard to employment specified in Part I and Part II of the Schedule. The legislature has left it to the Government to decide as to which employment the Act should be extended and in which areas. Section 5 (2) of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to fix or revise the minimum wages in regard to any of the employment to which the Act applies. This power can be exercised only if the employment in question is specified in the Schedule to the Act. Section 27 of the Act confers power on the appropriate Government to add an employment to the Schedule. ( 7 ) AS far as the dispute raised in this petition is concerned, we are required to refer to the definition of Scheduled Employment contained in Sec. 2 (g) of the Act which reads as follows:"scheduled Employment" means an employment specified in the Schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment. "as stated above, Sec. 27 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to add to either Part of the Schedule any employment in respect of which it is of the opinion that minimum wages should be fixed under the Act. It is an undisputed position that in relation to the State of Gujarat Entry No. 18 in Part I of the Schedule has been added by appropriate Notification dated 13/07/1964. The Entry reads as follows :"18.
It is an undisputed position that in relation to the State of Gujarat Entry No. 18 in Part I of the Schedule has been added by appropriate Notification dated 13/07/1964. The Entry reads as follows :"18. Employment in any powerloom industry in which any of the processes of winding, warping, beaming, sizing, drawing, reaching, weaving, dyeing, bleaching, calendering, folding, finishing or similar processes are carried on. " ( 8 ) READING the definition of scheduled employment contained in Sec. 2 (g) of the Act and Entry No. 18, reproduced hereinabove, it is required to be decided as to whether the establishments of the petitioners which run processing houses are covered by Entry No. 18 and, therefore, covered by the provisions of the Act or not. ( 9 ) IT is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners do not carry on activity of manufacturing of cloth in any of their process houses. It is further submitted that none of the petitioners is having powerloom in any of its establishment. This is an admitted position. In view of this admitted position it is submitted that the petitioners cannot be said to be covered by Entry No. 18 and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a scheduled employment. ( 10 ) IN order to understand the scope of the definition of scheduled employment and Entry No. 18 it would be proper to reproduce both again, and then read the relevant portion. "scheduled employment" means an employment specified in the schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment. " "18. Employment in any powerloom industry in which any of the processes of winding, warping, beaming sizing, drawing, reaching, weaving, dyeing, bleaching, calendering, folding, finishing or similar processes are carried on. " in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case it would read as follows :" scheduled employment means employment in any powerloom industry or any process or branch of work forming part of employment in powerloom industry. "read in this fashion it would be clear that the legislature intended to cover all the processes which may be necessary and which may be being carried on in a powerloom industry. Similarly, the legislature also intended to include branch of work forming part of employment in powerloom industry.
"read in this fashion it would be clear that the legislature intended to cover all the processes which may be necessary and which may be being carried on in a powerloom industry. Similarly, the legislature also intended to include branch of work forming part of employment in powerloom industry. ( 11 ) IT is not the case of the petitioners that the cloth processed in their processing houses is not manufactured on powerlooms. It is also not the case of the petitioners that processing of grey cloth is not incidental activity of the manufacturing of cloth on powerlooms. As indicated hereinabove all the petitioners are registered under the Factories Act, 1948. They are governed by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. As stated by the petitioners themselves they obtain cloth from others and process the same for resale and/or process ready-made cloth for and on behalf of others. To repeat, it is averred in para 5 of the petition that the petitioners obtain ready cloth, i. e. , woven cloth. The said cloth is then bleached, dyed and/or printed, depending upon the requirements of the petitioners and/or the requirements of the suppliers. It is also an admitted position that processing is done of ready-made cloth and no weaving process is carried on by the petitioners who run processing houses. ( 12 ) IN view of the admitted facts the short question which needs to be answered is - simply because the petitioners do not have powerlooms in their establishments, can it be said that they are not covered by Entry No. 18 of Part I of the Schedule to the Act read with the definition of scheduled employment occurring in Sec. 2 (g) of the Act ? ( 13 ) IF the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the words "or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment" occurring in the definition of scheduled employment would become redundant. As indicated hereinabove, the legislature intended to cover all the processes in the powerloom industry. The legislature also intended to cover branch of work forming part of employment in powerloom industry. That is the reason why the definition of scheduled employment has not stopped at stating, an employment specified in the Schedule.
As indicated hereinabove, the legislature intended to cover all the processes in the powerloom industry. The legislature also intended to cover branch of work forming part of employment in powerloom industry. That is the reason why the definition of scheduled employment has not stopped at stating, an employment specified in the Schedule. It has proceeded further so as to include any process or branch of work forming part of such employment - in the context, employment in powerloom industry. ( 14 ) IN this connection reference may be made to decision of the supreme Court in the case of M. P. Mineral Industry Association v. The regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur, reported in AIR 1960 sc 1068 . In that case the question arose as to what would be the width and amplitude of entry relating to employment in stone-breaking and stonecrushing. In para 11 of the decision the Supreme Court inter alia observed, "in answering the question it would be necessary to bear in mind that the scheduled employment under Sec. 2 (g) covers the employment specified in the Schedule or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment". It was conceded before the Supreme Court that the provisions of the Act apply to the scheduled employments in all branches of their work which may be incidental to the main scheduled employment. The supreme Court noted this concession with approval. ( 15 ) IN view of the aforesaid position of law laid down by the honble Supreme Court, all that is required to be considered by the court in the instant case is whether processing of ready-made cloth (or grey cloth as it is many a times called) would be covered by the expression "or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment" occurring in the definition of scheduled employment ? The answer has to be in affirmative. This is so because in Entry No. 18 the legislature did not stop at saying, employment in any powerloom industry. The legislature further stated, "in which any of the processes of winding, warping, beaming, sizing, drawing, reaching, weaving, dyeing, bleaching, calendering, folding, finishing or similar processes are carried on".
The answer has to be in affirmative. This is so because in Entry No. 18 the legislature did not stop at saying, employment in any powerloom industry. The legislature further stated, "in which any of the processes of winding, warping, beaming, sizing, drawing, reaching, weaving, dyeing, bleaching, calendering, folding, finishing or similar processes are carried on". Had it been the intention of the legislature to cover only establishments actually weaving cloth on powerlooms and having powerlooms in their establishments, then the legislature would not have used the expression, employment in any powerloom industry. The legislature would have used the expression, employment in any powerloom establishment. Moreover, the legislature also would not have used the expression, in which any of the processes of winding, warping, beaming, fixing, drawing, reaching, weaving, dyeing, bleaching, calendering, folding, finishing or similar processes are carried on". If the aforesaid interpretation is not given, the expression "or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment occurring in the definition of scheduled employment contained in Sec. 2 (g) would be rendered meaningless. Moreover, it would also be against the avowed object of the Act. As indicated hereinabove the Act is a piece of social welfare legislation. It is aimed to further the Directive Principles of State Policy. It is required to be interpreted by applying the beneficent rule of construction. Therefore the attempt of the Court should be to give widest possible amplitude to the expression, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment and also to the words employment in any powerloom industry and the subsequent expression occurring in the said entry. If this approach is not adopted by the Court, the very object of the Act would be frustrated. By adopting a narrow meaning as suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioner the Court would be adopting the interpretation which would run counter to the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in the constitution. Such approach is not permissible nor the same is warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submitted that processing of ready-made cloth woven by textile mills on powerlooms itself has become a separate industry. In his submission there are several units which carry on only processing activity.
Such approach is not permissible nor the same is warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submitted that processing of ready-made cloth woven by textile mills on powerlooms itself has become a separate industry. In his submission there are several units which carry on only processing activity. In fact in this petition there are fifteen petitioners who carry on such activity and they joined together to challenge the legality and validity of the stand taken by the respondents. It is submitted that some time in the year 1966 a committee was appointed by the Government for deciding as to which industry should be covered by the provisions of the Act. The said committee also has not stated that the processing houses should be covered by the provisions of the Act. In his submission the Government has not specifically included employment in processing houses in the Schedule. Therefore, it should be held that the legislature never intended to cover employment in processing houses by the provisions of the Act. ( 17 ) THE argument is double edged. The Government did not specify the employment in processing houses separately, not because the Government did not wish to cover the employment in processing houses by the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. The Government did not do so because by the definition of scheduled employment and the wide coverage of Entry No. 18, employment in processing houses stood covered. We have already indicated our reasons why this interpretation has to be adopted. This is the only possible reason why the Government has refrained from indulging in exercise in futility and creating further confusion. ( 18 ) LEARNED Counsel for petitioners relied upon a decision rendered by learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Prakash Textile (Guj.) p. Ltd. v. State, reported in [1982 (2)] XXIII (2) GLR 392. It was a case wherein processing house was prosecuted for not complying with the provisions of the Act. The accused therein filed application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying that the complaint filed against it be quashed and set aside.
It was a case wherein processing house was prosecuted for not complying with the provisions of the Act. The accused therein filed application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying that the complaint filed against it be quashed and set aside. The learned single Judge, after referring to the provisions of Sec. 2 (g) and also Entry No. 18 of Part I of the schedule, in para 5 of the decision observed as follows :"a mere look at the aforesaid entry shows that before any employment is held to be a scheduled employment as per that entry, it must be shown that any of the processes as mentioned in Entry 18 is carried on therein as a part and parcel of a powerloom industry. The entry in terms takes in its fold employment in any powerloom industry and treats it as scheduled employment. In the course of running of such powerloom industry, if various types of processes are carried on by the employer like dyeing, bleaching, etc. , as mentioned in the entry, these processes would all be covered by the net-work of Entry 18. It is true that the petitioner No. 1-Company is running a processing house wherein grey cloth is subjected to the process of bleaching and dyeing. However, merely because process of bleaching and dyeing of grey cloth is carried on by petitioner no. 1-Company, it cannot be termed as a scheduled employment as per Entry 18 unless it is further shown that the said process of bleaching and dyeing of grey cloth is carried on by petitioner No. 1-Company as an integral part and a component of the main powerloom industry. Unless that is established. Entry 18 cannot apply at all. In short, before Entry 18 can apply to an industry, it must be shown that it is a powerloom industry and in the process of its running, looms on power, various other processes of winding, warping, dyeing, bleaching, etc. , are being carried on by the establishment. Thus. for the applicability of entry 18, existence of a powerloom industry is a sine que non or a condition precedent. It must, therefore, be alleged and shown that a powerloom industry is being run by the concerned accused and in the process, they are also offering employment in their bleaching or dyeing depart.
Thus. for the applicability of entry 18, existence of a powerloom industry is a sine que non or a condition precedent. It must, therefore, be alleged and shown that a powerloom industry is being run by the concerned accused and in the process, they are also offering employment in their bleaching or dyeing depart. ments and that, therefore, they are required to comply with the statutory provisions of the Act. " ( 19 ) IT is not contemplated by the definition of scheduled employment and the language of Entry No. 18 that the process or branch of work in employment of powerloom industry should be as a part and parcel of powerloom industry. Such process or branch of work need not and may not be an integral part or component of the main powerloom industry. The learned single Judge has erroneously referred to the expression "powerloom industry" as synonymous with "powerloom establishment". This is an error which has crept in the aforesaid conclusion. With utmost respect, the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge is erroneous. Despite the able assistance rendered in that case by the Counsel appearing for the parties, attention of the learned single Judge was not drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. P. Mineral Industry association (supra ). As observed by the Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision any process or branch of work forming part of such employment would also be covered by the employment specified as scheduled employment. As pointed out hereinabove, the Honble Supreme court has also observed that the Act would apply to the scheduled employment in all branches of the work which may be incidental to the main scheduled employment. Had the attention of the learned single Judge been drawn to this settled law, the error might not have been committed. ( 20 ) IN the aforesaid extracted portion the distinction between industry and establishment is lost sight of. Employment in powerloom industry is not synonymous with employment in powerloom establishment. In a powerloom establishment there may be only manufacturing activity of weaving on powerloom. In such establishment other processes also may be integrated, but it is not necessary that other processes should always be integrated in powerloom establishment. Over and above weaving of cloth there are many other processes and branches of work in powerloom industry.
In a powerloom establishment there may be only manufacturing activity of weaving on powerloom. In such establishment other processes also may be integrated, but it is not necessary that other processes should always be integrated in powerloom establishment. Over and above weaving of cloth there are many other processes and branches of work in powerloom industry. These processes are also covered by Entry No. 18. These processes and branches of work are also covered by the definition of scheduled employment. The language of the definition of scheduled employment or the language of Entry No. 18 do not by any stretch of reasoning indicate that for covering any establishment wherein any incidental process or branch of work forming part of employment in powerloom industry is being carried on, there should be powerloom as a sine qua non or a condition precedent. If this interpretation is adopted it would run counter to the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in M. P. Mineral Industry Association (supra ). Moreover, such interpretation would frustrate the object of the Act and would run counter to the Directive principles of State Policy enshrined in the Constitution. In view of this position, with utmost respect, the interpretation rendered by the learned single judge in the case of Prakash Textile (Guj.) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) cannot be accepted and the same does not lay down the correct law. . ( 21 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. G. R. Tiles Manufacturers v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1977 SC 90 : [1977 GLR 688 (SC)]. In that case the Supreme Court interpreted the word "includes" occurring in Entry No. 22 of Part I to the Schedule. In that context the Supreme Court held that the word includes" should be read as "means" and not as extending the scope of the entry. In the instant case there is no question of extending the scope of the entry. In the instant case it is an admitted position that the petitioners are processing houses and they are carrying on one or other process which is mentioned in Entry No. 18. Therefore, reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of S. G. R. Tiles Manufacturers (supra) is of no help to the petitioner.
In the instant case it is an admitted position that the petitioners are processing houses and they are carrying on one or other process which is mentioned in Entry No. 18. Therefore, reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of S. G. R. Tiles Manufacturers (supra) is of no help to the petitioner. ( 22 ) NO other contention is raised. ( 23 ) IN the result the petition fails. For the aforesaid reasons the petition is rejected. Rule discharged. .