A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition amply demonstrates the plight of the parties who are at times unnecessarily tossed from the pillar to the post and vice-versa. Till this petition has come to be moved in this Court the parties have undergone some 16 proceedings in the one or the other form. Most of the times the matter has been remanded. What is challenged is this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal at Dhandhuka (the first authority for convenience) on 27th November 1980 in Tenancy Case No. 206 as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms-Appeals3 at Ahmedabad (the appellate authority for convenience) on 16th July 1982 in Tenancy Appeal No. 136 of 1981 as further affirmed in revision by the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 11th June 1984 in Revision Application No. 1687 of 1982. By his impugned order the first authority came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 herein was not entitled to purchase one parcel of land bearing Survey No. 570 admeasuring 6 acres 27 gunthas situated in the sim of village Gorasu taluka Dhandhuka district Ahmedabad (the disputed land for convenience) as his holding as on 1st April 1957 (the Tillers Day) was in excess of the ceiling area and ordered it to be placed for disposal under Sec. 32p of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (the Act for brief ). ( 2 ) THIS litigation has a somewhat chequered history. Respondent No. 1 herein was the tenant of the disputed land as on 1st April 1957. He therefore would become its deemed purchaser under sec. 32 of the Act subject to certain provisions contained therein. One such provision is found to be in Sec. 32b thereof. If the holding of the tenant as on 1st April 1957 was found to be in excess of the ceiling area either as a tenant or as an owner or partly as a tenant and partly as an owner he would not become the deemed purchaser of the land held by him as a tenant under Sec. 32 thereof. If the holding of the tenant as on 1st April 1957 was found to be in excess of the ceiling area either as a tenant or as an owner or partly as a tenant and partly as an owner he would not become the deemed purchaser of the land held by him as a tenant under Sec. 32 thereof. Since respondent No. 1 herein was the tenant of the disputed land as on 1 April 1957 the proceeding under Sec. 32g of the Act was undertaken by the first authority in 1969 It came to be registered as Tenancy Case No. 32 of 1969. By his order passed on 7th July 1969 in the aforesaid proceeding the first authority came to the conclusion that the holding of respondent No. 1 herein was more than the ceiling area for the purposes of the Act and therefore the purchase of the disputed land became ineffective and it was placed for disposal under Sec. 32p thereof. Its copy is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 38. That aggrieved respondent No. 1 herein. He therefore carried the manner in appeal before the appellate authority by means of Tenacy Appeal No. 94 of 1969. By his order passed on 13th December 1969 in the aforesaid appeal the aforesaid order passed by the first authority on 7th July 1969 at Annexure E (part) to this petition came to be set aside and the matter came to be remanded to the first authority for fresh inquiry. On remand the first authority came to the conclusion that the tenant was entitled to purchase the disputed land and fixed its purchase price by his order passed on 29 May 1970 Its copy is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 40. THAT aggrieved the present petitioner. He carried the matter in appeal before that appellate authority by means of his Tenancy Appeal No. 160 of 1970. By his order passed on 3rd December 1970 in the aforesaid appeal the appellate authority accepted the appeal and set aside the aforesaid order passed by the first authority on 29th May 1970 and again remanded the matter to the first authority for fresh inquiry for the purposes of sec. 32c of the Act. By his order passed on 3rd December 1970 in the aforesaid appeal the appellate authority accepted the appeal and set aside the aforesaid order passed by the first authority on 29th May 1970 and again remanded the matter to the first authority for fresh inquiry for the purposes of sec. 32c of the Act. A copy of the aforesaid appellate order passed by the appellate authority on 3rd December 1970 is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 44. That aggrieved respondent No. 1 herein. He carried the matter in revision before the Tribunal by means of his Revision Application No. TEN B. A. 273 of 1971. By its decision rendered on 15th February 1972 in the aforesaid revisional application the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is at Annexure D to this petition at page 33 On remand by his order passed on 31st December 1972 the first authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner as the landlord was entitled to possession of the disputed land for personal cultivation under sec. 32p of the Act. Its copy is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 47. It appears that the aforesaid order passed by the first authority on 31st December 1972 came to the notice of the appellate authority and he found it not to be according to law. He thereupon took up the suo motu proceeding for upsetting it in exercise of his powers under Sec 76 of the Act. It appears that in the meantime respondent No. 1 herein appears to have preferred some appeal questioning the correctness of the aforesaid order passed by the first authority on 31 December 1972. Thereupon the appellate authority revoked the notice issued for his suo motu proceeding under Sec. 76a of the Act by his order passed on 1st June 1973. Its copy is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 50. It appears that by his order passed on 18th February 1973 the appellate authority set aside the aforesaid order passed by the first authority on 31st December 1972 and remanded the matter to the first authority for his fresh decision according to law. After remand by his order passed on 13th December 1973 the first authority disposed of the proceeding as having been compromised between the parties. It appears that respondent No. 1 was aggrieved thereby. After remand by his order passed on 13th December 1973 the first authority disposed of the proceeding as having been compromised between the parties. It appears that respondent No. 1 was aggrieved thereby. He thereupon carried the matter in appeal before the appellate authority by means of Tenancy Appeal No. 12 of 1974. BY his order passed on 29th April 1974 inthe aforesaid appeal the appellate authority accepted the appeal and set aside the aforesaid order passed by the first authority on 13th December 1973 and remanded the matter for his fresh decision according to law. Its copy is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 51. That aggrieved the present petitioner. He thereupon invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal by means of his Revision Application No. 408 of 1974. By its decision rendered on 28th April 1975 in the aforesaid revisional application the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 55. The matter thereupon came back to the first authority and came to be registered afresh as Tenancy Case No. 206 of 1975. By his order passed on 31st May 1977 in Tenancy Case No. 206 of 1975 the first authority came to the conclusion that the tenant had no surplus land and was therefore entitled to statutory purchase of the disputed land and fixed its purchase price accordingly. Its copy is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 61. That appears to have aggrieved both the landlord and the tenant. Both of them carried the matter in appeal before the appellate authority by means of their respective appeals Nos. 280/199 and 281 of 1977. By his common order passed on 25 May 1978 in the aforesaid two appeals the appellate authority came to the conclusion that the aforesaid order passed on 31st May 1977 was not required to be implemented and the other earlier order passed on 18th February 1973 on the basis of the compromise between the parties was required to be restored. IT was strange that the order passed on 18th February 1973 by the first authority was upset by the appellate authority by his order passed on 29 April 1974 in Tenancy Appeal No. 12 of 1974 and the same order came to be confirmed by the order passed by the appellate authority on 25th May 1978 as aforesaid. IT was strange that the order passed on 18th February 1973 by the first authority was upset by the appellate authority by his order passed on 29 April 1974 in Tenancy Appeal No. 12 of 1974 and the same order came to be confirmed by the order passed by the appellate authority on 25th May 1978 as aforesaid. Its copy is part of Annexure E to this petition at page 67. That aggrieved respondent No. 1 herein. He thereupon invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal by means of his Revision Application No. 106 of 1979. By its decision rendered on 6th April 1979 in the aforesaid revisional application the Tribunal accepted it and the orders passed by the lower authorities were set aside and the matter was remanded to the first authority for his fresh decision according to law in the light of the observations made in its decision. A copy of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal rendered on 6th April 1979 is pan of Annexure E to this petition at page 72. After remand the case was registered afresh as Tenancy Case No. 206 before the first authority. By his order passed on 27th November 1980 in Tenancy Case No. 206 the first authority came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 herein was not entitled to purchase statutorily the disputed land under the Act as his holding was in excess of the ceiling area as on 1st April 1957 and the disputed land was placed for disposal at the instance of the Collector under Sec. 32p (5) thereof: It COPY is at Annexure A to this petition at page 13. That aggrieved the present petitioner. He carried the matter in appeal before the appellate authority by means of his Tenancy Appeal No. 136 of 1981. By his order passed on 16th July 1982 in the aforesaid appeal the appellate authority dismissed it. Its copy is at Annexure B to this petition at page 17. The aggrieved petitioner thereupon unsuccessfully invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal by means of his Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1687 of 1982 By its decision rendered on 11th July 1984 in the aforesaid revisional application the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is Annexure C to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner thereupon unsuccessfully invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal by means of his Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1687 of 1982 By its decision rendered on 11th July 1984 in the aforesaid revisional application the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is Annexure C to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner has thereupon moved this Court by means of this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India of questioning the correctness of the impugned order at Annexure A to is petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure B to this petition as further affirmed in revision by the impugned decision at Annexure C to this petition. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 has rightly not challenged the impugned order at Annexure A to this petition as affirmed in appeal and revision as his holding was in excess of the ceiling area on 1st April 1957. The petitioner has challenged it because the disputed land is placed at the disposal of the Collector under Sec. 32p (5) of the Act rather than giving it to the petitioner. The grievance voiced by Shri R. A. Patel for the petitioner before me is to the effect that the rights of the parties as on the Tillers Day have to be taken into consideration and the law as applicable on that day will have to be applied and not as applicable on the date of the order at Annexure A to this petition. As against this Shri Rathod for respondent No. 2 has submitted that the impugned order at Annexure A to this petition as affirmed in appeal and revision is quite just and proper and according to law and calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of its limited powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. Shri Amin for respondent No. 1 has adopted the submissions urged before me by Shri Rathod for respondent No. 2. ( 4 ) IT is obvious that Sec. 32e of the Act will govern the situation. As pointed out hereinabove respondent No. 1 herein as the tenant of the disputed land could not become its deemed purchaser in view of Sec. 32b thereof. It will have therefore to be disposed of as provided in Sec. 32e thereof. ( 4 ) IT is obvious that Sec. 32e of the Act will govern the situation. As pointed out hereinabove respondent No. 1 herein as the tenant of the disputed land could not become its deemed purchaser in view of Sec. 32b thereof. It will have therefore to be disposed of as provided in Sec. 32e thereof. It appears that the said statutory provision in the present form was brought on the statute book by Gujarat Act V of 1973 (the Amending Act for brief ). The question would therefore arise as to whether the Amending Act is prospective or retrospective in operation. If it is prospective in operation the disputed land will have to be disposed of in accordance with Sec. 32e of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by the Amending Act. If it is retrospective in operation the impugned order at Annexure A to this petition as affirmed in appeal and revision calls for no interference by this Court. ( 5 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court in its binding ruling in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Rameshwar Rathod reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1849. It is well-settled that the normal rule of construction is that a provision in a statute is prospective and not retrospective. but however in the case of statutes which are merely declaratory or which relate to only matters of procedure or of evidence it may have retrospective effect if there are indications to that effect or the manifest purpose compels one to construe the Act as such. In that case the Apex Court was required to consider whether the case was governed by the unamended provisions of Sec. 6a of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 (the Act of 1955 for brief) prior to its amendment by Act XXX of 1974 or it was governed by the amended provision of Sec. 6a of the Act of 1955. The Supreme Court found that there wore no specific words in Act XXX of 1974 to indicate that the provisions were of retrospective effect. On the contrary it was found in Sec. 1 (2) of Act XXX of 1974 that the amendment must be deemed to have come in effect on a particular date. In the light of these two features in Act XXX of 1974. On the contrary it was found in Sec. 1 (2) of Act XXX of 1974 that the amendment must be deemed to have come in effect on a particular date. In the light of these two features in Act XXX of 1974. the Supreme Court held in that case that Act XXX of 1974 was prospective and not retrospective in operation. According to Shri Patel for the petitioner. the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the ease of Rameshwar Rathod (supra) will squarely govern the present case so far as the Amending Act is concerned. ( 6 ) AS pointed out hereinabove the well-settled principle of construction is that a statute affecting vested rights of a person or a class of persons cannot ordinarily have any retrospective operation. A substantial right of a person or a class of persons cannot be taken away with retrospective effect in absence of any clear intention of the legislature in that regard. Section 32e as it existed prior to its amendment by the Amending Act read:the balance of any land after the purchase by the tenant under section 32 shall be disposed of in the manner laid down in section 15 as if it were land surrendered by the tenant. After amendment by the Amending Act it reads:the balance of any land after the purchases by the tenant under sec. 32 shall be disposed of by sale by the Collector in the manner specified in clause (c) of sub-section (2) of sec. 32p and thereupon the provisions of sub-section (5) of Sec. 32p shall apply to such sale. It becomes clear that the statutory provision engrafted in Sec. 32e of the Act prior to its amendment by the Amending Act was conferring a substantive right on landlord to claim the tenanted land if its statutory sale in favour of the tenant became ineffective under Sec. 32a or 32 of the Act. of course the right of the landlord in that regard was subject to fulfilment of certain conditions under Sec. 15 thereof as it existed at that time Nonetheless the landlord was entitled to claim the tenanted land if its statutory sale under the Act became ineffective. The Amending Act has taken away that right of the landlord irrespective of fulfilment of the conditions prescribed in Sec. 15 thereof as existing at the relevant time. The Amending Act has taken away that right of the landlord irrespective of fulfilment of the conditions prescribed in Sec. 15 thereof as existing at the relevant time. The tenanted land in that case is made disposable in the hands of the Collector. It thus becomes clear that the Amending Act has affected the-substantive right of a landlord like the present petitioner. It is obvious that it does not relate- to any procedural law or any rule of evidence. It is also not declaratory in nature. In view of the settled principle of interpretation. The said provision of the Amending Act will have to be construed as prospective and not retrospective in operation. ( 7 ) AS rightly submitted by Shri Patel for the petitioner there is no specific provision anywhere in the Amending Act to indicate the provisions thereof to be of retrospective effect. Sub-section 1 (2) thereof provides: It shall come into force on such date as the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette appoint. This would mean that the Act was to be brought into force on some future cate. This can be said to be a clear pointer to the effect that the Amending Act was not retrospective but prospective in operation. The aforesaid two features found in the Amending Act were found in Act XXX of 1974 by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling. On the basis of the aforesaid two features the Supreme Court held- Act XXX of 1974 to be prospective and not retrospective in operation. The aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court is on all fours applicable in the present case. As pointed out hereinabove those two very features are found present in the Amending Act. It will have therefore to be held that the Amending Act is prospective and not retrospective in operation. ( 8 ) AS rightly relied on by Shri Patel for the petitioner the Division Bench of this Court in its ruling in the case of Bapubhai Lunvir vs. RB. Mehta President Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and others reported in (1967) 8 G. L. R. 110 has held that the right of the parties inter alia for the purposes of Sections 32 32 and 32b will have to be decided as they were crystallised on the tillers day that is on 1st April 1957. Mehta President Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and others reported in (1967) 8 G. L. R. 110 has held that the right of the parties inter alia for the purposes of Sections 32 32 and 32b will have to be decided as they were crystallised on the tillers day that is on 1st April 1957. The impugned order in the instant case has certainly crystallised the right of the tenant that is respondent No. 1 herein as on 1st April 1957. It has however failed to crystallise the right of the landlord as on that day or date. That has certainly resulted in injustice to the landlord that is the petitioner herein. If the statutory purchase of the disputed land by the tenant under the Act become ineffective it would have to be disposed of in the light of the provisions applicable as on 1st April 1957 and not in the light of the provisions as applicable on the date the proceeding came to be finally terminated. No party should be prejudiced with respect to his substantive rights simply on account of laws delays. It is obvious that the petitioner was not solely responsible for tossing of the proceeding from time to time and remand of the matters for umpteen times. ( 9 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion I am of the opinion that the impugned order at Annexure A to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure B to this petition as further affirmed in revision by the impugned decision at Annexure C to this petition cannot be sustained in law. It has to be quashed and set aside. The matter will have to be remanded to the first authority for restoration of the case to file and disposal of the disputed land in accordance with the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 32e of the Act as it existed prior to its amendment by the Amending Act. In other words the case will have to be decided in the light of the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 32b read with Sec. 15 of the Act as were in existence on 1 April 1957. ( 10 ) IN the result this petition is accepted. In other words the case will have to be decided in the light of the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 32b read with Sec. 15 of the Act as were in existence on 1 April 1957. ( 10 ) IN the result this petition is accepted. The impugned order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal at Dhandhuka on 27th November 1980 in Tenancy Case No. 206 at Annexure A to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order passed by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms-Appeals) at Ahmedabad on 16th July 1982 in Tenancy Appeal No. 136 of 1981 at Annexure B to this petition as further affirmed in revision by the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 11th June 1984 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1687 of 1982 at Annexure C to this petition is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the first authority for disposal of the disputed land in the light of this judgment of mine Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. Petition Allowed. .