JUDGMENT : G.T. Nanavati, J. The assessee's appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the order of assessment for the assessment year 1968-69 was disposed of by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on May 30, 1972. By an application dated May 29, 1976, which was received by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on June 1, 1976, the assessee applied for rectification of that order by granting deduction of surtax paid by the assessee for the relevant assessment year. This application was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the ground that it was barred by limitation as the order was passed on May 30, 1972, and the application was made on May 29, 1976. Aggrieved by that order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad. The appeal was dismissed. The assessee then moved the Tribunal for referring the following question to this court under section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the application of the assessee was barred by limitation and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was justified in refusing to pass an order under section 154 of the Act on the same ?" 2. The Tribunal has referred the said question to this court for its opinion. 3. What is contended by learned counsel for the assessee is that, if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner wanted to reject the assessee's application on the ground of limitation, then the assessee should have been given an opportunity of satisfying him that the application was not barred by limitation. He further submitted that the assessee could have submitted that the date of communication of the order should be regarded as the date of the order and on that basis, the application which was filed by it was quite in time. In support of his contention that the date of communication of the order should be regarded as the date of that order, learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in CST v. Dharmdas Naresh Chand [1980] 45 STC 289, and of the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 . Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 . But for the fact that the point regarding deductibility of surcharge is now decided by this court in S. L. M. Maneklal Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1988] 172 ITR 176, we would have been required to consider the interpretation of the provisions of section 154 and more particularly sub-section (7) thereof, as it then stood. It is now settled law that the amount paid by way of surtax is not deductible from the total income. In that view of the matter, we decline to answer the question referred to us. We decline to answer the question also because even if the same is decided in favour of the assessee on the point of limitation, ultimately, it will have to be held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was justified in not granting deduction of surtax amount. The reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.