Judgment : These criminal original petitions and criminal miscellaneous petitions are disposed of together by a common order since they relate to the same case though two of the accused involved in the crime are different. In Crl.O.P.No.13738 of 1992, preferred by the State represented by the Inspector of Police, CBI/SCB, Madras, the prayer is to cancel bail in the event of arrest granted in favour of respondent K.Srinivasan by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras by his order dated 29. 1992 made in Crl.M.P.No.4656 of 1992 Criminal O.P.No. 13739of 1992 is a similar petition filed by the same Inspector of Police to cancel bail in the event of arrest ordered in favour of accused S.Balasubramaniam by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, by his order dated 10. 1992 made in Crl.M.P.No.4705 of 1992. 2. Crl.O.P.No.13310 of 1992 is again a petition by the same Inspector of Police to set aside that portion of the order made by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras in Crl.M.P.No.4705 of 1992 directing the respondent/accused S.Balasubramaniam to appear for interrogation along with his counsel .Crl.M.P.No.7117of l992 is yet another petition filed by the same Inspector of Police for stay of operation of the order in Crl.M.P. No.4705 of 1992 passed by the court of Sessions in favour of, respondent S.Balasubramaniam, pending disposal of Crl.O.P.No.13310 of 1992. 3. Crl.M.P.No.7553 of 1992 is a petition by accused Balasubramaniam for modification of the ex parte order made by this Court in Crl..M.P.No.7117 of 1992 deleting the word in the order of the learned Sessions Judge, made in Crl.M.P. No.4705 of 1992. .4. Facts in brief will have to be stated for the disposal of all these petitions. On the complaint of the Additional Collector of Customs, Madras, a case against S.Balasubramaniam, K. Srinivasan (both concerned in these petitions) and four others under Secs.l20-B read with 420,420,465,468 and 471 read with 468, Indian Penal Code was registered under R.C.No.l2(s)/92, under the orders of Superintendent of Police, CBI/SCB, Madras. Preliminary investigation revealed that the respondents in these petitions and 5 others had entered into a Criminal conspiracy to forge endorsements as though shipping bills were purportedly made by customs officials at various levels, and further had made use of those documents for exporting three consignments through Madras Air Cargo Complex to Singapore, for the purpose of illicitly exporting snake skins and narcotics, which are items banned for export. There was further indication that apart from the three consignments referred to above 17 other consignments had also been exported through Madras Air Cargo Complex to Malaysia, during January to December, 1991, by these accused, in respect of which shipping bills were in the process of being traced. The efforts of the Investigating officer to contact the respondents involved in these petitions to interrogate them did not meet with success. While so, after notice to the Investigating agency, learned principal Sessions Judge, Madras in Crl.M.P.No.4705 of 1992 on 1st October, 1992, directed enlargement on bail in the event of arrest of respondent Balasubramaniam on his executing a bond for a sum of Rs.5,000 (Rupees five thousand) with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the 10th Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras and on further condition that until further orders, respondent Balasubramaniam should report before the investigating officer dairy between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. for 15 working days for interrogation along with his advocate. It is the case of the investigating officer that till he received a copy of the order, he was not aware that the learned Sessions Judge had permitted the presence of counsel along with respondent Balasubramaniam for interrogation, for the petition filed by Balasubramaniam for anticipatory bail did not contain any such prayer. Further no argument was advanced in his presence by the learned counsel representing Balasubramaniam, pleading for presence of a counsel with him, at the time of interrogation. 5. As far as respondent Srinivasan is concerned, learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, on 29. 1992, in Crl.M.P.No.4656 of 1992, directed his release on bail in the event of his arrest on the same terms and conditions under which respondent Balasubramaniam was enlarged on bail except that respondent Srinivasan did not have the benefit of appearing along with his advocate for interrogation. .6. In pursuance of the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, respondent Balasubramaniam, appeared before the Investigating officer on 110. 1992 along with his counsel. He was not interrogated on that day since he appeared with his counsel. On the two subsequent dates, respondent Balasubramaniam did not appear for interrogation either individually or with his counsel. It was in that context, that on 110. 1992 along with his counsel. He was not interrogated on that day since he appeared with his counsel. On the two subsequent dates, respondent Balasubramaniam did not appear for interrogation either individually or with his counsel. It was in that context, that on 110. 1992 Investigating Officer moved this Court in Crl.O.P.No.l3310 of 1992, to set aside the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge made in Crl.M.P.No.4705 of 1992, and also obtained in Crl.M.P.No.7117 of 1992, stay of operation of that portion of the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge which permitted presence of an advocate, with respondent Balasubramaniam, for interrogation. 7. It is the case of Investigating Officer that respondent Balasubramaniam and his counsel were intimated over telephone of the order of stay obtained from this Court. However, on 110. 1992 and 110. 1992, Investigating officer received telegrams from Abdul Malick and Abdul Nazeer, counsel representing both the respondents as though the respondents had appeared before the Investigating Officer on 110. 1992 along with their advocate, when they were asked to go away without signing and directed to present themselves for interrogation, as and when required in future, by the Investigating officer. The second telegram refers to certain telephone calls received from the office of the investigating agency administering threats not to bring their counsel. A written notice was requested by the respondents. 8. As far as respondent Srinivasan is concerned, he appeared for interrogation on 110. 1992 along with his counsel, when he was not interrogated. On two subsequent dates, he did not appear. However, on 110. 1992 Investigating officer received a telegram from Advocate Abdul Malick stating that he had appeared along with his client Srinivasan, who was petitioner in W.P.No. 15503 of 1992, as ordered by the High Court, but only his specimen signatures were obtained and later made to go away with a direction to attend in future whenever required. On 110. 1992 another telegram was received from the counsel similar to the one referred to while narrating the facts with regard to respondent Balasubramaniam. Thereafter Srinivasan also did not appear. 9. While petitions for cancellation of bail in the event of arrest were pending before this Court, on the directions of Padmini Jesudurai, J., respondent Srinivasan claims to have appeared before the investigating officer for 13 days accompanied by his counsel. They include all the working days between 111. 1992 and 12. Thereafter Srinivasan also did not appear. 9. While petitions for cancellation of bail in the event of arrest were pending before this Court, on the directions of Padmini Jesudurai, J., respondent Srinivasan claims to have appeared before the investigating officer for 13 days accompanied by his counsel. They include all the working days between 111. 1992 and 12. 1992 respondent Srinivasan so appeared along with his counsel since he had obtained direction, facilitating that course, by filing W.P.No.15503 of 1992. It is not seriously disputed by the investigating officer, that respondent Srinivasan did appear on those thirteen days. 10. The grievance of the State, through the investigating officer, is that, if the respondents are to be permitted to appear in the company of their counsel, it would seriously impair and undermine the effectivity of investigation which is to be carried out in secrecy for essentially it was confidential in nature. Further according to the State, respondents have no fundamental right to have the presence of a lawyer at the time of interrogation or examination. Such a right does not also flow from any statute, since investigation had to be carried out with promptitude, to facilitate untravelling of the different facets in commission of this grave crime. If the respondents are permitted to present themselves for interrogation with their counsel the whole process of investigation will be thwarted and even non-incriminatory material will be denied, preventing a reasonable probe into the crime, for the ultimate benefit of the society. 11. Mr.P.Rajamanickam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State emphasised, that respondent Balasubramaniam had flouted the order of this Court atleast from 110. 1992, when this Court deleted that portion of the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, which permitted him to appear along with his counsel, while respondent Srinivasan had flouted the order, till he obtained orders in the writ petition permitting him to present himself for interrogation, along with his counsel. 12. Mr.M.R.M.Abdul Kareem, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of both the respondents contended, that soon after obtaining bail orders from the court of Sessions, be it on 29. 1992 or 10. 1992, courts were closed for Dasara holidays and even during vacation, respondent Srinivasan had obtained orders from this Court, by filing a writ petition, facilitating presence of a counsel along with him for interrogation. 1992 or 10. 1992, courts were closed for Dasara holidays and even during vacation, respondent Srinivasan had obtained orders from this Court, by filing a writ petition, facilitating presence of a counsel along with him for interrogation. Due to intervention of holidays, they got themselves released on bail in the event of arrest, by furnishing sureties only after the courts were opened and then promptly commenced appearing before the Investigating Officer. For reasons best known, respondents were not interrogated, but were directed to report for interrogation later as and when required. Such an attitude of the Investigating officer necessitated telegrams being forwarded. He strenuously argued that both the respondents were under the bona fide belief, that they should report for interrogation only after they had furnished sureties and not earlier and in any event mala fides cannot be imported into their action. 13. While Mr.P.Rajamanickam on the basis of certain decided cases, would urge that the respondents have no right to take a counsel along with them for interrogation, Mr.M.R.M Abdul Kareem, would with equal force contend, that a line of demarcation has to be drawn between persons sought to be interrogated under the customs or Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and persons accused of criminal offences under the Indian Penal Code, for under the former category, persons interrogated cannot be deemed to be accused, while under the latter category, persons interrogated are the accused mentioned in the first information report as such. According to Mr.Abdul Kareem, observation of the Supreme Court in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L.Dani, (1978)2 S.C.C 424 :1978 S.CC (Crl.) 236:1978 Crl.L.R. (S.C) 195:1978 Crl.App.R. (S.C) 273:1978 Crl.L.J. 968.A.I.R 1978 S.E. 1025. 14. Both counsel have referred to certain decided cases which I will consider in the relevant context. 15. Both respondents claim, that under Art.20(3) of the Constitution, they, being accused of an offence, shall not be compelled to be witnesses against themselves. Further they would seek protection under Art22(1) of the Constitution, and contend that they shall not be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice. 116. I had occasion to consider this question in The Senior Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue, Intelligence, Madras v. M.Premkumar and M.Ravi, 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 247. Further they would seek protection under Art22(1) of the Constitution, and contend that they shall not be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice. 116. I had occasion to consider this question in The Senior Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue, Intelligence, Madras v. M.Premkumar and M.Ravi, 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 247. In that case the respondents were sought to be interrogated under Sec.108 of the Customs Act and hence I held, that they were not in the position of accused or suspects and were not even arrested. Therefore they did not stand in the character of an accused and it will not suffice that at a future stage, they may be made accused in the Crime. The Customs authorities were performing their statutory duties and examination of these persons summoned, having regard to the scope and nature of the enquiry, was just fair and reasonable. Therefore while negativing the right of the respondents therein, to have the presence of a counsel during interrogation, I set aside that part of the order of the Sessions Judge permitting such a course while confirming the order of the court below, directing release of the respondents on bail in the even of their arrest, subject to certain modifications, while erasing the directions made to the respondents therein to appear before the petitioner only on two days for interrogation. In that context, I have observed as follows: “I am, therefore, of the firm view that the presence of a lawyer during interrogation of the respondents cannot be permitted as of right, which they claim as being entitled to. Therefore, that part of the order of the Sessions Judge directing the petitioner to permit the presence of the lawyers during interrogation of the respondents has to be set aside. However, it will be advisable for the department to permit the presence of the lawyers during such examination or interrogation taking such precautionary measures as may be considered necessary to keep the confidential nature of the statements and the secrecy of the enquiry. The petitioner (prosecution) must also keep in mind that if the presence of a lawyer during examination or interrogation is refused, the ultimate statements recorded will become questionable as not voluntary and as statements obtained under duress, making them. The petitioner (prosecution) must also keep in mind that if the presence of a lawyer during examination or interrogation is refused, the ultimate statements recorded will become questionable as not voluntary and as statements obtained under duress, making them. Further I have stated, that the right to consult a legal practitioner is different from requiring a legal practitioner to be present, while the person is examined or interrogated under Sec.108 of the Customs Act. The question of being defended by a legal practitioner does not arise at this stage.” 17. Clause (3) of Art.20 of the Constitution embodies the principle of protection against compulsion or self-incrimination by raising it to the status of a constitutional prohibition. It consists of three components. .(a) It is a right pertaining to a person accused of an offence; .(b) It is a protection against compulsion to be a witness; and .(c) It is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his giving evidence against himself. On facts it can be unhesitatingly concluded, that respondents are persons accused of offences under the Indian Penal Code, since they have been shown as accused in the first information report, registered by the investigating agency. It is settled law that a person against whom first information report has been recorded, by the police, can claim the benefit of protection under Art.20(3) of the Constitution of India. 18. In Ramanlal Bhogical Shah v. D.K.Guha, (1973)1 S.C.C. 596: 1973 S.C.C. (Crl.) 583: 1973 S.C.D. 487:1973 Mer.L.R. 205:1973 Crl..L.J. 921.A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1196, the Apex Court clearly stated that a person against whom a first information report in respect of an offence is lodged, falls within the expression a person accused of an offence contemplated under Art.20(3) of the Constitution. In that case, a first information report was lodged alleging offences inter alia under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The Supreme Court stated, that a person, who is accused of an offence, cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. However, he cannot deny to give information regarding matters which do not tend to incriminate him in proceedings against him under the Act. 19. The Supreme Court stated, that a person, who is accused of an offence, cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. However, he cannot deny to give information regarding matters which do not tend to incriminate him in proceedings against him under the Act. 19. It is no doubt true that some of the basic safeguards, rights and privileges of accused persons should not be dispensed with however grave may be the charge subject matter of any enquiry, investigation or trial and Courts have since the days of the Courts of star-chamber zealously guarded and preserved these safeguards, rights and privileges, even at the worst of times. At the same time Courts have not lagged behind in realising the deleterious effect of smuggling and violations of foreign exchange on the national economy and the peculiar difficulties and problems in tracking down smugglers and those involved in the violation of foreign exchange laws. Time and again courts, including the highest, have given expression to the peculiar problems of this class of offences and have justified departure from the normal law in dealing with this class of people. Though the offences registered in the instant crime are under the Indian Penal Code, facts placed by the prosecution disclose customs violation and illegal export of banned articles. It is therefore necessary for the investigating agency to obtain as much information as may be available from the respondents without self-incrimination to unravel different facets of this grave crime. 20. In Nandini Satpathy v. P.L.Dani, (1978)2 S.C.C. 424 :1978 S.C.C. (Crl) 236: 1978 Crl.L.R. (S.C.) 195:1978 Crl.App.R. (S.C.) 273:1978 Crl.L.J. 968: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1025, quite often, reliance is placed by counsel for accused, on the following passage found in paragraph 58 of the judgment. “Right at the beginning we must notice Art.22(1) of the Constitution, which reads: “No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be of the grounds for such arrest nor shall be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice" The right to consult an advocate of his choice shall not be denied to any person who is arrested. This does not mean that persons who are not under arrest or custody can be denied that right. This does not mean that persons who are not under arrest or custody can be denied that right. The spirit and sense of Art.22(1) is that is fundamental to the rule of law that the services of a lawyer shall be available for consultation to any accused person under circumstances of near-custodial interrogation. Moreover, the observance of the right against self-incrimination is best promoted by conceding to the accused the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice" The context of these observations made by the Supreme Court will have to be understood in the light of further observations, made in the very same case. Those observations read as follows: "Lawyer’s presence is constitutional claim in some circumstances in our country also, and, in the context of Art.20(3) is an assurance of awareness and observance of the right to silence.........We think that Art.20(3) and Art.22(1) may, in a way, be telescoped by making it prudent for the police to permit the advocate of the accused, if there be one, to be present at the time he is examined. Overreaching Art.20(3) and Sec.161 (2) will be obviated by this requirement. We do not lay down that the police must secure the services of a lawyer. That will lead to ‘Police-station-lawyer’ system, an abuse which breeds other vices. But all (hat we mean is that if an accused person expresses the wish to have his lawyer by his side when his examination goes on, this facility shall not be denied, without being exposed to the serious reproof that involuntary self-crimination secured in secrecy and by coercing the will, was the project". "Not that a lawyer’s presence is a panacea for all problems of in voluntary self-incrimination, for he cannot supply answers or whisper hints or otherwise interfere with the course of questioning except to intercept where intimi-datory tactics tried, caution his client, where incrimination is attempted and insist on questions and answers being noted where objections are not otherwise fully appreciated. He cannot harangue the police but may help his client and complain on his behalf, although his very presence will ordinarily remove the implicit menace of a police station" "We realise that the presence of a lawyer is asking for the moon in many cases until a public defender system becomes ubiquitous. The police need not wait more than for a reasonable while for an advocate’s arrival. The police need not wait more than for a reasonable while for an advocate’s arrival. But they must invariably warn and record that fact about the right to silence against self-incrimination; and where the accused is literate take his written acknowledgement. While considering the legal basis of the police practice of interrogating suspects in view of the Constitutional and legal safeguards available to a person against oppressive and unjust police interrogatives Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Bench in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L.Dani, (1978)2 S.C.C 424 :1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 236:1978 Crl.L.R. (S.C.) 195:1978 Crl.A.R. (S.C.) 273:1978 Crl.L.J. 968: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1025 case, was not prepared to go against the settled view of the Supreme court in cases involving grave offences. Krishna Iyer, J. stated as hereunder; "36. It is plausible to argue that where realism prevails over formalism and probability over possibility, the enquiries under criminal statutes with quasi-criminal investigations are of an accusatory nature and are sure to end in prosecution, if the offence is grave and the evidence gathered good. And to deny the protection of a constitutional shield designed to defend a suspect because the enquiry is preliminary and may possibly not reach the court is to erode the substance while paying hollow homage to the holy verbalism of the article. We are not directly concerned with this facet of Art.20(3); nor are we free to go against the settled view of this Court. There it is". 21. The Apex Court has taken the view that, in order that a testimony of an accused person may be said to have been self-incriminatory, the compulsion of which comes within the prohibition of the Constitutional provisions, it must be of such a character, that by itself it should have the tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually doing so. In other word, it should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person at least probable, considered by itself. Again the Court indicated that Art.20(3) could be invoked only against statements which had a material bearing on the criminality of the maker of the statement. ‘By itself does not exclude the setting or other integral circumstances but means something in the fact disclosed, a guilt element. The taint of tendency under Art.20(3) is not a remote, recondite freak or fanciful inference but a reasonable, real, material or probable deduction. 22. ‘By itself does not exclude the setting or other integral circumstances but means something in the fact disclosed, a guilt element. The taint of tendency under Art.20(3) is not a remote, recondite freak or fanciful inference but a reasonable, real, material or probable deduction. 22. A Division Bench of this Court in Anil G.Merchant v. The Director of Revenue, (1985)2 M.L.J. 46, while considering applicability of these constitutional provisions to a person summoned by a Customs Officer under Secs. 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, held that such a person had no fundamental right to have the presence of a lawyer of his choice during examination or interrogation. The Bench further stated, that the right to consult a legal adviser was different from requiring a law-yer or an advocate to be present while a person was examined or interrogated during investigation. At that stage necessary investigation had to be secret and in fact even the identity of the person interrogated or examined may have to be kept secret until a late stage in the investigation itself. 23. Sengottuvelan, J., in Jagir Singh v. State by V.P.Augustine, 1985 L.W. (Crl.)46, had to consider a similar question posed in these petitions. After referring to Sec30 of the Advocates Act and Art.22 of the Constitution of India, learned Judge held, that the Investigating Officer was at liberty to come to his own conclusion on the question whether to permit a lawyer at the time of questioning the petitioners. But the High Court cannot give any direction in that regard. The Forest Official as and when an application was made to him for the presence of lawyer when the petitioners were being questioned, would have to adopt the following modus operandi: .(a) He was not bound to grant the request for the presence of a lawyer during the questioning; .(b) But at the same time, he must bear in mind that the presence of the lawyer will avoid any adverse criticism of any confession that may be made by the petitioner during interrogation; and .(c) As per Sec.30 of the advocates Act an investigating officer, being a person not authorised to take evidence, was not a forum before which an advocate has got a right of audience. Whatever may be the practice, under the advocate Act, an advocate was not entitled to/any right of audience before any forum other than those set out in Sec.30". 24. The Delhi High Court in Ram Lalwani v. State, 1981 Cri.L.J. 97: (1980)1 S.D.L. T. 141, observed as follows: "From a reading of the above observation in Nandini Satpathv v. P.L.Dani, (1978)2 S.C.C. 424 :1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 236:1978 Crl.L.R. (S.C.) 195: 1978 Crl.A.R. (S.C.) 273: 1978 Cri.L.J. 968.A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1025 case and Marinada’s case, (1968-384 U.S. 436), I feel that subject to a few exceptions, Sec.162, Crl.P.C. and Sccs.24 to 30 of the Evidence Act to already take care of the constitutional rights by excluding from evidence all self-incriminatory statements whether voluntary or otherwise and there was no need to give any directions. What the court appears to be concerned in Nandini is to Siestas the police to humanism and, therefore it made it prudent for the police to allow a lawyer where the accused wants to have one at the time of interrogation, if it wants to escape the censure that its interrogation is carried on in Secrecy by physical and psychic torture. That is why it cautioned that it was not a ‘mandate’ but a ‘strong suggestion’. I think it is correct to urge that the Supreme Court was not laying down a binding direction but only prudent policy for the police." 25. In Poolpandi v. Superintendent, Central Excise, 1992S.C.C. (Crl.) 620, it is reiteration of the law laid down in Ram Lalwani v. State, 1981 Cri.L.J. 97: (1980)1 S.D.L.T. 141 case, that the only protection that Art.20(3) gives a person accused of an offence is that he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself, but this does not mean that he need not give information regarding matters which do not tend to incriminate him. However, these observations permitting him in not to answer self-incriminating questions were made only because the appellant was held to be an accused on the relevant date. The Supreme Court was concerned with Secs. 107 and 108 of the Customs Act and Secs.39 and 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 26. However, these observations permitting him in not to answer self-incriminating questions were made only because the appellant was held to be an accused on the relevant date. The Supreme Court was concerned with Secs. 107 and 108 of the Customs Act and Secs.39 and 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 26. Keeping in view the right of the accused under Art.20(3) of the Constitution against self-incrimination vis-a-vis Society’s interest in the general security, which has to be given equal weight and that as much as the human dignity of the accused who are involved, human personality of others in the Society has to be preserved, I hold, that the respondents cannot deny to give information regarding matters, which do not tend to incriminatethem in proceedings initiated against them. The observations of the Supreme Court in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L.Dani, (1978)2S.C.C. 424: 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 236:1978 Crl.L.R. (S.C.) 195: 1978 Crl.A.R. (S.C.) 273:1978 Crl.L.J. 968.A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1025 case had permitted the presence of lawyers during examination or interrogation of the respondents to that limited extent, by taking such precautionary measures as may be considered necessary to keep the confidential nature of the statements and secrecy of the inquiry. A lawyer can be permitted to watch the interrogation from some distance so that as observed by the Supreme Court in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L.Dani, (1978)2 S.C.C. 424 :1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 236:1978 Crl.L.R. (S.C.) 195:1978 Crl.A.R. (S.C.) 273:1978 Crl.L.J. 968.A.1.R. 1978 S.C. 1025 case, he cannot supply answers or whisper hints or otherwise interfere with the course of questioning. All that the lawyer could do is to intercept while intimidatory tactics were tried and cautioning his client where incrimination is attempted. If at any particular point of time the respondents need their lawyer’s assistance during interrogation, when they consider that an answer to a particular question may tend to incriminate them, legal assistance cannot be negated. The counsel shall not interfere in the course of interrogation except to the limited extent stated above. 27. On the facts placed before me, it is not possible to hold that the respondents had acted with lack of bona fides in not having reported before Investigating Officer as directed by the learned Sessions Judge. Holidays which had intervened do enure in favour of the respondents. As far as respondent Balasubramaniam is concerned, he had become aware of the order of stay only on 29-10-1992. Holidays which had intervened do enure in favour of the respondents. As far as respondent Balasubramaniam is concerned, he had become aware of the order of stay only on 29-10-1992. Thereafter since these petitions were pending disposal, he did not choose to appear before the investigating Officer, through on specific directions respondent Srinivasan had appeared before the investigating officer. Mr.M.R.M.Abdul Kareem claims that respondent S.Balasubramaniam was directed by Padmini Jesudurai, J. to appear before the investigating officer for interrogation, since the question of appearing for interrogation along with his advocate, had to be decided in these petitions. As far as respondent Srinivasan is concerned, his case is slightly different, because he was permitted to appear along with his counsel by this Court, exercising its powers under writ jurisdiction. State’s right to investigate shall not be throttled by any agency. Respondent Srinivasan shall appear before the investigating officer as and when required in future, on prior intimation in writing. The presence of a lawyer during interrogation will be limited to the extent narrated earlier. As far as respondent Balasubramaniam is concerned, he has not appeared for interrogation and he is bound to appear before the Investigating Officer for 13 more working days as directed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, commencing from 2. 1993. But the presence of his counsel during interrogation will be limited to that extent, as observed by me earlier. He shall make himself available for interrogation even thereafter if need be, on prior communication in writing. 28. A Division Bench of this Court in H.CM.P.No.7 of 1992 in W.P. No.6393 of 1993, permitted the petitioner therein to take his counsel, for interrogation stating that he shall be at some distance, at the time of inquiry. The object obviously was to render help if need be to prevent self-incrimination. Another Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.l9213of 1990 by its order dated 9-1-1991, observed that if any demand was made by the 5th respondent therein, for any counsel to be present at the time of interrogation, the police shall comply. 29. The object obviously was to render help if need be to prevent self-incrimination. Another Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.l9213of 1990 by its order dated 9-1-1991, observed that if any demand was made by the 5th respondent therein, for any counsel to be present at the time of interrogation, the police shall comply. 29. Since in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L.Dani, (1978)2 S.C.C. 424 :1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 236:1978 Crl.L.R. (S.C.) 195:1978 Crl.A.R. (S.C.) 273:1978 Crl.L.J. 968: A.I.R. 1978 S.C 1025 case, the Supreme Court has not mandated, but strongly suggested the prudent policy for the police, keeping in view the rights of the accused/respondents and interests of the Society, the practical approach will be that lawyer’s presence shall be permitted at a distance sufficient enough, to protect his client’s right against self-incrimination and further enough to preserve the right of the Investigating agency to obtain evidence, other than self-incriminatory, for the purpose of proper administration of justice. One cannot overlook that every right is subject to reasonable restrictions. 30. No ground has been made out to cancel bail in the even of arrest ordered in favour of the respon-dents. Crl.O.P.Nos.13788 of 1992 and 13739 of 1992 are dismissed subject to observations. Crl.O.P.No.13310 of 1992 has become infructu-ous in view of the orders passed in the other two criminal original petitions. In view of the disposal of Crl.O.P.No.13310 of 1992, no separate orders are necessary in Crl.M.P.No.7117 of 1992, which merges therein. Similarly in view of the disposal of Crl.O.P.Nos. 13738 and 13739 of 1992, no further orders are required in Crl.M.P.No.7553 of 1992. All these petitions are disposed of accordingly. 31. Before parting with these petitions, I am impelled to observe, that if the provisions under Sec.438, Crl.P.C, which provide for a condition being imposed, on ‘that person’ ordered to be released on bail in the event of arrest,to make himself available for interrogation as and when required, should have meaningful significance, that person so released, must within a reasonable time, sufficient enough to obtain order copies and arrange for sureties, present himself before the concerned Magistrate, which puts him under the jurisdiction of the court, sufficient to take care of the words "in the event of arrest’‘, perform the duty cast on him before the Magistrate and commence soon thereafter to appear for interrogation, before the Investigating Agency, Women of course will make themselves available for interrogation. 32. 32. Persons directed to be enlarged on bail in the event of their arrest, cannot be allowed to claim, that armed with an order in their favour, under Sec.438, Crl.P.C, they can coolly pocket it and choose to postpone appearance or availability for interrogation, to any suitable date of their choice, may be in some cases spread over for weeks or months, without appearing before a Magistrate and executing bonds, for then, the dire need for prompt investigation, to collect evidence will effectively be thwarted. That is not the object underlying this beneficial provision. 33. It will always be desirable that courts do fix a date for commencement of interrogation, whenever orders arc passed under Sec.438, Crl.P.C. of coarse being alive to the time factor that may be required to obtain copies of orders, arranging sureties, travel distance to the scats of courts and the Investigating agency and similar such circumstances.