A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE show-cause notice issued by respondent No. 1 on 9/04/1984 under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (`the Act for brief) is under challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. By its impugned notice respondent No. 1 has directed the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 herein to show-cause why the order passed by the Competent Authority on 26/04/1982 under Section 8 (4) of the Act should not be set aside on the grounds mentioned in the show-cause notice therein. ( 2 ) THE disputes arising in this petition centre round three parcels of land bearing Survey Nos. 200. 1 200 and 187/2 and two house sites bearing Gram Panchayat Nos. 87 and 89 situated in village Mamnagar taluka City district Ahmedabad (`the disputed properties for convenience ). They original belonged to one Chimanlal Cheldas. He appears to have filed the required statement under Section 6 of the Act on 8/08/1976. Pursuant thereto a draft statement under Section 8 (1) thereof was served with the notice of 21/01/1982 It appears that by that time the land owner had breathed his last leaving behind him petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 in this petition as his heirs and legal representatives. They submitted their objections on 2 5/02/1982 to the draft statement received along with the notice of 21/01/1982. According to them the disputed properties has come to their share in equal proportion of 1113 square metres each. After hearing the parties the Competent Authority came to the conclusion that only 3 square metres of land was in excess and accordingly the necessary order under Section 8 (4) of the Act was passed on 26/04/1982. Its copy is at Annexure A to this petition. It appears that the petitioners wanted to sell the disputed properties to petitioner No. 5 herein and apropos the notice under Section 26 of the Act was served to the Competent Authority on 1 3/07/1982. It appears that the Competent Authority sat silent over that notice and by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 26 thereof the presumption that the Competent Authority had no intention to purchase the disputed properties arose in favour of the intending vendors. It appears that thereafter petitioners Nos. 1-4 sold the disputed properties to petitioner No. 5 by a registered sale deed. It appears that thereafter petitioners Nos. 1-4 sold the disputed properties to petitioner No. 5 by a registered sale deed. I am told at the Bar by Kum. Shah for the petitioners that the sale deed was registered on 3/02/1984. It appears that thereupon the respondent came to know that the sale transaction in question took place pursuant to the order passed by the Competent Auhtority at Annexure A to this petition. The respondent did not find it according to law. It therefore thought of exercising its revisional powers under Section 34 of the Act for upsetting it. With a view to preventing any change of equity qua the disputed properties by its order of injunction issued on 3/04/1984. The respondent directed petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 herein to maintain status quo with respect to the disputed properties. Its copy is at Annexure B to this petition. Soon thereafter it issued a show-cause notice to them on 9/04/1984 directing them to show-cause why the order at Annexure A to this petition should not be quashed and set aside. A copy of the show-cause notice is at Annexure C to this petition. That appears to have aggrieved not only the recipients of the show-cause notice but petitioner No. 5 also as the purchaser of the disputed properties. It appears that petitioner No. 5 had undertaken construction of flats on the disputed properties and the necessary contract was given to petitioner No. 6. Thereupon all the petitioners joining together have moved this Court by means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for questioning the validity of the impugned show-cause notice at Annexure C to this petition. ( 3 ) KUM. Shah for the petitioners has urged that the power under Section 34 of the Act cannot be exercised after unreasonable length of time and that serious prejudice would be caused if such power is exercised after such unreasonable length of time in the present case. As against this Shri Patel for the respondent has submitted that lapse of time by itself cannot come in the way of the revisional authority to upset any order passed by the Competent Authority if it is ex facie contrary to law. As against this Shri Patel for the respondent has submitted that lapse of time by itself cannot come in the way of the revisional authority to upset any order passed by the Competent Authority if it is ex facie contrary to law. He has further submitted in the alternative that it would be for the petitioners to satisfy the revisional authority that the exercise of power after unreasonable time would cause serious prejudice to them. ( 4 ) WHETHER delay by itself could come in the way of the revisional authority under Section 34 of the Act is a question no longer res integra. In its Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Haresh Kantilal Vora v. Competent Authority and Additional Collector Rajkot and Another reported in 1992 (2) G. L. H. 424 on interpretation of Section 34 of the Act it has been held : ( 5 ) THERE is nothing on record to show that simply because the power is exercised after a period of about three years the exercise of power has become unreasonable. Mere lapse of time without anything more would not make the exercise of power unreasonable. Therefore the argument that there was inordinate delay in issuing show-cause notice and therefore the Government could not have exercised the power cannot be accepted. (Emphasis supplied.) ( 6 ) IN that view of the matter the first submission urged before me by Kum. Shah for the petitioners that the power under Section 34 of the Act cannot be exercised after certain lapse of time cannot hold water in view of the aforesaid binding Division Bench ruling of this Court. Sitting as a single Judge I am bound by it. Even otherwise I am in respectful agreement therewith. ( 7 ) BESIDES the delay in this case is roughly of two years. The order in question at Annexure A to this petition was passed on 26/04/1982. The show-cause notice at Annexure C to this petition is issued on 9/04/1984 that is within two years from the date of the order at Annexure A to this petition. This lapse of time may not be considered unreasonable in a given fact-situation. ( 8 ) KUM. Shah for the petitioners has however submitted that petitioners Nos. The show-cause notice at Annexure C to this petition is issued on 9/04/1984 that is within two years from the date of the order at Annexure A to this petition. This lapse of time may not be considered unreasonable in a given fact-situation. ( 8 ) KUM. Shah for the petitioners has however submitted that petitioners Nos. 1-4 have sold the disputed properties to petitioner No. 5 after serving the due notice to the Competent Authority under Section 26 of the Act pursuant to the order passed by the Competent Authority at Annexure A to this petition. She has further urged that petitioner No. 5 is a co-operative society registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 and it has constructed flats for its members after purchase of the disputed properties from petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 herein. According to Kum. Shah for the petitioners a huge sum of Rs. 40 lakhs or so has been invested in raising construction by and on behalf of petitioner No. 5 herein on the disputed properties. A serious prejudice would be caused to the petitioners runs her submission if the order at Annexure A to this petition is upset after such a long lapse of time more particularly when this petition has remained pending in this Court for more than 9 years. ( 9 ) KUM. Shah for the petitioners might be right in her submission that petitioner No. 5 has constructed residential accommodation on the disputed properties for its members and by now the construction might be complete. She tells at the Bar that most members have occupied their respective residential accommodation booked by them in that residential complex raised by petitioner No. 5 for its members. That was obviously pursuant to the interim relief granted by this Court on 22/08/1984 as prayed for in para 18 (C) in this petition. The petitioners themselves have prayed for permission to proceed with the construction at their own risk and cost with a clear understanding that such further construction would not be taken as a defence against the legal action complained of in this petition. Thus the petitioners have themselves allowed the position to be changed. What will have to be seen would be the position as obtainable on the date of the show-cause notice at Annexure C to the petition. Thus the petitioners have themselves allowed the position to be changed. What will have to be seen would be the position as obtainable on the date of the show-cause notice at Annexure C to the petition. If any serious prejudice is caused to the petitioners it would be open to them to satisfy the revisional authority pursuant to the show-cause notice at Annexure C to this petition. ( 10 ) KUM. Shah for the petitioners is right in voicing her grievance to the effect that petitioner No. 5 is not made a party to the proceeding sought to be initiated under Section 34 of the Act presumably with a view to upsetting the order at Annexure A to this petition. As pointed out hereinabove petitioners Nos. 1-4 have already sold away the disputed properties to petitioner No. 5. As rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioners for all one knows petitioners Nos. 1 might not have any interest left in the disputed properties after their having sold the same to petitioner No. 5. It appears to be the admitted position on record that petitioner No. 5 has purchased the disputed properties after the vendors that is petitioners Nos. 1-4 herein have duly served the required notice under Section 26 of the Act to the Competent Authority to sell the same to petitioner No. 5. It transpires from the averment made in this petition that the sale transaction is evidenced by a registered sale document. In that view of the matter petitioner No. 5 would be necessary party for revising the order at Annexure A to this petition. It is a settled principle of law that no right of a party should adversely affected without affording an opportunity of hearing to such party. Petitioner No. 5 has acquired its title to the disputed properties in due course to the knowledge of the Competent Authority named in Section 26 of the Act. It has not done anything surreptitiously. Its title to the disputed properties cannot be affected without affording an opportunity of hearing to it. It would therefore be necessary on the part of respondent No. 1 to issue a show-cause notice also to petitioner No. 5 before exercising its powers under Section 34 of the Act qua the order at Annexure A to this petition. Its title to the disputed properties cannot be affected without affording an opportunity of hearing to it. It would therefore be necessary on the part of respondent No. 1 to issue a show-cause notice also to petitioner No. 5 before exercising its powers under Section 34 of the Act qua the order at Annexure A to this petition. ( 11 ) IT is unfortunate that this Court has not been able to find time more than nine years to dispose of this matter questioning the validity of the show-cause notice at Annexure C to this petition. That however is no ground not to allow the revisional authority to act according to law and to carry the proceeding initiated by the show-cause notice at Annexure C to this petition to its logical conclusion. 10 In the result this petition is partly accepted only to the limited extent that petitioner No. 5 is not served with the show-cause notice at Annexure C to this petition. It is directed that the show-cause notice at Annexure C to this petition should not be served to petitioner No. 5 herein before any attempt is made to carry the proceeding initiated thereby and thereunder to its logical conclusion. It would be open to the recipients of the show-cause notice including petitioner No. 5 to show-cause why the order at Annexure A to this petition calls for no interference in revision under Section 34 of the Act. It is obvious that an opportunity of hearing will be afforded to petitioners Nos. 1 to 5 before any such thing is done. Rule is accordingly made absolute only to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. .