Judgment :- Manoharan, J. Accused was charged under Secs.302, 392 and 397, I.P.C. for causing the death of his wife Moly alias Mariyam and having robbed her studs worn by her. Learned Sessions Judge, Wayanad found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Sec. 302, I.P.C., convicted and sentenced him to death. He was acquitted of the offences punishable under Secs. 392 and 397, I.P.C. The accused challenges the said conviction and sentence in this appeal; the reference is for confirmation of the death sentence imposed on the accused. 2. The prosecution case can be summarised as follows: Accused married Moly alias Mariyam and was living with her in her house at Perunkulam in Vellamunda amsom and desom in Wayanad District. Accused picked up quarrel with Moly on suspicion that she had illicit intimacy with P.W.14 and tried to strangulate her. Thereafter he left Moly. She had a son (P.W.4) in her previous marriage and after the accused left she was living on the income by selling milk of her cow to the cooperative society. Accused left Moly about an year before the occurrence in this case which was on 11. 1990. As usual in the early morning of 11. 1990 Moly was proceeding to the Milk Co-operative Society situated at Pulinjal through the Perunkulam-Pulinjai road and when she reached the scene of occurrence accused who was lying in wait for Moly pounced upon her and inflicted cut injuries on her neck with M.O.2 knife. On receiving the cut injury of the neck she fell. P.W.1 who was coming through the road from Muthakkara to the Milk Co-operative Society for selling milk when reached the junction where the Perinkulam road joins, saw P.W.5 a neighbour who too was proceeding to the Milk Co-operative Society. A brook crosses the road to the Milk Society a little away from the junction. When P.Ws.1 and 5 just reached opposite side of the thodu a cry of a woman attracted their attention; P.W.5 asked P.W.1 to go and see what has happened. P.W.1 handed over the milk can to P.W.5 and rushed to the place from where the cry was heard. When he reached the junction P.W.8 was seen coming in an agitated condition. Then he saw Moly lying in a pool of blood a little away and the accused sitting by her side engaged in snatching the studs from her ears. P.W.1 handed over the milk can to P.W.5 and rushed to the place from where the cry was heard. When he reached the junction P.W.8 was seen coming in an agitated condition. Then he saw Moly lying in a pool of blood a little away and the accused sitting by her side engaged in snatching the studs from her ears. When P.W.1 approached, the accused threatened him with M.O.2. He ran to P.W.5; by that time P.W.7 also reached the place where P.W.5 stood. He conveyed what he witnessed. They then went to the place where Moly was lying and found her dead. Accused had by that time left. Thereafter P.Ws.1 and 5 proceeded to the society and after selling milk they along with others proceeded to the police station and P.W.1 tendered Ex.P-1 F.I. statement before P.W. 23, Sub-Inspector of Police. On the basis of Ex.P-1 he registered Ex.P-1(a) F.I.R. against the accused under Sec. 302, I.P.C. 3. Investigation was taken over by P.W.24 he went to the scene of occurrence and held Ex.P-3 inquest. In the meanwhile he informed P.W.20, the Finger Print Expert who reached the scene of occurrence and on noticing three finger prints on M.O.2 knife which was lying at the scene he developed and preserved the same and affixed his initials. Under Ex.P-3 inquest P.W.24 seized M.O.2 knife, M.O.3 milk can carried by Moly and M.Os.4 to 12 personal belongings of Moly. The dead-body was sent for postmortem. Autopsy was conducted by P.W.17. He issued Ex.P-7 post-mortem report. P.W.24 also prepared Ex.P-2 scene mahazar on the next day. 4. At about 5 p.m. on 11. 1990 the accused was arrested from a place at Kappundikkal by P.W.23, Sub-Inspector of Police. He seized M.O.1 blanket worn by the accused and also M.Os.14 to 19 of which M.O.17 is the pieces of studs wrapped in M.Os.15 and 16 kept in the pocket of M.O.14 shirt worn by the accused. P.W.22, police photographer took photos of the finger prints on the knife; Exs.P-13 and P-14 are the photograph and enlargement, and Exs.P-13(a) and P-14(a) are the negatives respectively of Exs.P-13 and P-14. P.W.21, Finger Print Expert issued Ex.P-15 opinion stating that the chance print developed was of middle right finger which was identical with the specimen finger print of middle right finger of the accused. MO.13 towel belonging to the deceased was seized under Ex.P-5 by P.W.24. P.W.21, Finger Print Expert issued Ex.P-15 opinion stating that the chance print developed was of middle right finger which was identical with the specimen finger print of middle right finger of the accused. MO.13 towel belonging to the deceased was seized under Ex.P-5 by P.W.24. P.W.24 sent report to the effect that the investigation is proceeded under Secs. 392 and 397, I.P.C. also. He questioned the witnesses, completed the investigation and laid the charge before court. When the accused was questioned under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. he denied the prosecution case arid maintained that he is innocent. He said that he had to separate from Moly on account of P.W. 14. 5. Ex.P-2 scene mahazar and Ex.P-3 inquest report give the description where the deadbody was found. The deadbody had injuries. The details of the same are mentioned P.W. 17, the doctor who conducted the autopsy. P.W. 17 in his evidence as well as Ex.P-7 post-mortem report stated, he noted nine injuries, five incised injuries, three abrasions, and lacerations on the lower part of lobule of both ears measuring 1 x 0.5 cms. Injuries 1 and 2 were on the neck. Injury No. 1 was 9 x 5 cm. bone deep transverse incised wound on the front and leftside of the neck which cut the windpipe, and oesophagus underneath was completely cut. The left half of the 4th cervical vertbra was also cut partially severing the spinalcord. Injury No. 2 was also an incised wound located on the left side of the neck 2 cm. above injury No. 1. He said that the death was due to injuries 1 and 2. He also said that injury No. 5 the laceration on the lower part of the lobule of both ears, could be caused while forcibly removing the ear rings. He added that both the lobules were torn. According to him the cut injuries could be caused with a weapon like M.O.2. 6. The medical evidence unambiguously would show that the death was homicide and with due regard to the nature and seal of the injuries, particularly injuries 1 and 2, it is clear that the assailant intended to cause death. Consequently the death was culpable homicide amounting to murder. 7. Prosecution relies on the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 8 the occurrence witnesses corroborated by the evidence of PWs.5 and 7. Consequently the death was culpable homicide amounting to murder. 7. Prosecution relies on the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 8 the occurrence witnesses corroborated by the evidence of PWs.5 and 7. The prosecution also relies on the evidence of seizure of M.O.17, the evidence of P.W.10 and the recovery of M.O.2 knife which had the finger print of the accused. Along with the said evidence the prosecution also relies on the evidence as to motive spoken to by P.W.4 and P.W.8. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the witnesses are chance witnesses; their evidence cannot be relied on as according to the learned counsel the very investigation was influenced by P.W.14 who had enmity against the accused. It was maintained by the learned counsel that the evidence as regards the finger print of the accused on M.O.2 and also the recovery of M.O.17 are unworthy of acceptance as they suffer from serious infirmities. According to him the evidence will not bring home the guilt of the accused beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. Alternatively it was maintained by the learned counsel that at any rate the award of death sentence cannot be sustained. 9. On the other hand the learned Additional Director General of Prosecution maintained that the evidence of the occurrence witnesses since is effectively corroborated by other evidence that by itself is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused. It was also maintained by him that the recovery of M.O.17 from the person of the accused at the time of arrest is a highly incriminating circumstance which will lend effective corroboration to the evidence of P.W.1. Learned Additional Director of Prosecution contested the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the investigation was influenced by P.W. 14. According to the learned Additional Director General of Prosecution the nature of the offence justifies the extreme penalty and therefore the sentence awarded to the accused cannot also be called in question. 10. Ex.P-12 plan prepared by P.W.19, the Village Officer shows the scene of occurrence and the surroundings. The scene of occurrence also is described in Ex.P-2 scene mahazar. It would show that the occurrence was in a road proceeding from Perinkulam through J & J. Coffee Estate. 11. 10. Ex.P-12 plan prepared by P.W.19, the Village Officer shows the scene of occurrence and the surroundings. The scene of occurrence also is described in Ex.P-2 scene mahazar. It would show that the occurrence was in a road proceeding from Perinkulam through J & J. Coffee Estate. 11. P.W.1 said that he knows the accused and the deceased, that he is residing near the J & J. Coffee Estate, that Moly was the wife of the accused, that there is a Milk Cooperative Society at Pulinjal and that he, Moly and others used to sell milk to that society. In the early morning on 11. 1990 as usual he left for the society with milk through Muthakkara Pulinjal road and when he reached the junction where the Perinkulam road joins Muthakkara road, he saw P.W.5, from there both together proceeded through Punlinjal road and when they reached about 15 metres towards west and crossed the thodu which flows across the road, they heard a cry of a woman, upon which P.W.5 after taking the milk can from him asked him to go and see as to what was happening. He therefore returned to the junction and on the way he saw P.W.8 coming from the junction in an agitated condition, and when he reached the junction he saw Moly lyinga little away in the road and accused sitting near her head engaged in snatching something from her ear. When the accused saw him he (accused) threatened him with M.O.2 asking him to run away, else he would be killed. He raised an alarm and ran to P.W.5. He told P.W.5 what he saw. When they reached the scene accused was not there, and found Moly dead. He deposed that, he and P.W.5 went to the Milk Co-operative Society, sold the milk proceeded to the police station and tendered Ex.P-1 F.I. statement. He also said that, about an year before the occurrence the accused and the deceased quarrelled and the accused left her. He said that, when he saw the accused near Moly he was having M.O.1 blanket. He also saw milk spilled at the scene and M.O.3 can lying there. He noticed M.O.2 knife lying near the dead body. P.W.5 corroborated P.W.2. 12. He said that, when he saw the accused near Moly he was having M.O.1 blanket. He also saw milk spilled at the scene and M.O.3 can lying there. He noticed M.O.2 knife lying near the dead body. P.W.5 corroborated P.W.2. 12. P.W.7, a neighbour to the scene of occurrence said that while he was proceeding to the Church and reached the junction he heard a sound and saw P.W.1 going towards P.W.5 who was standing a little away. When he reached them P.W.1 said that, the accused murdered Moly and that the accused threatened him. Though P.W.1 saw only part of the occurrence. P.W.8 has sworn to her having seen the whole occurrence. She is an illiterate lady, aged 55. She said that she knows Moly and the accused is her husband. On the date of occurrence while she was proceeding to the church for participating in ‘qurbana’ and reached the junction, she heard the cry of a woman and saw the accused inflicting a cut injury on the neck of Moly and when Moly fell accused removed the studs from her cars. Scared, she rushed to the church: on the way she saw P.Ws. 1 and 5. Though she did not reveal to P.Ws.1 and 5 as to what she saw, on reaching the church she told the occurrence to those assembled in the church. She has also deposed that on a prior occasion when the accused attempted to strangulate Moly her son and others saved her and that the accused left Moly thercafter. She said that she was questioned by the police. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that these witnesses being chance witnesses, their evidence is not reliable. He also maintained that they are swearing falsehood at the instance of P.W.14 who is inimical towards the accused. This contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted particularly in view of the time of occurrence and the scene of occurrence. These witnesses have accounted for their presence at the time of occurrence. The occurrence took place in a road. The occasion for the presence of P.Ws.1 and 5 was that they were carrying milk to the society. Moly too was carrying milk to the society. P.W.8 was on her way to the church. These witnesses have accounted for their presence at the time of occurrence. The occurrence took place in a road. The occasion for the presence of P.Ws.1 and 5 was that they were carrying milk to the society. Moly too was carrying milk to the society. P.W.8 was on her way to the church. As is held in the decision in Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 680:1983 Crl.L.J. 1272: (1983) 3 S.C.C. 327 :1983 S.C.C.(Crl.) 601: (1983) 2 Crimes 342, when an occurrence takes place in a road pedestrian are the natural witnesses. Nothing is brought out in the evidence of the said witnesses to show any interestedness in the prosecution of enmity against the accused. No suggestion was made to these witnesses that they are swearing falsehood at the instance of P.W.14. Therefore, the evidence of these witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground that they are chance witnesses. Apart from the same, there is another aspect to be noted in this connection. Ex.P-1. F.I.statement was tendered without delay. The occurrence was at about 7.20 a.m. on 11. 1990 and the F.I.statement was tendered at 8.30 a.m. on the same day. It reached the Magistrate on 11. 1990 at 6.45 p.m. Thus there was hardly any time for any manipulation. Learned counsel for the accused contended the fact that the F.I.statement is descriptive of the details of the occurrence, is an indication of prior deliberation. Since the F.I. statement was tendered within an hour of the occurrence the said contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. The F.I.statement thus corroborates the testimony of P.W.1. 14. The attack against the evidence of P.W.8 is that her name is not mentioned in Ex.P- 1. It is not necessary that the names of all the occurrence witnesses should find a place in the F.I. statement. In that agitated moment if the occurrence witness who tendered Ex.P-1 omits to mention the names of all the occurrence witnesses, that by itself cannot be a ground to reject the evidence of the occurrence witnesses. Of course, if the names of the occurrence witnesses also find a place in the F.I. statement that could add to the credibility of the witnesses, but as indicated, the omission by itself need not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such a witness is un-reliable. Of course, if the names of the occurrence witnesses also find a place in the F.I. statement that could add to the credibility of the witnesses, but as indicated, the omission by itself need not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such a witness is un-reliable. In view of the fact that, hostility or enmity is neither brought out in the cross-examination of P.W.8 nor even a suggestion in that regard having been made, we do not consider that evidence of P.W.8 can be rejected on the ground that her name does not figure in Ex.P-1 or that she was not questioned at the inquest. This is particularly so as there is effective corroboration for the evidence of these witnesses from other source. 15. The evidence of P.W.8 would show that the accused attempted to strangulate her about an year before the occurrence, at the intervention of others Moly was saved and it was thereafter that the accused left her, the evidence of P.W.10 would show that about 5-5.30 p.m. on 11. 1990 the accused came to his house and stayed there. He said that, when he woke up on the next morning the accused had already left. His wife told him that the accused left with M.O.1 blanket given to him for sleep during the night. P.W.10 would further swear that on learning that Moly was murdered he went to the scene. He noticed, a knife lying a little away from the dead body. He had a doubt that the same belonged to him. Therefore, he returned to his house and verified in the roof of the verandan where he had kept the knife. He found M.O.2 knife missing. He identified M.O.2 knife. P.W.23 arrested the accused on 11. 1990 at about 5 p.m. at Kappundikkal away from the scene of occurrence. He saw accused wearing M.O.1. He seized M.O.1 along with M.Os.14 to 19 under Ex.P-4 to which P.W.6 is an attestor. Ex.P-11 Chemical Analyst’s report would show that M.O.1 had human bloodstain of Group ‘A’. M.Os.4, 5 and 7 the blouse, lunki and brassiere of the deceased also contained, human blood ‘A’ group. Thus M.O.1 blanket which was given to the accused by P.W.10 for this sleep during the night of 11. 1990 was found worn by the accused at about 5 p.m. on 11. 1990 and the said blanket contained bloodstain of ‘A’ group. M.Os.4, 5 and 7 the blouse, lunki and brassiere of the deceased also contained, human blood ‘A’ group. Thus M.O.1 blanket which was given to the accused by P.W.10 for this sleep during the night of 11. 1990 was found worn by the accused at about 5 p.m. on 11. 1990 and the said blanket contained bloodstain of ‘A’ group. This is an incriminating circumstance against the accused. 16. M.O.2 knife belonging to the accused was found at the scene near the dead body. P.W.10 who was not cross-examined said that, the knife was kept in the roof of the verandah of his house where the accused slept in the night of 11. 1990. The knife was seized by P.VV.24 under Ex.P-3 inquest. P.W.20, Finger Print Expert developed and preserved the finger print obtained on the knife. P.W.22, the Police Photographer took Exs.P-13 and P-14, Photographs of the finger print and its enlargement. P.W.22 compared the photographs of the chance finger print with specimen print of the accused and issued Ex.P-15 expert opinion. P.W.21 said that, the chance print of the right middle finger is identical with the finger print of the right finger of the accused. This is a positive link to connect the accused with the crime. 17. In the statement under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. accused said that when he was taken to the police station he was asked to catch hold of the knife. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant contended that in view of the fact that the photographs were taken after the arrest of the accused there is enough force in the submission of the accused in his statement under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. This argument looses its value in view of the fact that the accused did not make any complaint in that regard when he was produced before the Magistrate. P.W.20 developed and preserved the chance finger print at the scene and he initiated the same. In such circumstance, the contention that the chance print was taken at the police station at the instance of the police cannot be accepted. As noticed, this is yet another piece of evidence which would connect the accused with the offence. 18. P.W.17, the doctor said that the injuries sustained by Moly could be caused with a weapon like M.O.2. M.O.2 also had bloodstained belonging to ‘A’ group. As noticed, this is yet another piece of evidence which would connect the accused with the offence. 18. P.W.17, the doctor said that the injuries sustained by Moly could be caused with a weapon like M.O.2. M.O.2 also had bloodstained belonging to ‘A’ group. Thus M.O.2 was involved in the occurrence is clear and the evidence of P.W.21 along with Ex.P-15 would show that the accused held the weapon and it was with that weapon the injuries were inflicted. 19. The evidence of P.W.23 would show that, at the time of arrest the accused was wearing M.O.14 shirt, He seized M.Os.14 to 19 under Ex.P-4 as noticed P.W.6 is an attestor to Ex.P-4. M.O.14 shirt had human bloodstains of ‘A’ group as per Ex.P-11 Chemical Analyst’s report. The more important aspect to be noted in this connection is P.Ws.1 and 8said that they saw the accused snatching studs from the ears of Moly. The evidence of P.W.13 the wife of P.W.14 would show that M.O.17 belonged to Moly. The evidence of P.Ws. 13 and 14 is to the effect that their relationship with the accused and Moly were cordial. P.W. 13 had occasion to note M.O.17. P.W.17, the doctor noted five injuries in Ex.P-7. Injury No. 5 is laceration in both the lobules of ears of Moly. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 8 thus gets corroboration from the medical evidence. 20. Now coming to the evidence of P.W.23 he found M.O.17 parts of studs wrapped in M.Os.15 and 16 kept in the pocket of M.O.14 shirt worn by the accused. The evidence thus is compelling to the effect that the accused removed the studs and he was having it at the time of arrest, when questioned under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. the accused said that when he was taken in the jeep a Head Constable put a packet in his pocket. With due regard to the attending circumstances as well as the evidence of P.Ws.6 and 23, the said statement of the accused cannot be accepted. The evidence clearly would show that the accused removed the studs from the ears of Moly. 21. In this connection it is necessary to advert to the finding of the lower court to the effect that the accused is not guilty of the offences punishable under Secs. The evidence clearly would show that the accused removed the studs from the ears of Moly. 21. In this connection it is necessary to advert to the finding of the lower court to the effect that the accused is not guilty of the offences punishable under Secs. 392 and 397, I.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge did not disbelieve the evidence of the seizure of M.O.17 from the person of the accused. But the learned Sessions Judge was of the view that the ingredients of the said offence arc not made out. Of course, there being no appeal against the acquittal of the accused of the offence punishable under Secs.392 and 397 of the I.P.C, this Court cannot reverse the said acquittal. But on appreciation of the evidence this Court is entitled to arrive at its own conclusion. The evidence shows, M.O.17.was seized from the person of the accused at the time of arrest. The principles laid down in the decision in Brathi v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 318: (1991) Crl.L.J. 402, lends support to the said conclusion. Recent unexplained possession of articles belonging to the deceased is not only evidence as to the robbery but is also presumptive evidence of the charge of murder as well Baiju v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 522: (1978) Crl.L.J. 646. The said pieces of evidence lend effective corroboration to the evidence of the occurrence witnesses together. The said evidence would establish the prosecution case against the accused. Adding to this, there is the evidence of motive. As noticed P.W.4, the son of deceased and P.W.8 have sworn to the fact that the accused attempted to strangulate Moly about one year before the occurrence and that after the said incident he left Moly. In his statement under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. the accused said that the cause of his separation from Moly was P.W.14. Thus the prosecution case that the accused had suspicion that Moly had illicit intimacy with P.W.14 finds support from the statement of the accused under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. The evidence of P.Ws.4 and 8 that, at one point of time the accused attempted to strangulate Moly has to be taken in the context of the said answer given by the accused under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. Thus the prosecution is successful in proving motive also. When the evidence of the occurrence witnesses thus gets enough corroboration front other sources, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant when he submitted that, the evidence of these witnesses cannot be accepted, the argument that P.W.14 is an influential person and that it was at his instance the accused is implicated in the offence does not get support from the evidence. P.W.13 the wife of P.W.14 said that the accused and P.W.14 were intimate and that on two occasions when the accused was implicated in certain criminal cases the accused was saved with the help of P.W.14. From that alone it is not possible to infer that it was at the instance of P.W.14 the accused was implicated in this case. Particular advertance to the evidence of P.W. 10 in this context is necessary. P.W.10 was not cross-examined. The accused who was away from the place appeared in the evening of 11. 1990, in the early morning taking along with him the blanket given to him for sleep and also the knife which was kept in the roof of verandah in which he slept. This would show that the accused came with a purpose, he waited in morning for the deceased to come through the road which led to the Milk Co-operative Society where she had to sell the Milk and when she reached the place he struck her. The evidence of these witnesses cannot be rejected on the assumption that it was P.W.14 who engineered the case against the accused. We are unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard. Therefore, it is clear that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Sec. 302, I.P.C. does not suffer from any infirmity. The findings is only to be confirmed. 22. Now what remains is as regards the sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge. Learned counsel for the appellant made severe criticism against the death sentence awarded to the accused. According to the learned counsel with due regard to the facts and circumstances, it was a case where the extreme penalty should not have been awarded. He maintained that the learned Sessions Judge has awarded the sentence on the basis of assumptions and irrelevant considerations. According to the learned counsel with due regard to the facts and circumstances, it was a case where the extreme penalty should not have been awarded. He maintained that the learned Sessions Judge has awarded the sentence on the basis of assumptions and irrelevant considerations. He maintained that the sentence awarded to the accused suffers serious infirmity in as much as the mandatory provisions of the law was not followed by the learned Sessions Judge. It is his case that, this case will not fall under category of ‘rarest of rare cases’ so as to impose the death penalty. The Supreme Court in the decision in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 957:1983 Crl.L.J. 1457. “Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances...... In order to apply these guidelines inter alia the following questions may be asked and answered; (a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence? (b) are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?”. We have to recall the circumstance under which the offence was committed. Though the prosecution would maintain that the accused is the second husband of Moly,. in his statement under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. the accused would say that her first husband is alive, her second husband died and that he is her third husband. According to the learned counsel for the appellant. Moly was a Muslim lady and was married to one Usman and P.W.4 is the child born to Usman in Moly, that after she converted to christianity she was married to Papachan. Pappachan died in an accident and that it was thereafter the accused married her. P.W.4 is stated to be a Muslim and his father is mentioned as Uduman. 23. Pappachan died in an accident and that it was thereafter the accused married her. P.W.4 is stated to be a Muslim and his father is mentioned as Uduman. 23. P.W.13 would swear that she and her husband (P.W.14) and accused hail from Kouayam and that it was herself and P.W.14 who took initiative for the marriage of the accused with Moly. Her evidence would further show that even after the accused left, when Moly had a fracture in her hand P.W.14 helped her. Of course, she denied that her husband had illicit-intimacy with Moly. The evidence of P.W.14 would show that his family and Moly were in intimate terms. After the death of Moly, P.W.4 is residing with P.Ws.13 and 14. This background has to be kept in view in appreciating the suspicion of the accused that P.W.14 had illicit intimacy with Moly. Thus, it cannot be said, it is wholly unusual that a person like the accused entertained suspicion as to her fidelity. What we want to stress in this connection is, even according to the prosecution the offence was committed due to his suspicion as to the chastity of Moly. It is true, the accused inflicted deadly injuries on Moly. But the question to be considered as is held in the decision in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 957: 1983 Crl.L.J. 1457 is whether the imprisonment for life is altogether inadequate. In the decision in Amrutha v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 629: 1983 Crl.L.J. 1057, the accused committed pre-mediated murder of his wife and daughter, there was no justification for the murder of the daughter. Accused and his wife frequently quarelled and accused suspected her chastity. There was no basis for the suspicion entertained by the accused. The accused was sentenced to death by the Sessions Court; the sentence was confirmed by the High Court. The accused came up before the Supreme Court for Special Leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court observed: "We have anxiously considered the question of sentence. While on the one hand, it is clear that the murders are premeditated and there was really no justification whatsoever for the murder of Shasikala, on the other hand, we have the circumstance that the accused and the deceased. Janabai were frequently quarrelling and the accused suspected the chastity of his wife. While on the one hand, it is clear that the murders are premeditated and there was really no justification whatsoever for the murder of Shasikala, on the other hand, we have the circumstance that the accused and the deceased. Janabai were frequently quarrelling and the accused suspected the chastity of his wife. Janabai had infact left the house of the accused with her daughter about two weeks prior to the occurrence. We do not know that there was any basis for the suspicion entertained by the accused regarding Janabai’s chastity, but we do know that accused nurtured and was labouring under a sense of grievance and was often dejected and moody presumably because of his suspicions. He was apparently inclined to brood over the wrong suspected by him to have been done to him. While ho one can hold a brief for a modern Othello, we cannot also lose sight of the fact that sexual jealousy and injured vanity often combine together to furnish powerful motive for murder, particularly among rustic rural folk to which class the accused belongs". Ultimately the appeal was allowed and the Supreme Court set aside the sentence of death and substituted the sentence of imprisonment for life. 24. We have pointed out, the very prosecution case and the evidence regarding the circumstance under which the accused entertained the belief that Moly was unfaithful to him. That has to be taken into account with due regard to the antecedent of parties. With due regard to the said aspect that emerges from the evidence it could be noticed that this case is similar to Amrutha’s case, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 629: 1983 Crl.L.J. 1057. 25. The learned Sessions Judge has stated that the accused had killed his first wife and undergone imprisonment for the same. That along with the answer given by the accused when he was asked as to the sentences to be awarded to him were taken as circumstance which would warrant the imposition of capital sentence. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was no basis for the said observations of the learned Sessions Judge. As regards the case that the accused had killed his first wife, the evidence that is now relied on by the learned Additional Director General of Prosecution is that of P.W.13, the wife of P.W.14. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was no basis for the said observations of the learned Sessions Judge. As regards the case that the accused had killed his first wife, the evidence that is now relied on by the learned Additional Director General of Prosecution is that of P.W.13, the wife of P.W.14. In the cross-examination of P.W.13, she said that the accused was in jail in connection with the killing of his wife. In the reexamination it is brought out that the accused was in jail on conviction. In Ex.P-1 F.I. Statement it is slated that P.W.1 had hearsay information that the accused had been in jail for causing the death of his wife. Neither the judgment in that case was produced not any investigation whatsoever was conducted as regards the same. In fact the number of the said case even is not mentioned anywhere. The information as regards the same to P.W.13 is also not known. It is a matter which could be proved by documentary evidence; nothing is produced. To crown all these, though such an incriminating statement was made by P.W.13 and the learned Sessions Judge relied on that, the same was not put to the accused and his explanation sought when he was questioned under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. In the decision in Sharad v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1084 S.C. 1622: 1084 Crl.L.J. 1738 after referring the decision in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 468: 1053 Crl.L.J. 1033 it is held: "Ever since this decision, there is a catena of authorities of this Court uniformly taking the view that unless the circumstance appearing against an accused is put to him in his examination under Sec. 342 or Sec. 313 of the Crl.P.C., the same cannot be used against him." What is to be noted in this connection is, the said incriminating part of the evidence was also relied on to award death sentence to the accused. It is on the basis of the said evidence the learned Sessions Judge made the observation that there is no chance for reforming the accused. The very basis of the said view itself is knocked off because of what is stated above. 27. Now what remains is the answer given by the accused when he was questioned as regards the sentence to be awarded to him. The very basis of the said view itself is knocked off because of what is stated above. 27. Now what remains is the answer given by the accused when he was questioned as regards the sentence to be awarded to him. As already noticed, the evidence in this case will not compel the awarding of death sentence. The accused when asked as regards the sentence, he said that, even if he is sentenced to death, he should not be sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. When the court on the basis of the evidence and circumstance comes to the conclusion that the accused is liable to be imposed a particular sentence, merely on the basis of the wish of the accused it will not be justifiable for the court to award the sentence sought by the accused. The nature of the answer given by the accused of course can be taken into consideration along with the other circumstances and evidence relating to the said aspect. What is highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant, is, as soon as the accused was pronounced guilty of the offence under Sec. 302, I.P.C. he was asked with respect to the sentence. According to the learned counsel there was hardly any time for the accused to regain his composure and give a rational answer to the question. It was maintained by him that there was total violation of Sec. 235 (2) of Crl.P.C in as much as the accused was not given time to give answer to the question. The answer could be out of frustration and remorse, it could as well be on account of repentance. In the decision in Allaudin Mian Bin v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1456: 1989 Crl.L.J. 1466 with reference to Sec. 235(2) of Crl.P.C. the Supreme Court held: "Since the provision is intended to give the accused an opportunity to place before the court all the relevant material having a bearing on the question of sentence there can be no doubt that the provision is salutary and must be strictly followed. It is clearly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality. It is clearly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality. In a case of life or death as in the case of punishment for murder, the presiding officer must show a high degree of concern for the statutory right of the accused and should not treat it as a mere formality to be crossed before making, the choice of sentence. If the choice is made without giving the accused as effective and real opportunity to place his antecedents, social and economic background, mitigating and extenuating circumstances, etc., before the court, the court’s decision on the sentence would be vulnerable.... As a general rule the trial courts should after recording the conviction adjourn the matter to a future date and call upon both the prosecution as well as the defence to place the relevant material bearing on the question of sentence before it and thereafter pronounce the sentence to be imposed on the offender". In that case accused 1 and 2 were sentenced to death. The High Court confirmed the sentenced of death for the murder of two infant girls. There was no compliance of Sec. 235(2) of the Crl.P.C. The Supreme Court set aside the sentence of death and converted it to imprisonment for life. 28. The learned Additional Director General of Prosecution relying on the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 S.C.C. 700 : 1992 Crl.L.J. 3454, contended that merely because Sec. 235(2) of the Crl.P.C. is not complied with the sentence of death cannot be interfered with. In that case this aspect was considered. But the view expressed in Allanddin Mian’s case, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1456: 1989 Crl.L.J. 1466, was reiterated. The argument against the adjournment was advanced on the basis of the third proviso to Sec. 309(2), Crl.P.C. with reference to the same the Supreme Court observed: "The underlying object is to discourage frequent adjournments. But that does not mean that the proviso precludes the court from adjourning the matter even where the interest of justice to demands. The proviso may not entitled an accused to an adjournment but it does not prohibit or preclude the court from granting one in such serious case of life and death to satisfy the requirement of justice as enshrined in Sec. 235(2) of the Code". In that case the sentence of death awarded to accused 1 and 5 was not interfered with. In that case the sentence of death awarded to accused 1 and 5 was not interfered with. They had told the trial court that they were proud of their act and were not afraid of death and were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the article of their faith. The Supreme Court observed: “It is thus apparent that before they made their statements admitting their involvement they had mentally prepared themselves for the extreme penalty and, therefore, if they desired to place any material for a lesser sentence they had ample opportunity to do so”. It was under those circumstances, the Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence. This case does not have any such characteristics. Therefore, the said decision cannot be pressed into service. In the decision in Malikiat Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 4 S.C.C. 341 , also it is held that the awarding of sentence on the same day of pronouncement of conviction is not in accordance with law, and that normally the same would have the effect of remand in the case for reconsideration. Yet, the Supreme Court held with due in regard to circumstance in that case that, it is sufficient that the sentence of death is converted into imprisonment for life. The effect of the answer given by the accused to the question regarding sentence has to be viewed in the context of the principles laid down in the decisions referred to early. We have already found that the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the imposition of death sentence. When that is the position, in the circumstance of this case, the sentence of death has to be set aside and the accused has to be sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. In the result the finding and conviction against the accused under Sec. 302, I.P.C. are confirmed. The sentence of death is set aside and the accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The appeal is allowed in part. Reference is answered accordingly.