A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal of Ahmedabd (the Tribunal for convenience) on 18/08/1988 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. S. 7 of 1984 is under challenge in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. By its impugned decision, the Tribunal upset the order passed by the Deputy Collector of Chores Prant at Surat (the first authority for convenience) on 10/08/1983 in Tenancy Case No. 1 of 1983. ( 2 ) ). The facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. Respondents Nos. 1 to 9 are trustees of one trust in the name and style of Shri Surat Swaminarayan Mandir Gaushala Trust (the Trust for convenience ). It owns several parcels of land in village Fulpada, taluka Choryase. One such parcel of land bears Survey No. 14 (the disputed land for convenience ). The predecessor-in-title of the petitioners was its tenant on and before 1/04/1957. He could not become its deemed purchaser as the disputed land enjoyed protection from the relevant provisions contained in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Tenancy Act for brief) by virtue of Section 88-B thereof as it stood prior to its amendment by Gujarat Act 16 of 1969. With abolition of every kind of devasthan inam by the Gujarat Devasthan Inam Abolition Act, 1969, the disputed land ceased to enjoy such protection under Section 88-B of the Tenancy Act with effect from 15/11/1969. by virtue of Section 88-E of the Tenancy Act inserted by Gujarat Act 16 of 1969 on the statute book, the tenant became its deemed purchaser with effect from 15/11/1969. It appears that the trustee of the Trust wanted the exemption to continue under Section 88-B of the Tenancy act. They appear to have moved the competent authority under Section 88-B thereof by means of their application. It came to be registered as Tenancy Application No. 2 of 1978. It appears to have been assigned to the Assistant Collector for hearing and disposal. By his order passed on 11/06/1979 in the aforesaid proceeding, the Assistant Collector had rejected it. That aggrieved the trustees of the Trust. They carried the matter in revision before the tribunal by means of their revision Application No. TEN. B. S. 150 of 1979. It appears to have been assigned to the Assistant Collector for hearing and disposal. By his order passed on 11/06/1979 in the aforesaid proceeding, the Assistant Collector had rejected it. That aggrieved the trustees of the Trust. They carried the matter in revision before the tribunal by means of their revision Application No. TEN. B. S. 150 of 1979. By its decision rendered on 13/01/1983 in the aforesaid revisional application, the Tribunal accepted it and remanded the matter to the first authority for restoration of the proceeding to file and for his fresh decision after giving an opportunity to the Trust to cross-examine witnesses in the proceeding. After remand, the proceeding was registered afresh as Tenancy Appeal/revision No. 1 of 1983. It appears that the certificate of exemption under Section 88-B of the Tenancy Act was sought for with respect to several parcels of land but in view of the compromise between the parties the claim was restricted to only two parcels of land including the disputed land. In view of the compromise between the parties, cross-examination of witnesses by and on behalf of the trust was not found necessary. After bearing the parties, by his decision rendered on 10/08/1983 in Tenancy Appeal/revision No. 1 of application for exemption under Section 88-B of the Tenancy Act. Its copy is at Annexure-A to this petition. That aggrieved the trustees. They carried the matter in revision before the Tribunal by means of their Revision Application No. TEN. B. S. 7 of 1984. By its decision rendered on 18/08/1988 in the aforesaid revisional application, the Tribunal accepted it only on the ground that the first authority did not carry out its directions given in its earlier decision rendered on 13/01/1983, in Revision Application No. TEN. B. S. 150 of 1979. A copy of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal rendered on 18/08/1988 is at Annexure-B to this petition. It may be mentioned that by the time the Tenancy Act was initiated, the original tenant had breathed his last leaving behind him the present petitioners as his heirs and legal representatives. The aforesaid decision of the Tribunal at them. They have, therefore, moved this Court by means of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the impugned decision at Annexure-C to this petition. ( 3 ) ). The aforesaid decision of the Tribunal at them. They have, therefore, moved this Court by means of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the impugned decision at Annexure-C to this petition. ( 3 ) ). It transpires from the order at Annexure-A to this petition that the Trust was registered separately sometime on 26/11/1976 in the present form. The temple trust was registered earlier but the gaushala was not included in it and that was the reason why a separate trust for the gaushala was required to be carried and registered and it came to be registered on 26/11/1976 as aforesaid. In that view of the matter, it would be a new trust. Before its creation and registration, Section 88-E of the Tenancy Act had already come into force with effect from 15/11/1969 making the predecessor-in-title of the present petitioners to be the deemed purchaser of the disputed land under the relevant provisions contained therein. In that view of the matter, the hands of clock could not be put back by virtue of any subsequent registration of a trust for gaushala. The first authority was, therefore, justified in rejecting the application of the Trust under Section 88-B of the Tenancy Act. ( 4 ) ). Shri Rathod for respondent No. 26 has vehemently urged that the Tribunal in its impugned decision at Annexure-B to this petition was justified in upsetting the order Annexure-A to this petition on the ground that its earlier directions were not carried out. There is force and substance in the aforesaid submission urged before me by Shri Rathod for respondent No. 26. No subordinate officer can be permitted to flout any directions issued by his superior officer or the Tribunal exercising revisional powers with respect to the orders passed by such subordinate officer. No subordinate officer can be permitted to be wiser than his superior officer or the Tribunal with respect to the directions given by him or it in any quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings as the case may be. It has been rightly said by that great philosopher Ceasro : To be wiser then law is the very thing condemned by good law. In that view of the matter, the first authority ought to have kept himself within the bounds of such directions. It has been rightly said by that great philosopher Ceasro : To be wiser then law is the very thing condemned by good law. In that view of the matter, the first authority ought to have kept himself within the bounds of such directions. However, in the present case, the first authority had done substantial justice between the parties according to law. As pointed out hereinabove, the Trust in the present case has come into existence sometime in 1976. It came to be registered according to law. Prior thereto, the predecessor-in-title of the present petitioners had become the deemed purchaser of the disputed land by virtue of Section 88-E of the Tenancy Act. In that view of the matter, rejection of the application by the Trust under Section 88-B of the Tenancy Act by the first authority was strictly according to law. I think the Tribunal ought not to have been somewhat touchy when the impugned order was found to be according to law. In view of the aforesaid position of law, no useful purpose would be served by permitting the Trust to cross-examine witnesses. While condemning and deprecating the attitude on the part of the first authority in not following the directions issued by the Tribunal in its earlier decision, I think the first authority has ultimately acted strictly according to law. His order at Annexure-A to this petition, therefore, called for no interference in revision by the Tribunal in exercise of its revisional powers. ( 5 ) ). By way of abundant caution I clarify that it would not be open to any subordinate officer to act contrary to any direction issued by any superior officer or any Tribunal in any quasi-judicial or judicial proceeding except on very strong justifiable grounds. ( 6 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure-B to this petition cannot be sustained in law and it has to be quashed and set aside. The order passed by the first authority at Annexure-A to this petition deserves to be restored. ( 7 ) ). ( 6 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure-B to this petition cannot be sustained in law and it has to be quashed and set aside. The order passed by the first authority at Annexure-A to this petition deserves to be restored. ( 7 ) ). Before parting with this judgment, I will fail in my duty if I do not record the note of appreciation for valuable assistance rendered by Shri M. H. Rathod for respondent No. 26 though the dispute arising in this petition was essentially between the petitioners on the one hand and respondent Nos. 1 to 9 on the other. Respondent No. 26 was merely a formal party. The assistance rendered by Shri Rathod for respondent No. 26 is all the more valuable because respondent Nos. 1 to 9 have remained absent. ( 8 ) ). In the result, the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 18/08/1988 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. S. 7 of 1984 at Annexure-B to this petition is quashed and set aside and the order passed by the Deputy Collector of Chores Prant at Surat on 10/08/1983 in Tenancy Appeal/revision No. 1 of 1983 at Annexure-A to this petition is restored. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. .