JUDGMENT K.P. Balanarayana Marar, J. 1. Canara Bank, Ernakulam is the petitioner in this original petition. The Bank has been giving financial accommodation to first respondent from October, 1972 on wards in order to enable them to execute various contract works undertaken by them. First respondent had taken up contract work for F. A. C. T. Engineering and Design Organisation and the Southern Railway. The total amount due to the Bank from the first respondent under various accounts would come to more than Rs. 17 lakhs. On 8-3-1975 first respondent executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the Bank by which the Bank was authorised to receive payment of all amounts due and which may become due from the second respondent under various contract works and to appropriate such amounts in reduction of the advances given by the Bank, The original power of attorney was forwarded to the second respondent and the same was registered in their office. Similarly an irrevocable power of attorney was executed by the first respondent authorising the Bank to receive payment of all amounts which may become due in respect of the contracts entered into between first respondent and Southern Railway. The original power of attorney was forwarded to third respondent and it was since then returned. It is averred in the petition that the powers of attorney constitute an equitable assignment of the amounts due or which may become due to first respondent from respondents 2 and 3 and the Bank was constituted the owners of those amounts. The Bank was therefore entitled to receive payment of all amounts due to first respondent from respondents 2 and 3. The Bank has got a charge and a lien over those amounts. 2. Fourth respondent, the Income Tax Officer, B Ward, Ernakulam Issued orders under S.226(3) of the Income Tax Act calling upon respondents 2 and 3 to deposit the amounts due from them to the first respondent to the credit of the Central Government. These orders were issued on the basis that a sum of Rs. 1,03,148/- was due from first respondent towards arrears of income tax. It is averred that the arrears of tax sought to be recovered is for a period subsequent to the execution of the powers of attorney. The ownership of the amounts having vested in the Bank, the fourth respondent was not entitled to proceed against those amounts. 1,03,148/- was due from first respondent towards arrears of income tax. It is averred that the arrears of tax sought to be recovered is for a period subsequent to the execution of the powers of attorney. The ownership of the amounts having vested in the Bank, the fourth respondent was not entitled to proceed against those amounts. Fourth respondent had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned order. 3. Two applications were filed before 4th respondent requesting the Income Tax Department to revoke the notice Issued by them pointing out the equitable assignment of the amounts In favour of the Bank. Since no orders were passed on those petitions within a reasonable time, the Bank moved this court by 4831/1976. By judgment dt. 13-7-1977 this court directed 4th respondent to dispose of the applications within two months. Thereafter an order was passed on 9-9-1977 rejecting the petition. Aggrieved by that order the Bank again moved this court by O P. 4441/1977 pointing oat that the order was vitiated by errors of law apparent en the face of the record. This court by judgment dated 10-3-1982 directed the Income Tax Officer to decide the question whether petitioner has obtained an indefeasible right to the money by reason of the arrangement entered into between the Back and the first respondent. The matter was again considered by the Income Tax Officer who by order dt. 19-3-1993 rejected the petitions Aggrieved by that order the Bank has filed this original petition seeking a writ of certiorari' or other appropriate writ, order or direction to quash the orders of the Income Tax Officer and for an issue of a writ of mandamus directing respondents 4 and 5, the Income Tax Officer and the Commissioner of Income Tax, Ernakulam, to refrain from collecting amounts due from respondent 2 and 3 to first respondent pursuant to the notices Exts. P5 and P6 and also to direst them to pay over to petitioner such sums, as may have been collected by them on the basis of those orders. 4. P5 and P6 and also to direst them to pay over to petitioner such sums, as may have been collected by them on the basis of those orders. 4. In the counter affidavit filed by 4th respondent it is contended that the equitable assignments referred to in the petition are subject to the amounts due to the Central Revenue, that the Bank doss not have any priority or charge or Hen over those amounts, that the arrears of tax sought to be recovered do not relate to periods subsequent to the execution of the powers of attorney and that the amounts did not cease to be payable to the first respondent and that 4th respondent has jurisdiction and power to issue the impugned orders. In the additional counter affidavit filed by 4th respondent it is stated that 4th respondent has so far collected Rs. 6091/- and Rs, 562671- from respondents 2 and 3 respectively in pursuance to the notices issued. No counter affidavit is seen filed by respondents 1 to 3 and 5 in the original petition. An affidavit was filed by first respondent in pursuance to the direction in C M P. 6470/1988 wherein mention is made about the value of the work order and stating that 2nd respondent is not in a position to give the exact dates on which the bills of first respondent were passed. The affidavit further states that an amount of Rs. 6091 86 outstanding to the credit of the contractor was remitted to the Income Tax Department on 6-7-1983. Second respondent expressed Inability to trace the bills since they related to the year 1975. Third respondent has filed a statement with an annexure showing she details of the bills presented by 1st respondent. 5. The learned Single Judge before them the original petition came up for hearing felt that aa important question of law has been raised in the original petition and adjourned the case to be heard a Bench of two Judges. That is how the matter is now before us. 6. Heard counsel. 7. The main question in the original petition is whether the powers of attorney, Exts. P1 and P3 dt. That is how the matter is now before us. 6. Heard counsel. 7. The main question in the original petition is whether the powers of attorney, Exts. P1 and P3 dt. 8-3-1975 and 15-10-1973 respectively, Amount to an equitable assignment of the monies due to first respondent who executed the powers of attorney in favour of petitioner Bank authorising the Back to receive the monies and to adjust the same toward" the amount borrowed by first respondent from the Bank. Before adverting to the arguments advanced on both sides, it is only appropriate to refer to the relevant recitals contained in Exts. P1 and P3. 8. The Preamble of Ext. P1 mentions about the agreements enter into between first respondent and F. A. C. T. Engineering and Design Organisation and the promise of the Bank to extend financial assistance for the works undertaken by first respondent. Thereafter the document reads: "We execute an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of all the said Bank authorising them to receive payment of all moneys due to us as per bills signed by us and drafts (including earnest money deposit and retention amounts) and credit into our account in reduction of the money advanced. We Tecon Engineers, Thiruvankulam hereby agree and confer on the said Bank irrevocable authority to receive proceeds of all bills, deposits and other money including earnest money and retention deposits as and when due to us by cheques direct from the F.A.C.T. ENGINEERING AND DESIGN ORGANISATION or say other officer or officers of the name of the company making payments they may be executed by us in future and their receipts shall be complete discharge of the amounts due to us under the agreements and credit it to our account in reduction of the money advanced." 9. Ext. P3 power of attorney mentions about the agreement between first respondent and Southern Railway. That document also refers to the promise by the Bank to extend financial assistance. Ext. P3 power of attorney mentions about the agreement between first respondent and Southern Railway. That document also refers to the promise by the Bank to extend financial assistance. The power of attorney there after recites thus; ""..............We Tecon Engineers do hereby nominate and appoint the Canara Bank as our Attorney in our name and on our behalf to do or execute that all or any of the acts or things thereinafter mentioned that is to negotiate and receive payment of all moneys due to us as per bills signed by us and drafts (including earnest money deposit and retention amounts) and credit to our account in reduction of the money advanced, (2) to compromise, negotiate and receive proceeds of all bills, deposits as and when due to us by cheques direct from the Divisional Accounts Officer, Southern Railway / Construction / Trivandrum or any other officer or officers, (3) making payments that may be payable by us in future, (4) to issue receipts or discharge for to payments as received and their receipts shall be complete discharge of the amounts due to us under the agreements." 10. Intimation of both the powers of attorney were given to respondents 2 and 3 respectively. Ext. P2 is the acknowledgment received from 2nd respondent and Ext. P4 the acknowledgment received from third respondent. It was thereafter, that fourth respondent by Ext. P5 dated 22-11-1975 requested second respondent to pay all monies which have become due and which second respondent may hold for or on account of first respondent to be paid to 4th respondent towards arrears of income tax payable by first respondent. A similar notice was sent to third respondent on 12-11-1975 as per Ext. P6. The attempts of pensioner to get these notices revoked by making representation to the Income Tax Department proved futile. That necessitated the filing of this original petition. 11. Sri T. R Govinda Warrier, learned Sr. Advocate for petitioner, contended that Exts. P1 and P3 amount to an equitable assignment of the amounts due to first respondent from respondents 2 and 3. The Bank has therefore an interest in the fund and Exts P1 and P3 are irrevocable powers of attorney. On the other hand, it is urged by Sri P. K. R. Menon, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for respondents 4 and 5, that Exts. The Bank has therefore an interest in the fund and Exts P1 and P3 are irrevocable powers of attorney. On the other hand, it is urged by Sri P. K. R. Menon, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for respondents 4 and 5, that Exts. P1 and P3 are only pay orders and do not create an interest in she payee. It is his contention that the Bank has no control over the money covered by the bills to be presented by first respondent and he was not therefore competent to make an assignment in favour of the Bank. Before proceeding further we have to understand the distinction between an "actionable claim" or a "chose in action" and a "pay order". 12. As per the definition contained in the Transfer of Property Act, an 'actionable claim' is a claim to any debt other than a secured debt or any beneficial interest in movable property not in the possession of the claimant. S.130 enables the transferee of an actionable claim to sue or institute proceedings for the same in his own name without obtaining the transferor's consent and without making him a party thereto. The validity of transferring a specific fund towards she payment of debt Incurred by the debtor cannot therefore be questioned. The specification of it particular fund paints to an assignment whereas there is no such specification in the case of a pay order, which is only a mere direction to pay. The term "actionable claim" means "a claim so a debt". A "debt" ordinarily is a sum of money due from one parson to another. That sum of money must be a liquidated or a certain sum which generally is due on some contract alleged to have taken place between the parties. The claim can therefore be over a specified fund which may either be liquidated or unliquidated which may become liquidated on a future date. On the other hand, an order for payment of money pre supposes that the party to whom the order is entrusted has in his hand the money of the drawer. Such money has to be applied according to the directions by the order of the party who is entitled to it. There is no such obligation in the case of an actionable claim. Such money has to be applied according to the directions by the order of the party who is entitled to it. There is no such obligation in the case of an actionable claim. Keeping in mind the distinguishing features of an ''actionable claim" and a "pay order", there is no difficulty in finding that Exts. P1 and P3 are not in the nature of pay orders whereas they are assignment of an actionable claim or a chose in action. 13. A "chose" means a thing and a '"chose in action'' means a thing in action. According to Halsbury the expression "chose in action" in the literal sense means a thing recoverable by action as contrasted with a "chose in possession" namely a thing of which a person has not only ownership but also actual physical possession. A chose in action is assignable and is treated as property under Chap.8 of the Transfer of Property Act which calls it "an actionable claim". "Actionable claim" means a claim to any debt other than a secured debt or a beneficial interest in movable property not in the possession of the claimant. Actionable claims include claims recognised by the court as affording grounds for relief either as to unsecured debts or as to beneficial interests in movable property. It is not necessary that the property is in the possession of the person concerned. Such possession may be actual or constructive, whether present or future, conditional or contingent. From very early times equity has recognised the assignment of chooses in action on the principle that equity considers that as done which ought to be done. 14. A chose in action can be in respect of a future claim also. At page 493 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. IV it is stated that an assignment in terms present and immediate sufficient and will bind the subject matter when it comes into existence, if it is of such a nature and so described as to be capable of being ascertained and there is consideration for the assignment. Such assignment is known as equitable assignment for which no form of words is required: but it is necessary to specify the debt or fund which constitutes the equitable assignment. Such assignment is known as equitable assignment for which no form of words is required: but it is necessary to specify the debt or fund which constitutes the equitable assignment. In order to make the equitable assignment binding as between the assignor and the assignee, it has to be communicated to the assignee, and on such assignment the right to sue passes to the assignee. He can thereafter sue in his own name without making the assignor a party to the action. It is not necessary that notice should be given to the debtor or fund bolder. In short, the essential of an equitable assignment is the intention to assign and the transfer of a debt with a direction to pay out of a specified debt or fund. 15. An actionable claim also is a claim to any debt, but that claim is to a debt other than a secured debt. A beneficial interest in movable property not in the possession of the claimant is also included within the definition of "actionable claim". A claim to a future debt also comes within the scopes of the definition of "actionable claim" contained in the Transfer of Property Act. But in order to validate a transfer of an actionable claim the only restriction imposed by S.100 of the Transfer of Properly Act is that if has to be done by an instrument In writing which necessarily Secludes power of attorney also. In case a power of attorney is executed by the contractor in favour of a bank embodying an arrangement between the contractor and the bank according to which the bank agreed to advance monies to the contractor on the security of the bills and the contractor has given necessary authority to the bank to collect the amount covered by those bills, the requirement of S.130 of the T. P. Act are complied with and the transferee gets a right over the amount covered by the bills on the principle of equitable assignment. 16. In support of his contention that Exts. P1 and P3 amount to equitable assignment Sri Warrier has drawn attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Nidhi Ltd. Takharmal ( AIR 1969 SC 33 ) The Supreme Court was interpreting a power of attorney which contained more or less identical recitals. 16. In support of his contention that Exts. P1 and P3 amount to equitable assignment Sri Warrier has drawn attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Nidhi Ltd. Takharmal ( AIR 1969 SC 33 ) The Supreme Court was interpreting a power of attorney which contained more or less identical recitals. In that case the power of attorney in favour of the appellant authorised him to sue for, recover and receive the monies due in connection with the contracts entered into by one Malhotra with military and other authorities. He needed funds for the execution of his contracts. The money was advanced by the appellant in whose favour power of attorney was executed. It was declared: "all powers hereby granted are and shall be irrevocable as long as any claims of the attorneys against us whether for principal, interest, costs, charges or otherwise outstanding and unpaid."" 17. While construing the power of attorney the Supreme Court observed that it is necessary to bear in mind that the relationship of the two parties, Malhotra and the Bank, was that of a borrower and lender and that the document was brought into existence in connection with a proposed transaction of financing of Malhotra's contracts. The loans were to be advanced by the Bank against Malhotra's bills for supplies under the contract. The intention of the parties was to provide protection for the loan and to secure payment of the loans. It was with this object in view this lender was authorised to receive payment of the bills and to appropriate the receipts towards repayment of the loans. The power of attorney authorised appellant to receive all monies due or to become due to Malhotra in respect of pending or future contracts with the Government authorities. On the basis of these recitals the Supreme Court held that there was a valid equitable assignment of future debts and that the debt passes on to the assignees as and when it comes into existence. The Supreme Court repelled the contention that there was no engagement to pay out of a specific fund and therefore there was no assignment. 18. Before the Supreme Court a, contention was raised that the document was only a pay order. This contention was also rejected by observing that an interest in a specific fund was created by the power of attorney and that it was irrevocable. 18. Before the Supreme Court a, contention was raised that the document was only a pay order. This contention was also rejected by observing that an interest in a specific fund was created by the power of attorney and that it was irrevocable. It is observed that there is an essential distinction between a pay order and an assignment. A pay order is a revocable mandate. It gives the payee no interest in the fund whereas an assignment creates an interest in the fund and is not revocable. It was for these reasons that the Supreme Court held that there was a sufficient equitable assignment of specific fund in favour of the appellant therein. 19. In this connection Sri P. K. R. Menon has raised a contention that the Supreme Court was considering a case where there was an endorsement; 00 the bill whereas if has not been shown that there is such an endorsement in the present case. But that does not make any difference. In the case considered by the Supreme Court the bill was endorsed in favour of the appellant. The Supreme Court has only read the endorsement in the light of the power of attorney. The recitals in the power of attorney were construed by the Supreme Court and it was held that there can be & valid equitable assignment of the future debts. The Supreme Court has also referred to S.130 of the Transfer of Property Act under which an actionable claim can be transferred. It is further observed that where a document does not amount to a transfer within S.130, it may, apart from and independently of the section, operate as an equitable assignment of the actionable claim. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the absence of an endorsement on the bill, even if there is any, does not make any difference. 20. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the absence of an endorsement on the bill, even if there is any, does not make any difference. 20. On the question as to what constitutes an equitable assignment the Supreme Court has referred to Palmer v. Carey (L R. (1926) A. C. 703 at 706) where it was held: "The law as to equitable assignment, as stated in Rodick v. Gandell is this: The extent of the principle to be deducted is that an agreement between a debtor and a creditor that the debt owing shall be paid out of specific fund coming to the debtor, or an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a person 'owing money or holding funds belonging to the giver of the order, directing such person to pay such funds to the creditor, will create a valid equitable charge upon such fund, in other words, will operate as an equitable assignment of the debts or fund to which the order refers." While observing that the question whether a document: amounts to an equitable assignment or not is primarily one of construction, the Supreme Court followed the decision in Jagabhai Lallabhai v. Rustomji Nauserwanji (1885) ILR Bom. 311 where it was held that an agreement to finance the borrower and the power attorney of even date to receive the monies due to the borrower under certain contracts had the effect of an equitable alignment of the funds. The Supreme Court has also followed an unreported decision of that court rendered on 25-4-1968 in C. A. No. 644 of 1965, Loon Karan Sethiya v. State Bank of Jaipur, where it was held that a power of attorney authorising a lender to execute a decree then passed in favour of the borrower or which might be passed in his favour in a pending appeal and to credit to the borrower's account the monies realised in execution of the decree amounted to an equitable assignment of the funds. 21. The Madras High Court in the decision in Navajee v. The Administrator General of Madras (ILR 38 Mad. 500) held that when an instrument refers to specific funds out of which the claims of a creditor are to be satisfied, the creditor has a charge; on such fund. 22. 21. The Madras High Court in the decision in Navajee v. The Administrator General of Madras (ILR 38 Mad. 500) held that when an instrument refers to specific funds out of which the claims of a creditor are to be satisfied, the creditor has a charge; on such fund. 22. The question had come up for consideration before the Calcutta High Court in Lagdir Nauji v. Surendra Mohun Nag (AIR 1938 Cal. 606). It was held that no attachment could be made, when there is no existing debt due by the garnishee to the judgment debtor, and if the judgment debtor has already parted with his interest in the debt by assignment or created an equitable charge in respect of the same in favour of, another person, the attaching creditor acquires no larger rights than his debtor. It is further observed that in case the judgment debtor still E remains the owner of the money due by the garnishee, the mere fact that he has entered into a contract with another person that the fund shall be applied in any particular way does not prevent the creditor A from attaching the fund. The Calcutta High Court referred to the law as to equitable assignment as stated by Lord Truro in (1850) 1 Meg M and G 763, Rodick v. Gandell in the following manner: " ......... an agreement between a debtor and a creditor, that the debt owing shall be paid out of a specific fund coming to the debtor, or an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a person owing money or holding funds belonging to the giver of the order directing such person to pay such funds so the creditor, will create a valid equitable charge upon the fund, in other words, will operate as an equitable assignment of the debts or fund to which the order refers." It is then observed that this enunciation of law has never been dissented from. The test to he applied as per this decision is whether there was an intention to assign or create a charge which will give the assignee an equitable interest in the fund itself. 23. In Ninkileri Lakshmikutty Kettilamma v. Thekke Madathil Vishnu Nambisan ( AIR 1939 Mad. 411 ) the Madras High Court was considering an insurance policy assigned by the assured in favour of his wife by indorsement. 23. In Ninkileri Lakshmikutty Kettilamma v. Thekke Madathil Vishnu Nambisan ( AIR 1939 Mad. 411 ) the Madras High Court was considering an insurance policy assigned by the assured in favour of his wife by indorsement. The question arose whether the policy amount would form part of the assets of the assured and could be attached by the bolder of a decree against the assured. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the endorsement did not amount merely to a power of attorney or a transfer in future, but operated as a present transfer in favour of the assignee giving her an absolute interest in the same. There was thus no scope for the operation of the reverter clause. It was held that the policy amount did not form part of the assets of the assured and could not therefore be attached by the decree holder. 24. Leaded counsel for petitioner cited the decision in Seth Loon Karan Sethiya v. Ivan E. John ( AIR 1969 SC 73 ) wherein also the Supreme Court has considered the recitals in a power of attorney by which an equitable assignment was created. The Supreme Court formulated five questions for consideration of which the question relevant for our purpose is: "Whether in view of the said power the Bank can be held to be an assignee of the interest in the decree: if so, whether that assignment is a legal assignment or an equitable assignment?". 25. The amount under the decree was specifically ear marked for discharge of the debts due to the Bank and it was constituted as a special fund for the said purpose. The power to realise that fund was made over to the Bank for further security to set off the amount realised towards the debt due to it. The Supreme Court observed that the power of attorney is an engagement to pay out of the particular fund the debt due to the Bank and hence the same constitutes an equitable assignment of the amount due under the decree or so much of that amount as is necessary for discharging the debts due to if. 26. The only other decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision of the House of Lords in Tailby v. Official Receiver (13 Appeal Cases 523 (1886-90) All E R Sep. page 486. 26. The only other decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision of the House of Lords in Tailby v. Official Receiver (13 Appeal Cases 523 (1886-90) All E R Sep. page 486. The point to be determined in that case was whether an assignment by way of security of certain book debts not existing at the time of the assignment was valid so as to give the assignee a good rule to them when they came into existence. On this question Lord Herschell held: "I confess I am unable to see any sound distinction between an instrument assigning future book debts which may become due to the assignor in any business carried on by him, and one assigning future bequests and devises to which he may under any will become entitled. The subjects of both assignments are equally wide, equally incapable of ascertainment at the time of the assignment, but equally capable of identification when the subject has come into existence and it is sought to enforce the security." Lord Macnaghten in his judgment held: "The mode or form of assignment is absolutely immaterial, provided the Intention of the parties is clear. To effectuate the intention an assignment for value, in terms present and immediate, has always been regarded in equity as a contract binding on the conscience of the assignor, and so binding the subject matter of the contract when it comes into existence, if it is of such a nature and so described as to be capable of being ascertained and identified " 27. Following the principles stated by the Supreme Court and agreeing with the views of the Madras, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts in the aforementioned decisions, we hold that Exts. P1 and P3 are irrevocable powers of attorney by which an equitable assignment was created in favour of petitioner Bank. An interest was created in favour of the Bank over the monies due to the first respondent. Such interest relates to the amount then due and amounts accruing in future. 28. Drawing attention to page 1478 of Vol.11, 14th Edn. of Mulla's C.P.C learned counsel for petitioner would point out that a debt may be a sum of money payable under an existing obligation or it may be payable at a future date. Even then if is a debt though accruing in future. 28. Drawing attention to page 1478 of Vol.11, 14th Edn. of Mulla's C.P.C learned counsel for petitioner would point out that a debt may be a sum of money payable under an existing obligation or it may be payable at a future date. Even then if is a debt though accruing in future. The position may be different in the case of a contingent debt which bus no present existence since it is payable only when the contingency happens. The amounts due from respondents 2 and 3 are not in the nature of a contingent debt whereas it is a debt accruing in future. That also is a debt which can be proceeded against under R.46 of O.21. We are therefore of the view that a transfer of the amounts due to first respondent from respondents 2 and 3 had been made in favour of petitioner Bank which can be enforced against respondents 2 and 3. Over the amounts due to the Bank no other person can have any claim since an Interest has already been created in favour of the Bank and the Bank had become the owner thereof. 29. In view of our finding that interest has already been created in favour of the Bank, fourth respondent cannot have any claim over those amounts. The income tax liability of first respondent cannot therefore be enforced over the amounts which had already been transferred in favour of the Bank. Notices Exts. P5 and P6 are therefore liable to be quashed and we do so. We hereby issue a writ of mandamus directing respondent 4 and 5 to refrain from collecting amounts due from respondents 2 and 3 to first respondent pursuant to Exts. P5 and P6. 30. Learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 has raised a contention that Exts. P1 and P3 can be enforced only from the date of acceptance. Ext. P1 was accepted on 10-4-1975 and Ext. P3 on 20-5-1974. The contention is that Revenue has got a priority over the money due between the dates of Exts. P1 and P3 and the date of acceptance. This amount, according to learned counsel, comes to Rs. 24000 approximately. The acceptances of the power of attorney has taken place months after It was executed. After executing the power of attorney first respondent had forwarded the document to respondents 2 and 3 respectively. P1 and P3 and the date of acceptance. This amount, according to learned counsel, comes to Rs. 24000 approximately. The acceptances of the power of attorney has taken place months after It was executed. After executing the power of attorney first respondent had forwarded the document to respondents 2 and 3 respectively. That they accepted it at a later date is no reason to hold that fourth respondent gets a claim over the money which became due between the date of the power of attorney and the date of its acceptance. By Exts. P1 and P3 executed on 8-3-1975 and 15-10-1973 respectively, first respondent had authorised the Bank to receive all monies due to first respondent. A transfer of interest has therefore taken place by execution of the power of attorney. The intention to create security has been manifested by producing the powers of attorney before petitioner Bank, Communication is sent to the debtors namely respondents 2 and 3 in order to inform them about the execution of the power of attorney so as to enable the debtors to make payment to the Bank on behalf of the contractor first respondent. The acceptance of the power of attorney by respondents 2 and 3 is therefore of not much consequence and no claim can therefore be made by fourth respondent over amounts which became due between the date of the power of attorney and its acceptance. This contention He therefore without substance. 31. Claim is made in the original petition for payment of the Amount received by fourth respondent from respondents 2 and 3. It is admitted that an amount of Rs. 6091/- was received from second respondent and an amount of Rs. 56267/- from third respondent making up a total of Rs. 62358/-. These amounts were received by fourth respondent at a time when those amounts were due to the Bank on the strength of Exts. P1 and P3 Fourth respondent was therefore not entitled to get those amounts. They are liable to pay over the same to the petitioner. B Since fourth respondent had retained with them the amount which they are not legally entitled, Interest on the amount is payable. We deem it proper to direct, fourth respondent to pay interest on the amount at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of the filing of original petition. B Since fourth respondent had retained with them the amount which they are not legally entitled, Interest on the amount is payable. We deem it proper to direct, fourth respondent to pay interest on the amount at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of the filing of original petition. For the aforesaid reasons the original petition is allowed and Exts. P5 and P6 notices issued by the fourth respondent on 22-11-1975 and 12-11-1975 are quashed. We direct respondents 4 and 5 to refrain from collecting amounts due from respondents 2 and 3 to first respondent. Fourth respondent is directed to pay petitioner an amount of Rs. 62358/- with interest at 15% from 29-6-1983, the date of presentation of this petition till the date of payment. We direct the parties to suffer their costs.