Judgment : B. M. Lai, J. 1. ACCORDING to petitioner, while serving as Project Engineer in M/s. Engineering Projects (India) Ltd. (a Government of India Enterprise), he applied for the post of Chief Manager in U. P. Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) in pursuance of the advertisement made for the same. Ultimately he was selected and appointed on the post of Chief Manager in the pay scale of Rs. 1410-2175 with four advance increments of Rs . 60/- each plus other allowances as admissible to the officers of the Corporation in the above mentioned grade. His appointment was subject to the condition that he executes a bond in favour of the Corporation on Stamp paper of Rs. 43/- for serving the Corporation for minimum period of 5 years from the date of jointing his duties. He Was called upon to resign from previous service and bring relieving certificate from previous employer. The petitioner executed aforesaid bond and produced requisite documents and joined the services of Corporation. At the time of appointment petitioner's period of probation was fixed as one year from the date of joining the duties in the Corporation. The petitioner joined the services of Corporation on 10-2-1986. In addition to four advance increments given to the petitioner at the time of initial appointment, he was given two more increments. Thereafter petitioner's period of probation was extended from 10-3-1987 to 9-3-1988 and again from 10-3-88 to 9-3-19.89, in between vide order dated 4-2-1989, petitioner was discharged from the services of the Corporation with immediate effect. 2. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that admittedly, the petitioner was an officer of the Corporation and Regulation 15 of the U. P. Financial Corporation Staff Regulation 1961 (for short the Regulations) framed under section 43 of State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (for short the Act); deals with the period of probation in the Corporation. Regulation 17 of the Regulations deals with the Managing Director's power to extend probationary period. These Regulations 15 and 17 read as under : REGULATION NO 15 : PERIOD OF PROBATION : (1) An officer directly recruited to the Corporation Service shall be required to be on probation for period which shall not be less than one year and more thin two years as may be fixed at the time of the appointment. These Regulations 15 and 17 read as under : REGULATION NO 15 : PERIOD OF PROBATION : (1) An officer directly recruited to the Corporation Service shall be required to be on probation for period which shall not be less than one year and more thin two years as may be fixed at the time of the appointment. (2) Employees, not included in sub-regulation (1) of this Regulation shall on their first appointment in the Corporation's service, be required to be on probation for six months." "REGULATION NO. 17. MANAGING DIRECTOR'S POWER TO EXTEND PROBATIONARY PERIOD: (1) The period of probation of an employee may be extended at the discretion of the Managing Director but in no case shall be total period of probation exceed three years. . (2) 'I he power to extended the period of probation of an officer shall be exercised by the Managing Director subject to the approval of the Board." Thus Regulation 15 (1) speaks for the officers, 15 (2) speaks for the employees other than officers, 17 (2) speaks for the officers and 17 (1) speaks for the employees. Accordingly in view of Regulation 15 (1) an officer's period of probation cannot be fixed less than one year and more than two years and the same cannot be extended beyond two years. At the time of appointment of an officer if it is fixed one year, it can be extended for another one year by the Managing Director subject to approval by the Board. A combined reading of Regulations 15 and 17 makes it manifest that for the purposes of probation staff of Corporation has been devided info two classes, one is of the officers and the other is of the employees other than officers. The minimum and maximum period of probation for officers has been provided under Regulation 15 (1) whereas minimum period of probation for employees other than officers has been provided under Regulation 15 (2) and maximum period of probation for employees other than officers has been provided under Regulation 17 (1) of the Regulations. Since maximum period of probation for officers has been provided in Regulation 15 (1) itself hence Regulation 17 (2) provides only for the authority by which the power of extending probationary period is to be exercised. Since maximum period of probation for officers has been provided in Regulation 15 (1) itself hence Regulation 17 (2) provides only for the authority by which the power of extending probationary period is to be exercised. Regulation 17 (1) provides that power to extend the period of probation in respect of employees other than officers, is to be exercised by the Managing Director exclusively whereas power to extend the period of probation in respect of officers is to be exercised by the Managing Director subject to approval by the Board. On this basis learned counsel for the petitioner contended that at the time of appointment, one year's period of probation was fixed for petitioner with effect from 10-2-1986 i.e. from the date of joining, which was satisfactorily completed by the petitioner on 9-3-1987 and this fact is not disputed that till 17-12-87 this period of probation was not extended neither by the Managing Director nor by the Board consequently after satisfactory completion of probationary period fixed for petitioner, he became confirmed automatically on 10-3-1987 and thereafter it was not open for the respondents to put the petitioner again on probation but the respondents erred in law by extending probationary period vide letter dated 18-12-87 after about 9 months from the date of deemed confirmation of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that under the Regulations there is no provision of express confirmation consequently in the eye of law there was no need of any such provision as well as any order extending period of probation by any authority, in view of satisfactory completion of probationary period petitioner was deemed to have become confirmed on 10-3-87. Moreover, there was no provision under the Regulations for putting a confirmed officer on probation bypassing any order having retrospective operation purporting to be an order extending the period of probation. 3. Moreover, there was no provision under the Regulations for putting a confirmed officer on probation bypassing any order having retrospective operation purporting to be an order extending the period of probation. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also contended that subject to approval of the Board, Managing Director was empowered under Regulation 17 (2) to extend the period of petitioner's probation for a maximum period of two years but in the absence of any provision for express order of confirmation, it was obligatory on the part of Managing Director subject to approval of Board to have extended the period of probation before expiry of the period fixed earlier but the Managing Director failed in discharge the above obligations on its' part consequently after successful completion of one year's probationary period fixed at the time of appointment petitioner became confirmed in the eye of law, thereafter, it was not open for any authority of the Corporation to put the petitioner again on probation. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner further contended that if the petitioner was discharged from service on account of irregularities alleged to have been committed by him or having been found unsuitable for the service of the Corporation, then he was entitled to be given opportunity of being heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice which have not been followed in the instant case, consequently impugned order of termination is violative of principles of natural justice therefore, same is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on catena of decisions of this Court and apex Court but only some of them are being referred here. Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 494 , Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, AIR 1984 SC 636 , Om Prakash Maurya v. U. P. Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow, AIR 1986 SC 1844 , State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav. AIR 1987 SC 2135 , and M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank, AIR 1988 SC 286 . 5. AIR 1987 SC 2135 , and M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank, AIR 1988 SC 286 . 5. LEARNED counsel for the respondents strenuously contended with all clarity at his command that where the Rule empowers the authority to extend probation beyond the prescribed period, mere expiry of the initial period of pronation would not automatically result in deemed confirmation and express order of confirmation is necessary therefore, mere completion of probationary period fixed for petitioner would not entitle him to confirmation in the instant case where in view of Regulation 17(1) petitioner's period of probation was extendable up to three years. 6. LEARNED counsel for the respondents further contended that probationer has no right and very purpose of placing a person on probation is to try him during the probation period to assess his suitability for the job therefore there is no question of hearing before termination of service during the probationary period. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on Municipal Corporation Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra, AIR 1991 SC 1402 , and Unit Trust of India v. T. Bijai Kumar, 1992 JT Vol. VI page 82. 7. HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, the points which emerge for determination by this Court are, whether or not, in view of Regulations 15 and 17 probationary period of petitioner who was admittedly an officer, could be extended up to maximum period of two years only, and whether the petitioner become confirmed upon the expiry of the maximum period of probation by implication or express order of confirmation was necessary. The third point to be determined is whether impugned order of termination is violative of principles of natural justice or not ? 8. FOR the purposes of determination of the first point which involves interpretation of Regulations 15 and 17 of the Regulations, statement of Honourable Iyer, J. is very relevant which reads as under : (vide para 9 in Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 . "to be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul. The judicial key to construction is the composite perception of the DEHA and the DHI of the provision." The same word may mean one thing in one context and another in different context, therefore, with a view to have harmonious construction provisions of Regulations 15 and 17, quoted above, be read together. The judicial key to construction is the composite perception of the DEHA and the DHI of the provision." The same word may mean one thing in one context and another in different context, therefore, with a view to have harmonious construction provisions of Regulations 15 and 17, quoted above, be read together. Sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 15 provides not only for the period of probation but specifies the minimum and maximum both by using the words 'shall not be less than one year and more than two years' whereas sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 15 provides only for the period of probation and does not specify the maximum, therefore, sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 17 specifies the maximum for those whose maximum has not been specified in sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 15. Since maximum period of employees other than officers has not been specified in sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 15 hence specification of maximum period-made in sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 17 relates to employees other than officers. Further, a bare reading of sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 17 makes it crystal clear that total period of three years referred therein, pertains to an employee whose extention is at the discretion of the Managing Director. Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 17 clearly says that extension of an officer is not at the discretion of Managing Director rather it is subject to the approval of the Board, therefore, word 'employee' used in Regulation 17 (1) refers to the employees referred in Regulation 15 (2). However, we feel that the provisions of Regulations 15 and 17 are not couched in most appropriate language and are not very happily worded. But combined reading of both the provisions makes it clear, that an officer of the Corporation shall be required to be on probation for period, which shall not be less than one year and more than two years, whereas an employee other than officer shall be required to, be on probation for period which shall not be less than six months and more than three years, and the power to extend the period of probation shall be exercised by the Managing Director subject to approval of the Board in respect of officers of the Corporation, whereas the power to extend probation shall be exercised by the Managing Director in respect of employees other than officers. 9. 9. IN the instant case petitioner being Chief Manager of the Corporation, is admittedly an officer of the Corporation, therefore, period of his probation cannot be extended beyond two years under the Regulations 10. NOW coming to the second point as to whether the petitioner become confirmed upon the expiry of the maximum period of probation by implication or express order of confirmation was necessary, in our opinion the decision of the Apex Court relied upon by the petitioner rendered by their lordships Honourable R. S. Pathak, the then Chief Justice of India and Honourable M. N. Venkatachalliah, J. (as his lordship then was), present Chief Justice of India, in M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank, AIR 1988 SC 286 is complete answer on the point, where their lordships have held in para 4 as follows : "The first point need not detain us. The period of the probation was one year, in the first instance. The employer could extend it only for a further period of six more months. The limitation on the. power of the employer to extend the probation beyond 18 months coupled with the further requirement that at the end of it the services of the probationer should either be confirmed or discharged render the inference inescapable that if the probationer was not discharged, at or before the expiry of the maximum period of probation, then there would be an implied confirmation as there was no statutory indication as to what should follow in the absence of express confirmation at the end of even the maximum permissible period of probation. In cases where, as here, these conditions coalesce, it has been held, there would be confirmation by implication." Similar view has been taken in Om Prakash Maurya v. U. P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Lucknow, AIR 1986 SC 1844 and other cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. In cases where, as here, these conditions coalesce, it has been held, there would be confirmation by implication." Similar view has been taken in Om Prakash Maurya v. U. P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Lucknow, AIR 1986 SC 1844 and other cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. IN Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra, AIR 1991 SC 1402 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, their lordships of Apex Court referred the decision rendered in M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank (supra) and held in para 6 as follows : "If the rules do not empower the appointing authority to extend the probation beyond the preset bed period, or where the rules are absent about confirmation or passing of the prescribed test for confirmation of probation and inaction for a very long time may lead to an indication of the satifactory completion of probation. But in this case. R. 3 expressly postulates otherwise. The period of probation is subject to extension by order in writing for another period of one year, passing the prescribed examinations and successful completion of probation and to make an order of confirmation are condition precedent" 12. THUS it is clear that in re Municipal Corporation Raipur (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, in view of specific Rule 8 referred therein, passing the prescribed examinations, successful completion of probation and to make an express order of confirmation were the conditions precedent, whereas in the instant case there was no such condition precedent, neither in the order of appointment nor in the Regulations, that the petitioner would be required passing of any prescribed examination or any express order of confirmation would be a must. The only condition precedent was the successfully completed maximum period of probation. Therefore, since under the regulations petitioner's probationary period could not be extended beyond the maximum period of two years, as stated above, he stood confirmed on the expiry of the maximum probationary period, by implication in the absence of statutory indication as to what should follow in the absence of express confirmation at the end of even the maximum permissible period of probation. So far as the third point as to whether impugned order of termination is violative of principles of natural justice, is concerned, in view of our conclusions on first two points it is clear that impugned order of discharge simplicitor is bad in case of a confirmed officer. But that is not all. 13. IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents, sworn by Chitranjan Sahai, Deputy Senior Manager (law), respondents filed copy of the order of discharge (Annexure C.A. II) and relevant extract form the minutes of the meeting of Board (Annexure CA-I) in which the Board considered the note of the Managing Director dated 23-1-89 and was satisfied that petitioner was found to be unsuitable for the services of the corporation. IN para 17 of the counter affidavit it has been stated as under. "The superior officers were finding the petitioner's work to be wholly unsatisfactory and the petitioner to be a liability." 14. PLACING reliance on a decision of Apex Court in Unit Trust of India v. T. Bijaya Kumar, 1992 JT vol. VI SC 82, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that an order of discharge is not an order of punishment and cannot be challenged. In the aforesaid case Apex Court observed in para 4 as follows : "The first respondent contends that, the Court ought not to go by the plain language of the termination order but must lift the veil to ascertain the true reason which prompted the Management to put an end to his service. We have examined the backdrop in which this order came to be passed. As stated earlier even on close scrutiny of the material on record, we are not in a position to persuade ourselves to the view taken by the High Court. 15. IN Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, AIR 1984 SC 636 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner Apex Court ruled in paras 11 and 12 as follows :- "The form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the fact and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Article 311 (2). Where the form of the order is merely camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order, though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee." 16. FURTHER in para in the Apex Court ruled as follows :- "Even though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it cannot stand alone. Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored The recommendation which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for the incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of dischage should fall to the ground if the servant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution." In the instant case with a view to a certain as to whether impugned order of discharge dated 4th Feb. 1989 contained in annexure C.A. 2 is an order of discharge simplicitor or an order of termination for misconduct, it is necessary to lift the veil. 17. ANNEXURE C.A.I, the extracts of the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors dated 31-1-1989 reveals that the Board found petitioner unsuitable for the services of the Corporation on the basis of note of Managing Director dated 23-1-89. 17. ANNEXURE C.A.I, the extracts of the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors dated 31-1-1989 reveals that the Board found petitioner unsuitable for the services of the Corporation on the basis of note of Managing Director dated 23-1-89. A base perusal of aforesaid note dated 23-1-1989 (R.A.I.) of Managing Director makes it clear that petitioner has committed various irregularities, which are of very serious nature, as a result of which he has been discharged from the services of the Corporation, A combined reading of the note of Managing Director, decision of the Board and impugned order of discharge leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner has been discharged for the reason of alleged irregularities committed by him, though the form of the impugned order is that of a discharge simplicitor. Therefore, since the respondents have arrived at a conclusion to discharge the petitioner on the basis of alleged irregularities committed by him, hence it was incumbent upon them to have followed the principles of natural justice, but the respondents have not followed the principles of natural justice while passing impugned order, thus the order impugned is violative of principles of natural justice and therefore not sustainable and liable to be quashed. 18. IT would not be out of place to mention here that the writ petition was presented by the petitioner on 2-2-1989 and impugned order of termination was passed on 4-2-1989, therefore by means of supplementary affidavit and application dated 16-2-1989, impugned order dated 4-2-1989 was also sought to be quashed. The application dated 16-2-1989 for amending the writ petition was allowed by this Court on 12-5-1989. By order dated 12-5-1989 passed by this Court it was made clear that since affidavits have been exchanged, hence writ petition shall be disposed of finally at the admission stage itself. Accordingly petition is being disposed of finally. For the reasons stated above, since the petitioner became confirm after successful completion of maximum probationary period, hence he cannot be discharged by the impugned, order. The order impugned being passed on unsuitability of the petitioner as a result of alleged irregularities is violative of principles of natural justice, consequently cannot be allowed to stand. Accordingly, petition succeeds and is allowed, impugned order dated 4-2-1989 and 21-1-1989 are hereby quashed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.