JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petition arises in the following circumstances. 3. There exists a strip of land abutting the house of the petitioners, within the Municipal limits Pali. The Municipal Council, Pali in the first instance, had ordered the disposal of said strip of land by auction, between Khinv Raj, Jasraj and Chhaganlal. The petitioners, aggrieved with the said order of the Municipal Council, moved an application raising objection to the resolution of the Municipal Council, before the Additional Collector, Pali. The Additional Collector, Pali by his order dated 6.3.1982, made a reference to the State Government under Section 285(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act for passing an order under section 285(2) of the Act. The State passed an order dated 17.7.1984 (Annx.2) under section 285(2) of the Act, quashing the order of the Additional Collector, Pali dated 6.3.1982, and passed an order for allotting the strip of land to petitioners on payment of market rate. Thereafter, on an application moved by Raju Ram, natural son of Khinvraj, and adopted son of Mehran and Jasraj, by its order dated 12.10.1987, the State Government cancelled its earlier order dated 17.7.1984 and, directed the said strip of land to be allotted to petitioners-Raju Ram and Jasraj on the market rate. The order has been passed under Section 300 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. 4. This order Annx. 3 has been challenged on the ground that under the Municipalities Act, the State Government has not been conferred with any power to review its own orders, which it has passed as quasi-judicial authority. The power to review its own order by a court or quasi-judicial tribunal, depends upon confirmation of such powers by the Statute, therefore, the order Annx. 3 is wholly without jurisdiction. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 contends that every authority has inherent power to review its own order, if they are incorrect or wrong. He places reliance on O.N. Mohindroo v. The District Judge, Delhi and Another, AIR 1971 SC 107 . Secondly, he contends that the earlier order Annx. 2 dated 17.7.1984 having been passed without hearing the applicants, the State had jurisdiction to recall its earlier order and to pass fresh order under section 285(2) of the Act. 6. He places reliance on O.N. Mohindroo v. The District Judge, Delhi and Another, AIR 1971 SC 107 . Secondly, he contends that the earlier order Annx. 2 dated 17.7.1984 having been passed without hearing the applicants, the State had jurisdiction to recall its earlier order and to pass fresh order under section 285(2) of the Act. 6. There is no dispute that there is no specific power conferred on the State' Government to review its own orders under any provision of the Municipalities Act. The consensus of opinion of the various High Courts, is that there is no power of review unless specially granted by the statute which creates the forum. The power of reviewing its own decision by the Court or the Tribunal, which has pronounced upon a dispute, is not inherent for a court or tribunal. Reference in this connection may also be made to Dr. V.N. Subba Rao and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1968 AP 98 ; Monoher Lal Verma v. State of M.P. and Ors., AIR 1970 MP 131 ; Kailash Singh Rajput v. Ram Prakash, AIR 1979 All 110 and, Union of India and Ors. v. M/s. Mahabir Prasad and Sons, Delhi 6 and Another, AIR 1983 Del 150 . These cases are with reference to powers of the Court or tribunal. The power of the quasi-judicial authorities are strictly restricted as its ambit and scope are strictly governed by the statute, which vest in it a power to determine the question arising under the statute confirming such power. The State, under section 285(2) of the Act, while deciding upon the order passed by the Additional Collector under section 285(1), in respect of resolution passed by the Municipalities, undoubtedly acts as a quasi judicial authority. About power of a quasi judicial authority in the matter of reviewing its own order, there cannot be any doubt after a pronouncement of their Lordships of Supreme Court in Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2186 . The Apex Court stated in no uncertain terms, that the quasi judicial authority has no power to review its own order unless such power is expressly conferred on it by the Statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2186 . The Apex Court stated in no uncertain terms, that the quasi judicial authority has no power to review its own order unless such power is expressly conferred on it by the Statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Court observed as under : "It is now well established that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute which it derives its jurisdiction......" In this connection, the contention on behalf of contesting respondent, by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, cannot be accepted. The decision relied on by him has no bearing on the present case. That was a case that arise under the Advocate Act, under which the disciplinary authority of the Bar Council of India has-, been expressly conferred a power to review its own order. While considering the power of the Supreme Court to review, the Apex Court held that the Supreme Court is vested under the Constitution a special power of review and, it may further pass any order to do full and effective justice. Obviously, the Court was referred to its power under Art. 137 of the Constitution and, under Art. 142 of the Constitution. In the aforesaid decision, the Court did not pronounce upon the question about inherent power c . any quasi-judicial authority to review its own order in the absence of any such specific provision, conferring a power of review on the quasi judicial authority concerned. Therefore, it must be held that a State had no jurisdiction to review its own order, passed under Section 285(2) of the Act, there being no express provision in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act conferring such power in the State. 7. Coming to contention of learned counsel for the petitioner I do not find any merit in that either. The order speaks that admittedly Raju Ram, applicant, was not heard and that has been made foundation for reconsidering the order dated 17.7.1984. In this connection, it is pertinent to notice that Khinvraj, Chhagan Lal and Jasraj were parties before the State Government in the proceedings that had culminated in the order dated 17.7.1984. The impugned order does not states that Khinvraj, Jasraj or Chhaganlal were not heard or represented. In this connection, it is pertinent to notice that Khinvraj, Chhagan Lal and Jasraj were parties before the State Government in the proceedings that had culminated in the order dated 17.7.1984. The impugned order does not states that Khinvraj, Jasraj or Chhaganlal were not heard or represented. What the order states, is that Raju Ram has not earlier been heard. Firstly, Raju Ram was to a party to the proceedings at all. Therefore, the question of hearing him before passing of the order dated 17.7.1984 simply do not arise. Secondly from the order itself, it is apparent that Raju Ram has come forward as son of Khinvraj, adopted son of Mehran. If Khinvraj, in whose favour the earlier order was passed by the State was heard, and Raju Ram does not claim any independent right, the very foundation for claim to rehearing does not exist. If Raju Ram claims as adopted son of Mehran, no foundation has been laid about his locus standi as son of Mehran, to challenge any order passed relating so a strip of land, which is subject matter of the two orders. Therefore, the fact that Raju Ram was not heard, cannot be put forward as a ground for branding the impugned order as order recalling, which in fact, is nothing but reviewing the earlier order on fresh material. 8. As I have held above, that the State Government under the Municipalities Act, had no jurisdiction to review its own order, the Annx. 3 must be held to be without jurisdiction and, therefore, cannot be sustained. 9. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. Order Annx. 3 dated 12.10.1987 is quashed. 10. However, this order will not affect the rights of Raju Ram to have recourse to other remedies, that may be available to him, in respect of any independent right that he may be claiming. 11. There will be no order as to costs of this writ petition.Petition dismissed. *******