R. V. VASANTHA KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THESE civil revision petitions arise out of orders passed by the jurisdictional City civil Court in respect of applications filed by several shopkeepers in respect of the shops belonging to the Corporation of City of Bangalore situate in Jayanagar market, Vegetable and Shopping Complex. Corporation of City of Bangalore initiated action for recovery of certain arrears of rent/licence fee due from several shopkeepers in respect of shops either let out or permitted to occupy for carrying on business. As against the punitive action resorted to by the Corporation of City of bangalore, petitioners approached the jurisdictional City Civil Court forredressal of their rights by invoking Sections 470 and 471 of the Karnataka Municipal corporations Act, 1976 and Rules framed thereunder. The jurisdictional City Civil court after holding enquiry and giving due opportunities to the parties on record to lead any material evidence on the subject-matter of dispute dismissed the applications filed by the petitioners mainly on the ground of limitation. ( 2 ) DETAILS as to the shop numbers, rent/fee, dates of demand, notices andmiscellaneous proceeding numbers and corresponding numbers of the civil revision petitions are mentioned hereunder in a tabular statement. Name of occupier Civil Revision Petition Nos. Trial Court Case Nos. Misc. Demand notice/bill Original Rent/fee Rs. Shop Nos, Harish 4391/1991 348/1984 30-6-1984 958/- 15 Abdul 4392/1991 1034/1984 8-11-1984 159/- 43+44 Shackoor M. Nagendra Setty 4393/1991 1033/1984 8-11-1984 159/- 133 + 134 Shivaji Rao 4394/1991 1035/1984 8-11-1984 159/- 33 + 34 Nanjappa 4395/1991 1015/1984 8-11-1984 159/- 37 & 38 ( 3 ) FEW facts to be briefly stated are that the petitioners claiming themselves to bethe tenants of the shops belonging to the Corporation of the City of Bangalore challenged the demand notices issued by the Corporation enhancing the rental value (licence fee) in respect of the premises in their occupation by virtue of a resolution dated 16-3-1984 passed by the Corporation regarding revision of rental value (licence fee) giving effect from 1-4-1984. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners were let into possession of shops on a rental, as noted in the tabular statement mentioned supra. ( 4 ) THE main grievances of the petitioners being that the Corporation did not givedue notices before passing the resolution revising the rental/fee which virtually amounted to 100 per cent increase. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners were let into possession of shops on a rental, as noted in the tabular statement mentioned supra. ( 4 ) THE main grievances of the petitioners being that the Corporation did not givedue notices before passing the resolution revising the rental/fee which virtually amounted to 100 per cent increase. ( 5 ) PROFORMA of Bill/notice issued under Section 470 read with Chapter X,section 147, Schedule III, Collection of Taxes issued to the occupants reads:"corporation of the City of Bangalore office of the Commissioner, corporation Offices, market Department, bangalore, dated. . . . . . . Bill/notice under Section 470 read with Chapter X, Section 147, Schedule III, collection of Taxes. To dear Sir, you are in arrears of amount detail below is due to the Corporation. Period Amount 1. Rents 2. Electricity charges 3. Water charges 4. Other charges (interest) you are required to pay the amount a show cause why it should not be paid within 15 days from the service of this bill/notice. If you fail to do so, any movable property belonging to you and/or found in the scheduled premises is liable to be distrained and sold to recover the sura due along with charges for detention and sale. Schedule 1. Shop No. 2. Description of the shop 3. Name of the Market 4. Amount due asst. Revenue Officer (Markets), corporation of Bangalore. " ( 6 ) IN all these civil revision petitions, Corporation has executed agreements infavour of petitioners. Proforma agreement reads:"this deed of lease is executed on the. . . . . day of. . . . . 1979 between the corporation of the City of Bangalore represented by the Deputy Commissioner (Development) Sri A. R. M. Iqbal Ahmed, I. A. S. hereinafter called the 'lessor' (which term shall mean and include its successors and assigns) of the one part and Sri. . . . . . . . . . . . being the other part. Whereas, the lessor is the legal and beneficial owner of the Jayanagar shopping Complex at IV Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore-560 011. Whereas, the lessee applied to lessor with earnest money deposit of Rs. . . . . for the lease of the shop of the floor area. . . . . sq. mts. with the fixtures and fittings, accessories thereof more fully described in the schedule hereunder for the business of. Whereas, the lessee applied to lessor with earnest money deposit of Rs. . . . . for the lease of the shop of the floor area. . . . . sq. mts. with the fixtures and fittings, accessories thereof more fully described in the schedule hereunder for the business of. . . . . . . . Whereas, the Commissioner, exercising the powers under Section 176 (1) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act ordered resolved to grant the said shop with the fixtures, fittings and accessories to the lessee for the period of one year on a rent of Rs. . . . . . . per month. Now this deed of lease witnesseth as follows: 1. The lessee shall be for a period of one year from. . . . . 2. The rent shall be Rs. . . . . . . per month payable in advance on or before the tenth of every month. 3. The lessee has paid to the lessor the sum of Rs. . . . . . being the amount for six months rent in which the earnest money deposit has been taken into account the receipt of which the lessor hereby acknowledges and this amount shall be kept in deposit by the lessor and shall be adjusted towards the last six months rent. 4. The lessee shall keep the interior of the said showroom/shop with the doors and windows thereof and fixtures, fittings and accessories therein in good and tenable repair and condition. 5. The lessee shall not display any name board or advertisement on the outer walls or the surface of the said showroom/shop and not paint or exhibit on any of the doors, windows or other parts of said showroom/shop any advertisement or name or announcement whatsoever except as shall be permitted by the lessor in which event the lessee shall at his own expense duly comply with all the conditions subject to which such consent is given. 6. The lessee shall permit the officers of the lessor to inspect the conditions of the showroom/shop at all reasonable hours. 6. The lessee shall permit the officers of the lessor to inspect the conditions of the showroom/shop at all reasonable hours. ( 7 ) THE lessee shall not make any structural alteration, addition, partition orinterior alteration of the said showroom/shop in any manner without the consent in writing of the lessor, provided that on such consent of the lessor being obtained the alteration, addition and partition shall be made at the cost of lessee carried out by the lessor's contractors or appoint. ( 8 ) THE lessee shall use the said showroom/shop only for the purpose of thebusiness for which it is let out and not for any other purposes. ( 9 ) THE lessee shall not sublet or part with the possession of the saidshowroom/shop in any manner. ( 10 ) THE lessee shall pay for the electricity and water supply consumed inregard to the said showroom/shop. ( 11 ) THE lessee shall insure all his goods in trade in the said showroom/shopagainst fire or such other calamities in the interest of both the parties. ( 12 ) THE lessee shall during the last three months of the tenancy permit thelessor to affix and display on any window or door of the said show room/shop a notice that the same is to let. ( 13 ) THE lessee shall surrender possession of the said shop to the lessor on theexpiry of the period oi'lease. ( 14 ) THE lessee shall, have the right to use in common with the lessor and theirtenants ot the other parts of the building the entrance hall, stairs and landing leading to the said shop the water closet, and lavatory accommodations earmarked for the use of all the tenants of the said floor of the buildings. ( 15 ) THE lessor shall keep the said entrance hall stairs and landing leading tothe said shop clean and properly lighted by electric light during the hours of darkness. ( 16 ) THE lessor shall provide adequate supply of water for the said water closetand lavatory accommodations. ( 17 ) THE lessor shall keep the outside of the said shop the said entrance hall,stairs, landing leading to the said shop water closet and lavatory accommodation in good and tenable repair and condition. ( 16 ) THE lessor shall provide adequate supply of water for the said water closetand lavatory accommodations. ( 17 ) THE lessor shall keep the outside of the said shop the said entrance hall,stairs, landing leading to the said shop water closet and lavatory accommodation in good and tenable repair and condition. ( 18 ) SHOULD the lessee be in arrears of the rent whether legally demanded ornot or commit any breach of any of the foregoing terms required to be complied with by the lessee the lessor shall be entitled to terminate the lease, issue of notice and resume possession notwithstanding the fact that the period of lease is not expired. ( 19 ) ON the lessor being aggreable the lease may renewed for a further periodon such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed between the parties. Schedule1. Shop No. . . . . . . . Jayanagar Shopping Complex, Bangalore-560 011. 2. Boundaries 3. Fittings handed over in witness whereof the parties hereto have signed this deed of lease on the day, month and year first above written witnesses: 1. sd/- Lessor sd/- 2. sd/- Lessee sd/-"7. Petitioners being aggrieved of the notices/bill issued dated 30-6-1984, 8- 11-1984 (whereas in one case in Misc. No. 348/1984 notice/bill is dated 30-6-1984) approached the court of the City Civil Judge, Bangalore under Section 471 of the karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1974 read with Section 151 of C. P. C. It is to be noted that bill/notices are issued in conformity with forms prescribed in Schedule iii, Taxation Rules by virtue of powers conferred under Sections 103 and 147 of the karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (in short 'the Act') and the rules framed thereunder. Section 103 enumerates details as to items of taxes on which taxes may be imposed. Section 103 reads: "taxes which may be imposed. Subject to the general or special orders of government, a Corporation shall, (a) after observing the preliminary procedure required by Section 104, and (b) with the sanction of the Government and at rates not exceeding those specified in Schedules III, IV, V, VII and VIII levy any one or more of the following taxes: (i) a tax on buildings or lands or both situated within the city (hereinafter referred to as the 'property tax'); (ii) a tax on carriages and animals; (iii) a tax on carts; (iv) xx xx xx. (v) a toll on vehicles other than motor vehicles paying vehicles tax under the karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 35 of 1957) entering the Corporation limits; (vi) a tax on advertisement; (vii) a duty on certain transfers of property in the shape of an additional stamp duty; (viii) a general sanitary cess for the construction or maintenance or both of public privies and for the removal and disposal of refuse; (ix) a water-rate or water-rates for water supplied by the Corporation which may be imposed in the form of a tax assessed on buildings and lands, or in any other form, including that of charges for such supply fixed in such mode or modes as shall be best adapted to the varying circumstances of any class of ceases or of any individual case:provided that the tax on carts shall be at the rates specified in Section 124. Section 104 reads:"procedure preliminary to imposing a tax. Section 104 reads:"procedure preliminary to imposing a tax. A Corporation, before imposing a tax, shall observe the following preliminary procedure, (a) it shall, by resolution passed at a total general meeting, select for the purpose one or other of the taxes specified in Section 103 and in such resolution specify, sofaras may be applicable, (i) the classes of persons or of property or of both which the Corporation proposes to make liable and any exemptions which it proposes to make; (ii) the amount or rate at which the Corporation proposes to assess each such class; (iii) (b) when such resolution has been passed, the Corporation shall publish in the Official Gazette and in such other manner, as may be prescribed, a notice of such resolution in the prescribed form; (c) any inhabitant of the city objecting to the imposition of the said tax or to the amount or rate proposed or to the classes of persons or property to be made liable thereto or to any exemptions proposed, may, within one month from the publication in the Official Gazette of the said notice, send his objection in writing to the Corporation; the Corporation shall take all such objections into consideration, or shall authorise the standing committee for taxation and finance to consider the same and report thereon and unless it decides to abandon the proposed tax, shall submit such objections with its opinion thereon and any modifications proposed in accordance therewith together with a copy of the notice aforesaid to Government. "section 105 envisages application of mind of Government either to sanction or refusal of resolution. Section 107 envisages publication of sanctioned resolution with notice. Before dealing with the contentions raised, it is proper to know the definitions and meanings attached to words such as section 2 Definitions. (1) "building" includes, (a) a house, outhouse, stable, privy, shed, hut, wall, verandah, fixed platform, plinth, doorstep and any other such structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever, xx XX XX. Before dealing with the contentions raised, it is proper to know the definitions and meanings attached to words such as section 2 Definitions. (1) "building" includes, (a) a house, outhouse, stable, privy, shed, hut, wall, verandah, fixed platform, plinth, doorstep and any other such structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever, xx XX XX. (19) "market" includes any place where person assemble for the sale, of, or for the purpose of exposing for sale, livestock, food for livestock, meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, flowers, animals intended for human food or any other articles of human food, whatsoever, with or without the consent of the owner of such place, notwithstanding that there may be no common regulation of the concourse of buyers and sellers and whether or not any control is exercised over the business of or the persons frequenting the market by the owner of the place, or any other person; (23) "occupier" includes any person for the time being paying or liable to pay to the owner the rent or any portion of the rent of the land or building or part of the same in respect of which the word is used or damages on account of the occupation of such land, building or part and also a rent-free tenant; (32) "rateable value" means the value of any building or land fixed in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules for the purpose of assessment to property tax; (41) "tax" includes toll, rate cess, fee or other impost leviable under this Act; section 147 of the Act reads:"rules in Schedule III: The rules. and tables embodied in Schedule III shall be read as part of this Chapter. 8. It is to be noted that shops given to the petitioners for occupation comes under the ambit of Section 368 of the Act. It reads: "public markets. All markets which are acquired, constructed, repaired or maintained out of the Corporation fund, shall be deemed to be public markets. " section 369 reads: "power of municipal authorities in respect of public markets. (1) The Corporation may provide places for use as public markets. It reads: "public markets. All markets which are acquired, constructed, repaired or maintained out of the Corporation fund, shall be deemed to be public markets. " section 369 reads: "power of municipal authorities in respect of public markets. (1) The Corporation may provide places for use as public markets. (2) The Commissioner may, in any public market charge and levy any one or more of the following fees at such rales, as the standing committee may determine and may place the collection of such fees under the management of such persons, as may appear to him proper or may farm out such fees on such terms and subject to such conditions as he may deem fit, namely: (a) fees for the use of, or for the right to expose goods for sale, in such markets; (b) fees for the use of shops, stalls, pens or stands in such markets; (c) fees on vehicles or pack-animals carrying or one persons bringing goods for sale in such markets; (d) fees on animals brought for sale into, or sold in, such markets; and (e) Licence fees on brokers, commission agents, weighmen and measures practising their calling in such markets. (3) Such fees shall be recoverable in the same manner as the property tax. (4) The Corporation may, within the sanction of Government, close any public market or part thereof. "section 370 reads:"commissioner's control over public markets. (1) No person shall, without the permission of the Commissioner, or if the fees have been farmed out, of the farmer, sell or expose for sale any animal or article within any public market. (2) Any person who contravenes sub-section (1) or any condition of the licence or any regulation made under Section 378 or in any bye-law made under section 423 or who commits default in payment of the fees leviable under section 369 may after three clear days' notice be summarily removed from such market by any corporation officer or servant and any lease or tenure which any person may possess may be terminated for such period and from such date as the commissioner may determine without prejudice to the legal rights of the corporation to prosecute the person or to recover the fees leviable under Section 369 and expenses, if any, which the Corporation may incur in such removal. " it is thus clear by looking at to the Legislative intent, that the Commissioner is empowered to charge and levy fees at such rates as the standing committee may determine. Further, it is envisaged that such fees shall be recoverable in the same manner as property tax (see sub-section (3) of Section 369 of the Act ). Another important question that arises for consideration is whether the nature of the transaction entered into between the parlies as evidenced in the agreement in question would partake the character of licence or lease. Sri Manjunath, counsel for the Corporation contends that having in view of the statutory provisions applicable to shops in public markets the question of transaction partaking character of an agreement of lease would not arise since the mandate of section 369 contemplate charging or levying of fees for the use of shops in public market. In the agreements entered into in these cases what is discernible is that the commissioner has exercised his powers under Section 176 (1) of the Act, as the same is borne out in one of the clauses in the agreement which reads: "whereas the Commissioner exercising the powers under Section 176 (1) of the kamataka Municipal Act ordered and resolved to grant the said shop with fixtures, fittings and accessories, to the lessee for the period of one year on a rent of rs. 159/- per month. "9. Section 176 (1) of the Act reads:"disposal of property and interest therein. (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 182, the Commissioner may dispose of by sale or exchange of any corporation movable property the value of which does not exceed two thousand rupees in each instance or grant for any term not exceeding twelve months a lease of any Corporation immovable property or a lease or concession of any right of fishing or grazing or of gathering and taking fruit and the like: provided that such lease or concession shall be subject to the condition that the grantee shall not erect any permanent structure on the demised premises: provided further that every such disposal, lease or concession made or granted by the Commissioner, shall be reported to the standing committee within fifteen days. "10. "10. As such what is to be seen from the nature of the transaction is that the commissioner of the City Corporation in exercise of his statutory powers conferred on him under sub-section (1) of Section 176 of the Act has entered into a lease transaction with the petitioners. The basic assumption of the Corporation that the transaction as partaking the character of 'licence' has no legal foundation. The commissioner even though he was empowered to exercise his powers under Section 369 of the Act to charge and levy fees for the use of shops but has exercised his powers under Section 176 of the Act and as such it is not open for the Corporation authorities to contend that the transaction as being licence and not lease. 11. Then the other important question that would arise for consideration is whether the procedure followed by the Corporation in enhancing the rent by following the procedure applicable to taxation under Chapter X could be legally permissible? it is evident from the records that the Corporation has followed the procedure under Chapter X applicable to taxes and not the procedure as envisaged in Chapter xvii applicable to licences and fees. The resolution passed by the taxation committee on 16-3-1984 and bill/notices issued on 8-11-1984 under Section 470 read with Chapter X, Section 147, Schedule iii have been proceeded on the assumption that the nature of the transaction as being licence which on the materials placed cannot be legally countenanced. As such it is not open for the Corporation to justify its stand that they have complied with the statutory requirements, in either enhancing or revising the fee while in fact the nature of the transaction is a simple lease as between the parties in the instant cases. 12. Sri V. N. Satyanarayana contends that the procedure adapted by the corporation in either enhancing or raising the rent by 100 per cent by following the procedure as envisaged to taxes cannot be legally supported. 12. Sri V. N. Satyanarayana contends that the procedure adapted by the corporation in either enhancing or raising the rent by 100 per cent by following the procedure as envisaged to taxes cannot be legally supported. Further, he contends that whatever notices/bills that have been issued at earlier point of time, that is earlier to bill/notice dated 8-11-1984, demanding arrears of rent based on unilateral revision by the Corporation also cannot be legally supported as the Corporation has not given the petitioners any opportunity before the revision of the rents and the assumption that the petitioners as being in arrears of rent also cannot be legally supported and notices/bills issued in that behalf as being invalid in the eye of law. Further, Sri V. N. Satyanarayana contends that notices issued in year 1981 by the corporation did not relate to either revision of rent or enhancement thereon as contended by the Corporation but the same was actuated by withdrawal of 30% concession of rent of shops at Jayanagar Shopping Complex with effect from 1-1-1981. Proforma notices issued to the petitioners earlier to 8-11-1984 reads. "corporation of the City of Bangalore. DRO'jsc PR Office of the Dy. Revenue Officer (M),. . . . 1982-83 Corporation of Bangalore, bangalore, dated. . . . . Sub. : Withdrawal of 30% concession of rent of shops at Jayanagar Shopping complex, w. e. f. 1-1-1981. Ref. : Proceedings of Administrator dated 9-12-1980. In continuation of this office intimation dated 31-1-1981, and 19-12-1981 30% concession in rent has been withdrawn w. e. f. 1-1-1981. You are in arrears of rent due at the rate of Rs. . . . . . per month. The details of arrears is as follows: 1-1-1981 to. . . . . . Now you are hereby required to make immediate arrangements for payment of the above sum within 7 days from the receipt of this notice failing which action will be taken to evict you from the premises as per provision of K. P. P. Act, 1974. Yours faithfully, deputy Rev. Officer (Market), corporation of Bangalore. " 13. Sri V. N. Sathyanarayana states that as far as petitioners are concerned, they have paid rents upto date as agreed upon by the parties in the agreement in question and not the rents as demanded by the Corporation. Yours faithfully, deputy Rev. Officer (Market), corporation of Bangalore. " 13. Sri V. N. Sathyanarayana states that as far as petitioners are concerned, they have paid rents upto date as agreed upon by the parties in the agreement in question and not the rents as demanded by the Corporation. Further it is contended after issuance of notice in the year 1982 demanding arrears in consequence of withdrawal of 30% concession in pursuance of proceedings of Administrator dated 19-12-1980 and after acceptance of agreed rent for over a period of two years it is not open to content that notices dated 8-11-1984 based on resolution of the taxation committee dated 16-3-1984, to be equated to earlier notices, since the accrual of cause of action for initiation of recovery are based on entirely on different subject-matter. Further, it is contended that even the demand based on administrator's proceedings dated 19- 12-1980 made by the Corporation earlier to the impugned notices dated 8-11-1984 cannot be legally countenanced since no notices were issued to the petitioners by the administrator before passing orders on 19-12-1980 and as such it is not open for the corporation to contend that the petitions filed by the petitioners under Section 471 of the Act as being barred by period of limitation. Sri V. S. Satyanarayana contends that the trial court did not advert its mind properly and further without even considering the real intendment of the provisions of the Act, erred in holding that petitions filed by the petitioners as being barred by period of limitation. 14. Sri Manjunath contends that when once it is admitted fact that the petitioners had received notices in the year 1982 wherein the Corporation demanded arrears of rent based on the Administrators proceedings dated 19-12-1980 and since the petitioners did not approach the court for their redressal, and further notices issued on 8-11-1984, being in continuation of the previous proceedings, the petitions filed by the petitioners cannot be construed as valid petitions within the prescribed period of limitation by virtue of Section 471 of the Act. Section 471 of the Act reads: "determination by district court of sums payable. Section 471 of the Act reads: "determination by district court of sums payable. Where in any case not provided for in Section 480 any municipal authority or any person is required by or under this Act or any rule, bye-law regulation or contract made under it to pay any costs, damages, penalties, compensation, charges, fees, rents, expenses, contributions, or other sums referred to in Section 470, the amount or apportionment of the same, shall, in case of dispute, be ascertained and determined except as is otherwise provided in Section 207,407 or 460 or in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by the district court having jurisdiction on application made to it for this purpose at any time within six months from the date when such costs, damages, penalties, compensation, charges, fees, rents, expenses, contributions or other sums first became payable. " nothing is placed on record by the Corporation as to what was bargained between the parties as on the date when the agreement of lease was entered into while fixing the rent. In the copy of the lease deed, there is no mention of fixation of rent based on at concessional rate at 30%. Further, it is to be noted that petitions were filed by the petitioner in the year 1984, and the same were disposed of on 27-5-1991. During this long period of pendency of the proceeding, the Corporation has not made any attempts to place the best evidence before the court for arriving at a just decision. Proceedings of the Administrator dated 19-12-1980 and resolution of the Standing committee dated 16-3-1984 were not even produced in the proceedings for the reasons best known to the Corporation. 15. It is to be stated that a party in possession of best evidence which would throw light on the issue in controversy withholding it, court ought to draw an adverse inference against that party notwithstanding that onus of proof does not lie on that party. That party cannot rely on an abstract doctrine of onus of proof or on the fact that party was not called upon to produce. 16. That party cannot rely on an abstract doctrine of onus of proof or on the fact that party was not called upon to produce. 16. It is made clear that unilateral revision of rent without the consensus of the other party to the transaction in the absence of statutory guidelines cannot be legally supported, and further issuances of Bill/demand notices as envisaged for recovery of taxes, cannot also be legally sustained, since (he term rent does not come within the definition of taxes and entire procedure adapted by the Corporation in revising the rental value of the shop in occupation of the petitioner on the assumption of the same partaking the character of fee also cannot be legally sustained. Even though under the Act, the Commissioner was empowered to charge and levy fee in respect of the shops, under Section 369 of the Act, he has not exercised those powers but for the reasons best known has exercised powers under Section 176 of the Act and as such it is not open for the Commissioner to adapt procedure envisaged for recovery of taxes in respect of arrears of rent, if any, and issuance of bill or demand notices to that effect cannot be legally supported and the same are invalid. It was next argued that since the notices/bills are invalid in the eye of law, then it is not open for the petitioners to approach the courts under Section 471 of the Act. 17. The petitioners reply to this contention is that it is not open for the party to assume the invalidity of the bills/demand notices, but it is the domain of the courts to declare the same as illegal one as such they being aggrieved persons approached the court under Section 471 of the Act. The question that is posed is whether petitioners are aggrieved persons? in J. M. Desai v Roshan Kumar, reported in AIR 1976 SC 578 at para 12, the supreme Court has observed: ". . . . . . Who is an "aggrieved person"? And what are the qualifications requisite for such a status? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described on a broad tentative manner. . . . . . Who is an "aggrieved person"? And what are the qualifications requisite for such a status? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described on a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, tbe specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or 'standing' to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. " to summarise the general tests, the following precedents have to be taken into consideration. 1) Aggrieved persons has been held to be one who has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public in saying that the law is properly administered. 2) Aggrieved person must be having sufficient interest. 3) Persons are aggrieved became failure to give prior notice and hearing. 4) Aggrieved person includes any person whose interests are prejudicially affected by what is taking place, includes a person who has genuine grievance because something has been done or may be done which affects him. 5) Duty to act fairly in accordance with principles of natural justice. Thus a corresponding right to be treated fairly was also imported by implication, and if impugned action adversely affects the persons interest and that interest should be recognised in law. 6) A person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered legal grievance a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has been wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. Applying the above tests, it is crystal clear that petitioners in these Civil Revision petitions have sustained injuries to their legally protected interest and have been denied and deprived of their legal rights. Bills/demand notices issued affect their legal rights and have justiciable claims. 18. Applying the above tests, it is crystal clear that petitioners in these Civil Revision petitions have sustained injuries to their legally protected interest and have been denied and deprived of their legal rights. Bills/demand notices issued affect their legal rights and have justiciable claims. 18. Sri V. S. Satyanarayana counsel for the petitioners invites this court's attention to two of the unreported decisions covering the aspect of maintainability, in respect of the action initiated under Section 471, arising out of the similar demand notices/bills. In C. R. P. No. 3981/1988, The Corporation of the City of Bangalore v K. Saroja, decided on 8-11-1991, this court observed: "sofaras the maintainability of the petition is concerned, it appears to me that under Section 471 of the said Act the petitioner was entitled to request the district court to ascertain and determine the rate of rent when there was no notice in regard to enhancement. Therefore, the court below was justified in entertaining the petition. The above ratio deciclendi was reiterated in another unreported decision rendered by this court in Corporation of City of Bangalore v Sannullah, decided on 11-3-1992 in c. R. P. No. 6124/1988. The relevant passage reads: " If the Corporation made any resolutions to enhance the rent, the said resolution should be made available to the respondent calling upon to file his objections by giving 60 days lime. After receipt of the objection the Corporation is directed to consider the same and after hearing the respondent should proceed to take a decision. Any decision so taken will be binding on the respondent, unless it is challenged and set aside in a n appropriate forum by process known to law. " the question of petitions being barred by limitation as contended also cannot be legally supported since the causes instrumental for issuances of notices in the year 1982 as being different from the causes narrated in notices dated 8-11-1984. 19. It is to be noted that it is not as if Corporation has no powers to enhance the rent, but the same could be enforced provided there is mutuality and consensus between the parties to an agreement. Respondents' counsel invites the attention of this court to the ratio decidendi in prahlad Venkanna Munderg'i v Gadag-Betagen City Municipal Council, reported in air 1987 Kant. 183. Respondents' counsel invites the attention of this court to the ratio decidendi in prahlad Venkanna Munderg'i v Gadag-Betagen City Municipal Council, reported in air 1987 Kant. 183. Para 6 reads: " He next relied upon a decision of Supreme Court in A. L, Kalra v Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. , AIR 1984 SC 1361 . I do not think the passage relied upon by him is of any assistance to the petitioners herein. Adverting to the ruling of Bagwati, J. (as he then was) in Royappa's case, AIR 1974 SC 555 , the Supreme Court held that the action of the State of Tamil Nadu was liable to be struck down as it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, but, the observation of Bagawati, J,, in Royappa's case was made in connections with the service conditions under the service of the State. Not in connection with the powers of the State as owners of property and its intention or action to putthe property in a manner most advantageous to the State financially. Like any other owner, the State also must have the rights of owner to derive the maximum income from the property which it owns. More so, when that additional income is to be expended on the welfare of the citizens of the State or the Municipal council. Therefore, unilateral fixation itself cannot be termed arbitrary. In fact, in the instant case, though the raise was unilaterally proposed, it was retained as such only after consulting the tenants and obtaining their views and their willingness to pay enhanced rents. Therefore, the procedure followed ,by the standing Committee cannot be said to be arbitrary either. " this is not a case which comes within the ratio of wrong reference to the power under which action was taken which would not per se vitiate the action as if it could be justified under some other power under which the Corporation could lawfully do that act, but it is referable to exercise of power under well defined scheme of the Act. It is well-settled that exercise of power, if there is indeed a power will be referable to a jurisdiction when the validity of the exercise of a power is in issue which confers validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under which it would be nugatory though the section was not referred and a different or a wrong section of different provision is mentioned. Intention of the Legislature must be given effect. Section 369 confers powers on the Corporation to charge and levy fee in respect of shops in the market and equally the Act confers powers on the Commissioner under Section 176 to enter into lease transactions. In all these cases under revision, the Commissioner has exercised his powers under Section 176 of the Act, whereas the Corporation has followed the procedure as if the powers having been exercised under Section 369 which on the fact of it cannot be legally countenanced. ( 20 ) THE findings arrived at and reasonings recorded by the court cannot be said tobe perverse as far as invalidity of notices are concerned. The trial court has not applied its mind to the real intendment of powers conferred under Section 176 and section 369 of the Act. The reasonings adapted while arriving at its conclusion are based mainly on the principles of natural justice. The findings arrived at by the trial court on Point No. 1 touching upon the question oflimitation are based on improper assumption of facts, as far as petitioners cases are concerned since notices issued in the year -1981 and 1982 are based on the proceedings of the Administrator dated 19-12-1980 withdrawing concession of rent at 30% alleged to have been provided to the shopkeepers. In the absence of evidence regarding the rent mentioned in the agreement of leases entered into with the parties, as being at a concessional rate, it cannot be imported that fixation of rent mentioned in the lease deeds having been based on concessional rates. The Corporation has not placed any documents to evidence that the rent in the lease deeds in question was based at concessional rate at 30% as made out in the proceedings of the administrator. Even otherwise withdrawal of concessional rate as evidenced in the proceedings of the Administrator cannot be construed as enhancement of rent in respect of shops in question. Even otherwise withdrawal of concessional rate as evidenced in the proceedings of the Administrator cannot be construed as enhancement of rent in respect of shops in question. Even otherwise at the time when the Administrator passed orders withdrawing the concessional rate of rent at 30% no notices have been issued to the petitioner and nor petitioners have been heard by the Administrator. As such, no reliance can be placed on the notices issued in the year 1981 and 1982 as being accrual of cause of action for purposes of limitation. Sri Manjunath next contended that the Corporation is empowered to adapt a unilateral revision of rent to augment its resources in the public interest and as such individual interest of petitioners must yield to the public policy followed by the corporation. ( 21 ) IT is needless to reiterate the well-settled law that the statutory power vestedin statutory authorities which are likely to affect the rights of rate payers ought to be exercised in accordance with principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court in union of India v Tulsiram, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 has explained in detail the concept of natural justice. It is well-settled position in law that the principles of natural justice must be regarded as super added to any statutory provision which confers power on any public authority unless by necessary implication, it is excluded. Since concept of natural justice is expanding rules of natural justice are applicable to administrative actions enquiries and no order has to be passed to the prejudice of any person unless reasonable opportunity is afforded. In Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 SC 597 , atpara 59, the supreme Court has observed: " Now, if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, there can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for this purpose. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or to put it negatively, to prevent mis-carriage of4ustice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both. On what principle can distinction be made between one and the other? It must logically apply to both. On what principle can distinction be made between one and the other? Can it be said that the requirement of 'fair play in action' is any the less in an administrative inquiry than in a quasi-judicial one? Sometimes an unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may have far more serious consequences than a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry and hence the rules of natural justice must apply equally in an administrative inquiry which entails civil consequences. " duty to act judicially is concomitant of fair administrative process. In the matters under revision, Corporation has not given any opportunity either by the Administrator before he passed orders on 19-12-1980 or by the Corporation before resolution dated 16-3-1964 passed by the taxation committee to the petitioners to have their say in the matter. In S. C. and Weaker Section Welfare Association v State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1117 , in para 15 the Supreme Court has observed:" It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power and the rule of natural justice operates in areas not covered by any law validly made. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to an extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the body of persons appointed for that purpose. It is only where there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit the giving of an opportunity to be heard, but on the other hand, the nature of the statutory duty imposed itself necessarily implied an obligation to hear before deciding, that the audi alterant partem rule could be imported. " ( 22 ) IN view of the ratio decidendi of the cases cited supra, petitioners who areaffected persons must have been given an opportunity at the time when the corporation unilaterally decided to enhance the rental value of the shops detrimental to their interests. " ( 22 ) IN view of the ratio decidendi of the cases cited supra, petitioners who areaffected persons must have been given an opportunity at the time when the corporation unilaterally decided to enhance the rental value of the shops detrimental to their interests. Demand notices/bills issued to the petitioners on the basis of the resolution of the Taxation Committee dated 16-3-1984 are hereby declared as invalid and the proposed action indicated in the Bill/demand notice dated 8-11-1984 cannot be legally supported. The impugned orders, the subject-matter of these civil revision petitions, are hereby set aside. The Corporation may take necessary action in accordance with law. ( 23 ) ACCORDINGLY, these civil revision petitions are allowed. --- *** --- .