Judgment S.N. Agarwal, J. 1. The writ petition is directed against the order dated 4th September 1915, passed by IInd Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, dismissing the revision of the petitioners against the order of the Judge, Small Causes Court, Bareilly, whereby the suit against the petitioners was decreed for their ejectment from the premises In question. 2. The petitioners were tenants of premises in question comprising of the shops in the shape of two separate apartments with intervening wall and two kothas on the rear side adjacent to the intervening wait situated In Gangapur locality of Bareilly town. The respondents 3 and 4 filed S.C.O. suit no. 249 of 1978 for arrears of rent against the petitioners and the respondents 5 to 8 on the allegation that the tenants made material alterations in the premises in question by removing the intervening wall which separated two shops on the front side besides opening a door in the connecting wall between the two kothas on the rear side and thereby diminished the value of the disputed premises It was further asserted that the floor of the front shop was also erased and uprooted and brought to lower level besides the tenant damaged the corner wall of the disputed premises by installing electric angle for taking the electric connection This coursed substantial damage to the disputed premises. These material alterations and damage to the building in the suit were brought about by the defendants without consent of the landlord. With the result they became liable for eviction under the provisions of section 20(2)(b) and (c) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The petitioners contested the suit. They denied that they carried out any material alteration which diminished the value of the property or substantially damaged any portion of the property in suit. They denied the service of notice on some defendants and alleged that they have paid the entire arrears of rent. 3. The Judge Small Causes Court, recorded a finding that the petitioners caused material alterations which diminished the value of the property and further they substantially damaged the property in question and decreed the suit. On revision, the respondent no. 1, affirmed the findings recorded by the trial court. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the respondent no. On revision, the respondent no. 1, affirmed the findings recorded by the trial court. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the respondent no. 1 declined to interfere with the order of the trial court on the ground that the question as to whether there was material alteration which diminished the value of the property or the petitioners caused substantial damage to the property in question was question of fact and could not have been interfered with in revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, is erroneous in law. This Court in Dr. Jai Gapal Gupta v. Bodh Mal, 1969 ALJ 477, held that in a suit based on material alteration the Court has first to record a finding about the actual construction made by the tenant and that finding will be a finding of fact After the Court has ascertained the actual constructions made by the tenant, it has to form an opinion as to whether those constructions have materially altered the accommodation. This will be ordinarily a finding of law. 5. In Om Prakash v. Amar Singh, AIR 1987 SC 617 , the Supreme Court held that the findings of the Court regarding constructions would be findings of fact but the question whether the constructions materially altered the accommodation Is a mixed question of fact and law which should be determined on the application of the correct principles of law. In the light of these decisions it has to the examined as to whether the construction or alteration made by the petitioners amounts to such alteration which are covered by clause (a) of section 20(2) of the Act. There is no dispute that the tenants had made the following alterations and constructions : (1) The tenants removed the intervening wall which separated the two shops on the front side. (2) They opened door in the connecting wall between the two kothas on the rear side. (3) They installed an electric angle in the corner of the wall of the disputed premises for taking electric connection. 6. (2) They opened door in the connecting wall between the two kothas on the rear side. (3) They installed an electric angle in the corner of the wall of the disputed premises for taking electric connection. 6. It is contended that mere removal of the intervening wall between the two shops does not amount to any construction or structural alteration in the building as it is likely to diminish its value or utility or disfigure it, as contemplated under sub-section (2)(c) of section 20 of the Act. Section 20(2)(c) of the Act permits the tenant without obtaining permission of the landlord in writing to make construction or structural alteration in the building provided it does not diminish its value or utility or disfigure it. He placed reliance on Om Prakash v. Amar Singh, AIR 1987 SC 670 . In this case, the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of section 14(o) of U.P. Cantonment, Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1952. The tenanted premises was let out to the tenant for running Dal and oil mill. The tenant raised a partition wall in a hall and converted the same into two portions. It was of a temporary nature. The finding was recorded that the partition wall did not actually partition the hall converting the some permanently into two rooms. The partition wall was made without digging any foundation of the floor of the room nor it touched the ceiling instead. It was admittedly wall of 6' height converting the big hall into two portions, for its convenient use, it could be removed at any time without causing any damage to the building. The partition wall did not make any structural change of substantial character either in the form or structure of the accommodation. 7. In Baldeo Das v. Ram Ehelawan, 1959 ALR 44, the Court took the view that merely by raising a partition wall within the tenanted shop may not amount to material alteration. Similar view was expressed in M/s. Kedar Nath Baij Nath v. Sri Ram Chandraji, 1991 (1) ARC 420, where the tenant had pot partition wall and it was held that such construction could not per se justify the conclusion that the utility of the two shops had diminished or that it had become automatically disfigured. 8. These are the cases where the partition wall was raised. 8. These are the cases where the partition wall was raised. It was a construction and the question was whether such constructions amounted to diminishing its value or utility or it disfigured the building. They were not the cases where certain constructions were demolished. In a case where the constructions are demolished and there is no Justifiable reason to demolish any portion of the building, it is for the tenant to establish that it has not diminished or likely to diminish the value, utility of the building or disfigured it. The case where the building or any portion of it is in such a dilapidated condition that the tenant has to remove the same, the position may be different but to demolish any portion of the building for his own purposes shall reduce the utility and the value of the property. The value of the shop to the extent of value of the wall removed by the tenant Is diminished Further in case there are two shops and intervening wall is removed, the existence of two shops is reduced into one shop and their utility as two shops are affected. This question came up for consideration in Nanak Chand v. Om Prakash, 1983(2) ARC 135 where the partition wall, intervening the two shops was removed, Honourable N.D. Ojha, J. observed : "When a partition wall was constructed between the two shops belonging to co-owners with the result that respondent no. 1 became the owner and landlord of the shop In dispute exclusively and ceased to have any connection with the adjoining shop there can be no manner of doubt that the removal of the partition wall which converted two independent shops into one single unit would some within the purview of structural alteration in the building. Likewise, if the partition wall between the two shops was removed there seems to be no doubt that the value of the shop at any rate, to the extent of the value of the wall removed by the tenant apparently diminished. Likewise, if the partition wall between the two shops was removed there seems to be no doubt that the value of the shop at any rate, to the extent of the value of the wall removed by the tenant apparently diminished. Thus it was clearly a ease where provisions of section 20(2)(c) of the Act were attracted." In Kishan Lal v. Ram Babu, 1970 ALJ 1154, the Court while considering the provisions of section 3(c) of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947, held that even though by pulling down the partition wall between two shops front of the structure might not have changed, still the structure involved in the case had gone an important change and by demolishing the partition wall the tenant altered two different accommodations and converted them into one accommodation and that amounted to material alteration and the tenant was liable for ejectment on that ground. Similar view was expressed in Delhi Iron Syndicate (P) Ltd. v. Sidh Nath, 1965 ALJ 17 (summary). 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon Ratan Singh v. Khudavand Hayyul Qayyam, 1978 ALJ 1265, In which it was held that mere taking out few bricks from the back of the almirah from that side, does not amount to material alteration within the meaning of section 3(1)(c) of U.P. Act No 3 of 1947 as the same can be dosed at any time. It was not the case of total demolition of the wall and on the facts of that case it was held that it was not material alteration but the said case is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. In a case the tenant wanted that the partition wall should be removed as to make two separate shops into one for the purpose of his business it was obligatory on him to obtain a consent from the landlord. The tenants set up a case that their father had obtained the consent from the erstwhile landlord for making this material alteration and they placed reliance on certain documents produced by them. The trial court disbelieved the version of the defendants after considering material evidence on record. On this finding it cannot be held that the orders passed by the courts below are erroneous in law. The trial court disbelieved the version of the defendants after considering material evidence on record. On this finding it cannot be held that the orders passed by the courts below are erroneous in law. The tenant had opened a new door intervening the two Kothas which were on the rear side of the shops. The mere opening a new door may not amount to such construction or structural alteration that may diminish the value and utility of the property. The landlord did not lead any evidence to indicate that much opening of the door in between the two kothas diminished the utility. The two different kothas continued to remain in fact. 11. The next allegation of the landlords was that the tenant had fixed iron angles in the corner of the wall of the building the mere fact that iron angle was fixed to obtain electric connection does not itself establish that there was any structural alteration as to diminish its value or disfigured it. The trial court, however, recorded a finding that while fixing the iron angles cracks developed in the wall and] that damaged the building. It further recorded a finding that it caused substantial damage to the building. It a finding of fact and no illegality has been pointed out the damage to a building is ground for eviction under section 20(2)(b) of the Act. 12. On the facts of the present case it cannot be held that the decree passed by the courts below is erroneous in law. To other point has been pressed. 13. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, he no order as to costs. 14. The petitioners are granted four months time to vacate the accommodation in question provided they give a written undertaking before the respondent no. 2 within three weeks from today that they shall vacate the accommodation within the time allowed by this court.