Arun B. Saharya ( 1 ) THIS revision petition under Section 115 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. is directed against an order dated 1st offebruary 1992, passed by the Trial Court, dismissing an application of thepetitioner claiming payment of salary for the period of two years, afterattaming the age of 58 years, when she continued to woik under orders ofthe Court, during pendency of her suit for declaration that she was entitledto remain in service till she attained the age of 60 years. ( 2 ). The petitioner Veena Kohli was employed by the first respondent,the Family Planning Association of India (FPAI ). FPAI is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act for promoting the family planningprogramme as a Field Worker. FPAI is funded by grants-in-aid by thesecond respondent Delhi Administration. ( 3 ). A dispute arose about the age of superannuation of employeeslike the petitioner working in the FPAI. The employees claimed that theywere entitled to work upto the age of 60 years by virtue of paragraph 42 ofthe General Rules and Service Regulations, 1984. On the other hand, themanagement took up the stand, on the basis of an Office Order dated 26thof December 1988/2nd of January 1969, that their retirement age was 58years. FPAI sought to enforce this order on the employees as and whenthey attained the age of 58 years. ( 4 ). Two of the employees, namely, Krishna Rani and Satya Singh,jointly filed a suit in January, 1989 for a declaration that they were entitledto continue in service upto the age of 60 years and for an injunction to restain FPAl from removing them from service before they attained that age. An order dated 2nd of January 1992 retiring Krishna Rani, who was goingto attain the age of 58 years on 2nd of February 1989, was stated to be thecause of action. That suit is still pending in a Sub-Judge s Court. ( 5 ). Krishna Rani filed an application along with the plaint for stayof operation of the order of her retirement. Shri 0m Parkash, Sub-Judge,after hearing the parties, by a detailed order dated 28th of February 1989,stayed operation of the retirement order and directed FPAl to pay salary andother allowances to Krishna Rani, subject to decision of her claim in thesuit. FPAl implemented this order without demur. ( 6 ). Shri 0m Parkash, Sub-Judge,after hearing the parties, by a detailed order dated 28th of February 1989,stayed operation of the retirement order and directed FPAl to pay salary andother allowances to Krishna Rani, subject to decision of her claim in thesuit. FPAl implemented this order without demur. ( 6 ). When Satya Singh attained the age of 58 years, an order dated31st of July 1989 was issued by FPAl for her superannuation as well. Shealso applied for interim orders on the same lines as were granted to her colleague Krishna Rani. By an order dated 1st of August 1989, FPAl wasrestrained from giving effect to this order also, and her application was likewise allowed. This tims, however, FPAl moved an application under Orderxxxix Rule 4 CPC before the Trial Court for vacating the injunctionorder. This application was dismissed. FPAl preferred an appeal. Thesenior Sub-Judge stayed operation of the Trial Court s order dated 1st ofaugust 1989 till final decision in the appeal. That appeal also is still pending. ( 7 ). Veena Kohli, the present petitioner was going to complete theage of 58 years on 28th of February 1990. Just a day earlier, she filed aseparate suit praying for declaration that office order dt. 26th of December1988/2nd of January 1989 was unlawful; that she was entitled to continue inservice upto the age of 60 years; for an injunction restraining FPAl fromdispensing with her services before she attained that age; and tor any otherrelief that may be deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. She also filed an application under XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC for interiminjunction restraining FPAl from dispensing wrth her services. This suitwas marked to another Court of Shri D. K. Saini, Sub-Judge, who passed anex parts interim order dated 27th of February 1990 restraining FPAl "fromsuperannuating plaintiff before next date of hearing i. e. 8-3-90". That day,after service of notice on the defendants, the interim order was directed tocontinue. On 24th of April 199u, FPAl filed its written statement along withan application seeking vacation of the interim order under Order XXXIXRule 4 CPC. The interim order, however, was extended from time to time,and Veena Kohli continued in service. That day,after service of notice on the defendants, the interim order was directed tocontinue. On 24th of April 199u, FPAl filed its written statement along withan application seeking vacation of the interim order under Order XXXIXRule 4 CPC. The interim order, however, was extended from time to time,and Veena Kohli continued in service. Then, by an application dated 14thof May 1990, she complained that the defendants had not paid her salaryand allowances inspite of Court s order dated 27th of February 1990 andprayed that the defendants be directed to release the arrears of her salaryand also continue to pay her future salary by 1st of each succeeding Englishcalender month. The Trial Court dismissed this application by the impugned order dated 1st of February 1992. ( 8 ). Now, the peculiar position that has arisen is that Veena Kohlihas continuously worked for FPAl, albeit under orders of the Court, sheattained the age of 60 years on 28th of February 1992, but without paymentof any remuneration for the last two years. Although FPAI bad raisedpreliminary objection in its written statement to maintainability of the suit,and had also moved the application for vacating the ex parte injunction orderdated 27th of February 1990 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC much earlier,yet the sams remained undecided. Further, what is more disturbing is thefact that two other employees, namely, Krishna Rani and Satya Singh, whoare governed by the same set of service conditions and whose suit for similarrelief is pending, have been dealt with differently. Even the other two, whohad jointly filed the earlier suit, had in store fate different from each other. The result is that Krishna Rani remained in service till she attained the ageof 60 years and was paid the salary and other allowances for the disputedperiod of last two years on executing a bond for restitution, subject to outcome of her suit; Satya Singh worked only till she attained 58 years age; andveena Kohli, the petitioner herein, has worked upto the date she attainedthe full age of 60 years, but has not been paid any remuneration for the lastperiod of two years in dispute. ( 9 ). In the impugned order, after noticing the substance of rival pleadings, the learned Trial Judge has very rightly left the question whetherveena Kohli was entitled to be retained in service till the age of 60 yearsopen for trial. ( 9 ). In the impugned order, after noticing the substance of rival pleadings, the learned Trial Judge has very rightly left the question whetherveena Kohli was entitled to be retained in service till the age of 60 yearsopen for trial. He has noted that she had actually performed her dutiesduring the disputed period and that this pertinent fact had "not beenrefuted". But, he did not carry the matter any further. He took a narrowand strict view, without appreciating the consequential part of the reliefsought in the suit, and without, feeling concerned about non-payment forwork actually done by Veena Kohli as a direct result of orders passed by thecourt, and reached the conclusion stated in the operative part of the orderthus:"this is a suit for declaration and injunction. Relief claimed in theapplication is that direction for immediate release of salary andallowances to the plaintiff, together with interest be issued and indefault initiate contempt proceedings against Mrs. Krishna Puri,president and the Executive Secretary Dr. M. A. Owaisy be initiated. I am of the considered opinion that the relief claimed in theapplications cannot be granted. As such I am of the view that theapplications are not maintainable and the same are hereby dismissed. "( 10 ). It is clear that the learned Trial Judge felt that the relief soughtin the application for payment of salary and allowances etc. was beyondthe scope of the suit. This was not even the case set up by FPAI. On thecontrary, FPAI had specifically pleaded in its reply that the grant of reliefsought by the application "tantamounts to decreeing the suit. " Indeed, thisplea has been noted in the earlier part of the impugned order. Even otherwise, the conclusion reached by the Trial Court does not stand to reason. The suit is for declaration, injunction and other consequential relief, if thedeclaration sought by Veena Kohli is ultimately granted, surely, payment ofsalary and allowances for the disputed period of two years, even if she wasnot allowed to work, shall have to be given by way of consequential relief. Therefore, it cannot be said that the interim relief sought by Veena Kohliwas beyond the scope of the suit. He application should not have beenthrown out as not maintainable on this ground. ( 11 ). Mr. Therefore, it cannot be said that the interim relief sought by Veena Kohliwas beyond the scope of the suit. He application should not have beenthrown out as not maintainable on this ground. ( 11 ). Mr. Khanna, learned Counsel appearing for FPAI made a stronggrievance against the failure of the Trial Court to dispose of the applicationunder Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC for vacating the ex parts injunction orderdated 27th of February 1990 right from April 1990 onwards, which has undoubtedly resulted in this anamolous situation. I share his anguish. It may,however, be noted that lawyers were frequently on strike during the saidperiod. Precious little can now be done about it. Veena Kohli has crossedthe age of 60 years and she has in fact rendered service for the disputedperiod of two years on the basis of the interim order of injunction dated 27thof February 1990. Now, in the given circumstances, variation of that orderwill be meaningless. The application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPCmoved by FPAI for vacating that order has,, therefore, really become infructuous. ( 12 ). FPAI also is responsible for creating confusion. As pointed outearlier, in similar circumstances, Krishna Rani and Satya Singh met withdifferent fates. FPAI did not pursue the matter in the case of the former asit did in the later case. Not only this, under similar circumstances application moved by FPAI in the case of Satya Singh under Order XXXIX Rule 4cpc also stood rejected by the Trial Court. Since that is a matter pendingin appeal, nothing need be said about it here. ( 13 ). In any event, now we are confronted with a fate accompli in thecase of Veene Kohli. She has rendered service for two years under orders ofthe Court. Whether those orders were right or wrong, is not open for discussion at this stage. Fair play and justice demand payment of compensationto Veena Kohli for services rendered by her and availed of by FPAI. Shemust be placed in the same position as Krishna Rani. That, to my mind,will meet the ends of justice. ( 14 ). The matter may be viewed from another angle. Veena Kohlihas lawfully worked for the respondents for two years after she attained theage of 58 years, not intending to do so gratuitously. Shemust be placed in the same position as Krishna Rani. That, to my mind,will meet the ends of justice. ( 14 ). The matter may be viewed from another angle. Veena Kohlihas lawfully worked for the respondents for two years after she attained theage of 58 years, not intending to do so gratuitously. The respondents haveavailed and edjoyed the benefit thereof and are, therefore, bound to makecompensation to Veena Kohli in respect of the work so done by her. Thereappears to be no justification for denying the financial benefit for the workdode by her for the last two years in dispute. Section 70 of the Contractact is squarely applicable in the present case. ( 15 ). Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside, and FPAI is directedto pay to Veena Kohli, or deposit in Court for payment to her, within onemonth, salary and allowances, for the period of two years that she continuedto work after attaining the age of 58 years, of course, subject to her furishing security for restitution in the event of ultimate dismissal of the suit. ( 16 ). The revision petition is, therefore, allowed. No costs.