JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma J.—The controversy between the petitioner-tenant and the respondents-landlords is in respect of vacation of a vacant piece of land comprised in Khasra No. 585/2/5 measuring 30’ X 72’ situated at Cart Road, Shlmla, which was admittedly leased out by the father of the landlords, namely, Sh. Harkrishan Lal Kothiala in the year 1974. The allegations made in the eviction petition were that the piece of land in dispute was leased out for non-residential purpose of stacking coal only but the tenants had wrongly, illegally and unauthorisedly constructed structures over it without the consent and knowledge of the landlords and they are using the same for the residence of their labourers. Another allegation was that by the unauthorised construction, the value and the utility of the piece of land has been materially impaired. The third ground of eviction taken by the landlords was that the piece of land was bonafide required by them for their own use of establishment of an industry. According to the landlords, they were not occupying, in the urban area of Shimla, any other rented land suitable for their business purposes and they have not vacated any such rented land without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of their petition. The ground of non-payment of rent was also preferred by the landlords but on the tenants tendering the arrears of rent, it was given up. 2. In their reply, the tenants denied the allegations and raised the preliminary objection that:— ".....the premises in dispute are non-residential building used for commercial and industrial purposes and no order of eviction in respect of such non-residential building can be passed on the grounds of bonafide personal requirement of the petitioners under the law as the respondents have made construction on the land with the permission of the petitioners received through their father Shri Barknshau Lal Kuthiala-Landlord-who had let out the premises to the respondents and inducted them therein and used to collect rent therefore” 3. The tenants further asserted that the premises in question are not a vacant piece of land but are non-residential building built on an area of 240 Sq. yards at a heavy cost of Rs. The tenants further asserted that the premises in question are not a vacant piece of land but are non-residential building built on an area of 240 Sq. yards at a heavy cost of Rs. 25,000 According to them, the structure was constructed with the permission of the father of the landlords, Sh Harkrishan Lal Kuthiala, who had also agreed in writing to execute a proper lease deed in due course of time but later on the landlords avoided to do it on frivolous and flimsy pretexts and also with ulterior motive. It was also alleged that since the construction was made with the consent of the landlords, the question of impairing its value and utility does not arise at all. According to the tenants, the landlords were in occupation of sufficient vacant laid in the urban area of Shimla and they had also vacated and let out such vacant land within five years from the date of the filing of the eviction petition. They have further averred that the eviction petition was filed by the landlords to coerce them to fulfil their demands of loaning them substantial amount of money or purchase of land in question on their terms. 4. In the rejoinder, the landlords reiterated their allegations made in the eviction petition and denied the contrary stated in the reply filed by the tenants. It was specifically denied that the father of the landlords had ever given permission, either in writing or orally, for the construction as alleged by the tenants. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :— 1. Whether the respondents have used the rented land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased to them, as alleged in para 18 (a) (i) of the petition? OPP 2. Whether the value and utility of the rented land has been impaired materially as alleged ? OPP 3. Whether the rented land in question is bonafide required by the petitioners for their own use, as has been alleged in the petition ? OPP 4. Whether the present petition is not maintainable, as alleged in preliminary objection No. 1 ? OPR 5. Whether the petition lacks material particulars, if so, its effect ? OPR 6. Relief. 6. Ultimately, the Rent Controller by his judgment dated 31st May, 1985 ordered the eviction of the tenants. OPP 4. Whether the present petition is not maintainable, as alleged in preliminary objection No. 1 ? OPR 5. Whether the petition lacks material particulars, if so, its effect ? OPR 6. Relief. 6. Ultimately, the Rent Controller by his judgment dated 31st May, 1985 ordered the eviction of the tenants. He has held that the land in dispute has been used by the tenants for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out to them which has materially impaired its value and utility. It has also been held that the land in dispute is bonafide required by the landlords for their own use as alleged by them in their petition. The preliminary objection raised by the tenants has been rejected and the land in dispute has been held to be a vacant piece of land. Another objection that the eviction petition was lacking in material particulars, as alleged by the tenants, was also found un-sustainable. In appeal, these findings were affirmed by the Appellate Authority vide its judgment dated 26th October, 1990. Hence the present revision petition. 7. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Mr Cbhabil Dass, learned Counsel for the tenants, has vehemently urged that both the Courts below have misread the writing Ex. R-4 made on the back of the rent receipt dated 13th March, 1975 given by Sh. Harkrishan Lai Kuthiaia, father of the landlords, who was then managing the land in dispute on behalf of the landlords According to Mr. Chbabil Dass, the writing Ex. R-4 is that, "The temporary shed which has now been constructed with our consent, its mention will be made in the agreement." He submits that the meaning given by the Courts below to this writing that the temporary shed which is now to be construct ed with our consent, its mention will be made in the agreement is not correct as from the certified copy of the judgment Ex R-5 and the statements of Balbir Singh (PW 1) Engineer of the Municipal Corporation, Shimla, and Vishwa Nath (RW 1). the tenant, it is established on the record that the construction of the structure over the land in dispute was completed in February, 1973, much before the receipt Ex. R-2 and the writing on the back of it, Ex. R-4, were executed by Sh. the tenant, it is established on the record that the construction of the structure over the land in dispute was completed in February, 1973, much before the receipt Ex. R-2 and the writing on the back of it, Ex. R-4, were executed by Sh. Harkrishan Lal Kuthiaia on 13th March, 1975, Therefore, it is proved that the structure on the land in dispute was built with the consent and knowledge of the father of the landlords, Sh. Harkrishan Lal Kuthiaia, who was managing the land in dispute on their behalf. Mr Chbabil Dass has also urged that after the alleged construction, the rent of the land in dispute was increas ed from Rs 600 to Rs. 749 per annum as is clear from the receipts Ex R-3, which pertains to the earlier period, and Exs P-l and R-2, which pertain to the later period, when construction was complete. The alternative case put up by Mr. Chhabil Dass is that even if the interpretation of the writing Ex. R-4 as given by the Courts below is accepted, it is proved that Sh. Harkrishan Lal Kuthiaia, father of the landlords, had consented to the construction of the structure over the land in dispute may that structure be already constructed or yet to be constructed Once the consent of the landlord for building the structure is established, the grounds, that the land in dispute has been used for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out by building structure thereon and by using the same for residential purpose and thereby materially impairing its value and utility, are not available to the landlords. 8. Another point raised by Sh Chhabil Dass is that the eviction petition of the landlords deserves to be dismissed on the short ground that they have not disclosed the material facts that when was the structure built and what was its nature. The landlords have also withheld the fact that their father Sh Harkrishan Lal Kuthiata had given permission in writing for the construction of the structure over the land in dispute Even after it was specifically averred in the reply to the eviction petition, the land lords stuck to their stand and denied it in their rejoinder that their father had ever given such permission. But when their father appeared in the witness box as PW 2 and was confronted with his writing Ex. But when their father appeared in the witness box as PW 2 and was confronted with his writing Ex. R-4, he admitted it, though explained it. In support of his this submission, Mr Chhabil Dass has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Civil Revision No. 314 of 1983 titled Tara Chand v. Bail Nath and others, decided on 1st May, 1992. 9. The third argument of Mr. Chhabil Dass is that the landlords do not bonafide require the land in dispute for the purpose of setting up an industry as alleged by them in the eviction petition According to him, the landlords were required to specify in the eviction petition, which industry they wanted to set up, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Attar Singh v Inder Kumar, AIR 1967 SC 773. Moreover, the area where the land in dispute is situated has been declared as residential and no new industry can be set up there as provided under Chapter X, para 10.4.1.2 of the Interim Development Plan of Shimla Town. For making this point, the tenants have moved C. M. P. No 87 of 1991 to place on record letter No. Him. T. G General 4/91-4238, dated 16th February, 1991 that no industry, muchless Saw Mill, can be set up in the area where the land in dispute is situated. The landlords have been permitted to file reply to this application to controvert the allegations made therein to which rejoinder has also been filed by the tenants. 10. Sh. A. K. Goel, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the landlords has pointed out that there are concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below that the tenants have built permanent structure over the land in dispute, without the consent of the landlords and are using it for the residence of their labourers, which is a purpose other than that for which the land was leased out, that is, stacking of coal and have thereby committed such acts which have impaired its value and utility and made themselves liable for eviction He has submitted that the findings of fact are not to be interfered with by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction According to Mr. Goel, the correct meaning of the writing Ex. Goel, the correct meaning of the writing Ex. R-4 is that "the temporary shed which is to be constructed with the consent of landlords, its mention will be made in the agreement" and not the one which has been suggested on behalf of the tenants. Had the structure been complete on the day the writing Ex. R-4 was executed and the rent was increased due to the construction of the structure as urged by Sh. Chhabil Dass on behalf of the tenants, the mention of the structure would have been made in the receipt Ex. R-2, in which the premises have been referred to as One Plot\ In the alternative, Mr Goel has argued that assuming Sh Harkrishan Lal Kuthiala, the father of the landlords, had consented for making construction over the land in dispute by the tenants, it was only a temporary shed and certainly not a permanent structure built on the suit land as admitted in the reply filed by the tenants and by Vishwa Nath tenant himself when he appeared in the witness box and also by his witnesses. By making a permanent structure and also by using it for the purpose of residence of their labourers, without the consent of the landlords, the tenants have used the rented land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out to them, that is, stacking of coal and also thereby materially impaired its value and utility. 11. Mr. A. K Goel has also controverted the second argument raised on behalf of the tenants that the landlords have not disclosed the material facts and withheld that Sh. Harkrishanlal Kuthiala, their father, had given written consent for making the construction over the land in dispute. He has urged that, in fact, the landlords did not know the exact date when the construction was made or completed They had made a complaint dated 19th March, 1976, Ex. PW-l/A to the Municipal Corporation, Shimla and had also given a notice dated 8th December, 1976, Ex. PW-6/A, to the tenants after they had come to know about the construction So far the judgment Ex R-5 is concerned, the landlords were not a party to it. PW-l/A to the Municipal Corporation, Shimla and had also given a notice dated 8th December, 1976, Ex. PW-6/A, to the tenants after they had come to know about the construction So far the judgment Ex R-5 is concerned, the landlords were not a party to it. Since they had given no consent for building the structure existing over the land in dispute, how could they state about it in the petition and they were also right in denying it in their rejoinder that their father had ever given any permission for the construction purposes as has been wrongly alleged, because in the written statement they have alleged that they had built permanent structure for setting up an industry and carrying on the business at a heavy cost of Rs. 25,000 with the permission of the father of the landlords, Sh. Harkrishan Lal Kuthiala Later on, when he was con fronted with the writing Ex. R-4, he has admitted it and explained its meaning, which writing pertains to a temporary structure only. 12. In reply to the third argument raised on behalf of the tenants, Sh. Goel has distinguished the judgment in Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar (supra) on the ground that it pertains to the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act which are materially different than the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 under which it was not necessary to specify the industry which the landlords intended to establish on the land in dispute. Moreover, the father of the landlords, Sh Harkrishan Lai Kuthiala, as well as the landlord Vinay Kumar Kuthiala (PW 6) have stated on oath that when they filed the eviction petition, they intended to build a hotel but later on after consultation with the Financial Corporation and on receipt of letter Ex. PW/6-G from the office of the Town and Country Planning, they wanted to set up a small furniture factory and also use the land in dispute for keeping the stock of plywood, in which he has been dealing and for which permission of Town and Country Planning department \% not required as the land in dispute is already being used for stacking of coal. 13. 13. After giving best consideration to the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by bath the Courts below. (Please 5ie i 1984 (1) Rent Control Reporter 1?6, Shyam Babu v. District Judge, Moradabad and others; 1985 (2) RCR 5?6f Rajesh and others v. Jomna Dass and others ; 1986 (1) Rent Control Reporter 589, Bodh Raj and others v. Balbir Singh ; AIR 1988 SC 1845, Smt- Rajbir Kaur and another v. Mis. S. Chokosiri and Co, and AIR 1992 SC 1696, K A Anthappai v. 0. Ahamed). Even if the interpretation of the writing Ex. R-4 as suggested by Mr. Chbabil Dass on behalf of the tenants is accepted, the fact remains that according to the father of the landlords, Sh Harknshan Lal KLuthiala, the tenants had built a temporary shed for which he had consented and not the permanent structure as they have alleged, which has changed the vacant piece of land into a non-residential building Besides the admission in the reply filed by the tenants, the tenant Vishwa Nath has admitted that the structure is built of grit, cement, CGI sheets and wood and is of permanent nature. His witness Bagicha Ram [RW 6] who had made the construction, as a mason, has also admitted that in the shed, the tenant is himself living besides storing his articles. As such, the findings of both the Courts below that there was no consent given by the landlords for the permanent structure built over the land in dispute by the tenants are based on correct appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record. The natural consequence of these findings is that the tenants have made themselves liable for eviction on the ground of change of use of the land in dispute for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out to them and also on the ground that by building a permanent structure and by using the same, the value and utility of the rented land has been materially impaired. Had the structure been temporary and used for the purpose of stacking coal, the nature of the land in dispute would have continued to be a vacant piece of land and the tenants might not be liable to be evicted. 14. So far the second argument of Mr. Chhabil Dass raised on behalf of the tenants is concerned, it is attractive but without any substance. Mr. A K. Goel, appearing on behalf of the landlords, is right that since the father of the landlords or the landlords had not given any consent for the structure built over the land in dispute, how could state it in the petition and also admit tt in the rejoinder It is correct that there was a writing consenting to a structure either already built or to be built but it is in respect of a temporary shed and not to the building of a permanent structure, admittedly raised over the suit land. In these facts and circumstances, this Court does not find that the pleadings were lacking in any manner as urged by Mr. Chhabil Dass, because it is stated in the eviction petition that the land in dispute was let out for the purpose of stacking coal whereupon a structure has been built which is being used for the residence of labourers, which is a change of use of the land in dispute for a purpose other than that for which it was tenanted. Moreover, it was within the knowledge of the tenants that when they had built the structure. what was its nature and to what use it was being put by them and they ate not prejudiced in any manner if the landlords have not given complete Information which could not be within their knowledge. The law laid down in the case of Tara Chand v. Baij Nath and others (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Above all, though an issue was framed that, "whether the petition lacks in material particulars if so, its effect", yet, the tenants could not substantiate it before the Rent Controller and it was decided against them. Thereafter, they did not take up this ground before the Appellate Authority and also in the grounds of the present revision petition. 15. The third point raised by Mr. Chhabil Dass on behalf of the tenants is also without any force. Thereafter, they did not take up this ground before the Appellate Authority and also in the grounds of the present revision petition. 15. The third point raised by Mr. Chhabil Dass on behalf of the tenants is also without any force. The provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act which were interpreted in Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar, (supra) materially differ from the provisions of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act wherein it is provided that: — "14. Eviction of Tenants. (3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession— (a) (b) in the case of rented land if— (i) he requires it for his own use: Provided that he is not occupying in the urban area concerned any other rented land, for the purpose of his business : Provided further that he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application in the urban area concerned; (ii) he requires rented land for construction of residential or non-residential building or for establishment of industry; (iii) the tenant lets out his rented land to some body else on higher rent;" 16. In the equivalent section 13 (3) (a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (b), sub-section (3) of section 14 of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act are not there. Section 13 (3) (a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is as under ;— "(3) (a) a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession (ii) in the case of rented land, if— (a) he requires it for his own use; (b) he is cot occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such rented land, and (c) he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned." 17. Therefore, a comparison of both the sections makes it clear that the requirement of the landlord for his own use in respect of rented land is not only restricted for the purpose of his business but he can require it also for the construction of residential/non-residential building or for establishment of industry or also if the tenant lets out his rented land to some body else on higher rent. In view of this provision, it was sufficient if the landlords have stated that they require the land in dispute for the purpose of business to establish an industry. The father of the landlords, Sh. Harkrishan Lal Kuthiala and Vinay Kumar Kuthiala, one of the landlords, have also explained which industry they intend to set up. They have proved that they have no other land in Shimla for their business and have not vacated any such land within five years before the filing of the eviction petition. As such, both the Courts below have rightly held their requirement as bonafide. In view of these findings, this Court need not go into the controversy raised by the tenants in C, M. P. No 87 of 1991. The landlords are entitled to get the land in dispute vacated for the purpose of establishment of an industry. It is not for this Court to decide what industry the landlords can establish as it will depend upon various factors. Moreover, the tenants who themselves are running a business of Coal on the land in dispute cannot take the stand that the area where the land in dispute is situated is residential and it cannot be got vacated for the purpose of establishment of an industry. It is also not their case that no industry can be established on the land in dispute. 18. In the result, this Court does not find any force in the Revision petition and it is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Revision petition dismissed.