R. V. VASANTHA KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this writ petition has sought for quashing of the order. dated 23-11-1992 passed in k. d. r. ra. 2 of 1989-90 by the deputy commissioner, belgaum. ( 2 ) BEFORE adverting to the contentions advanced, reference to previous proceedings pending between the parties on record would throw much light to decide the issues involved. One bhima son of rama hiralkodi on 30-4-1975 had mortgaged an extent of 2 acres and 10 guntas comprised in sy. No. 458 situate in kanagala village in favour of one shankar son of jotiba kirc kodi for a sum of Rs. 8,500/- and in pursuance of the same possession of the lands in question was delivered to shankar. Subsequently, bhima filed an application under the Provisions of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 seeking relief from indebtedness, proceeding being numbered as kdr/hkp. 445, dated 25-11-1976 the taluk magistrate passed the Order, the operative portion being:"at the outset, it is admitted by the petitioner himself that he owns 7 acres 20 guntas of land excluding the suit land. So, the petitioner is not a small holder under the act. This fact is evidenced by the extracts from r. Of Rs. Of the lands of the petitioner produced by the opponent. Since the petitioner is not a small holder, he is not entitled to for any relief under the Provisions of the k. d. r. act. Therefore, the petition will have to be and is hereby dismissed. " subsequently, bhima filed another application dated 24-7-1985 before the taluk executive magistrate for his being considered as debtor and for consequential order of discharge of mortgage loan, the proceeding came to be numbered as kdr/sr 1415 and on 24-9-1985, taluk magistrate passed the Order, the operative portion being: "the land 2 acres 10 guntas standing in the records of rights as mortgage in possession in the name of the respondent should be restored to the petitioner immediately. The respondent may seek redress for getting Rs. 17,900/- advanced as further loan, approaching competent court of law. "shankar filed a writ petition against the order dated 24-9-1985 seeking quashing of the Order, proceeding being numbered as W. P. No. 15466 of 1985 and this court on 5-12-1985 passed the following order:"rule is, made absolute, the writ petition is allowed, the impugned order dated 24-9-1985, Annexure-A is quashed. 17,900/- advanced as further loan, approaching competent court of law. "shankar filed a writ petition against the order dated 24-9-1985 seeking quashing of the Order, proceeding being numbered as W. P. No. 15466 of 1985 and this court on 5-12-1985 passed the following order:"rule is, made absolute, the writ petition is allowed, the impugned order dated 24-9-1985, Annexure-A is quashed. The matter is remitted to the taluk executive magistrate, hukkeri, with a direction to hold a fresh enquiry and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after affording opportunity to the parties. No costs. " ( 3 ) THE taluk magistrate in pursuance of the order passed by this court in w. p. no. 15466 of 1985, held an enquiry and on 14-10-1986 passed the following order: ds "and ;> ed rfsandraqaid zjo^andoandq, acbcbcndcb sdoeqsdi, ticnd zss,d jte^jte^iafc^ sflttjftandj, ?rattei> siaandlkh^wsrbsands ). ^rrsrtde djaeuni^, edes *. A. O. A??. O*. 1415, sso0i 24-9-1985 d acsezte^ vyandoaatftinno,". the abovesaid order dated 14-10-1986 was challenged by shankar in writ proceedings numbered as W. P. No. 18664 of 1986. In the memorandum of writ petition numbered W. P. No. 18664 of 1986, shankar has averred the following facts:1) that on 7-7-1983 bhima having executed an agreement of sale in favour of shankar to an extent of 3 acres 10 guntas comprising the lands, the subject-matter of mortgage and as such by virtue of past performance he has been in possession and the mortgage having been redeemed. 2) sale of an extent of 6 acres 29 guntas of land situate in kangala village by bhima in favour of mallappa kallappa dhongi for a sum of Rs. 60,000/- under 2 registered documents of sale. 3) purchase of an extent of 1 acre 4 guntas comprised in sy. No. 457/4b02 on 21-6-1985 by bhima. 4) bhima being the owner of house nos. 188,249 and 250 of kangala village stating the above facts shankar-petitioner in the W. P. No. 18664 of 1986 challenged the order dated 14-10-1986 passed by taluk magistrate. This court on 23-6-1989 while allowing the writ petition made certain observations. The relevant observations being found at para 6. It reads: "in the result, for the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the Rule made absolute. The impugned order is quashed. This court on 23-6-1989 while allowing the writ petition made certain observations. The relevant observations being found at para 6. It reads: "in the result, for the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the Rule made absolute. The impugned order is quashed. Respondent 1 is directed to consider and give a finding on the preliminary issue whether or not the application of respondent 2 filed under the act is barred by limitation as urged by the petitioner. If respondent 1 comes to the conclusion that, on facts and in law, the application is barred by limitation, it is not necessary for him to go into other questions. But if he comes to the conclusion that the application is not barred by limitation, a fresh enquiry on all the points is issued and the contentions that may be raised by the contending parties shall be gone into and findings given after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the parties and dispose 01 tne case in accordance with law within a time limit of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. A copy of this order shall be communicated to respondent 1 forthwith. The parties to the case are directed to appear before respondent 1 on 17-7-1989. The learned counsel appearing for the parties shall intimate the date of hearing to the respective parties. "once again taluk magistrate in pursuance of the order made by this court in W. P. No. 18664 of 1986, held an enquiry, and after assessing the materials on record on 3-10-1989 passed the following Order, the operative portion being:"in view of the facts discussed supra, the application of the respondent seeking redressal under k. d. r. act requires to be rejected and accordingly it is rejected. "the main grounds that prevailed on the taluk magistrate to dismiss the application dated 24-7-1985 filed by bhima being that it was filed beyond the prescribed period under the act. 3. Section 5 of the Karnataka debt relief (Amendment) Act, 1981 as amended by act 17 of 1981 reads. "the main grounds that prevailed on the taluk magistrate to dismiss the application dated 24-7-1985 filed by bhima being that it was filed beyond the prescribed period under the act. 3. Section 5 of the Karnataka debt relief (Amendment) Act, 1981 as amended by act 17 of 1981 reads. Section 5 (1):"a debtor referred to in clause (f) of Section 3 may on or before the 31st december, 1981 make an application to assistant commissioner having jurisdiction over the area within which the mortgaged property is situate for an order releasing the mortgaged property and for the grant of certificate of redemption. "since the application by bhima filed on 24-7-1985 was being beyond 3 years six months, the taluk magistrate dismissed the same as barred by time. The other ground which prevailed on the authority was that since the application filed by bhima having already been rejected in kdr/hkr/445 on 25-11-1976 under 1976 Act, it was not open for him to reagitate the same under 1980 act. ( 4 ) AGGRIEVED against the order dated 3-10-1989, bhima preferred a revisio nunder Section 14 of the k. d. r. Act, 1980 before the deputy commissioner, proceeding being numbered as kdr ra 2 of 1989-90 and on 23-11-1992, the deputy commissioner confirmed the order dated 3-10-1989 passed by the taluk magistrate. Aggrieved by the order dated 23-11-1992 passed by the deputy commissioner this writ petition has been filed. ( 5 ) THE main grounds by the petitioner bhima in this writ petition being:1) that the order passed by taluk magistrate on 24-9-1985 as being valid in view of the enlarged definition of debtor under act 29 of 1980 and dismissal of his application as being passed by the authorities subsequently as being bad in law and without jurisdiction. 2) since both the acts namely, act 25 of 1976 and act 29 of 1980 are being in operation, dismissal of the application under the act 25 of 1976 as being not a bar for considering another application under act 29 of 1980 which has enlarged definition of debtor and only decision arrived under act 25 of 1976 cannot operate as either estoppel or res judicata for considering fresh application under act 29 of 1980. 3) the authorities have exceeded in their jurisdiction in deciding other extraneous matters such as plea of limitation beyond the order of remand. 3) the authorities have exceeded in their jurisdiction in deciding other extraneous matters such as plea of limitation beyond the order of remand. 4) that the authorities have not properly adverted their mind to the effect of the saving clause under act 29 of 1980. 5) that the authorities erred in not recording any reasons on his application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. ( 6 ) POINTS noted above if summarised would result in the following conclusions. In the state of Karnataka three main legislations cover the relief as to debts. The first one is Karnataka agricultural Debt Relief Act, 1966 having come into force on 1-4-1969 covers debts which were in existence on the date of 1-4-1969. The second act is Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 having come into force on 21-10-1975 covers debts which were in existence on 21-10-1975. The third act is Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1980 having come into force on 15-11-1979 covers debts in existence on that date. What is to be noted is that act No. 25 of 1976 has not been repealed by act 29 of 1980. Section 7 of the act No. 25 of 1976 throws burden of proof that they were debtors on the judgment debtors. Section 6 (2) of 1980 act throws the burden on the creditor to show that the person contending that he is a debtor under the act not a debtor. This provision is not applicable to a proceeding under Section 25 of 1976 act. Section 6 (2) docs not enact merely procedure but creates an obligation on the creditor. Hence, it is only prospective in operation and not retrospective. Further Section 15 (1) of 1980 act specifically saves the operation of act 25 of 1976. In sebastin antony v ramanand bhatt, reported in 1981 (2) kar. L. j. 409: ILR 1982 kar. 73 this court has observed at paragraphs 31 and 32. They read:"para 31. thus, it is obvious that the legislature wanted to give relief to such debtors who incurred loans after the coming into force of the 1976 act and for such debts which were in existence on the date of the application of act No. 29 of 1980. Para 32. thus, as stated above, Section 15 (1) of act No. 29 of 1980 specifically saves the operation of act No. 25 of 1976 in all respects. Para 32. thus, as stated above, Section 15 (1) of act No. 29 of 1980 specifically saves the operation of act No. 25 of 1976 in all respects. That docs mean that if a contending debtor is held not a debtor under act No. 25 of 1976 and if his debts are existing on the date of commencement of act No. 29 of 1980, he is disabled to apply for relief under act No. 29 of 1980. If the otherwise satisfies the conditions stipulated in act No. 29 of 1980, he would be at liberty to seek relief under act No. 29 of 1980 because all that is necessary for the application of the Provisions of act No. 29 of 1980 would be that the debt should be existing on the date of the commencement of the said act and the debtor must satisfy the conditions stipulated in the said act. "the sum and substance would be that the debt must be existing on me uaic in commencement of the said act and debtor must satisfy the conditions stipulated in the said act. ( 7 ) IT is to be noted that if any matter is pending consideration under act 25of 1976, when the act 29 of 1980 came into force then in that event matter has to be enquired into under act 25 of 1976 itself in view of the saving clause. If the debt is subsequent to act 25 of 1976 and existing as on the date when act 29 of 1980 came into force, then in that event debtor can take advantage of the Provisions of the act 29 of 1980. When once the party avails of remedy under act 25 of 1976, and the same is enquired into and decided on merits, then it is not open for the debtor to make a fresh application under act 29 of 1980, as though the debt is existing as on the date when act 29 of 1980 came into force. In y. b. patiland others v y. l. patil, reported in AIR 1977 SC 392 , the Supreme Court has observed:"no appeal was filed against that judgment and it has became final. It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. "the petitioner sought statutory discharge and the authorities exercised their powers conferred under the act in force. If the petitioner had not invoked the Provisions of the act 26 of 1976, and as on the date when act 29 of 1980 came into force, and if the debt has been existing then it would have been open for the petitioner to take advantage of the Provisions of the act 29 of 1980. Even otherwise, if petitioners application seeking relief of indebtedness under act 25 of 1976 was pending, as on the date when act of 29 of 1980 came into force, then it would be open for debtor to take advantage of the Provisions of act 29 of 1980 and not in cases where authorities have exercised their powers and decided the matter under act 25 of 1976. The above view is in accordance with ratio deddendi of t. s. kotagi v tahsildar, gadag, reported in 1987 (2) kar. L. j. sh. N. 258 : AIR 1985 Karnataka 265 and sebastin antony v ramananda bhat, reported in 1981 (2) kar. L. j. 409: ILR 1982 Karnataka 73. ( 8 ) AS such, the contentions advanced by the petitioner regarding his right to approach the authorities under act 29 of 1980 inspite of the finding recorded in a proceeding initiated under act 25 of 1976 cannot be legally accepted since there was neither the matter pending consideration under act 25 of 1976 nor a debt existing as on that date to invoke Provisions of act No. 29 of 1980. ( 9 ) IN the instant case, it would be futile to discuss the merits of the petitioner's cause to get himself entitled to the benefits under act 29 of 1980 as the petitioner did not file the application under act 29 of 1980 on or before 31-12-1981 under Section 5 (1) of the act 29 of 1980. Admittedly, the petitioner has filed the application on 24-7-1985 which is beyond the prescribed period to invoke the benefits under 1980 act. Admittedly, the petitioner has filed the application on 24-7-1985 which is beyond the prescribed period to invoke the benefits under 1980 act. The contentions advanced by the petitioner that the authorities having erred to exercise their discretionary powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not arise for any consideration since under the Act, there is no provision conferring powers to the authorities concerned either to condone the delay or to exercise its powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is to be stated that the limitation prescribed and restrictions imposed under the act cannot be said to be unreasonable. In mis. Fatcchand himmatlal v state, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1825 , the Supreme Court while upholding the validity of Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1976 has observed that restrictions imposed under that act as being reasonable, the Provisions which are in substance the same as envisaged under act 25 of 1976 and act 29 of 1980. ( 10 ) IT is to be stated that if statutory period expires before action is brought, the petitioner's right is not extinguished. He is merely deprived of his remedies of action and set off. Reasons of public policy has dictated the enactment of law of limitation, Limitation Act has expressly declared that whether the defence of limitation be pleaded or not the court is bound to give effect to law. Bar of limitation cannot be waived and proceeding must be dismissed if brought after the prescribed period of limitation. The Provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act are peremptory and impose a duty on the court or authorities to dismiss the application as the case may be which is out of time, unless the delay that could be condoned under Section 5 of the act or under any other Provisions of the law for the time being in force. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is mandatory and leaves no room for equitable considerations, since it bars the remedy but does not destroy the right. Jurisdiction has to be exercised only within the amplitude of jurisdiction conferred by the statute and authority is not entitled to go outside those Provisions and in effect to legislate for itself or arrogate or clutch at the jurisdiction which it does not really possess under the statute. Jurisdiction has to be exercised only within the amplitude of jurisdiction conferred by the statute and authority is not entitled to go outside those Provisions and in effect to legislate for itself or arrogate or clutch at the jurisdiction which it does not really possess under the statute. Whenever a statute confers jurisdiction under certain particular conditions, it cannot be understood or interfered to confer jurisdiction also in cases which do not fall within the ambit of the conditions laid down in the statute. In view of the same, contentions advanced by the petitioner that the authorities erred in not exercising jurisdiction to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act also cannot be legally accepted. ( 11 ) SRI b. Jigijinni learned counsel for the petitioner, with his legal expertise and resources at command, contended that the authorities having exceeded their jurisdiction in dismissing the application on the ground of limitation when that was not the case either pleaded or argued at the time when this court in W. P. No. 15466 of 1985 ordered remand with a direction to hold fresh enquiry. He invited this court's attention to the legal principles enunciated in the following cases: 1) ILR 2 bom. 120 morabin putalji v gopal bin satu 2) AIR 1921 PC 23 raja of ramnad v velusani tewar 3) AIR 1954 Cal 506 newton v official trustee 4) 16 ILR 492 (mys.) Central Karnataka motor services ltd. V state of Mysore 5) 1967 (2) mys. L. j. 637 channaiah v regional transport authority 6) 1982 (1) kar. L. j. 19 united medical agencies v abdul gafar md. Setni 7) 1981 (2) kar. L. j. 409 : 1lr 1982 kar. 73 sebastin anthony v ramanand bhat 8) AIR 1964 SC 907 ittavira v varkey there cannot be any dispute about the legal principles enunciated in the above cases. But factually the contentions advanced by the petitioner overlooks the order of remand dated 23-6-1989 made by this court subsequently in W. P. No. 18664 of 1986 which is mentioned earlier. As such, there is no legal force in the contentions advanced by the petitioner. But factually the contentions advanced by the petitioner overlooks the order of remand dated 23-6-1989 made by this court subsequently in W. P. No. 18664 of 1986 which is mentioned earlier. As such, there is no legal force in the contentions advanced by the petitioner. ( 12 ) THE reasonings recorded and findings arrived at by the concerned authorities cannot be characterised as being without jurisdiction and perverse and it is to be stated that they are based on sound principles of law and as such circumstances do not warrant any further interference with the impugned order. Authorities are directed to give effect to the orders passed by them. ( 13 ) ACCORDINGLY, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .