Judgment :- The prayer in the writ petition is to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to effect the correct spelling in English language against the age-old customary one, towards the name of our language and State, which remains as “Tamil” and “Tamil Nadu” as “Tamizh” and “Tamizh Nadu” including the change of the name of this High Court as “Tamizh Nadu High Court” instead of the Madras High Court forthwith in the interest of the principles of literalism and for the glorification of the ancient language, State and High Court. 2. The petitioner appearing as party-in-person has filed this writ petition stating that it is filed in the interest of Tamizh masses. It is alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the State was re-named from the original name of Madras State by the then Chief Minister late Dr.C.N.Annadurai in the year 1967, but the spelling of the name in English language remains un-altercd and its pronunciation as “Tamil” by the Britishers is continued. It is also stated by the petitioner that Britishers were negligent in so far as the pronounication of the language is concerned and as such the spelling of the name of the language should be “Thamizh” instead of “Tamil” and also the spelling of the name of the State also should be changed as “Tamizh Nadu” instead of “Tamil Nadu”. It is also alleged in the affidavit that though the petitioner is concerned about the spelling of very many other words in English language, he is very much concerned about the spelling of the name language, i.e., mother-tongue, Thamizh. The petitioner has narrated as to how certain words are spelt in paragraphs 6and 8 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. The petitioner also alleges that even in the cause list of the Apex Court of the land at the personal request insisted upon to print as “Tamizh Nadu” instead “Tamil Nadu” and got his cases listed where he appeared as party-in-person. The petitioner also alleges that even in the cause list of the Apex Court of the land at the personal request insisted upon to print as “Tamizh Nadu” instead “Tamil Nadu” and got his cases listed where he appeared as party-in-person. It is also stated that in order to safeguard the glory of the language and the State the petitioner wants a direction from this Court to correct the language against the age-old customary one which is totally wrong and according to him, contrary to the principles of literalism, which remain as “Tamil” and “Tamil Nadu” and the petitioner wants to change it is to be spelt as “Tamizh” and “Tamizh Naadu” and also “Tamizh Naadu High Court” instead of “Madras High Court” forthwith. 3. I have heard the arguments of the petitioner, who appears in party-in-person and have gone through the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. Though the petitioner, who appears as party-in-person, has styled himself as a social worker and public interest litigant, nowhere in the affidavit it is stated that the writ petition is filed as public interest litigation but it is stated that in the interest of Tamizh masses the case is filed before this Court in para 2 of the affidavit. It may be stated immediately that the approach of the petitioner, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, as a public interest litigant, cannot be accepted. In my view, it is not a public interest litigation, but it is a self advertisement litigation. The writ petition itself is wholly misconceived, and the prayer as asked for, cannot be granted. Sub-clause (2) of Art.l of the Constitution of India defines that the States and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the First Schedule. In the First Schedule, Item 7 is shown as ‘Tamil Nadu’. Originally, it was called as ‘Madras’. The name of ‘Madras’ has been changed to ‘Tamil Nadu’ by the Madras State (Alteration of Name) Act, 1968, (Act No.53 of 1968). In the fourth schedule also read with Arts.4(1) and 32 of the Constitution of India, the term ‘Tamil Nadu’ appears. As such, it is seen that even in the Constitution of India itself, for the term spelling in ‘Tamil Naadu’ alone is used. In the fourth schedule also read with Arts.4(1) and 32 of the Constitution of India, the term ‘Tamil Nadu’ appears. As such, it is seen that even in the Constitution of India itself, for the term spelling in ‘Tamil Naadu’ alone is used. When the Constitution itself used the word ‘Tamil Nadu’, I do not think the petitioner can ask for a direction to issue to the respondent as asked for, to change the spelling of the term "Tamil Nadu"as "Tamizh Naadu". If any of such change has to be done, in my view, it has to be done only by Parliament and not by anybody else, more so, by the respondent before this Court. So I am of the view, that without looking into the provisions of the Constitution, the petitioner has filed this writ petition as if he is interested in the glorification of the Tamil language. So the effect of Articles of the Constitution and Central Act LIII of 1968 cannot be changed, as asked for, by the petitioner, by an administrative order. In my view, the writ petition has been filed, as I have already stated, to have a self-advertisement. It is to be deprecated. 4. More so, it is of common knowledge that when the term "Tamil" is used it is spelt as only and only when they were trans lated into English they were spelt differently, as stated by the petitioner. As such, when it is used within the State of Tamil Nadu, the grandeur of the language is not lost. That apart, if the spelling of the term has to be changed as stated by the petitioner, it cannot be done by issuing a writ of mandamus and if any such writ is issued, in mv view, it will be against what all is stated in the Articles of the Constitution of India. More so, I am of the view that a term in one language cannot be written in another language and if it is written it will be only artificial and it will not be in the original form. 5. Haying said so, it is necessary for me to see as to whether this writ petition can be called as ‘Public interest litigation’ at all and to be entertained by this Court. Surely, the petitioner has no right to come up before this Court with such a prayer. 5. Haying said so, it is necessary for me to see as to whether this writ petition can be called as ‘Public interest litigation’ at all and to be entertained by this Court. Surely, the petitioner has no right to come up before this Court with such a prayer. In S.P.Gupta and others v. President of India and others, 1981 S.C.C. (Supp.) 87: 1982 Rajadhani L.R.389.A.I.R 1982 S.C. 149, the Supreme Court has held as follows: "We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or. the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objective". In Shri Sachidanand Pande and another v. The State of West Bengal, (1987)2 S.C.C. 295 : (1987)1 Com.L.J. 211: 1987 JT 425 : (1987)2 S.C.J. 70: (1987)1 Supreme 492: (1987)1 U.J. (S.C.) 641: (1987)4I.T.R. 134. A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1109, a note of caution was administered by the Supreme Court: "....Today public spirited litigants rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. They must be above suspicions...." In the same case, it has been further held: "It is only when Courts are apprised by of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action or when basic, human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the Courts, especially this Court should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the under dog and the neglected. I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self imposed restraint on public interest litigants..." It has also been held by the Supreme Court in Sheela Brase v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 2211 at page 2212, as follows: "...The proceedings in a public interest litigation are, therefore, intended to vindicate and effectuate the public interest by prevention of violation of the rights, constitutional or statutory of sizeable segments of the society, which owing to poverty, ignorance, social and economic disadvantages cannot themselves assert-and quite often not even aware of-those rights..." It has been further held as follows: "The grievance in a public interest action, generally speaking, is about the content and conduct of governmental action in relation to the constitutional and statutory rights of segments of society and in certain circumstances the conduct of governmental-policies..." Mishra, J. in Gopalan, Public Interest Litigant v. The Union of India, 1990 Writ L.R. 297, has held (at p.300) as follows: "...On the question of locus standi of a person to maintain a writ of certiorari, which rule in my view, has to apply strictly to a writ of manda-mus or forany other direction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court in Jashni v. Usshan Kumar, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578, held: "It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) person aggrieved; (ii) stranger’; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity, while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity, while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold". It is thereafter the Supreme Court said: "...The distinction between the first and categories of applicant, though real is not always well demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones, a solid central zone of certainty and a grey outer circle of lessening certainly in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outer nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of ‘person aggrieved’. In the grey outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second intermix, interface and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be ‘persons aggrieved’." Some broad tests which are applied therefore to find out who amongst the strangers is a person aggrieved, who can maintain a litigation in a court of lawon behalf of "..another, the Supreme Court has said: "Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest, recognised by law has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person ‘against’ whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something?. Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority’? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority’? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words ‘person aggrieved’ is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals? In S.P.Gupta and others v. President of India and others, 1981 S.C.C. (Supp.) 87: 1982 Rajadhani L.R. 389.A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149, the Supreme Court has said: "It may therefore now be taken as well established that where a legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Art.226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons in this Court under Art.32seekingjudicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such persons....But we must hasten to make it clear that the individual who moves the court for judicial redressal in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal grain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the Court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and must reject this application at the threshold, whether it be in the form of a letter addressed to the court or even in form of a regular writ petition filed in court. We may also point out that as a matter of prudence and not as a rule of law, the court may confine this strategic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class or group of persons or the constitutional or legal right of such determinate class or group of persons is violated and as far as possible, not entertain cause of individual wrong or injury at the instance of a third party, where there is an effective legal aid organisation which can take care of such cases..." With respect I agree with Mishra, J., on this point. Looking at the backdrop of the decisions cited above, in my view, the writ petition cannot be entertained, as a public interest litigation. I am also of the view that the issue raised in this writ petition is not justiciable. In my view it is the duty of this Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. It is well settled that locus standi to approach by way of writ petition and refusal to grant relief in enquiry jurisdiction are two different aspects. In this case, in my view, the petitioner has no locus standi at all to come up to this Court, that too, styling the writ petition as public interest litigation. That apart, the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution being discretionary, I do not think the discretion can be exercised in favour of the petitioner on the facts and circumstances of this case. So looking at any angle, I do not think there is any substance in the allegations made by the petitioner in the affidavit. There are no merits in the writ petition and accordingly it is dismissed.