ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. 1. The present revision petition and the proceedings out of which they arise are a gross abuse of the process of the Court to say the least. The petitioner is a sub-tenant in certain premises earlier held by one Sukhdayal as a tenant holding from the non-petitioner/landlords. The proceedings for ejectment of the petitioner and the tenant Sukhdayal were initiated before the Rent Controlling Authority which terminated successfully in favour of the non-petitioners by the Authority directing ejectment of the tenant and naturally the petitioner holding under the tenant. It is noteworthy that the proceedings had terminated on a compromise dated 10-9-1984 allowing the occupants two years time to vacate the premises. 2. Having fully availed of the time allowed under the compromise, the tenant and sub-tenant filed a civil suit challenging the compromise and seeking an injunction restraining execution of the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controlling Authority. Injunction was refused by the trial court as also the appellate court. They came up to this Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Their petition was dismissed on 15-11-1991 by this Court overruling all the possible objections raised by the petitioners therein, (of whom one was the present revision-petitioer). See, Sukhdayal and another vs. State of M.P. & others (1992 1 M.P.J.R. 493). 3. The tenant Sukhdayal and the present petitioner Kedarnath - they jointly applied for review of the order dated 15-11-91 which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court, though the petitioners were allowed six months time to vacate the premises subject to their filing an undertaking for handing over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlords on expiry of 6 months (see Annexure R-3). Sukhdayal and Kedarnath (present petitioner) filed a joint undertaking on 25-5-92 (Annexure R-4). 4. That time having expired, the petitioners have once again initiated a fresh round of litigative process. Now they are canvassing at the stage of execution proceedings that the plaintiff/non-petitioners having constructed some shops available in their vacant possession, they have lost the right of executing the order of eviction which was based on their genuine need of the premises. The executing Court refused to go behind the decree. Now they are canvassing at the stage of execution proceedings that the plaintiff/non-petitioners having constructed some shops available in their vacant possession, they have lost the right of executing the order of eviction which was based on their genuine need of the premises. The executing Court refused to go behind the decree. As against the order of the Rent Controlling Authority overruling their objections, first the petitioners filed a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution before this Court which was rejected on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy of revision. Then they filed a revision before the District Judge which was dismissed as incompetent, the order of the Rent Controlling Authority being challengable only before the High Court under Chapter III- A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Now they have filed the present revsion which is hopelessly barred by lime by 250 days. Not only this the revision is filed by sub-tenant kedarnath alone leaving out Sukhdayal, the tenant, from the array of the parties. 5. Not only the revision is barred by time, the delay wherein this Court is not at all inclined to condone looking to the conduct of the petitioner and because of his having spent time in proceedings under Art. 227 of the Constitution and then a revision before the District Judge which were both grossly illadvised and were filed ignoring the law laid down by numberless decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, the petitioner does not have any case on merits too. Instead of complying with the terms of the compromise and undertaking filed in terms of the orders of this Court he is stretching the life of litigation beyond the permissible limits. Strictly speaking he is in contempt. He has to know that no executing court can go behind the decree unless the decree is set aside or modified in a manner and by a procedure known to law. 6. The Court does have power to notice subsequent events and in appropriate cases it is obliged to do so, but only until the matter before it has not achieved a finality. The power to notice subsequent events vests in the trial Court as also in the courts of appeal and revision, but not in the executing court. In Syed Asadullah Kazmi vs. The Addl. The power to notice subsequent events vests in the trial Court as also in the courts of appeal and revision, but not in the executing court. In Syed Asadullah Kazmi vs. The Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and others ( AIR 1981 S.C. 1724 ) the order for releasc of a portion of accommodation had acquired a finality and thereafter the person for whose requirement the accommodation was ordered to be released, died. The tenant wanted this subsequent event to be noticed by the Court at a point of time when the order was sought to be executed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that they could not reopen "that which has become final" and held: It is true that subsequent events must be taken into account by a statutory authority or Court when considering proceedings arising out of a landlord's petition for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal need. But in the present case, the order for release of a portion of the accommodation acquired finality before the death of Raj Kumar Sinha and the controversy concluded by it could not be reopened. The above noted law was followed by this Court in Nandkishore vs. Yashwant Harishchandra Talcherkar & ors (1986 MPRCJ SN 10) and this Court held that the executing Court could not take notice of the event of the death of persons for whose requirement accommodation was decreed to be vacated; the decree did not become unexecutable. In Radhe Shyam Narsingh Das Renwal vs. Bajrang Das Prahlad Das (1980 MPRCJ 14) also this Court has held that once the decree had already become final it remained binding on the parties and the executing court could not afford to go behind the same so as to nullify its execution by noticing such event as could have been noticed by the court before the decree had become final. 7. Reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad ( AIR 1981 S.C. 1711 ); Bhawani Prasad Mishra vs. Tara Bai ( 1984 MPWN 192 ) and Tarabai vs. Kuhrabai (1980 2 MPWN 270) is totally misconceived inasmuch as they are such cases where the Court was called upon to notice subsequent events mostly at the stage of appeal, but certainly before the decree had achieved a finality. 8. The revision is held totally devoid of any merit. 8. The revision is held totally devoid of any merit. It is dismissed. The petitioner is warned to honour the order of ejectment made by a competent court and the undertaking furnished by him pursuant to the order of the Division Bench of this Court, failing which, he must be prepared to face the proceedings in contempt. The petitioner shall pay costs quantified at Rs. 250/- to the non-petitioners in this revision.