JUDGMENT R.C. Lahoti, J. 1. The plaintiff has come up in second appeal feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court directing her suit for ejectment of the defendant/respondent to be dismissed in reversal of the decree or the trial court which had decreed the suit. 2. It is not disputed that the plaintiff/appellant is the owner/landlord of the suit accommodation, residential in nature, held by the defendant/respondent on a monthly tenancy. The trial court had upon an evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parlies found the case of the plaintiff fully proved that the suit accommodation was required bonafide for residence of the plaintiff and her family members consisting of herself, her husband and 8 children, of whom eldest being a daughter was married. The family of the plaintiff was residing in a tenanted premises. Though the family had 3 or 4 rooms in its possession, but the rooms were so small that the entire unit could hardly accommodate even a singlecot. The plaintiff was not possessed of any other alternate accommodation of her own suitable to satisfy her need. 3. The findings of facts arrived at by the trial court have been reversed by the lower appellate court solely on ground of the plaintiff herself having not entered in the witness-box. 4. Vide order dated 15-7-92 this Court admitted the appeal for hearing parties on the following substantial question of law: Whether the first appellate Court was legally wrong in negativing ground of bona fide requirement for residence of the suit accommodation set up on behalf of plaintiff/appellant Vimla Devi on the ground that she did not herself enter in the witness box and instead her husband gave evidence in support of the suit ? 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties this Court is satisfied that the reversal of the decree by the lower appellate Court has been grossly illegal resulting in failure of justice and hence this Court is obliged to interfere. 6. The plaintiff, though an owner/landlord is yet a house-wife. Her husband Ramswaroop, also a power of attorney holder of his wife - the plaintiff, appeared in the witness-box and deposed to all the facts to substantiate such plaint averments as could have been deposed to by the plaintiff herself. Other evidence was also adduced to lend support to the plaintiff's case. Her husband Ramswaroop, also a power of attorney holder of his wife - the plaintiff, appeared in the witness-box and deposed to all the facts to substantiate such plaint averments as could have been deposed to by the plaintiff herself. Other evidence was also adduced to lend support to the plaintiff's case. The defendant and his witnesses made such admissions as would be enough to prove the plaintiff's case. The defendant himself admitted the plaintiff with her family residing in tenanted premises. The nature and extent of 3 or 4 rooms in possession of the plaintiff was described by the defendant in a highly oscillating manner and the trial court having considered and appreciated his testimony had arrived at a finding that the statement of defendant was unworthy of credence and on scrutiny led to an inference of the accommodation in possession of the plaintiff being not enough to satisfy her requirement. Purushottamdas, defendant's witness No.2 and a close relation of his, admitted vide para 27 of his statement that the family of the plaintiff included 8 children, apart from the couple, and only the eldest of the children -a daughter was married. The next was a son aged around 20 years and so of a marriageable age. All other children had a difference of 2 years in between. They were studying also. He admitted that the children needed living space separately from their parent's room and also needed adequate accommodation for study. 7. The plaintiff's husband, also a power of attorney holder, appeared in the witness-box and deposed to all the facts constituting the alleged bonafide requirement from his personal knowledge. He was subjected to lengthy cross-examination, but without any loss of his credibility as a witness. Neither before the lower appellate Court nor before this Court the learned counsel for the defendant/respondent has been able to point out anything which was within the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff and could not have been deposed to by anyone else except herself so as to render her non-examination fatal to proof of the plaintiff's case. 8. It hardly needs any law to state the well-settled proposition of law that evidence is to be weighed and not to be counted. The principles flowing from the Illustration (g) to Section 114, Evidence Act, enjoin the material witnesses being produced by a party, but not all the witnesses. 8. It hardly needs any law to state the well-settled proposition of law that evidence is to be weighed and not to be counted. The principles flowing from the Illustration (g) to Section 114, Evidence Act, enjoin the material witnesses being produced by a party, but not all the witnesses. A bare perusal of the plaint and all other facts and relevant circumstances of the case go to show that there is nothing which could have been proved by the plaintiff alone and hence nothing rests on the examination or non-examination of the plaintiff alone. 9. In Nrendra Kumar Vs. Radhakishan (1982 M.P.L.J. 279) this Court has held: It is not a postulate of law that any particular number of witnesses should be examined or that any particular person should be examined to prove any particular fact. Where in a suit for eviction on ground falling under section 12(1) (e) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the plaintiff/landlord was examined, the non-examination of other members of his "family for whom suit premises were needed is of no consequence and an adverse inference cannot be drawn against the plaintiff to the effect mat the alleged requirement was not genuine. 10. In Laxmichand vs. Thakur Aikamsingh (1980 M.P.R.C.J. SN 120), the plaintiff/landlord needed the suit accommodation for developing his business so as to settle his sons. The sons were not examined. It was not the case of the plaintiff that the proposed business was to be carried on by his sons only. This Court held that the statement of the plaintiff was enough to prove the alleged requirement and nothing turned on the non-examination of the sons. 11. Dulari Bai vs. Mariumbi (1980 II M.P.W.N. 108) bears a close analogy with the facts of the case at hand. The suit was filed by the lady plaintiff who did not appear in the Court and her husband deposed to the requirement pleaded by the plaintiff. The finding of the lower appellate Court negativing the requirement of the plaintiff on account of her non-examination was set aside by this Court. 12. In Sanjay Kumar vs. Someshwar (1988 M.P.R.C.J. SN. 8) the requirement was of a family and one of the family members was examined in the Court. It was held that law does not require each one of the members of the family to depose before the Court about their respective need. 13. 12. In Sanjay Kumar vs. Someshwar (1988 M.P.R.C.J. SN. 8) the requirement was of a family and one of the family members was examined in the Court. It was held that law does not require each one of the members of the family to depose before the Court about their respective need. 13. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the defendant/respondent are clearly distinguishable. Purushottam vs. Sajjanbai (1987 I M.P.W.N. 10) is a case where the requirement of the mother was pleaded and she was not examined. 14. Nandlal Govardhandas & Co. vs. Smt. Samratbai Lalchand Shah ( AIR 1981 BOM. 1 ) is a Single Bench decision where a number of circumstances were taken into consideration for negativing the case of the plaintiff and one of the circumstances was landlord's non-appearing in the witness-box to support the case of her bonafide requirement which was her state of mind. Both the cases are distinguishable. They were cited before the Courts below also which unwittingly fell into the trap of following these decisions though no applicable. 15. In case of genuine requirement the Court cannot afford to adopt a pedantic approach. It has to be practical and reasonable. It has to be alive to the realities of life placing itself in the place of the landlord and then judge how it would have behaved placed in the circumstances of the landlord. 16. The inference drawn by the lower appellate Court is wholly perverse and in the circumstances vitiated on account of an approach having been adopted which is not permissible in law. 17. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial court are restored with costs throughout payable by the defendant/respondent to the plaintiff/appellant. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified. 18. 17. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial court are restored with costs throughout payable by the defendant/respondent to the plaintiff/appellant. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified. 18. However to relieve the defendant/respondent from the hardship which he may face on account of decree for ejectment by suddenly being put out of the premises, it is directed that the decree for ejectment shall not be available for execution until 30-4-1994 subject to the respondent filing an undertaking on affidavit before the executing Court on or before 30-11-93 in the following terms: (i) that the defendant/respondent shall on or before 30-4-1994 handover vacant and peaceful possession over the suit accommodation to the piaintift/landlord and shall not in between induct anyone else into possession thereof; (ii) that on or before 31-12-1993 the defendant/respondent shall deposit the entire money part of the decree including costs and rent in arrears calculated uptodate and shall thereafter continue to deposit the rent falling in arrears month by month by the 15th day of that month; (iii) failing filing of the undertaking or failing compliance with any of the terms abovesaid, the dacree for ejectment shall become available forthwith for execution. 19. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.