JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by Additional District Judge, Sirohi, dated 16.4.1976, in Civil Suit No. 18/73. 2. Smt. Sodi Devi, whose legal representatives are the present appellants, filed a suit for partition and possession of certain property against Hazarimal, Juharmal and Smt. Gulabi Bai, in the court of Addl. District Judge, Sirohi, on 8.8.1973. She alleged the following pedigree of Narsinghji:- 3. She alleged that out of four sons of Hinduji, Shankarlal separated himself about 33 years ago and the remaining three brothers--Jasraj, father of the plaintiff, Surajmal, father of defendant No. 1 Hazarimal and Juharmal, defendant No. 2; remained joint in status until death of Jasraj. Surajmal died in 1945. Jasraj dies in the night intervening between 24th and 25th January, 1973, leaving behind plaintiff the daughter of deceased Jasraj and the defendant No. 3 Gulabi Bai widow; as his only heirs. It was also alleged that after the death of Jasraj, the gold ornaments, silver utensils and other valuables in seven boxes, which were in the custody of Gulabi Bai, were removed from her custody by Sumermal, son of Hazarimal and were placed in the custody of defendant No. 1 Hazarimal. As a member of Joint Hindu Family, Jasraj at the time of his death, had ⅓rd share in the undivided property of the Hindu Undivided Family. 4. Along with the plaint were appended three schedules-showing the property in possession of the plaintiff, the joint property of three brothers and, the self-acquired property of Jasraj, in possession of Gulabi Bai, with an averment that the property, shown in the schedules is not complete list of the property but is only list of property which is known to the' plaintiff. However, she claimed that on enquiry whatever property is found to be of Joint Hindu Family or belonging to Jasraj, be partitioned between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 3Snit. Gulabi Bai, by metes and bounds and, she be delivered possession of her share in the property. She claimed 1/2 share in the interest of Jasraj in Joint Family property and his self-acquired property, with remaining 1/2 share to Smt. Gulabi Bai. 5. The plaintiff served a notice dated 1st March, 1973, on the defendants. demanding inventory of property in their possession and her share. She claimed 1/2 share in the interest of Jasraj in Joint Family property and his self-acquired property, with remaining 1/2 share to Smt. Gulabi Bai. 5. The plaintiff served a notice dated 1st March, 1973, on the defendants. demanding inventory of property in their possession and her share. The defendant No. 1 Hazarimal did not accept notice and the same was returned with endorsement defendant being out to town. The defendant No. 2-Juharmal replied to the notice, alleging that all the three brothers have separated during the life-time of Jasraj and whatever property remained with Jasraj, is his self-acquired property. The defendant No. 3 Smt. Gulabi Bai, mother of plaintiff, also replied to the notice, denying the facts mentioned in the notice of the plaintiff and further averred that Jasraj had taken Raichand, natural son of Hajarimal, defendant No. 1, in adoption, who became the sole heir of property of Jasraj. Reply of the notice by defendant No. 3 was replied by the plaintiff, denying the factum of adoption and separation of Jasraj from his brothers. 6. The defendants No. 1 and 3 filed separate written statements, dated 1.12.1973 and defendant No. 2 filed his written statements on 15.5.1974. The sum and substance of all the three written statements was that it was not denied that the plaintiff was one of the heirs of her father Jasraj. The continued existence of Joint Family between Jasraj and defendant No. 1 and 2 was denied. The possession of any property of Jasraj with defendant No. 1 was denied. It was admitted that the property stated in Schedule A, which was the property of Jasraj, after his death has become the property of plaintiff as per will of Jasraj. It was alleged that Raichand-natural son of Hazarimal, is the adopted son of Jasraj, who alone is the successor of Jasraj's property in terms of will dated 6.4.1970, including the property bequeathed to Smt. Sodi Devi under the will dated 7.4.1970. Jasraj had no property except described in the wills referred to above. It was also alleged that the suit is not maintainable in the absence of Raichand-adopted son of Jasraj and, that the suit is not triable by the Addl. District. Judge, Sirohi because no property in respect of which partition suit has been filed, is situated within the jurisdiction of the court. 7. It was also alleged that the suit is not maintainable in the absence of Raichand-adopted son of Jasraj and, that the suit is not triable by the Addl. District. Judge, Sirohi because no property in respect of which partition suit has been filed, is situated within the jurisdiction of the court. 7. In the written statement of defendant No. 3, the definite date of adoption was mentioned as Baisakh Sudi 10, Samvat 2020. The date of partition between the brothers was alleged to he Baisakh Sudi I, Samvat 1998. 8. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder on 14.10.1974, denying the factum of adoption of Raichand and the alleged wills pleaded by the defendants. 9. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed : " 1- D;k e`rd tljkt us oSlk[k lqnh 10 la0 2020 dks jk;pan dks fof/kor xksn fy;k FkkA 2- D;k tljkt] lwjtey] tqgkjey o 'kadjyky us l;qaDr ifjokj laifRr dk la0 1998 esa foHkktu fd;k Fkk ,oa mldk foHkktu i= eaxlj lqn 1 la0 1999 dks fy[kk x;k FkkA 3- D;k tljkt dh e`R;q ij izfroknh la0 1 ds iq= lqesjey us lksus ds tscj rFkk pkWanh ds crZuksa dks xqykchckbZ ds vkf/kiR; ls gVk fy;s FksA 4- D;k tljkt us LoLFk efLr"d ls bPNki= fnukad 6-4-70 rFkk 7-4-70 dk laiknu fd;k FkkA 5- D;k okfnuh ds i{k esa laikfnr bPNki=] tks fd fnukad 7-4-70 dk gS] ls jk;pan ds i{k esa gq;s bPNki= fnukad 6-4-70 jn~n gks tkrk gSA 6- D;k okn ls layxz ifjf'k"V " v " ] " c " ] " l " esa of.kZr laifRr la;qDr ifjokj laifRr gSA 7- D;k bl U;k;ky; ds vf/kdkj {ks= esa laifRr fjDr ugha gksus ds dkj.k ;g okn bl U;k;ky; esa Jo.kkf/kdkj esa ugha gSA 8- D;k bl okn esa jk;pan vko';d i{k gSA 9- D;k ;g okn fujk/kkj gS vr% izfroknhx.k fo'ks"k gjtkuk izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gSA 10- D;k ge U;k; 'kqYd fn;k x;k gSA " 10. The plaintiff in support of her case examined herself as P.W. 1, her husband-Kantilal as P.W. 2, her son- Randhir Kumar as P.W. 3, Roopchand as P.W. 4 and Dr. Mahavirlal as P.W. 5. The plaintiff also produced documentary evidence Ex. 1-power of attorney of Sodi Devi in favour of her husband; Ex. 2-copy of notice dated 1.3.1973 by the plaintiff to all the defendants; exs. Mahavirlal as P.W. 5. The plaintiff also produced documentary evidence Ex. 1-power of attorney of Sodi Devi in favour of her husband; Ex. 2-copy of notice dated 1.3.1973 by the plaintiff to all the defendants; exs. 3, 4 and -5-postal receipts and return of notices addressed to Hazarimal; Ex. 6-reply dated 14.3.1973 to notice on behalf of Juharmal; Ex. 7-reply dated 15.3.1973 on behalf of Mst. Gulabi Bai, Ex. 8-reply by Mst. Sodi Devi to Mst. Gulabi Bai dated 12.4.1973, Ex. 9-postal receipt; Ex. 10-reply on behalf of Mst. Gulabi Bai to the notice dated 12.4.1973, Exs. 11 to 13-letters by Jasraj, Ex. 14-letter of information of death of Jasraj; Ex. 15-details of property at the time of partition and Exs. 15 and 16A-Doctor's report. 11. As against this, the defendant examined 12 witnesses D.W.1-Juharmal, D.W. 2-Mst. Gulabi Bai, D. W-3-Hajarimal, D. W. 4-Tarachand, D.W. 5-Bhurmal, D.W. 6-Hastimal, D.W 7-Pragchand, D.W. 8-Roopchand, D.W. 9-Bhimraj D.W 10-Shankarlal, D.W. 11 Champa and D.W. 12- Babhootmal. Apart from oral evidence, defendants produced documentary evidence, in the form of Ex. All-writing of acknowledgment of partition dated Baisakh Sudi 1, Samvat 1998; Ex. A/2-Adoption deed dated 3.4.1970, Ex. A/3-Will dated 7.4.1970, Ex. A14-Will dated 6.4.1970, Ex. A/5-A memorandum, Ex. A/6-two accounts alleged to be in the handwriting of Jasraj, Ex. A/7-partition deed dated 31st January, 1968, ex. A/8-Agreement to sell certain property by Juharmal and Hazarimal and Ex. A/9-copy of rokad bahi. 12. The trial court decided issue No. 4 against the defendants by holding that execution of wills dated 6 and 7th April, 1970 by Jasraj-deceased, were not proved. Consequently, it felt un-necessary to decide issue No. 5. Issue No. 7 about the jurisdiction of the court was not pressed by the defendants and that too was decided against the defendants. Issue No. 10 regarding court-fee was also decided in favour of the plaintiff. So also, the issue No. 9 about the claim of defendants for compensatory cost was decided against the defendants. The findings on these issues have not been challenged before me, by the defendants, either by filing cross objection or during the course of arguments. 13. Issue No. 10 regarding court-fee was also decided in favour of the plaintiff. So also, the issue No. 9 about the claim of defendants for compensatory cost was decided against the defendants. The findings on these issues have not been challenged before me, by the defendants, either by filing cross objection or during the course of arguments. 13. Issue No. 1 was decided in favour of defendants by holding that adoption of Raichand by the deceasei Jasraj, on Baisakh Sudi 10, Samvat 2020, is duly proved; consequently, the issue No. 8 was also decided against the plaintiff, by holding that Raichand is a necessary party. Issue No. 2 relating to the fact that whether Jasraj was separated from his brothers in Samvat 1998, was decided in favour of defendants and against the plaintiff. Consequently, issue No. 6 relating to the 'fact that the property shown in schedule A, B and C was a Joint Family property of the deceased-Jasraj and defendants No. 1 and 2, was also decided against the plaintiff. Issue No. 3 regarding taking possession of gold ornaments, silver utensils and other valuables from the possession of Smt. Gulabi Bai, was found against the plaintiff. 14. As the court. has found that Raichand was necessary, party, the plaintiff's suit was dismissed even with regard to her share in the property of Jasraj on his death, to which she was entitled t o even if adoption of Raichand is held to be rightly proved. 15. During the pendency of this appeal, Juharmal died in April, 1979 and the application to bring his legal representatives on record, moved on 24.4.1979, was allowed. Smt. Sodi Devil, the plaintiff-appellant died in April, 1983 and the application to bring her legal representatives on record, moved on 13.8.1983, was also allowed. Hajarimal-defendant No. 1 died in April, 1986 and the application to implead his legal representatives was moved on 11.5.1986, in which Raichand who is alleged to be' adopted son of Jasraj, was shown to be son of Hajarimal and sought to be impleaded as legal representative o f Hajarimal. After service of notice on all the respondents, the application was not opposed and was allowed. Mst. Gulabi Bai-defendant No. 3, expired on 25.5.1981, and application for deleting her name was moved on 29.6.1981, alleging that appellant-Mst. After service of notice on all the respondents, the application was not opposed and was allowed. Mst. Gulabi Bai-defendant No. 3, expired on 25.5.1981, and application for deleting her name was moved on 29.6.1981, alleging that appellant-Mst. Sodi Devi was her sole heir and legal representation and she being already on record, her name be deleted from the array of the parties. The copy of the application was furnished to Mr. K.C. Samdariya learned counsel for the respondent No. 1- Hajarimal as well as of respondent No. 3-Mst. Gulabi Bai. At the relevant time, Hajarimal was alive. No reply to that application was filed, denying the fact that Smt. Sodi Devi is the sole legal representative of Smt. Gulabi Bai, and the application was finally allowed on 7.7.1983, as un-opposed. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following grounds for consideration in this appeal : (1) The trial court has erred in holding the adoption of Raichand by Jasraj duly proved. (2) Even if the adoption of Raichand is held to be duly proved, then the trial court ought not to have dismissed the suit, which is a suit for partition, but should have given an opportunity to the plaintiff to implead the person who is found to be a sharer on partition or the court ought to have exercised power to implead Raichand, suo moto, as party, under 0.1 r.10(2), C.P.C. (3) 'The findings of the trial court that Jasraj, Sumermal, Juharmal and Shankarlal have partitioned the property in Samvat year 1998 and Jasraj was not member of the Joint Family with his brothers at the time of his death, is erroneous and, consequently, the entire property was available for partition when suit was filed by Smt. Sodi Devi. (4) Findings on issue No. 3 was also challenged. 17. The third contention of learned counsel which related to issue No. 2 may be considered in the first instance. The contention in respect of finding about past partition is that in the document Ex. A/1-the document purported to be in acknowledgment of partition, there is an interpolation in the document by adding the words- " later on. This, according to learned counsel, is un-connected with the whole document and was so inserted so as to save the document from being inadmissible in evidence. A/1-the document purported to be in acknowledgment of partition, there is an interpolation in the document by adding the words- " later on. This, according to learned counsel, is un-connected with the whole document and was so inserted so as to save the document from being inadmissible in evidence. Learned counsel contends that if these words would not have been added later on, the document being a partition-deed and not being registered and stamped, could not have been admissible inevidence for any purpose. His further contention was that according to document Ex. A/7- which is also a document of defendants, they were joint with Jasraj until 31.1.1968, which gives a complete lie to the defendants'contention that all the brothers stood separated in Samvat year 1998. 18. Having examined carefully the document Ex. A/1, I am unable to agree with learned counsel that there is any interpolation in the document. Moreover, in document Ex. A/7-which is a partition deed, about which there is no dispute and which was executed on 31.1.1968 by Jasraj, Juharmal and Hazarimal son of Surajmal, and which is duly registered and stamped document; clearly mentions that : "...parties of first, second and father of the third part did not want to continue to be members of the Joint Family and for that purpose, they have become divided in status some time back and whereas they already divided their movable property during the life-time of father of third part (emphasis added)...." 19. It has come on record that Surajmal, father of defendant No. 1-Hajarimal, had died in 1945, that is to say, in the Samvat year 2001-2002. This recital, therefore, dates back the previous partition at least prior to Samvat 2002. 20. From the above, it is clear that the document Ex. A/7- a document of partition of the properties, which remained joint after the brothers have divided some properties in past and served the status of joint-ness, though the exect date of earlier partition has not been mentioned, but it clearly refers to a partition of movable properties in the past and discloses only the remaining properties which are to be partitioned among the three executants which were partitioned through EL A/7. This document conclusively establishes that all the brothers had separated during the life-time of Jasraj and Jasraj was not joint with his brothers at the time of his death. This document conclusively establishes that all the brothers had separated during the life-time of Jasraj and Jasraj was not joint with his brothers at the time of his death. Therefore, the finding on issue No. 2, in my opinion, is correctly arrived at by the trial court and does not call for interference. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiff insofar as it relates to her claim to secure her share in the property of joint family belonging to Jasraj, Juharmal and Surajmal-father of defendant No. 1, Hazarimal, must fail. 21. However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff's suit must fail in to-to, as an heir of Jasraj. In this connection, at the out-set, it may be observed that there is no dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants that she was an heir of class-I of deceased Jasraj, at the time of his death and she was entitled to a share in the property, whether it was self-acquired of Jasraj or came to him as a result of partition of joint family property, of which he was a member, in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in case Jasraj is held to have died intestate. To this simple claim of the plaintiff, defendants had put up to two-folds plea-first, that Sodi Devi and Gulabi Bai-defendant No. 3, since deceased, were not the onlyjieir of Jasraj, but Raichand-natural son of Hazarimal-defendant No. 1, was adopted by Jasraj and he was the third heir of Jasraj. Secondly, two testamentary disposition were also pleaded by the defendants, denying the plaintiff her share in Jasraj's property in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act. As a 22. The plaintiff, in her rejoinder, has denied the factum of adoption and execution of wills as well. 23. The trial court found that Raichand was adopted son of Jasraj but found the execution of wills not proved. 24. The learned counsel vehemently challenged the findings on issues No. 1 and 3 and relied on a number of circumstances and discrepancies in the evidence to support his contention. However, the course which I propose to adopt for the reasons that follow, I am refraining from expressing any opinion on the merit of other issues decided in case, lest it may prejudice any party. 25. However, the course which I propose to adopt for the reasons that follow, I am refraining from expressing any opinion on the merit of other issues decided in case, lest it may prejudice any party. 25. Even accepting that finding, the plaintiff's suit was liable to be decreed for her share in Jasraj's property to be determined by taking existence of 3 heirs of Jasraj class-I surviving, instead to two as claimed by the plaintiff. However, the trial court decided to dismiss the suit by holding Rai Chand to be a necessary party in the absence of which suit must fail. Before alluding to finding of adoption on merit, it may be examined whether that was the proper course adopted by the trial court in the facts and circumstances of the present case.26-27. The parties as well as the court proceeded on the assumption that whether Raichand is a necessary party or not, depend upon the findings about the question of adoption-on issue No. 1 and the question of execution of Wills-under issue No. 4 and 5. In this connection, it needs to be noticed that this plea of adoption on execution of Wills, for defeating the claim of the plaintiff was raised not by the claimant through adoption but was set up by Hajarimal, who was un-concerned with the succession of Jasraj, but was vitally interested to secure succession of Jasraj in favour of his natural born son Raichand and also by Mst. Gulabi Bai, against the plaintiff. It may also be noticed that the alleged claimant in whom the right of inheritance to Jasraj was asserted, never come forward, either as a party to the proceedings or witness in support of defendants' claim. He also did not chose to contest the appeal when he was impleaded as party to the appeal, as legal representative of Hajarimal, contrary to the pleadings of Hajarimal. The application for deleting the name of Mst. Gulabi Bai by alleging that Mst. Sodi Devi Mst. Gulabi Bai, which was filed during the life-time of Hajarimal and could be objected to, was delivered to counsel for Hajarimal, was never controverted. The court below totally ignored as well that in fact by embarking into an enquiry question of adoption and the execution of alleged Wills, the court was really determining the right of Raichand, who was not before it. The court below totally ignored as well that in fact by embarking into an enquiry question of adoption and the execution of alleged Wills, the court was really determining the right of Raichand, who was not before it. The plaintiff did not bring it on record because she was challenging the very factum of adoption and execution of Wills which was not put forward by the claimant himself but by the third party; and her case was that since adoption never took place and Wills were not executed, the defendants are not entitled to defeat her claim by putting forward the claim of Raichand. The defendants chose to keep back Raichand for reasons best known to them from coming to fore. P. However, in these circumstances, the staring reality was that accepting that Sodi Devi was one of the heirs of Jasraj for determination of her exact share in the property of Jasraj, the plea of Mst. Gulabi Bai (apart from the plea of Hajarimal which, in my opinion, he had no locus standi to raise because he had no interest in the succession of Jasraj whether intestate or testamentary, and as to the question as to who are the heirs of Jasraj. His interest in the litigation was confined to claim of the plaintiff about share in the property alleged to be joint of the three brothers, namely Jasraj property of Mst. Gulabi Bai and Jasraj, alleged to be in possession of Hajarimal, for the recovery of which also the suit has been filed. For the recovery of property, forcibly taken into possession by Hajarimal, all the co-owners were not necessary party. Therefore, for determining the rights of Mst. Sodi Devi in the property of Jasraj as his heir, Hajarimal has no locus standi to put a plea which does not affect the rights of Mst. Sodi Devi as an heir of Jasraj vis-a-vis Hajarimal, and for that determination, Raichand was not a necessary party. The question about the adoption and execution of alleged Wills had to be gone into for determining the rights of Mst. Sodi Devi and Mst. Gulabi Bai, as both were class-I heir of Jasraj. Mst. Gulabi Bai, by putting forward the claim of Wills, denuded herself to any succession to Jasraj. Any finding arrived thereon would result in affecting the rights of Raichand. Sodi Devi and Mst. Gulabi Bai, as both were class-I heir of Jasraj. Mst. Gulabi Bai, by putting forward the claim of Wills, denuded herself to any succession to Jasraj. Any finding arrived thereon would result in affecting the rights of Raichand. If his adoption were upheld, it would divest him of his right in natural father's property and, if it is negated, then too rights proclaimed in him as an heir of Jasraj would be defeated, without he being bound by any of the findings and leaving the issue wide open for being agitated by him again as it suits him.28. In this connection, one important fact to be noticed in that Mst. Gulabi Bai in her statement as P. W has categorically stated that " eq>s irk ugha fd nkok djus ds igys lksnh ckbZ us uksfVl fn;k ;k ughaA ;g dke vknfe;ksa ds gSa esjs dks irk ughaA O;kikj esa tljktth 'kkfey gSa ;k ugha eq>s ekywe ughaA caVokM+k gqvk Fkk ;k ugha eq>s irk ughaA ;g vknfe;ksa dk dke gSA " She was an illiterate lady who only knew to put thumb impression. The above statement leaves an imprinton the mind that the plea of adoption in reply to notice and suit has been set up by Hajarimal even on behlaf of Mst. Gulabi Bai, without her knwoledge and thereafter she has been put as a witness wihtout putting the claimant himself to contest. Nothing prevented Hajarimal to put Raichand as witness or, Raichand from coming forward to contest the claim of Mst. Sodi Devi. This, at least, goes to show that reply to notices and building up of defence on that basis cannot be attributed to Mst. Gulabi Bai, as on her own statement she did not knwo about it and everything in known to men-folk. It is important feature that there is no evidence on record to show any conduct on the part of Raichand to show his conduct consistent with theory of adoption. 29. Be that as it may, in my opinion, the only proper course in this situation for the trial court was to have acted under O. 1 r. 10(2), C.P.C., either to require the plaintiff to implead Raichand as defendant or to have suo moto added Raichand as defendant. 29. Be that as it may, in my opinion, the only proper course in this situation for the trial court was to have acted under O. 1 r. 10(2), C.P.C., either to require the plaintiff to implead Raichand as defendant or to have suo moto added Raichand as defendant. That was the only way by which the dispute, relating to the succession of Jasraj could have been effectually and completely adjudicated in the best interest of justice, without delay, inconvenience and expense, and save the separate actions in trial. In this connection, it may also be noticed that in a suit for partition of a joint property, all the persons claiming a share, are in the position of plaintiff and shares of any person claiming interest in property subject to partition can be determined only in the presence of all as persons interested in the property and claiming share therein on the basis of whatever right they claim attached to the property. At any time, before a final decree for partition is passed, if it comes to the notice of the court that a person has an interest in the property to claim share and he is not a party thereto, that question can be determined by joining him as party to the proceedings in order to effectually and completely settle that issue relating to the parties.30. In the context of partition suit, it will be relevant to refer to rule 18 of Order 20 C.P.C., which envisages passing a preliminary decree, declaring the rights of several parties, interested in the property, and giving further direction as may be required.31. In order to declare the rights of the parties the court has to ascertain as to who have the shares in the property. Thus, the court has to judicially determine before the preliminary decree for partition as to who are the parties 'interested' in the property to be partitioned and then to declare their rights. While determining such interest the court has to ascertain as to whether all the persons who arc interested in the properties are impleaded in the suit. A person who is interested in the result of a suit for partition and is entitled a share, he must be impleaded as a party. While determining such interest the court has to ascertain as to whether all the persons who arc interested in the properties are impleaded in the suit. A person who is interested in the result of a suit for partition and is entitled a share, he must be impleaded as a party. If it is found that a person being interested in the property has not been impleaded and the suit is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder, before dismissing such suit the court may give liberty to the plaintiff to implead such necessary party. If even after such liberty is given such necessary party is not impleaded without which the court cannot adjudicate the shares to be declared for all the parties to the suit for partition, then the court has to dismiss the suit on the ground of non- joinder of necessary party.32. That being the position, when Mst. Sodi Devi claimed her share in the property of her deceased father as one of the heirs and claimed that only other heir was Mst. Gulabi Bai, and, Mst. Gulabi Bai put forward that there is one more heir which affected the share of each of the heir in the estate of the deceased and she also claimed the testamentary document in favour of third person which purported to exclude the plaintiff partially from inheritance; it becomes all the more desirable for the court to have brought that third person on record in whom the defendants have set up a right adverse to the plaintiff, in exercise of its powers under O.1 r.10(2), C.P.C, before, finally determining the issue. Such power vests in the courts cannot be doubted.33. In this connection, reference may be made to Bastar Transport and Trading Co., Jagdalpur and anr. v. Court of Wards, Bastar and anr., AIR 1955 Nag 78 , where a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, stated as under : "... A court has power to add the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and whose presence before the Court may be necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. This power can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings 'suo moto' or on the application of any party." 34. This power can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings 'suo moto' or on the application of any party." 34. The present is eminently a fit case in which the court-below ought to have adopted the aforesaid principle before determining the rights of Raichand, and defeating the claim of Sodi Devi, which do exist even as per its own findings. In this regard, as per the approach adopted by the trial court also, in keeping the question of necessary party depending on findings on issue No. 1, it ought to have given an opportunity to plaintiff to implead Raichand after it decided issue No. 1 against the plaintiff, before dismissing the suit, for want of necessary party.35. It may also be noticed that now in this appeal, Raichand has become party, as legal representative of Hajarimal-defendant No. 1, and is already on record.36. Power under O. 1 r. 10(2), C.P.C. can be exercised at any stage including at the stage of appeal; is no more in doubt, as the Court of appeal has the same power as the original court in the matter of addition of parties to the suit or respondents to the appeal.37. In this connection, it may also be observed that as the findings about adoption as well as about the property of Jasraj in possession of Hajarimal which have been decided by the trial court in the absence of Raichand, which will not be binding on him and if the same were to be affirmed or reversed now, without giving an opportunity to Raichand to place his case and lead evidence is support of his case, it would cause prejudice to his interest.38. In furtherance to this, it may also be noticed that even according to the trial court, the plaintiff cannot be denied ⅓rd share in the property of her father. O. 1 r.9, C.P.C. is also a pointer to the basic principles underlined in the administration of justice that no claim must fail merely for want of joinder of parties. In furtherance to this, it may also be noticed that even according to the trial court, the plaintiff cannot be denied ⅓rd share in the property of her father. O. 1 r.9, C.P.C. is also a pointer to the basic principles underlined in the administration of justice that no claim must fail merely for want of joinder of parties. Where the rights of the plaintiff can he decided inter se with the parties already on record, the rights must be so decided; if not, the courts have been endowed with necessary power under O. 1 r.10, C.P.C. and if the case is not governed by specific provisions of the Code, under section 151, C.P.C. to pass appropriate orders for removing the technical defects and to do justice to the parties.39. In these circumstances, the proper course to be adopted in the present case would be to set aside the findings on issue No 1, 3 and 8 and set aside the decree of the trial court to the extent it dismissed the plaintiff's suit for declaration and possession of her share in the property of Jasraj, held by him at the time of his death; and, remand the case to the trial court with a direction to implead Raichand, natural son of Hajarimal and allegedly adopted son of Jasraj, as defendant and decide the suit afresh in the light of its findings on issue No. 1, 3 and 8, after giving an opportunity, as Raichand as any further evidence, is to desired by him in response to his being impleaded as party to the suit. If Raichand opts to file written statement and read evidence in its support, he may be permitted to do so. However, in that event, the plaintiff will also be given an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal. But in case Raichand chooses to get the suit decided on existing material, it may be so decided without bringing on record any fresh' material.40. Accordingly, the appeal is partly accepted. The judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside to the extent it dismisses the plaintiff's claim to share and her possession as an heir in the property held by Jasraj at the time of his death and the case is remanded back to the trial court with directions aforesaid. Accordingly, the appeal is partly accepted. The judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside to the extent it dismisses the plaintiff's claim to share and her possession as an heir in the property held by Jasraj at the time of his death and the case is remanded back to the trial court with directions aforesaid. The plaintiff's suit to the extent it claims share in the joint family property of Jasraj and defendants No. 1 and 2, stands dismissed. As no relief remains to be adjudicated against defendant No.2 Juharmal now represented by his legal representatives, their names may be deleted in the suit.41. The parties shall bear the cost of this appeal. It is further directed that the suit shall be disposed of within one year from the date for which notice of suit is served on Raichand, after remandAppeal Partly Allowed-Suit Remanded for Decision Afresh After Impleading Person Concerned as Necessary Party. *******