Judgment :- SRINIVASAN J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of Somasundaram J., dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground that the remedy of the appellant is to file a suit in the civil court. The appellant is the widow of one M. Gopal. He gave a proposal for a life insurance policy on August 28, 1978, for a sum of Rs. 50, 000 and it was accepted. The policy commenced from September 6, 1979. Halfyearly premium due for March, 1980, onwards was not paid with the result, the policy stood lapsed on March, 1980. The life assured submitted himself for medical examination and gave a personal statement regarding his health dated February 11, 1981. The policy was revived on April 24, 1981. The assured died on February 29, 1982. The petitioner prepared a claim for payment of the policy amount on April 10, 1982. After some correspondence, the petitioner issued a lawyer's notice on October 8, 1983, calling upon the respondents to pay the amount due under the policy. As the respondents refused to pay the sum the writ petition was filed. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that the writ petition is not maintainable and the remedy of the petitioner is only by way of a regular suit in the civil court. It is also averred in the counteraffidavit that the petitioner's husband did not disclose the true state of affairs in the proposal and the contract was null and void. The counteraffidavit also referred to the questions set out in the proposal form and the answers given by the petitioner's husband. It is contended by the respondents that the petitioner's husband gave a false declaration with regard to his health, and his prior illness. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the respondents had learnt that the life assured was a habitual drunkard and was taking treatment for extra ailment and cholesterol and he continued to consume alcohol against the doctor's advice. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the respondents had learnt that the life assured was a habitual drunkard and was taking treatment for extra ailment and cholesterol and he continued to consume alcohol against the doctor's advice. The counter affidavit refers to statements given by the relatives of the deceased and other associates that the life assured was suffering from serious ailment.Before the learned judge reliance was placed by the petitioner on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Dipashri v. LIC of India, On the side of the respondents, the attention of the learned judge was drawn to various judgments of this court as well as that of the Supreme Court in LIC of India v. Kiran Sinha. The learned judge accepted the contention of the respondents and dismissed the writ petition. He observed that the dismissal of the writ petition will not be a bar to the institution of a suit by the petitioner before the proper court for recovery of the amount due to the policy. It is also observed that the plea of limitation in instituting such suit cannot be put against the petitioner as she had filed the writ petition and has been prosecuting the same from 1984 and that period during which the writ petition was pending shall be excluded for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation for filing the suit before the civil court for the recovery of the amount on the basis of the policy. In this appeal, it is vehemently contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the Bombay High Court referred to above will squarely apply to this case and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Sinha's case, will not have any bearing. It is submitted that the appellant is a poor widow with three children without any male help and she should not be driven to a suit. It is also pointed out that when the writ petition was filed, an interlocutory application was taken out and the single judge of this court passed an order directing the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 25, 000 to the appellant. It is submitted that in view of the said order, the appellant cannot be driven to a civil court thereafter. 25, 000 to the appellant. It is submitted that in view of the said order, the appellant cannot be driven to a civil court thereafter. It is also contended that before the policy was effected, he was examined medically and the reports of the medical officers were not in any way against him and that there was no question of non-disclosure of relevant facts by the deceased.It is repeatedly stated by learned counsel for the appellant that though the respondents had referred in their counter-affidavit to some statements having been obtained from the relatives of the deceased about the prior illness of the deceased, they had not produced any statement before the court and the averment in the counter-affidavit is only an empty plea raised by the respondents to defeat the rightful claim of the appellant in these proceedings. At this stage, we wanted to satisfy ourselves whether the respondents had made a false claim in the counter-affidavit that they have obtained some statements from the relatives of the deceased as to his prior illness. We issued notice to the respondents and directed them to produce the relevant statements said to have been obtained from the relatives of the deceased. Learned counsel for the respondents said that he would have no objection to produce the statements before us and we could scrutinise them. But, the appellant should not be allowed to look into them as there is likelihood of the appellant tampering with the witnesses, if she is made aware of the said statements. We agreed to that course and directed the respondents to produce the documents. Accordingly, the respondent's counsel produced the evidence gathered by the respondents after the death of the appellant's husband in order to show that the deceased was having other illness even prior to his taking the policy and that he had not disclosed the entire truth in the proposal. We directed the respondents to file an affidavit in this appeal and the affidavit has been filed by the Secretary (Legal) of Southern Zonal Office in the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Madras. The affidavit is dated August 27, 1993. The affidavit contains the following statement : "It is learned that prior to making the personal statement regarding health dated February 11, 1981, the life assured had suffered from haemolysis and for which he took medical treatment. The affidavit is dated August 27, 1993. The affidavit contains the following statement : "It is learned that prior to making the personal statement regarding health dated February 11, 1981, the life assured had suffered from haemolysis and for which he took medical treatment. The doctor who treated the life assured has issued a certificate stating that the life assured was suffering from haemolysis and that he treated him in the year 1980 and even prior to 1980. Besides, certain individuals claiming to know the life assured have sent letters to Life Insurance Corporation of India stating, inter alia that the life assured was suffering from ailments and taking treatment for the same. I state that the said documents prima facie show that the life assured has suppressed material information regarding his health in his personal statement made at the time of revival of the lapsed policy. Since the oral and documentary evidence may have to be let in to establish that the life assured was suffering from very serious ailments during the relevant time, this court will not entertain the writ petition." The affidavit is kept on record. We are not expressing any opinion as to the veracity or credibility or acceptability of the statements produced before us by the respondent's counsel. It is a matter which has to be decided only in a civil court as and when they are relied on by the respondents in a civil proceeding. It is certainly open to the appellant to challenge the truth of the said statements and also to contend that they should not be accepted in evidence. It is open to the appellant to cross-examine the person who produces the said statements and demolish the case put forward by the respondents. But, it is not a question which can be gone into in the present appeal. We wanted to satisfy ourselves that the claim of the respondents that they had obtained statements from the relatives of the deceased is not a false claim and such statements are available with the respondents. Once, we are satisfied that they are available with the respondents, we are of the view that this is a matter in which oral and documentary evidence will have to be adduced and the civil court is a proper forum.There is no merit in the contention that after the interlocutory order directing payment of Rs. Once, we are satisfied that they are available with the respondents, we are of the view that this is a matter in which oral and documentary evidence will have to be adduced and the civil court is a proper forum.There is no merit in the contention that after the interlocutory order directing payment of Rs. 25, 000 to the petitioner, this court cannot direct her to file a suit. There is no question of estoppel against the court. Learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Dipashri v. Life Insurance Corporation of India. It is seen from the facts of the case that the policy was effected in July, 1975. The husband of the petitioner in that case sustained severe burns in an accident which took place in the kitchen of his house when he was lighting the stove on October 7, 1977. He was removed to the nursing home and to a hospital thereafter. But he succumbed to the injuries and died on October 8, 1977. A certificate was issued to the effect that death occurred due to toxaemia following 50 per cent. burns sustained accidentally by the deceased. The Corporation refuted its liability on the ground that the deceased had not disclosed in the proposal form about his prior illness. The Corporation produced a certificate issued by the employer of the deceased to show that the deceased had been availing of sick leave on medical grounds on several occasions. Reliance was placed on such certificate and it was contended that the illness suffered on various occasions was not disclosed in the proposal form. A learned judge of the Bombay High Court held that the certificate given by the employer would not by itself show that the deceased was actually suffering from illness as mentioned therein. It was further held by the learned judge that the fact that the party had obtained leave on several occasions by producing medical certificates would not lead to the conclusion that the deceased had actually taken treatment under a medical practitioner. It was further held by the learned judge that the fact that the party had obtained leave on several occasions by producing medical certificates would not lead to the conclusion that the deceased had actually taken treatment under a medical practitioner. The learned judge proceeded to point out that under section 45 of the Insurance Act, it was not open to the Corporation to question any failure on the ground that the statements made in the proposal were inaccurate or false, after the expiry of two years from the date on which the policy was effected. It is to be noted that in that case, the assured died after the period of two years after the policy was effected. In the present case, the assured died within ten months after the policy was revived and the section will not apply.The learned judge held on the facts that there was no evidence what ever to prove that the assured was suffering from such ailment which he should have disclosed in the proposal form. Though the Life Insurance Corporation of India claimed to have been in possession of materials with them, they did not produce any such material before the court. The court did not call upon them to produce the material to satisfy itself of the availability of such materials. Taking the view that the materials not having been produced in these proceedings, the Corporation should not be allowed to raise a plea that the deceased was suffering from illness which should have been disclosed in the proposal form. In this view, the learned judge directed the Corporation to pay the amount to the petitioner. The facts of this case are entirely different and the ruling of the Bombay High Court will have no bearing in this case. As pointed out already, the husband of the appellant died within ten months after the revival of the policy. The Life Insurance Corporation has not made an empty claim in the counter that they have obtained statements from the relatives of the deceased. They have produced before us such statements and it is a matter which could be canvassed in a civil court, if a suit is instituted. In these circumstances, the ruling of the Supreme Court in LIC of India v. Kiran Sinha, will squarely apply. They have produced before us such statements and it is a matter which could be canvassed in a civil court, if a suit is instituted. In these circumstances, the ruling of the Supreme Court in LIC of India v. Kiran Sinha, will squarely apply. The court held in that case that the High Court should not have in the circumstances of the case directed payment of the money in question in a petition filed under section 226 of the Constitution. It was held that the only remedy available to the respondent in that case was a suit before the civil court and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. In Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh, it was held that in the matter of a non-statutory contract no rule or order can be issued under article 226 of the Constitution, so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. Hence, the view taken by the single judge that the remedy of the appellant is only to file a suit is correct. We do not find any justification to interfere with the same. The writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.