ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. -- 1. A learned Judge (P.P. Naolekar, J.) of this Court while hearing a second appeal has found it difficult to subscribe to the view taken by another learned Judge of this Court sitting singly, in Lalta Prasad v. Ramcharan [ 1986 JLJ 713 = 1989 MPU 233]. He has referred the following two questions for consideration by a Division Bench, which have been placed before us by Hon'ble the Chief Justice: "1. Whether to be member of the family within section 2 (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, it is necessary to live jointly with the landlord and 'joint living' means actual living or residing continuously with landlord? 2. Whether separated son or other member as mentioned under Sec. 2 (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, are members of the family for the purpose of section 2 (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?" 2. The brief facts of the case are these: The respondent Balram is admittedly a landlord of the suit accommodation. He has two sons, namely, Rohit Prasad and Govind Prasad, both employees of the University of Jabalpur living in rented houses in Jabalpur on account of great paucity of accommodation with the father/landlord. The suit accommodation having been purchased pre-dominently with the idea of providing residential accommodation to his sons, the landlord Balram filed the present suit seeking ejectment of the tenant apparently on the ground available under Sec. 12 (i) (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', for short). The two Courts below decreed the suit. In the appeal preferred by the tenant, the contention of law canvassed was that the sons whose requirement was in issue were residing separately from the landlord and hence were not covered by the definition of 'member of the family', the phrase as used in Sec. 12 (1) (e) and defined in Sec. 2 (e) of the Act. Reliance by the tenant-appellant was placed on Lalta Prasad's case (supra) wherein it has been held: "A person living jointly with the landlord within the meaning of expression 'living jointly' occurring in the definition of 'member of the family' in section 2 (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act need not necessarily be dependant on him. Reliance by the tenant-appellant was placed on Lalta Prasad's case (supra) wherein it has been held: "A person living jointly with the landlord within the meaning of expression 'living jointly' occurring in the definition of 'member of the family' in section 2 (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act need not necessarily be dependant on him. A person must be actually living or residing continuously for all intent and purposes jointly with the landlord factually exercising right to live with the landlord jointly envisaged under section 2 (e) of the Act." 3. Sections 12 (1) (e) and 2 (e) of the Act provide as under: "12. Restrictions on eviction of tenants -- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely; (e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned." "2. Definition-- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -- (e) "member of the family" in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle's wife or widow, or brother's son or unmarried daughter living jointly with, or any other relation dependent on him;" 4. A bare reading of the definition of 'member of the family' shows that it embraces within its ken three categories of persons - (1) the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle's wife or widow; (2) or brother's son, or unmarried daughter living jointly with him; and (3) or any other relation dependent on him. 5. Punch is on the words 'living jointly with'. The question posed is whether these words qualify only the category-two relations or both category-one and category-two relations. The answer would solve the problem posed. 6. 5. Punch is on the words 'living jointly with'. The question posed is whether these words qualify only the category-two relations or both category-one and category-two relations. The answer would solve the problem posed. 6. It is well settled that if the language of the statute is plain and clearly spells out the legislative intent behind, effect has to be given to the language as used. A bare reading of the provision clearly suggests that the legislative intent is that the words 'living jointly with' are intended to qualify only brother's son or unmarried daughter, the words just preceding. They do not extend any beyond. The reason is not far to seek. The first category of relations are even otherwise the members of the family and in the Indian society those relations can ordinarily be expected to be living with the landlord. A brother may ordinarily live with the landlord, but not the brother's son or unmarried daughter ordinarily. Thus, in between the brother and his son or unmarried daughter, the Legislature' intended to draw a dividing line by resorting to 'living in jointness'. To put in other words, while the own son or unmarried daughter of the landlord would be a member of the family whether or not he or she was living jointly with him, the brother's son or unmarried daughter, would not be the member of the family unless he or she was living jointly with the landlord. 7. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti [ AIR 1980 SC 161 ], Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, referring to the cases of ejectment based on bona-fide personal need of the landlord in rent control legislation, have impressed upon the necessity of meaningfully construing the provisions so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical, it being a limited relief available to the landlords amidst a number of facilities to the tenants. To quote Their Lordships -- "While the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord's bona-fide personal necessity. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord's bona-fide personal necessity. The concept of bona-fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical." Reference may also be made to Ganpat Ram Sharma v. Smt. Gayatri Devi [ AIR 1987 SC 2016 ], wherein Their Lordships have observed that the rent control legislation is beneficial not to tenants alone but also to the landlords. It may be noticed that the phrase 'member of the family' is to be found used in Sec. 12 (1) (e) and 23-A (a), both providing for ejectment of tenant from residential accommodation for the bona-fide requirement of the landlord. The phrase 'member of the family' must accordingly receive a construction beneficial to the landlord and should be so construed as to make its meaning real, practical and meaningful. 8. Let us see what would happen if we read the words 'living jointly with' as qualifying even the first category of relations. Let us examine a few instances. There may be a son forced to live separately from the father landlord solely on account of paucity of accommodation. It would be very natural and bona-fide for the landlord if he would seek ejectment of his tenant from an accommodation forming part of the same house in which the landlord was residing so as to enable the son to live jointly with the landlord though presently not living jointly with him because of the non-availability of living space. There may be a son or unmarried daughter taking education in a different city (may be in a foreign country) for a number of years and thereby not living jointly with the father-landlord. Having finished the educational career, the son or daughter is to return and join the father and the father needs an accommodation to accommodate him or her though till the date of the arising of the need the son or the daughter was not living with him. Having finished the educational career, the son or daughter is to return and join the father and the father needs an accommodation to accommodate him or her though till the date of the arising of the need the son or the daughter was not living with him. There may be a case where bickerings between the son and the father had persuaded the son to desert the father, arranging for a separate residence of the former, but with the lapse of time the son became repentant or ill-health or old age of the father persuaded the son to join back his father. Then there may be spouse who were living separately and also prosecuting judicial separation or divorce proceedings between them. The proceedings having been terminated unsuccessfully the spouse now choose to join each other. The illustrations can be endlessly multiplied by reference to several relations in the first category. If the view taken in Lalta Prasad's case was to be accepted, then in all these cases, the absence of 'actually living or residing continuously for all intent and purposes jointly with the landlord factually exercising right to live with the landlord jointly' (borrowing the language from Lalta Prasad's case), would entail dismissal of all such claims for ejectment though very natural, reasonable, genuine and legitimate otherwise. The view is sure to defeat the very purpose sought to be achieved by the Legislature in such and several other similar cases. 9. We also find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the learned referring Judge that the words 'or' just preceding 'brother's son or unmarried daughter living jointly with' is to be read not conjunctively but disjunctively so as to separate this clause from the preceding one. The additional clue to deciphering the legislative intent in the manner in which we have done is to be found in the fact that the words 'dependent on him' occurring at the end of the definition qualifies only 'any other relation' and not the other two categories of relations just preceding. The comma just preceding 'or' renders additional strength to our reasoning. It he definition was to be read in the manner it has been read in Lalta Prasad's case (supra), there would have been no need of using both a coma and an 'or' before 'brother's son'. The comma just preceding 'or' renders additional strength to our reasoning. It he definition was to be read in the manner it has been read in Lalta Prasad's case (supra), there would have been no need of using both a coma and an 'or' before 'brother's son'. Reading of the language as done in Lalta Prasad's case would have been justified if this 'or' before 'brother's son' would not have been there. In our opinion, Lalta Prasad's case was not correctly decided. 10. In so far as the second question is concerned, suffice it to observe, that a mere separate living of any of the category-one relation from the landlord would not render him any less a member of the family. A mere separation of a spouse, child, either parent, brother, or sister, etc. (i.e. the various relations mentioned in category-one) may not by itself bring to an end the obligation of the landlord to make a provision for the residence of such relation. It is not difficult to comprehend the case where in spite of separation of such a relation from the landlord, the landlord might have expressly undertaken, or the separation might be accompanied by an express or implied obligation on the part of the landlord, to make a provision for the residence of the relation in an accommodation owned by him. In such a case, mere separation without more would not deprive the relation of the status of a member of the family for the purpose of Clause (e) of Sec. 2 of the Act. It will all depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual case whether there has been such a separation as to completely snap relationship with the landlord and take away from that relation the status of 'member of family'. 11. For the foregoing reasons, our answers to the questions referred are as under: (1) To be 'member of the family' within the meaning of section 2 (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, it is not necessary for the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grand father, mother, grand mother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle's wife or widow to be living jointly with the landlord. The words 'living jointly with' qualify only brother's son or unmarried daughter. The words 'living jointly with' qualify only brother's son or unmarried daughter. (2) The factum of separation has no relevance for interpreting 'member of the family' within the meaning of Sec. 2 (e) of the Act in so far as category-one relations are concerned. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case if the relation has so separated himself as to completely cease being a member of the family and result in his requirement ceasing to be the requirement of the landlord. 12. Let the appeal be now placed before the learned Single Judge.