R. L. Gupta, J. ( 1 ) IT is really most unfortunate that an officer of the level of Additional Sessions Judge should have passed such a non speaking order in such a serious matter wherein deceased Sunita whose marriage was solemnized with the respondent Mukesh only on 27. 1. 91 and who lost her life just after about 14 months only on 15. 3. 1992. The bail was granted to the respondent within less than a month s time by the following order: "heard. The petitioner be enlarged on bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000. 00 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned. " ( 2 ) IT will be necessary to understand the circumstances in which the Gist respondent was sought to be implicated in the murder of his wife. Om Prakash Gupta, father of the deceased made the following statement to the police. "i run a retail (PARCHOON) shop and reside at 2080 Mukim Pura, Delhi. The Marriage of my daughter Sunita was solemnized on 27. 1. 1991 with the respondent. Whenever she came to my house from the matrimonial home she said. "father, my in-laws keep on harassing me and tell me time and again what I had brought and that my parents had not given anything in dowry. We have married our son in a KANGAL family. Either bring money from your house for construction of a house or otherwise we shall leave you". My financial position did not permit me to give money for construction of a. house and after making Sunita understand politely we used to send her to the house of her in-laws. On 15. 3. 1992 I received information that the condition of my daughter was serious and I should come quickly. When we reached there we found our daughter burnt dead. We suspect that Mukesh, his mother, his sister Manju and his brother, all together, have killed our daughter by setting her ablaze. Legal action may be taken against them. " ( 3 ) THIS complaint was made by him on 16. 3. 1992, and it is he who seeks cancellation of bail of the respondent. It appears that the case was registered by the police at the instance of the SDM Sh. Legal action may be taken against them. " ( 3 ) THIS complaint was made by him on 16. 3. 1992, and it is he who seeks cancellation of bail of the respondent. It appears that the case was registered by the police at the instance of the SDM Sh. R. K. Misra and it was only subsequently that the respondent and others were arrested. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that Sunita was brutally murdered by respondent and his other family members just within about 14 months of her marriage and according to Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act (Act for short), a presumption of dowry death prima facie arose in this case. In the alternative. it was argued that even if it was a case of suicide, by the deceased, a presumption of abetment of suicide by the respondent and his relatives did arise under Section 113-A of the Act. However, it is further contended that learned Add ). Sessions Judge did not keep in view the nature and gravity of the offence attributed to the respondent. On the other hand on behalf of the respondent, it has been contended that cancellation of bail should not be by way of punishment even if there was a prima facie case againt the respondent. For cancellation of bail, it is argued, very cogent and over-whelming circumstances should be brought out and even then the approach of the court should not be primarily for keeping the accused in custody by way of punishment and that at this stage, the Court should be coneerned in finding out if bewould be readily available for trial or be was likely to abuse the discretion of the Court granted in his favour by tampering, with the prosecution evidence. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, it is further argued that the High Court has ample powers to cancel the bail granted to an accused person in the circumstances which prevail in this case. The motion for cancellation is also supported on behalf of the State. ( 5 ) MY attention has been drawn to the case of Tej Ram vs. Suresh and another 1988-91 C-C. Cases 123 (Supp.) in which I took into consideration the various authorities on the subject. I specifically took into consideraiton the case of H. C. Gaur Vs. The motion for cancellation is also supported on behalf of the State. ( 5 ) MY attention has been drawn to the case of Tej Ram vs. Suresh and another 1988-91 C-C. Cases 123 (Supp.) in which I took into consideration the various authorities on the subject. I specifically took into consideraiton the case of H. C. Gaur Vs. Rakesh Vij and another 40 (1990) DLT346 in which various authorities were taken innto consideration by this Court. Those authorities are, State Vs. Captain Jagjit Singh AIR 1982 SC 253, State Vs. Jagpal Singh Gill AIR 1984 SC 1503 , Bhagirath Singh Judeja Vs. State of Gujarat 1984 Cri. LJ. 160 and Gurcharan Singh and others Vs. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1978 SC 179 . It was held, "that although it may not be possible for the same Court who granted bail to cosider cancellation of the same in the absence of any new circumstances having crept up, it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of bail. " The Supreme Court further ruled," This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Sessions vis-a-vis the High Court". Ultimately the Court came to the conclusion that, "jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be circumscribed as a general proposition only by the two circumstances, namely, (i) availability of the accused for trial and (2) apprehension or otherwise likelihood of his tampering with evidence". Therefore, if the impropriety is manifest on record in the order of granting bail, the High Court can certainly reverse the order of bail and commit the accused to custody. ( 6 ) IN the present case the facts justify the cancellation of bail because the order dated 9. 4. 1992 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdara is absolutely a non-speaking order. The facts are that the marriage of the deceased Sunita with the respondent, Mukesh took place only on 27th January, 1991 and she lost her life only after about 14 months on 15. 3. 1992. The F. I. R. was recorded on the basis of a statement made by Om Parkash Gupta, father of the deceased Sunita, on 16. 3. 1992. His statement has been narrated in detail in the earlier portion of the judgment. 3. 1992. The F. I. R. was recorded on the basis of a statement made by Om Parkash Gupta, father of the deceased Sunita, on 16. 3. 1992. His statement has been narrated in detail in the earlier portion of the judgment. The deceased clearly made allegations of harassment against her in-laws because time and again they told her as to what she has had brought and that her parents had not given her anything in dowry and they bad married their son in a KANGAL family. Smt. Phoolwati and Sh. Krishan Gupta, mother and uncle respectively of the deceased, fully cor roborated the statement of Om Prakash Gupta. The MLC indicates that she was found to be brought dead in the hospital at 9. 00 p. m. on 15. 3. 1992. It is strange that name of the relative who must have accompanied the deceased at that time is not mentioned in this MLC. The post mortem report indicates that the deceased Sunita had suffered 100% bums. The CFSL report indicates the recovery of a plastic cane, a burnt Gadda, a burnt pillow and other clothes of the deceased, indicating the presence of kerosene residue on those articles. All these circumstances prima facie suggested that the respondent No. 1 and his parents etc. were guilty of serious offences under Secitons 498aand 304b Indian Penal Code The Addl-Secions Judge did not have the benefit of considering the CFSL report because it appears that this report was received subsequently. But even the statement of the father, uncle and mother of the deceased coupled with other circumstances narrated above prima facie indicated the commission of the aforesaid serious offences. ( 7 ) IN Section 113-B of the Act which was incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act by Act 43 of 1983, it is provided that, "when the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman bad been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. " Similarly in Section 113-A of the Act inserted by Act 46 of 1983, it is provided that. " Similarly in Section 113-A of the Act inserted by Act 46 of 1983, it is provided that. "when the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she bad committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband bad subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. " In the present case when the deceased was either burnt to death or committed suicide with in just 14 months of her marriage, that is, much less than a period of seven years, a prima facie presumption of dowry death on abetment of suicide could very well be raised at this stage by the ASJ. But it appeals that he did not at all apply his mind and granted bail to respondent No. 1 just after 23 days of the occurrence in a most arbitrary manner without applying mind when apparently there were reasons to believe that respondent No. l was prima facie guilty of having committed very heious offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC. ( 8 ) THE matter of cancellation of bail also arose recently in this Court in Crl. M. (M) 3215 of 1992 (reported at 1993 (25) DRJ) in which this Court suo motu took action for cancellation of bail in respect of two accused persons, namely, Vishnu Pandit and Baljeet Singh who were alleged to be guilty of very heinous offences. Vishnu Pandit was alleged to have committed rape twice upon Smt. Kamlesh Arya coupled with threats to kill her son alongwith the co-accused, and this very ASJ had granted bail to the aforesaid two accused persons by a very sketchy order. In that case this Court held, "the power which I have exercised in issuing notices to the respondents while at the same time staying operation of the orders of the learned Additional Sessions Judge releasing him on bail can also be relatable to Article 227 of the Constitution giving the source of power to the High Court in that regard. In that case this Court held, "the power which I have exercised in issuing notices to the respondents while at the same time staying operation of the orders of the learned Additional Sessions Judge releasing him on bail can also be relatable to Article 227 of the Constitution giving the source of power to the High Court in that regard. Clause (1) of Article 227 provides that every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. To -my mind, no law made by Parliament or State Legislature can whittle down the powers conferred by Article 227 on the High Court. " Thus it will be seen that the High Court has unlimited powers in passing orders by way of superintendence over all the Courts and Tribunals in its territory where it is of the view that a particular discretion vesting in any such Courts and Tribunals has been exercised in an unjudicious manner. As already pointed outabove, the ASJ in this case did not at all apply his mind to the version put forward by the prosecution in the shape of evidence of the closest relations of the deceased who with one voice attributed harassment of the deceased and demands made upon her for bringing more money from her parents. ( 9 ) IT should be remembered that the Courts, in a broader sense, are answerable to the Society at large. The orders passed by the Courts should be conducive to the bringing about of better law and order in the Society and not create a situation of chaos and anarchy. We do love and respect the concept of liberty of an individual as enshrined in our Constitution, but it does not mean that we shall ignore the rights vesting in those who are the victims of certain excesses committed upon them. In my view, Courts should always try to strike a judicious balance between the rights of idividuals accused of heinous offences and those who are alleged to have been wronged at their hands. A conspicuous tilt in the scales of justice in favour of either of them, specially in the initial stages of investigation, is bound to bring into disrepute the entire system of administration of criminal justice. By passing such sketchy orders of bail, as in this case. . A conspicuous tilt in the scales of justice in favour of either of them, specially in the initial stages of investigation, is bound to bring into disrepute the entire system of administration of criminal justice. By passing such sketchy orders of bail, as in this case. . the confidence of the Society in the Judicial system, is likely to be eroded.-It is not difficult to visualize the impact of this bail order upon the family of the deceased victim and they must have thought hundred times as to why they even reported the matter to the police if the accused persons were to be dealt with in such a distinctly favourable manner. Such unjudicious orders of bail, as in the present case, are bound to give a wrong signal to the people at large. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, it seems to be a very fit case wherein the bail granted to the respondent No. 1 is cancelled by this Court and he is committed to custody. I, therefore, direct that respondent No. 1l be taken into custody. The concerned court will issue non-bailable warrants against respondent No. l However, it may be clarified that it will not preclude respondent No. l. from applying afresh for grant of bail if the circumstances of the case so justify.