Judgment : The husband and the mother-in-law of one P. Renuka (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") have been tried for the offences punishable under Ss. 306 and 498A, I.P.C. on the allegations that on 15-5-1984 in the morning at Hari Nagar, Hyderabad, they have abetted the deceased to commit suicide, as a result of which she jumped into the waters of the filter house at Nagarjunasagar and put end to her life, and that the harassment and illtreatment of A1 and A2 demanding the deceased to get more dowry has resulted in the said suicide. The learned I Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge has come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against A2 for both the charges framed against her and that the prosecution has failed to prove its case under S. 306, I.P.C. against A1. He has, therefore, acquitted both A1 and A2 for the offence punishable under S. 306, I.P.C. and A2 for the offence punishable under S. 498A, I.P.C. He has, however, convicted A1 under S. 498A, I.P.C. and sentenced him to suffer R.I. for a period of one year and also pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default to suffer S.I. for three months. 2. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, A1 has preferred the above appeal. 3. The deceased is the third daughter of P.W. 1 and her marriage with A1 was celebarated in the year 1983. The happy married life of the deceased with A1 was short-lived because shortly after marriage, A1 and A2, who are the husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased, started harassing and torturing the deceased on the ground that she did not bring dowry and valuables up to their expectations. The prosecution case is that the deceased used to inform about the harassment and torture meted out to her to her parents. But, because of their poverty, the parents of the deceased could not fulfil the demands of the accused. 4. Having been vexed with the harassment and illtreatment, the deceased went to the house of P.W. 6 at Vijayapuri and in the pretext of going to answer calls of nature, she went to Nagarjunasagar Dam, and committed suicide by jumping into the waters of Nagarjuna Sagar Dam. The father of the deceased gave a complaint at Vijayapuri Police Station, which was registered as Crime No. 147 of 1984. The father of the deceased gave a complaint at Vijayapuri Police Station, which was registered as Crime No. 147 of 1984. Inquest over the dead body was conducted and in the postmortem, the Doctor opined that the death was due to Asphyxia due to drowning. The police have filed Final Report, but the father of the deceased has filed protest petition and later on, the charge-sheet was filed. 5. The prosecution proved its case by examining P.W. 1, who is the mother of the deceased, and P.W. 2 who is the brother of the deceased. Unfortunately, the father of the deceased died on 23-2-1985 and his evidence was not available for the prosecution. P.Ws. 1 and 2 have established that at the time of the marriage of the deceased with the first accused, they presented three tolas of gold, one steel almirah, a radio, utensils and clothes; that dowry amount of Rs. 10,000/- was fixed and that about a month after the marriage, A1 started ill-treating and beating the deceased on the pretext that her parents did not give him cash at the time of marriage. It is further stated that A1 used to abuse the deceased for not bringing sufficient dowry. The evidence of P.W. 1 is to the effect that the deceased informed her about the ill-treatment meted out to her by A1 and A2, when she visited the house of P.W. 1 three months after the marriage and also when she came to her parents house for Diwali celebration. P.W. 1 further deposed that on Diwali day, herself and her husband invited A1 and the deceased to their house and presented both of them with clothes; that A1 demanded a ceiling fan, bicycle and a wrist watch; that her husband (father of the deceased) expressed his inability to purchase those articles in view of his financial position and that ten days later the deceased came to her house once again and informed P.W. 1 that the accused were illtreating her as she could not get the fan, cycle and wrist watch from her parents as demanded by A1. P.W. 1 stated that she requested A1 to look after the deceased properly promising that she will present the articles demanded by him in due course, but A1 did not pay heed to her advice. P.W. 1 stated that she requested A1 to look after the deceased properly promising that she will present the articles demanded by him in due course, but A1 did not pay heed to her advice. The evidence of P.W. 1 shows that about two months after the above incident, the deceased again came to her house and complained about the ill-treatment but she had advised the deceased to somehow adjust herself and the deceased went back on that day. 6. The evidence of P.W. 1 was sought to be challenged before the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge that there are omissions in Ex. P. 3 report with regard to the demand of dowry, fan and cycle etc. The learned Sessions Judge rightly held that after registering Ex. P17 report and issuing Ex. P18 First Information Report, the police have recorded the statements of P.W. 1 and her late husband and that in their statements recorded under S. 161(3), Cr.P.C., P.W. 1 as well as her husband clearly stated about the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased by the accused. Inasmuch as the evidence of P.W. 1 given in the Court does not vary with her earlier statements, the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge has placed reliance upon her evidence. 1, therefore, agree with the observation made by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge that there are no improvements made by P.W. 1 in her evidence in the Sessions Court. 7. The evidence of P.W. 1 is further corroborated by P.W. 2 who is the brother of the deceased. It is not possible in a case like this to expect independent witnesses about the harassment and ill-treatment because the deceased who is a newly married woman will be anxious to bear with the ill-treatment and try to persuade her parents to meet the demands made by her husband and mother-in-law in the hope of leading a peaceful life in future than exposing her husband and mother-in-law. Therefore, the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge has not committed any error in placing reliance upon the evidence of P.W. 1 with regard to the harassment, ill-treatment and cruelty which the deceased was subjected to in the hands of the accused. 8. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 lends support from Exs. Therefore, the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge has not committed any error in placing reliance upon the evidence of P.W. 1 with regard to the harassment, ill-treatment and cruelty which the deceased was subjected to in the hands of the accused. 8. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 lends support from Exs. P1 and P2 to the extent that she has decided to commit suicide and that she did not want that the blame should be thrust upon her elder brother. P.W. 5 deposed that the deceased used to treat him as her elder brother and that he used to treat the deceased as his sister. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge is, therefore, perfectly correct in coming to the conclusion that the first accused has subjected the deceased to harassment, ill-treatment and insult. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in respect of the same offence, two crimes were registered by two different police stations viz., Musheerabad and Vijayapuri and on that ground, the conviction is liable to be set aside. He argued that after investigation, the police have submitted Final Reports treating the cases as suicide, and therefore, the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge is not justified in recording conviction. But the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the complaint given in Musheerabad Police Station is a case of woman missing, and the complaint given in Vijayapuri Police Station is registered under Section 174, Cr.P.C., but the present complaint given in Musheerabad Police Station is under Sections 498-A and 306, I.P.C. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that in the earlier instances the Final Reports were submitted by the police cannot be a ground to exonerate the accused. As the previously registered case reveals a cognizable case, the prosecution was launched by police on that basis. 10. But the main submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution is barred by limitation. As the previously registered case reveals a cognizable case, the prosecution was launched by police on that basis. 10. But the main submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution is barred by limitation. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of our High Court in K. Hanumantha Rao v. K. Narasimha Rao, (1981) 2 APLJ (HC) 315 : (1982 Cri LJ 734) in which it is held that even after the cognizance of the offence was taken by the Court, it is open to the accused to raise the plea of limitation enacted in Section 468(2), Cr.P.C. The Division Bench held that where the Court took cognizance of major offence, but ultimately found the accused guilty of a minor offence, the plea of limitation in respect of the minor offence for which the accused was found guilty can be raised. In that case, the charge framed was under Section 324, I.P.C. Ultimately, the Court while acquitting him of the offence under Section 324, I.P.C., has convicted him under Section 323, I.P.C. The Division Bench referred to above has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054 : (1981 Cri LJ 722). In that case, one Sarwan Singh was tried under Section 408, I.P.C. The trial Court while acquitting him of the charge under Section 408, I.P.C., has convicted him for the lesser offence, punishable under Section 406, I.P.C., and sentenced him. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon another Division Bench decision of our High Court in Khasim Beg v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1979) 2 APLJ (HC) 398. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon another Division Bench decision of our High Court in Khasim Beg v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1979) 2 APLJ (HC) 398. In that case, the Court has taken cognizance and framed charges for a more serious offence punishable under Sections 419 and 420, I.P.C. But having held that the complainant had not proved the case with regard to the offences punishable under Sections 419 and 420, I.P.C., the Court came to the conclusion that the complainant has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt warranting a conviction of the accused under Section 417, I.P.C. Consequently, the learned Judicial I Class Magistrate convicted the accused of the offence punishable under Section 417, I.P.C. The Division Bench held that when the Court has taken cognizance of a more serious offence and framed charge and subsequently held that a minor offence but not a serious offence has been committed and accordingly based conviction on the accused, the conviction was bad in view of the provisions of Section 468, Cr.P.C. 11. The above cited cases are distinguishable from the facts of this case, because this is not a case where the appellant was charged of a more serious offence and while acquitting him of that charge, he was convicted for a lesser offence. On the other hand, in this case, charges were framed against the appellant both under Section 306, I.P.C. and under Section 498-A, I.P.C., which are distinct and separate offences. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, no doubt, came to the conclusion that there is no satisfactory evidence to sustain the conviction under Section 306, I.P.C. and acquitted him, but at the same time, the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge relied upon the prosecution evidence to the extent of holding that the evidence has proved the offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C. beyond reasonable doubt. If so, Section 468, clause (3) of the Cr.P.C., which lays down that the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment, is attracted. If so, Section 468, clause (3) of the Cr.P.C., which lays down that the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment, is attracted. The offence under Section 306, I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for ten years and therefore clauses 1 and 2 of Section 468, Cr.P.C. limiting the period of limitation to three years are not applicable to this case, because the offence punishable with more severe punishment is for a period exceeding three years. I, therefore, hold that the limitation under Section 468, Cr.P.C. has no application to the facts of this case and the appellant cannot invoke the provisions of Section 468, Cr.P.C., and plead the period of limitation in defence. 12. For the reasons statedabove, I hold that the conviction and sentence imposed against the appellant are perfectly correct and do not call for any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court against the appellant. Appeal dismissed.