Judgment : This is a bid to axe down a claim made on the petitioner by his erstwhile wife as per Sec. 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short ‘the Muslim Women Act’) with an ingenious contention that the claim is barred by limitation. 2. Petitioner and first respondent were husband and wife. Two children were born in the wed-lock. On 11. 1986 the marriage was dissolved. Six and a half years later i.e. on 17. 1992 the first respondent (former wife) filed the application before a judicial magistrate of first class claiming reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. When petitioner got notice from the lower court, he filed the present petition invoking inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash the claim on the ground of limitation. 3. Contention of the petitioner is founded on Art.137 of he Third Division of Second Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act’). As per the said Article, a period of three years is prescribed for "any other application for which no period is provided elsewhere in this Division" from when the right to apply accrues. According to the learned counsel, right to apply would have accrued at least on the expiry of "iddat" period which followed dissolution of marriage. He pointed out that even though the Muslim Women Act came into force only on 15. 1986, Sec. 3 got retrospective operation as held by a learned single Judge of this Court in Hyderkhan v. Meharunnissa, (1992)2 K.L.T. 330. 4. Art.181 in the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1908 (old Limitation Act) corresponded with Art.137 of the present Limitation Act. Under the corresponding/Article in the old Limitation Act "application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule or by Sec. 48 of the C.P.C." should have been filed within three years. There is a catena of decisions affirming the position that Art.181 of the old Limitation Act applied only to applications envisaged under the Code of Civil Procedure. But with the change in the collocation of words in the present Art.137 its applicability is not confined to petitions filed under the C.P.C. With the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.K. Aliumma, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 282: 1976 K.L.T. 810, the position became well settled. But with the change in the collocation of words in the present Art.137 its applicability is not confined to petitions filed under the C.P.C. With the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.K. Aliumma, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 282: 1976 K.L.T. 810, the position became well settled. The Supreme Court has laid down the law in the following words: "The words any other application under Art.137 cannot be said on the principle of ejusdem generis to be applications under the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the third division. Any other application under Art. 137 would be petition or any application under any Act." 5. Shri.L.G. Poti, learned counsel for the first respondent argued that inspite of the marked change made in Art.137 the position still is that the Article is intended to apply only to petitions filed in a civil court. In support of the contention learned counsel has invited my attention to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. D.D. Authority, A.I.R. 1988 S. C. 1007: "In view of the decision of this Court in Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P.K. Aliumma, 1976 K.L.T. 810: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 282, it is now well settled that Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to any petition or application filed in a civil court". 6. A learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court has taken the view that as the Supreme Court observed that Art.137 would apply to any petition or application filed in the civil court under any Act, a wedge has been driven between civil administration and criminal administration of justice for the applicability of the said article. Hence learned Judge has held in Ramkrishna v. Kusum Ramkrishna, I.L.R. 1982 Bom. 808, that Art.137 has no applicability to a petition filed under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. In Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P.K. Aliumma, 1976 K.L.T. 810: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 282, Supreme Court was considering the question whether Art.137 has application to a petition filed before the District Court under Indian Telegraphs Act. So also the question considered by the Su-preme Court in Inder Singh v. D.D. Authority, .A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1007 was whether Art.137 would apply to a petition filed as per the Arbitration Act before the civil court. So also the question considered by the Su-preme Court in Inder Singh v. D.D. Authority, .A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1007 was whether Art.137 would apply to a petition filed as per the Arbitration Act before the civil court. Ofcourse, the Supreme Court said in both cases that Art.137 would apply to all applications filed in the civil court. The question of applicability of the article to criminal courts was not considered by the Supreme Court at alt. Hence with great respect to the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court, I find it difficult to agree with the reasoning that Supreme Court made a wedge between applications filed before the civil courts and criminal courts. 8. Under the Evidence Act "court" includes all judges and magistrates. Under the Limitation Act, 1963 "application" includes a petition. It is contextually appropriate to refer to the definition "applicant" in Sec. 2(a) of the Limitation Act as including a petitioner or any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply etc., As the Supreme Court has indicated in Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P.K. Aliumma, 1976 K.L.T. 810: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 282, that any other application filed in a court under any act would fall within the ambit of Art.137 it cannot be understood that the Supreme Court had driven a wedge between civil court and criminal court for the application of the said Article. Thus, in the light of the decision in Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P.K. Aliumma, 1976 K.L.T. 810: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 282, Art.137 would govern applications envisaged in the Code of Criminal Procedure also (for which no other period has been prescribed). 9. But the question then arises is, when the period would begin to run? In the third column of the Schedule it is provided that the period begins to run "when the right to apply accrues". The starting point is fixed like that to enable the court to decide, on the facts of each case, as to when the right to apply has accrued. Sufficient play at the joints must have been thought of by the legislature when it decided to have the words in that manner denoting the starting point. The starting point is fixed like that to enable the court to decide, on the facts of each case, as to when the right to apply has accrued. Sufficient play at the joints must have been thought of by the legislature when it decided to have the words in that manner denoting the starting point. Date on which the right to apply accrues is not to be ascertained with any fixed formula in all cases, as it depends on the facts of each case (vide: Gyaniram v. Gangabai, A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 85. The effort to be made is to extend the remedy provided by law and not to scuttle it. To secure the ends of justice the words "right to apply accrues" in the third column of the Article should be construed as liberally as possible so that the right to apply is put in such away as to make the remedy available to the party. This view was adopted by a Division Bench of Patna High Court (with Manohar Lall, J. and Imam, J., as he then was) in Sona Debi v. Bhola Prasad Sahi, A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 225. The Supreme Court has observed on the facts in Inder Singh v. D.D. Authority, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1007, that the right to apply accrued when the dispute had arisen. "A dispute arises where there is a claim and denial or repudiation of the claim". 10. Here the right to apply would have accrued only when the petitioner has refused to pay the reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. Petitioner has no case that he refused to make such payment at any time before three years counted backwards from the date of application. As such, the claim is not barred by limitation. 11. That apart, even if the claim was barred by limitation, it is open to the first respondent to satisfy the court that she has sufficient cause for not making the application within three years from the date of accrual of the right to apply. Such an eventuality does not arise in the case since the claim is not barred by limitation as found above. In the result, this criminal miscellaneous case is dismissed.