JUDGMENT 1. - The Court award, dated 4 February 1990, is subject of challenge in this writ petition. 2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent 1 was appointed as conductor on daily-wages by order, dated 13 June 1989, of the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jodhpur. By order, dated 30 August 1989, respondent 1 was removed from service on the ground that his service was no more required. An application under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, was filed by respondent 1 before the Industrial Tribunal. Jaipur, alleging therein that termination of his service was illegal and since a dispute was pending between the corporation and employees, he had sought remedy by filing application under section 33A of 1947 Act. The corporation contested the application filed by respondent 1 under section 33A by alleging that termination of service of respondent 1 was not based on any misconduct but it was a case of termination of service simpliciter. However, it also made a prayer that in case the Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion that termination of service of the workman was by way of misconduct, opportunity may be given to the corporation to lead evidence for substantiating the charge. 3. On 25 April 1991, the Industrial Tribunal held that termination of service of the petitioner (respondent 1) was founded on misconduct. It gave an opportunity to the corporation for proving the misconduct. Workman was also allowed to lead his evidence. After considering the rival arguments the Industrial Tribunal held that the workman committed an accident on 5 August 1989, while driving vehicle No. RNP 1624 at Jodhpur-Pipad Road. The Industrial Tribunal then examined the question of quantum of punishment and held that punishment of removal from service was not warranted, because respondent was a married person and it will be unfair to uphold the punishment of removal from service. It directed reinstatement of the workman and a sum of Rs.5000 by way of back-wages. 4. Sri K.N. Shrimal, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that employment of respondent 1 was subject to the conditions enumerated in the order of his appointment, dated 13 May 1989, and since the workman had caused an accident with the vehicle or corporation, he ought not to have been reinsated in service. 4. Sri K.N. Shrimal, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that employment of respondent 1 was subject to the conditions enumerated in the order of his appointment, dated 13 May 1989, and since the workman had caused an accident with the vehicle or corporation, he ought not to have been reinsated in service. Sri Shrimal pointed out that the workman had rendered just about two and a half months service when he was removed from service. He had caused accident due to negligent driving in less than two months of joining service and if such a person is allowed to be retained in service, it will be a risk not only to the corporation but to the general public. Sri B.L. Gupta, learned counsel for respondent 1, strenuously argued that the Court must not interfere with the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its power under section 11A of 1947 Act. 5. Admitted facts which have come on record show that workman was employed in service on 13 June 1989. He was driving vehicle No. RNP 1624 on 5 August 1989. The said vehicle met with an accident. That resulted in injuries to one Haribiram Bishnoi. Vehicle of the corporation also suffered damage to the tune of Rs.1600. It is also borne out from the record that one of the conditions for appointment of the petitioner was that if he causes an accident, he will be liable to be removed from service without any notice. The corporation did exercise that power when it passed order, dated 30 August 1989. It is, therefore, evident that even just over two months of his appointment, the workman was removed from service. 6. The Industrial Tribunal has considered the evidence that question of misconduct of respondent 1, namely, causing accident due to negligent driving and in my opinion there is no warrant for interfering with that finding of Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal has taken note of the rival pleadings as well as the affidavits in recording its conclusion that the workman was responsible for causing the accident on 5 August 1989.Having reached that conclusion the Industrial Tribunal straightaway observed that the punishment was unjustified and by making reference to humanitarian circumstances of age of the workman, his family, the Industrial Tribunal directed reinstatement. 7. 7. Although the Industrial Tribunal has got jurisdiction to alter the punishment imposed by the employer on its employee, once it comes to the conclusion that the punishments unduly harsh or unjustified, this power of substitution of penalty has to be exercised objectively. The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal has to record a fording that punishment imposed by the employer is unjustified. Mere abstract opinion that the punishment imposed by employer is excessive, is not sufficient compliance of the requirement of section 11A of 1947 Act. In the present case the Industrial Tribunal has completely lost sight of the fact that the total service rendered by the workman was of two months and few days and he had caused an accident in less than two months of his service. The Industrial Tribunal has also ignored the fact that being a driver, respondent 1 could be a prospective threat to the corporation as well as to the public at large. Therefore, it was not permissible for the Industrial Tribunal to have interfered with the penalty to removal from service by merely observing that the punishment is excessive/harsh. Clearly the Industrial Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the punishment imposed by the employer and this action of the Industrial Tribunal deserves to be set aside. 8. However, it is an admitted case of both the parties that no enquiry was held before passing of the order of termination of respondent 1. At the request of petitioner the Industrial Tribunal had decided a preliminary issue about the procedural justification of the order of punishment. The Industrial Tribunal held that termination of service was not a termination simpliciter but was founded on a misconduct. There both the parties were given opportunity to lead evidence and on the basis of evidence recorded before it, the Tribunal held that the charge of misconduct is proved. In this view of the matter, the Industrial Tribunal should have given direction for payment of wages to the workman between the date of termination of his service and the date of award. This was the only course open to the Industrial Tribunal in view of the decision of Supreme Court in Desh Raj Gupta v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, State of Uttar Pradesh [1991 - I L.L.N. 965]. I have also considered this matter in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Secretary Transport Workers Union and another [1991 (2) L.L.C.169](sic). This was the only course open to the Industrial Tribunal in view of the decision of Supreme Court in Desh Raj Gupta v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, State of Uttar Pradesh [1991 - I L.L.N. 965]. I have also considered this matter in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Secretary Transport Workers Union and another [1991 (2) L.L.C.169](sic). In that case, I have considered various decisions of the Supreme Court and it is held that if the action is sought to be justified by the employer before the Industrial Tribunal by leading evidence, it is bound,to pay salary between the date of passing of order of termination and the date of award. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed in part. Award, dated 4 February 1992, passed by the Industrial Tribunal is set aside in so far as it relates to reinstatement of respondent 1 and payment of a sum of Rs.5000. However, the petitioner is directed to pay salary to respondent 1 computed on the basis of last pay drawn by him. This amount shall be paid for the period between 30 August 1989, and the date of award i.e., 4 February 1992. Costs made easy. *******