Judgment :- 1. The tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), against whom eviction order has been passed concurrently by both the Authorities below under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act”, has preferred this revision: 2. The only contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there is no plea by the landlords regarding the relative hardship spoken to under S. 10(3)(c) Proviso of the Act and that yet, the Court below has erroneously passed the eviction order. The said provision, S. 10(3)(c) Proviso runs as follows:— “Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c) application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused outweight the advantage to the landlord.” the Controller shall reject the to the tenant by granting it will According to the said counsel, when there is no such plea, no amount of evidence can be looked into relating to the said aspect and in a petition under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act unless the Court could go into that aspect and come to a decision regarding the same in favour of the landlord, no eviction order could be passed. In this connection he also relies on Radhakrishnan v. Seethalakshmi , (1988-1-L.W. 67). But, in this connection first of all I must point out that it cannot be said that there is no plea at all regarding the said aspect. There is a definite plea regarding the same, raised by the petitioner tenant in his counter statement to the rent control original petition, paragraph 6 of the said counter. After narrating his own hardful, the tenant says. “The hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting ejection will outweight the advantage to the landlord.” Based on this p lea, admittedly evidence has been let in and finding also has been given by the Authorities below. Just to illustrate, this aspect has been considered by the lower appellate court in paragraph 8 of its order in detail. Therefore, it is clear that at the time when the enquiry of the rent control original petition went on, this aspect relating to relative hardship was in fact in the contemplation of the parties. While so, there is no bar for looking into the evidence on that aspect. Therefore, it is clear that at the time when the enquiry of the rent control original petition went on, this aspect relating to relative hardship was in fact in the contemplation of the parties. While so, there is no bar for looking into the evidence on that aspect. Only in that way, the Supreme Court also in(sic) V.N. Dhana Rao ( AIR 1956 S.C. 593 ) has explained the dictum which was laid down by the Privy Council in Atta Mohammad v. Emperor (AIR 1930 Privy Council 57). viz. “No amount of evidence can be looked into on a plea which was never put forward.” It is significant to point out here the following observation of the Supreme Court in the said decision while dealing with the abovesaid dictum or rule: “But that rule has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue. So, simply because there is no explicit plea in the rent control original petition of the landlords themselves, it cannot be contended that the evidence which is admittedly there regarding the above aspect in the present case, should not be looked into and that eviction order should not be passed. 2 A. Further, even in the rent control Original Petition, the landlords in paragraph 4, have narrated in detail how there would be hardship on their side if the eviction order is not given. The said paragraph concludes thus:— “The petitioner and the members of his family are being put to very great hardship and inconveniences on account of insufficiently of accommodation.” If really the relative hardship was not in contemplation of the landlords they need not have stated about their hardship. So, it can also be held that by implication even the petitioners have pleaded about abovesaid relative hardship. 3. On reading the abovesaid judgment reported in the abovesaid 1988-1-L.W. 67, it could be gathered that there was no plea at all by either party regarding the abovesaid relative hardship. Only in such a situation, the learned Judge observed that without such a plea, eviction could not be ordered under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act. 3. On reading the abovesaid judgment reported in the abovesaid 1988-1-L.W. 67, it could be gathered that there was no plea at all by either party regarding the abovesaid relative hardship. Only in such a situation, the learned Judge observed that without such a plea, eviction could not be ordered under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act. Therefore, the said decision in distinguishable and would not apply to the present facts that apart, in the other judgment in Annakilii Ammal v. Husain and Hussain (1984) I M.L.J. 340) relied on in Radhakrishnan v. Seethalakshmi (1988-1-L.W. 67) what is observed in relation to the abovesaid Section 10(3)(e) proviso is only as follows:— “.in order to enable the Rent Controller to give effect to this proviso, it would be necessary for the parties to plead that and place necessary materials in support thereof, as otherwise, the question of relative hardship cannot be satisfactorily decided.” (emphasis supplied). Thus, this also gives an indication that it is enough if there is a plea relating to the abovesaid aspect and that the said plea may be either from the petitioner or the respondent or both. 4. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is not admitted, but dismissed. Abdul Hadi, J. : After the abovesaid order is pronounced, learned counsel for the petitioner requests time for vacating the premises. Three months time is granted for vacating the premises, provided the petitioner files an affidavit of undertaking within one week to vacate the premises within the aforesaid time allowed.