JUDGMENT : S.R. Singh, J. Present petition has its genesis in the proceeding u/s 9A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 and is directed against the judgment and orders dated 9-9-93, 3-7-1969 and 6-10-1965 passed by Respondents 1, 2 and 3 respectively in respect of the land comprising Basic Khatauni Khata Nos. 17/1 and 17/2 of village Rasulpur Pargana Haveli District Mirzapur. In the basic year Khatauni, Smt. Sri Mani Devi wife of Ganesh Das was recorded as Bhumidhar of the land in dispute while Petitioners were recorded in Jaman-9 over some of the plots in dispute viz. plot Nos. 40, 68, 177, 176, 178, 187, 8, 39, 86, 189 and 190. 2. The case has a cheuquered history littered with long-drawn litigation spread over a period of more than four decades and it would be useful, nay necessary to delineate as under the consisted account of the case in so far as it is relevant to neo-light the controversy involved in the case. 3. One Salt Sindheshwari Devi was the fixed rate tenant of eight Bighas, ten Biswas and occupancy tenant of about 8 Bighas, 10 Biswas of land comprising the two Khatas in dispute. She had inherited the land in dispute from her husband Ram Kishore Lal. On 17-4-1941 the entire land in dispute was sublet to Ram Bachan, the father of petitioners, for a term of 5 years by Smt. Sidheshwari Devi by means of two registered Pattas (deeds of sub-lease). She executed a Will in favour of her daughter's daughter Smt. Srimani Devi on 15-4-1950 and died in May, 1950. It appears that after the death of Smt. Sidheshwari Devi, a dispute regarding possession in respect of the land in dispute cropped up between one Parshottam Dave on one hand and the petitioners on the other. The learned Magistrate concerned being satisfied as to the existence of apprehension of breach of peace, passed a preliminary order on 21st September 1951 and attached the property and on enquiry found Parshottam Dave to be in possession on the relevant date and accordingly, passed an order on 31-10-1952 in favour of Parshottam Dave. The revision preferred by petitioners against the said order was dismissed on 22-7-1953 and the attached property was released in favour of Parshottam Dave on 12-10-1953. 4. The revision preferred by petitioners against the said order was dismissed on 22-7-1953 and the attached property was released in favour of Parshottam Dave on 12-10-1953. 4. The proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure gave rise to the second phase of litigation in which civil suit no, 368 of 1953 was filed on 25-7-1953 by the petitioners for declaration and possession. The suit was decreed on 22-3-1955 and 'Dakhal' is said lo have been obtained by them through Court on 24-3-1955. The decree was, however, set, aside in appeal and the case remanded back to the trial court with a direction to refer the issue regarding title to the revenue court. Parshottam Dave applied for restitution of possession u/s 144 CPC which was allowed on 28-12-1959. The Revenue court held in its finding dated 28-12-1959 that the petitioners ware Asami of the land in dispute. The suit was decreed accordingly in terms of the revenue court's finding on 23-5-1960 and, it is said, petitioners obtained 'Dakhal' over the land in dispute on the same day. Parshottam Dave filed appeal Impugning the said decree which was initially stayed u/s 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 due to notification u/s 4(2) of the said Act issued on 27-5-1961 but it subsequently abated under amended Section 5 of the Act. 5. The third phase of litigation in respect of the land in dispute started off with the publication of the statement of principle in the Unit under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. It appears that initially the contest before the Consolidation Officer was between the petitioners on the one hand and Parshottam Dave on the other. The case proceeded exparte against the recorded tenure holder Smt. Srimani Devi and it was decided in favour of petitioners as against Parshottam Dave. The order of the Consolidation Officer was, however, challenged in appeal both by Parshottam and the recorded tenure holder Smt. Srimani Devi. The Settlement Officer Consolidation set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and remanded the case back to the Consolidation Officer. Parshottam Dave died in the meantime and none came forward to claim any interest in the land in dispute through him. The Settlement Officer Consolidation set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and remanded the case back to the Consolidation Officer. Parshottam Dave died in the meantime and none came forward to claim any interest in the land in dispute through him. Smt. Srimani Devi, the recorded tenure holder filed objection dated 22-10-1962 before the Consolidation Officer in support of the basic year entry showing herself to be the Bhumidhar of the land in dispute. Her case as set out in para 8 of her objection was that the Pattas executed by Smt. Sidheshwari Devi on 17-4-1941 in favour of Ram Bachan were never acted upon and since Ram Bachan could not get possession of the land in dispute due to the reason of the fact that it was in possession of setting sub-tenants who were not willing to vacate the land even at the risk of litigation and 'marpit' and hence Ram Bachan voluntarily gave up and surrendered his claim in the land in dispute and returned the Pattas to Smt. Sidheshwari Devi. The petitioners on the other hand in their objection u/s 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1952 claimed to have acquired Sirdari right on the basis of possession and Pattas aforesaid. They asserted that the Pattas were acted upon and their father Ram Bachan and after his death, they themselves have throughout been in possession except during the period the land in dispute was under attachment or it was in possession of Parshottam Dave under the orders of the learned Magistrate in proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. The Consolidation Officer maintained the basic year entry in favour of Smt. Srimani Devi and dismissed the objection filed by petitioners vide order dated 6-10-1965. On appeal, the said order was set aside by Asstt. Settlement Officer Consolidation, Jaunpur vide order dated 16-2-1966 but the said appellate order was set aside by the revisional Court, vide order dated 23-2-1978 on the ground that the appeal was not transferred to the Asstt. Settlement Officer Consolidation who decided the appeal vide order dated 16-2-1966. The appeal was accordingly remanded back to the Settlement Officer Consolidation for disposal according to law. Settlement Officer Consolidation who decided the appeal vide order dated 16-2-1966. The appeal was accordingly remanded back to the Settlement Officer Consolidation for disposal according to law. Consequent upon the order of the remand, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation Mirzapur heard the appeal preferred by the petitioners and allowed in part and held them to be Asami of the land in dispute vide the judgment and order dated 3-7-1969. The settlement Officer Consolidation held, on the question of sub-tenancy, in favour of Ram Bachan as under: For Smt. Srimani Devi it is alleged and contended that Ram Bachan father of the Appellants could not get possession over the land in pursuance of the lease because the sitting tenants did not give up possession hence he returned the leases in 1943 and” that Appellants are not in possession. The documents on file show that out of 16 plots over 11 plots Appellants were recorded sub-tenants and over 4 plots others were recorded sub-tenants before vesting. Other sub-tenants do not now claim their possession but they support the possession of the Appellants, hence the entries of sub-tenancy in favour of obviously have obviously been incorrect. Khatauni extracts for 1355 1356, 1358 show that out of about 17 bighas land included in the leases and now in dispute, plots measuring about 13 bighas were in the sub-tenancy of the Appellants. Plots No. 20, 177, 178 and 179 are showing 7 years as period of cultivation plots No. 176 and 36 are showing 6 years as period of cultivation in the Khatauni for 1355 F H means that sub-tenancy started in favour of the Appellants over some of the plots from 1349 F that is just after the lease were excluded in 1348 F. According to the statement of Smt. Srimani Devi, Ram Bachan father of the Appellants returned the leases as the sub-tenants did not give up the possession but in her statement she also said that the sub-tenants lateron gave up their possession and thereafter, the land was let out to one Ojha of Tahsil Chandauli but this theory does not appear to be convincing specially when no Ojha is coming forth to claim and no one else except Appellant and Parshottam have been in possession till now. This Parshottam is not in picture now and was put in possession for sometime under the order of the court. This Parshottam is not in picture now and was put in possession for sometime under the order of the court. It is also not understandable why the sitting sub-tenants did not like to give up possession in favour of Smt. Srimani Devi. Thus, the theory of return of leases as set up by the Respondents cannot be believed and I am clearly of “His opinion that Appellants entered into possession on the basis of leases executed in favour of their father by Smt. Sidheshwari in 1941. I have already held above that on the date of vesting the status of Appellants became that of Asami. So after vesting even if Appellants remain in possession and Respondent Smt. Srimani Devi may not be disabled, their status of Asami rights cannot change to Sirdari rights, In view of the above, I find that the appeal deserve to, be allowed partly. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners as well as the Respondents 4 to 6 preferred revision. It may be mentioned that Smt. Srimani Devi died during the pendency of revision and Respondents 4 to 6 being her sons were substituted in her place. The revision preferred by Respondents 4 to 6 was allowed, while the one the one preferred by petitioners was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation Varanasi Camp at Mirzapur vide order dated 7-7-1978. The basic year entry in favour of Smt. Srimani Devi was maintained and Varg-9 entries of possession without consent in favour of petitioner were ordered to be expunged. A direction was also issued that proceedings for mutation in favour of the heirs of Smt. Srimani Devi might be initiated according to law. The revisional order dated 7-7-1978 was, however, 'set aside' by the High Court vide order dated 7th Oct., 1988 passed in writ petition No. 6639 of 1978 and the case was remanded back to the Dy. Director of Consolidation for decision afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the directions contained in the judgment. The Respondents Brij Pal Das and others took up the matter to the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. The leave was granted and the appeal was allowed in terms of the directions given by the Supreme Court in its order dated Nov. 17, 1989 whereby the order of remand passed by the” High Court was maintained but the Dy. The leave was granted and the appeal was allowed in terms of the directions given by the Supreme Court in its order dated Nov. 17, 1989 whereby the order of remand passed by the” High Court was maintained but the Dy. Director of Consolidation was directed to 'confine' its decision only to the question whether Patta subsisted at the relevant time and the petitioners acquired any title to the land on the basis of the Patta under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950”. Pursuant to the direction given by the Supreme Court, the Dy. Director of Consolidation took up the matter again and allowed the revision preferred' by Respondents Brij Pal Das and others and dismissed the one preferred by petitioners, vide order dated 9-9-1993. the Dy. Director of Consolidation has this time returned a finding that the Pattas executed by Smt. Sudheshwari Devi ort 17-4-1941 in favour of Ram Bachan were returned by the latter to the former by reason of his failure to obtain possession of the land in dispute. The Dy. Director of Consolidation declined to go into other questions in view of the direction contained in the Supreme Court's order dated 17-11-1989. The relevant finding on the return of Pattas reads as under; Patravali per yeh tathya uplabdha hai ki vivadit Bhoorai kaafi samai se pratipakshigan ke kabje mein hai tatha patravali per yeh bhi tathya hai ki Mst. Sudetara Dwara Dinank 17-4-1941 ko vivadit Bhoomi se sambahdhit do pattey Ram Bachan ke Hak mein tahreer kiye gaye jiski pushti pust per kabja na paaney ke kaaran Ram Bachan ki ore se khud ke hastaakchar se patta waapsi ki tahreer ankit hai. Issey yeh eshpashta hota hai ki patta Dinank 15-4-1943 ko wapas ho gaya aur patta Dehanda Zamin per kabza dene ke daitva se mukta ho gaya aur Maalguzari wasul karne ke adhikaar ke bhi vanchit ho gaya. Patravali par yeh bhi tathya uplabdh hai ki san 1359F. ke gram Rasoblpur ke khasrey mein bhpokhand 8, 39, 40, 60, 86, 176, 177, 179 wa 190 Aadi per Ram Moorat wa Lallan bitaur kabiz ankit kiye gaye hain. San 1359F. ka khasra swayam mein bahut mahatwa ka hai kintu maanniya Sarwochnyayalaya ke nirdesh ke anusaar anya kisi prakaram per vichaar na karte huwey kewal pattey ke aadhar per pratiwadigan ke vivadit Bhoomi mein, adhikaar evam swatya ka uirnay kiya gana chahiye. 7. San 1359F. ka khasra swayam mein bahut mahatwa ka hai kintu maanniya Sarwochnyayalaya ke nirdesh ke anusaar anya kisi prakaram per vichaar na karte huwey kewal pattey ke aadhar per pratiwadigan ke vivadit Bhoomi mein, adhikaar evam swatya ka uirnay kiya gana chahiye. 7. Sri Sunkatha Rai, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners vehemently urged that the aforesaid findings on the question of return of Pattas is vitiated for non- consideration of roal as well as documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioners. He urged that- the Pattas were acted upon and possession of land in dispute delivered to Ram Bachan who acquired Sirdari right u/s 204 of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 due to the reason of failure of Smt. Srimani Devi to file a suit for ejectment u/s 202 of the said Act within three years of the date of vesting i.e. 1-7-1952 in that Smt, Srimani Devi was not a disabled person within the meaning of Section 157 of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951. Sri R. N. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, refuted the submissions made by Sri Sankatha Rai and urged that the finding on the question of return of Pattas in fact, rests on the evidence on record namely, the statement of Jagarnath and the endorsement made on the back, of the Pattas by the Ram Bachan himself. It was urged by Sri R. N. Singh that since the finding on the question of return of Pattas. is based on evidence on record, it cannot be challenged in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and further that even if the sub-leases in favour of Ram Bachan are held to have been acted upon, petitioners would not acquire Sirdari rights firstly because Smt. Srimani Devi was a disabled person within the meaning of Section 157 of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 in that she was living separately from her husband and, secondly, because they were admittedly not in possession on the date of vesting. 8. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed at the bar, it will be useful, nay necessary to notice the general principles Indicating the scope, nature and ambit of the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Const. 9. 8. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed at the bar, it will be useful, nay necessary to notice the general principles Indicating the scope, nature and ambit of the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Const. 9. The principles governing issue of a writ of 'certiorari' and its nature, have been explained by the Supreme Court in T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 440 as under: One of the fundamental principles in regard to issue of a writ of 'certiorari' is, that the writ can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. The expression 'Judicial acts' includes the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions and is used in contrast with what are purely ministerial acts The second essential component of a writ of certiorari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies is not in appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting a writ of 'certiorari' the superior courts does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the order of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. In Chandigarh Administration and another Vs. Manpreet Singh and others, AIR 1992 SC 435 , it has again been reiterated that “.... while acting under Article 226 of the Const, the High Court does not sit and/or act as an appellate Authority over the orders/actions of the subordinate Authorities/Tribunals. Its jurisdiction is supervisory in nature.... The High Court must ensure that while performing this function it does not over-step well recognized bounds of its own jurisdiction. 10. As to the scope of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Const. the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sawarn Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1976 SC 232 , may apply be quoted as below ; ...A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate court. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1976 SC 232 , may apply be quoted as below ; ...A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate court. As pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, AIR 1964 SC 477 . This Limit necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or question in writ jurisdiction. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ but not an error of fact however, grave it may appear to be. 11. The Supreme Court went on to observe further in the aforesaid case as under: In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the Tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible or has refused to admit admissible evidence or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. 12. As to the scope of judicial review of a finding of fact recorded by Tribunal it has further been held in Workmen of English Electric Company of India Ltd., Madras Vs. Presiding Officer and Another, (1990) 2 SCC 18 , that quantum of evidence or appreciation thereof for recording finding of fact would not come within the purview of High Court's extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution “and in State of West Bengal Vs. Atul Krishna Shaw and Another, AIR 1990 SC 2205 , that” .... If appellate authority had appreciated the evidence on record and recorded the findings of fact, those findings are binding on this Court or the High Court. By process of judicial review we cannot appreciate the evidence and record our findings of fact. Atul Krishna Shaw and Another, AIR 1990 SC 2205 , that” .... If appellate authority had appreciated the evidence on record and recorded the findings of fact, those findings are binding on this Court or the High Court. By process of judicial review we cannot appreciate the evidence and record our findings of fact. If the findings are based on no evidence or based on conjectures or surmises and no reasonable man would, on given facts and circumstances, come to the conclusion reached by the Appellate authority on the basis of the evidence on record, certainly this Court would over-see whether the findings recorded by the appellate authority are based on no evidence or beset with surmises or conjectures....” 13. In chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 1 WLR 1155, while dealing with the scope of the judicial review, Lord Brightman observed: Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made “and held that it would be an error to think ;” that the court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making-process but also on the correctness of the decision itself. 14. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh and Others, AIR 1989 SC 997 , the aforesaid view expressed by Lord Brightman has been noticed and M. N. Venkatachaliah, J. as the learned Chief then was, has very aptly explained the scope of judicial review of a decision as under: However, judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be converted into appeal. Judicial review is directed not against the decision but is confined to the examination of the decision-making-process. When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority entrusted with the power in question, could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevancy of the factors. D. Smith on “Judicial Review of Administration Action” Fourth Edition while dealing which the scope of judicial review of findings of law and findings of fact has observed, at page 128, as under: ...every finding by a tribunal postulates a process of abstraction and inference, which may be conditioned solely by the adjudicator's practical experience and knowledge of affairs, or partly or wholly by his knowledge of legal principle. He hears evidence and by satisfying himself as to its reliability, finds that were the 'true' facts; it may then be necessary for him to draw a series of inferences from these primary findings in order to determine whatever the material facts on which he has to base his decision: in order to draw certain of these inferences correctly, he may need to apply his knowledge of legal rules. Again at page 133, the learned Author has observed as under. A tribunal which has made a finding of primary fact wholly unsupported by evidence, or which has drawn an inference wholly unsupported by any of the primary facts found by it, will be held to have erred in point of law. And at page 136, the concept of error of, law has been succinctly explained by the learned Author as below: The concept of error of law includes the giving of reasons that are bad in law of (if there is a duty to give reasons) inconsistent, unintelligible or, it would seem, substantially inadequate. It includes also the application of a wrong legal gest to the facts found, taking irrelevant consideration into account and failing to take relevant consideration into account, exercising a discretion on the basis of any other incorrect legal principles, misdirection as to the burden of proof and wrongful admission or exclusion of evidence, as well as arriving at a conclusion without any supporting evidence. Speaking on the distinction between the appellate review for errors of law and, a supervisory review by means of certiorari, the learned Author (Prof, De Smith) has observed at page 138 of the aforestated Commentary as under: Although it would be difficult to maintain as a proposition of general application that there is any substantial difference between appellate review for errors of law and supervisory review by means of certiorari to quash for error of law on the face of the record, it should be noted that (a) on appeal the court may alter the original decision (or in some cases remit it to the inferior tribunal with directions). Whereas in certiorari proceedings the court can only quash it (save where, the impugned order is severable), although it may now also remit the matter and require the tribunal to reconsider and to reach a decision in accordance with the findings of the court ; (b) on an application for certiorari the court can review only such errors of law as are disclosed by the “record” save where an error goes to jurisdiction 5 (c) the evidence is seldom disclosed by the record, so that in practice perverse findings of primary fact can seldom be disturbed on an application for certiorari, or, indeed, on an appeal by way of case stated unless this ground of attack has been specifically included in the case stated ; (d) on an application for certiorari a court may have regard to the. fact that Parliament has not followed the now useful practice of providing an appeal on points of law from an inferior Tribunal and may be less astute to detect errors of law than on an appeal ; (e) the prerogative orders (and their statutory analogues) are discretionary and may be withheld in cases where the court thinks intervention in appropriate. But the artificial distinction between patent and latent errors of law in proceedings for certiorari to quash for error of law on the face of the record is very unsatisfactory, and it is difficult to see that damage would be done by affording persons aggrieved by the determinations of inferior tribunals a common gateway and avenue to the courts. But the artificial distinction between patent and latent errors of law in proceedings for certiorari to quash for error of law on the face of the record is very unsatisfactory, and it is difficult to see that damage would be done by affording persons aggrieved by the determinations of inferior tribunals a common gateway and avenue to the courts. It would still be possible for the courts to vary the intensity of review of determination by particular tribunals in the light of considerations such as the specialized exertise and aptitudes of the tribunal, the significance of the issues involved to the administration of the scheme and the nature of the individual interests at stake. It is true as held by the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth and Others Vs. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama, Goa, AIR 1993 SC 1014 , that subject to appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the High Courts in India, being superior courts of record, are possessed of wide and un-limited inherent and plenary powers to be exercised for the purpose of securing the ends of justice unless expressly or impliedly debarred. But it is equally well settled that the exercise of such powers has always been subject to certain self invented and self created fetters/limitations some of which in the contest of certiorari jurisdiction have been discussed above. 15. Before examining the legality or otherwise of the impugned decision, the nature of revisional powers u/s 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act 1953 may also be examined. It may be noticed that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was exercising revisional power u/s 48 as distinguished from an appellate power. Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953 is no doubt touched in a language of wide amplitude but that does not mean that the Dy. Director of Consolidation may act as an appellate Const. In K.A. Anthappai Vs. Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953 is no doubt touched in a language of wide amplitude but that does not mean that the Dy. Director of Consolidation may act as an appellate Const. In K.A. Anthappai Vs. C. Ahammed, AIR 1992 SC 1696 , the Supreme Court was considering the scope of revisional power of the High Court u/s 20 of Kerala Building (Leases and Rent Control) Act, 1965 whereunder the High Court can “call for an examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit” a provisions similar to the one contained in Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953. It was held as under: It is no doubt true that the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred u/s 20 is wider than that conferred u/s 115 CPC but at the same time a revision u/s 20 cannot be equated with an appeal. Moreover, the revisional power conferred u/s 20 also embraces an order passed by the appellate authority. While considering the provisions conferring revisional power couched in a language similar to that contained in Section 20 of the Act this Court has laid down that the power conferred on the High Court is essentially a power to superintendence and despite wide language employed, the High Court should not interfere with the finding of fact of the subordinate court merely because it does not agree with the said findings (See Dattonpant Gopalvarao Deva Ratte v. Vithabrao Maruthirao Jagangawal 1975 Suppl. SCR 67 ; Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, AIR 1980 SC 1253. The Supreme Court further held: The revisional court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent re-assessment of the evidence and supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as evidence on the record admitted of an supported the one reached by the Court below (See Rajbir Kaur and Another Vs. S. Chokesiri and Co., AIR 1988 SC 1845 . 17. S. Chokesiri and Co., AIR 1988 SC 1845 . 17. Now judging the impugned finding of fact recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on the touchstone of principle of law hid down in the afore-stated authorities I find that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has failed to bear in mind that it was sitting in revision as distinguished from appeal over the appellate order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation in that while reversing the finding recorded by the appellate authority on the relevant question the Deputy Director of Consolidation has failed to address himself to the evidence-oral, documentary and circumstantial-considered and examined by the appellate court vis-a-vis the question of return of Pattas amounting to surrender. The finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on the controversial issues whether the Pattas were returned and not acted upon, may be correct being based on evidence on record but the process by which the finding has been arrived at is certainly vitiated due to the reason of the failure on the part of the Deputy Director of Consolidation to examine and consider the material on which the appellate court had come to a contrary conclusion., 18. Sitting in revision over the appellate order, it was incumbent on the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have examined the correctness or otherwise of the relevant findings recorded by the appellate-court with reference to the evidence-oral, documentary and circumstantial on record including the ones specifically considered and examined by the appellate court, as also the reasons given by the appellate court in support it its finding. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has, in the present case, embarked upon an independent re-assessment/re-appraisal of some evidence on record not already considered and examined by the appellate court and substituted the appellate finding on relevant question by its own conclusion without meeting the reasoning given by the appellate court, Such a course, in my opinion, was incompatible with the nature of revisional power conferred by Section 48 of the UPCH Act, 1953 and I find it difficult to approve of the manner in which the revisional power has been exercised by the Dy. Director of Consolidation in the instant case. The Dy. Director of Consolidation has presumed that the endorsement as to return of Pattas appearing on the back of the original had been made by Ram Bachan himself. Director of Consolidation in the instant case. The Dy. Director of Consolidation has presumed that the endorsement as to return of Pattas appearing on the back of the original had been made by Ram Bachan himself. There is no discussion of the evidence on the point including the statement on oath made by one of the petitioners denying any such endorsement of return of Pattas having been made by his father -Ram Bachan. Similarly, the worth of the statement of Jagarnath who deposed that the Pattas were returned by Ram Bachan due to the reason of the fact that he was not able to get possession from the sitting sub-tenants has also not been examined by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. These irregularities committed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation in exercise of his revisional power u/s 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953 are amenable to certiorari jurisdiction on the principles already traversed upon hereinbefore inasmuch as these irregularities pertain to the very process of arriving at the impugned decision. 19. It is true that that the appellate Court's finding on the question of return of the Pattas has been recorded without considering the two relevant materials (I) the statement of Jagarnath and (2) the endorsement made by Ram Bachan on the back of the Pattas on record which have been believed by the Revisional Court but the failure of the appellate court to consider these materials, did rot absolve the revisional court of its duty to examine those materials as well which were considered and relied upon by the appellate Court. It is not for this Court to say whether the conclusion arrived at by the appellate court on the question of the sub-tenancy having been acted upon could or could not be sustained on the basis of material relied on by it for that is something which falls within the realm of revisional scrutiny u/s 48. It was for the revisional court to have examined the reasonings given by the appellate court and the evidence relied on by it in addition to the material on record which was left unconsidered by the appellate court and then to have arrived at the conclusion on the question whether or not the sub-tenancy was acted upon. It was for the revisional court to have examined the reasonings given by the appellate court and the evidence relied on by it in addition to the material on record which was left unconsidered by the appellate court and then to have arrived at the conclusion on the question whether or not the sub-tenancy was acted upon. The revisional court as would be evident from its judgment the relevant portion of which has been extracted hereinbefore-came to the conclusion that the sub-tenancy was not acted upon and that Pattas were returned merely on the basis of the statement of Jagarnath and the endorsement allegedly made by Ram Bachan at the back of Pattas without examining their worth vis-a-vis the circumstances taken into account by the appellate court. The revisional court has thus failed to bear in mind the distinction between the appellate and revisional powers of judicial review. 20. In view of the above conclusions, I would have quashed the revisional order and called upon-with pain and anguish-the Deputy Director of Consolidation to re-examine the question afresh in addition to the question whether Smt. Srimani Devi was a disabled person within the meaning of Section 157 of the U.P. Act 10 of 1951 but for the reasons that the petitioners would thereby gain nothing and it would be an exercise in futility to remit the matter to the Deputy Director of Consolidation as would be evident from the following discussion, 21. If it were to be held that the 'Pattas' had been acted upon the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest Ram Bachan had 'held' or 'occupied' the land in dispute- on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, then he would have acquired the status of an Asami u/s 21(1) (h) which runs as thus: 21(1)-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act every person who, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting occupied or held a land as .... (h) a tenant of Sir Land referred to in Sub-clause (a) of CI. (i) of the Explanation u/s 16, a sub-tenant referred to in Sub-clause (a) of Cl. (h) a tenant of Sir Land referred to in Sub-clause (a) of CI. (i) of the Explanation u/s 16, a sub-tenant referred to in Sub-clause (a) of Cl. (i) of Section 20 or an occupant referred to in Sub-clause (i) of Cl (b) of the said section where the land holder or if there are more than one land holder all of them where person or persons belonging- (a) if the land was let out or occupied prior to the ninth day of April 1946, both on the date of letting or occupation as the case may be, and on the ninth day of April 1946, and (b) If the land was let out or occupied on or after the ninth day of April 1946 on the date of letting or occupation to anyone or more of the classes mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 157. (Emphasis supplied) 22. Smt. Disheshwari Devi was admittedly a disabled person within the meaning of Section 157 of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951, both on iterate of sub-letting i.e. 17-4-1941 as well as on the material date namely 9th April, 1946. If therefore, it is held that 'Pattas' were acted upon and that the sub-tenant Ram Bachan 'held' or 'occupied' the land in dispute on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, he would acquired Asami right u/s 21 (1) (h) of the said Act which has an over- riding effect inasmuch as the section begin” with non-obstante clause-notwithstanding. This proposition cannot be doubted in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Richpal Singh and Another Vs. Desh Raj Singh and Others, AIR 1981 SC 1960 . If Ram Bachan is found to have entered into possession of the land in dispute on the basis of the Pattas and remained in possession even after the expiration of five-year-term of sub-tenancy his position in law could be like a sub-tenant by sufferance or a sub-tenant by holding over and if he 'held or 'occupied' in that capacity the land in dispute on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, he would have in my opinion, acquired 'asami' right, notwithstanding that the term of sub-tenancy had expired. That being so, the petitioners or then predecessor-in-interest Ram Bachan could acquire right by-adverse possession u/s 204 of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 due to failure of the land-holder to bring a suit u/s 202 (f) for ejectment of the Asami within three years from the date of determination of the disability or the date-of vesting whichever was later as prescribed by Item No. 25 (viii) of Appendix III to the Rules made under Act 1 of 1951. 23. Sri Sankatha Rai urged that the disability of the, land-holder came to an end with the death of Smt. Sidheshwari Devi in May 1950. and her successor-in interest, Smt. Srimani Devi not being a disabled person, ought to have filed a suit under, Section 202(f) for the ejectment of the Asami failing which Sirdari right was bound to have accrued in favour of Ram Bachan u/s 204 of the Act. The submission made by Sri, Sankatha Rai cannot be, countenanced in view of the admitted position that the land in dispute, was custodia legis on the date of vesting being under attachment in proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure with effect from 21st September 1951 and remained as such until it was released in favour of third party Parshottam Dave vide order dated 31-10-52 that is to say-after the date of vesting (July 1, 1952). One thing is certain that Ram Bachan was not in possession on. 21st September 1951, the date on which the land in dispute was attached u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. This may have happened because of the reasons that the sub-tenancy in his favour had not at all been acted upon or if acted upon, he was driven out of possession by third party Parshottam Dave. In case, the sub-tenancy in favour of Ram Bachan had been acted upon then he, may have had the right to. This may have happened because of the reasons that the sub-tenancy in his favour had not at all been acted upon or if acted upon, he was driven out of possession by third party Parshottam Dave. In case, the sub-tenancy in favour of Ram Bachan had been acted upon then he, may have had the right to. regain possession from Parshottam Dave by means of a suit u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 or if the period of limitation prescribed thereunder had not expired on the date of vesting, by a suit u/s 202 (f) of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 within three years front, the date of-vesting i.e. until such right was lost due to expiration of the period, of limitation prescribed for the purpose and if the right to regain possession subsisted, on the date of vesting Ram Bachan could be held entitled to Asami right u/s 21(1) (h) of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 notwithstanding the feet that the term of sub-tenancy had already expired and he was net even in actual possession of the land in dispute on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. This is so because of the import of the expression 'occupied' or 'held' occurring in Section (21) (1) (h). But in my opinion, this right to regain possession from Parshottam Dave would not, ensure to the benefit of Ram Bachan or his successors for the purpose of acquisition' of Sirdari right u/s 204 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951. Disability in relation of Smt. Sidheshwari Devi, no doubt, came to an end with her death in May 1950 but the question of institution of a suit for ejectment u/s 202(f) by Smt, Srimani Devi did not arise in view of the fact that Ram Bachan or the petitioners admittedly were not in actual physical possession during the aforesaid period. 24. As admitted in paragraph; 29 of the writ petition, the land in dispute was attached u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure on 21st September 1951 and it was lateron, released in favour of Parshottam Dave vide order” dated 31st October 1952 on account of the proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure ending in his favour. 24. As admitted in paragraph; 29 of the writ petition, the land in dispute was attached u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure on 21st September 1951 and it was lateron, released in favour of Parshottam Dave vide order” dated 31st October 1952 on account of the proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure ending in his favour. Petitioners being not, 'in possession on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting i.e., 30th June 1952 (the date of vesting being July 1, 1952) the three year-period of limitation prescribed under Item No. 25 (VIII) for a wit, u/s 202 (f) of U.P. Act i of 1951 did not at all commence to-run and a suit u/s 202 or Section 209 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 could not have been filed for ejectment of petitioners after the village was brought under consolidation operation inasmuch as Sections 9 and 28 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953 read together provide an effective substitute for Sections 202 and 209 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951. The possession or Dakhai obtained by petitioners under the decree (which lateron stood nullified) in view of the abatement of the suit u/s 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 1951, as a result of notification issued u/s 4(2) of the Act in 1961) of the Civil Court would not inure and indurate into maturing Sifdari right u/s 104 of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951. It cannot be gainsaid that the delivery of possession to petitioners pursuance to the Civil Court's decree was subject to the doctrine of 'restitution' embodied in Section 144 CPC and that the possession of Parshottam Dave cannot be availed of as the doctrine of lacking would not be attracted on the facts of this case. Ittavira Mathai Vs. Varkey Varkey and Another, AIR 1964 SC 907 and Anek Singh v. Ram Nath 1973 RD 290 do not help the petitioners in that when is deducible from these authorities is that the possession of court or of a Receiver u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure inures for the benefit of the real owner and has the effect of interruption in the possession of the trespasser. These decision may have been of some avail to the petitioners as against Parshottam Dave and not against the' contesting Respondents for the purposes of maturing rights u/s 202 read with Section 204 of the Act. It is for the aforesaid reasons that I have converged to the opinion that the remand of the case again to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to decide afresh the question as to whether the sub-tenaney was acted upon and further to decide the question as to whether Smt. Srimani Devi was disabled person within the meaning of Section 157 of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 would be an exercise in futility. 25. Therefore, the irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction and the error so committed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation as noticed earlier is this judgment and his failure to record a finding on the question whether Smt. Srimani Devi was a disabled person of the category specified in Section 157 of U.P. Act t of 1951 have not- culminated in failure or miscarriage: of justice. I am accordingly, not inched to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the Dy, Director of Consolidation. 26. The learned Counsel of the petitioners also tried to challenge the title of Smt. Srimani Devi on the ground that being daughter's daughter she could not inherit Smt. Sidheshwari Devi u/s 35 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and the 'Will' executed by her was void at least in respect of the occupancy tenancy it being hit by Section 44 of the said Act fiat this point cannot be allowed to be raised in view of the Supreme Court's order which reads as below: The main question involved in this appeal is whether the Patta which was admittedly granted in 1941 in favour of Ram Bachan Singh the father of the contesting Respondents 1 and 2 was returned and not acted upon the terminated and the land was surrendered to the land owner of the pitta subsisted on the relevant date. All that the record on the subject shows that the contesting Respondents were dispossessed on October 31, 1952 is a proceeding u/s 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That is ho evidence either of the termination or return of the Patta on or of the voluntary surrender of the land. All that the record on the subject shows that the contesting Respondents were dispossessed on October 31, 1952 is a proceeding u/s 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That is ho evidence either of the termination or return of the Patta on or of the voluntary surrender of the land. The High Court while remanding the matter for investigation, on this question has no doubt also remanded issue with regard to this validity of the Will executed by Sidheshwari in favour of Munni Devi”, the predecessor-in-title of the present Appellants, and other allied issues. We are of the view that the said issues are not germane to the decision on the title of the contesting Respondents to the land in dispute. While therefore, we maintain the order of remand, we make it clear that the Deputy Director of Consolidation will confine his decision only to the question whether the Patta subsisted at the relevant time and the contesting Respondents acquired any title to the land on the basis of the Patta under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Laud Reforms Act, 1950. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The parties will bear their own costs. 27. Even otherwise as noticed by the appellate court, no such point was initially raised by the petitioner. It was sought to be one raised by means of an application dated 16-2-1966 but rightly rejected by Settlement Officer Consolidation in these words. It is now argued for the Appellants that Srimani Devi has no right and title in the land. Smt. Sudeshra could not execute the will in favour of Smt. Srimani Devi and therefore, Smt. Srimani Devi has no rights on the basis of the Will but I find that during this long period of litigation no such plea was taken by the Appellants but their case has been simply for Sirdari rights on the basis of possession This appeal was earlier decided by this Court on 16-2-66 but even then such a plea does not appear to have been taken. It was after the remand of the case by the learned D.D.C. setting aside the order of this Court passed on 16-2-66 that the Appellants filed an application on 17-12-68 in which it is also challenged that for occupancy holding plots 10 times of land revenue was not deposited before the execution of the will but in my opinion such a plea at this late stage that is after about 7 years after the commencement of the proceedings in the consolidation cannot be considered. 28. The question whether Smt. Sidheshwari Devi had acquired transferable interest on the land in dispute u/s 7(1) (c) of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition Privileges) Act 1949, added by Item No. 5 of Schedule IV of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 w.e.f. August II, 1949 which is the date of commencement of U.P. Act X of 1949 by virtue of Section 340 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 sought to be raised by Sri Sankatha Rai does not arise in view of the order passed by Supreme Court confining the area of dispute to the question as to whether the sub-tenancy in favour of Ram Bachan was acted upon and if so its effect. 29. In view of the above discussion and conclusions the writ petition fails and is dismissed at the stage of motion hearing.