Honble AGRAWAL, CJ. — This is a defendants special appeal under Sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 preferred against the Judgment of a learned Single Judge maintaining the decree of the trial court for specific performance of the agreement. (2). Inside Ajmeri Gate, Thakur Boraj Ka Rasta, Chowkri Modi Khana, Jaipur City, there is situated a Haveli known as Boraj Thakur Ki Haveli with land measuring 87.6 x 27.6 at its back towards the south adjoining the Ganda Nala. The said property was owned and possessed by Thakur Vijai Singh of Boraj. After Thakur Vijai Singh, Thakur Ganpat Singh (father of Thakur Shanker Singh, plaintiff) owned and passed the said Haveli including the said land being heir of Thakur Vijay Singh. After death of Thakur Ganpat Singh, a partition took place between Thakur Shanker Singh and Thakur Sajjan Singh sons of Thakur Ganpat Singh and the aforesaid land measuring 87.6 x 27.6 came to the share of Thakur Shanker Singh. Since then the Chhoti Haveli and the said and was owned and possessed by Thakur Shanker Singh, defendant. After attaining majority. Shanker Singh executed a registered agreement dated 8.2.61 to sell the said land along with portion of Chhoti Haveli (in which Dharmdas plaintiff was residing as a tenant and doing business) for Rs. 32,000/-. In pursuance of the agreement, Dharmdas, plaintiff paid Rs. 3,000/- on 8.2.61 by way of earnest money. Under the terms of the said agreement, Dharmdas plaintiff, was to close the existing passage from towards north an had to open the gate towards south e.g. towards the side of the Ganda Nala. Despite efforts the opening of the gate could not be succeeded by the parties, on account of the claim set up by the Municipal Council that the said land had been handed over to the Rehabilitation Department of Public Works Department. Still, the parties stood by their agreement. In reply to the claim of the Municipal Council the plaintiff and defendant jointly represented to the Superintending Engineer vide letter dated 6.3.61 that the land was that of Shanker Singh and the same had been agreed to be sold to Dharmdas. Public Works Departments authorities did nothing to settle the matter. Still, the parties stood by their agreement. In reply to the claim of the Municipal Council the plaintiff and defendant jointly represented to the Superintending Engineer vide letter dated 6.3.61 that the land was that of Shanker Singh and the same had been agreed to be sold to Dharmdas. Public Works Departments authorities did nothing to settle the matter. Thakur Shanker Singh Boraj, defendant, and Dharmdas, plaintiff filed a joint writ petition in the High Court for direction to the Municipal Council to issue a writ restraining the State Government and from causing obstruction in the right of the aforesaid petitioners (plaintiff and defendant). By holding that since there war, a dispute of title of the land regarding which writ petition had been filed, the High Court dismissed the same vide judgment dated 6.9.62 (Ex. 16). After the dismissal of the writ petition, a joint suit for declaration against the State of Rajasthan and Municipal Council, Jaipur was instituted in the Court of Civil Judge, Jaipur City and the prayer made was for declaration that the land lying towards the south of the said Haveli measuring 87.6 x 27.6 adjoining the Ganda Nala belonged to Th. Shanker Singh, defendant. This suit was decreed vide judgment dated 30.03.1966 (Ex. 18). Aggrieved by the judgment of the Civil Judge, a first appeal was filed under Sec. 96 CPC, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 29.3.67 (Ex. 21). (3). Before all these happened, after the agreement dated 8.2.61, the parties had entered into another agreement dated 6.3.62 (Ex. 7) making suitable modifications and alterations in the terms and conditions of sale-deed. The changes made by the agreement dt. 21). (3). Before all these happened, after the agreement dated 8.2.61, the parties had entered into another agreement dated 6.3.62 (Ex. 7) making suitable modifications and alterations in the terms and conditions of sale-deed. The changes made by the agreement dt. 6.3.62 are as follows.— ^^vkt eSa ;g bdjkjukek vkSj rgjhj dj lkSnk pkyw j[krk gwWA 1- vykok lkfodk ,xzhesUV jftLVMZ mijksDr ds vki ls eSaus tehu yEckbZ iw-&ifpe 82-5 QwV pkSM+kbZ mRrj nf{k.k 234 QqV tks fd esjh lkfodk xkSnk dh bekjr ds mij fudklw VksMks ds uhps gSa vki ls fcy ,ot 1000 :- vkSj nsdj [kjhn djus dk r; fd;k gSA vkSj bl lkSns ds isVs :- 1000 vkSj ns fn;k gSA dqN lkSnk e; VksMks ds uhps dh tehu ds dherh :- 33000 dk cu x;k gS ftuesa vc rd eqrkfcd lkfodk bdjkjukek jftLVMZ rk- 8-2-1961 ds :- 3000 o mijksDr fn;s gq, 1000 :- dqy 4000 :- vkidks lkb isVs Hkqxrk pqdk gWw ckdh jde 29000 :- jftLVªh djkus rd vki dks pqdrh vnk djds vnk djds djk nwaxkA vkt rd bl jde lkbZ ds 4000 ds vykok esjh ,d ikbZ Hkh vkiesa vkSj ckdh ugha gSA 2- VksMks ds uhps dh tehu nsrs gq;s ;g r; ik;k x;k gS fd vc eSa rqEgsa vkSj edkuksa ds chp dksbZ xyh ugha NksM+h tkosxhA nksuksa dk pjisVk feyk gqvk gksxkA ge nksuksa dh pjisVs esa dksbZ f[kM+dh jkskunku o ukyk ugha j[ksaxsA lkfodk ,xzhesUV esa pjisVk ntZ ugha gS] ;g vc r; gqvk gSA 3- bl bekjr dk lkSnk :- 33000 esa ekStwnk gkyr esa tSlh bekjr iqjkuh gS mldk fd;k x;k gSA vc mlds ckn vkt ls tks Hkh kQk o btktr ysus okLrs rkehj eqdkukr o njokts xUns ukyk dh rjQ okys IykV esa cukus ds o nhxj rkehjkr o ejEer tks vkids tfj, ;k esjs tfj, djh tkosxh mldk [kpZ vkids ftEes ugha gksxkA oks eSa vykok dher 33000 :- vius ikl ls futh vkSj [kpZ d:WxkA vkils ,d ikbZ Hkh ysus gdnkj ugha gksxkA pkgs dke;kch gks ;k ugha] xUnk ukyk lkbM dh rkfey o ysus btktr o eqdnek esa eSa tks vkids nLr[krksa ls crkSj ikoj vkQ vVkjuh vkidk gksus dh otg ls odhy o dksVZ dk lc [kpkZ tks bl dsl esa o rkehj esa gksxk eSa futh yxkÅaxkA 4- lkfodk o ekStwnk nksuksa bdjkjukeksa dh krksZa dks iwjh o vFkok vkSj fdlh dkj.k ls lkSnk dsUly gksxk rks lkbZ esa fn;s gq, 4000 ds vykok vkSj dksbZ Hkh jde vkils ysus dk gdnkj ugha gwWxkA 5- pqdrh jde 33000 :- vkidks vnk djds jftLVªh djkus rd chp esa ftruk Hkh Vkbe yxsxk mldk fglkc ls fdjk;s 60 :- ekgokj dk :- 40 tks fd lkbZ dh jde nh gqbZ lwr ds crkSj dkV dj 20 :- ekgokj vkidks nsrk jgwWxkA On 8.7.71, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of the contract. The plaintiff alleged that as no sale-deed in pursuance of the agreement dated 8.2.61, which merged with the second agreement dated 6.3.62, was executed, he was entitled to get the decree. The salient features of the two agreements are that : (i) the condition for obtaining permission within two months time which was stipulated in the first agreement dated 8.2.1961 had become redundant and meaningless on execution of second agreement; (ii) the sale transaction would continue and virtually the first agreement dated 8.2.1961 has merged in the second agreement; (iii) the terms and conditions of second agreement dated 6.3.1962 superceded the terms of the first agreement so far as clauses (6) and (7) of first agreement were concerned and no term or condition relating to time being essence of the contract subsisted; (iv) in the second agreement there was no term or condition as to the essence of time or default. Even there was no implied term much less an expressed stipulation in the second agreement that time was essence of the contract; (v) if tune was intended to be essence of contract between the parties, the question of execution of second agreement would not have arisen. The suit was contested by the defendant on a number of grounds including that there was no subsisting agreement in between the parties; and that the suit was barred by time. (4). On the pleadings of the parties, several issues were framed by the trial court. Parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective case. Amongst the witnesses produced, plaintiff Dharmdas entered in the witness box as DW-1 and proved the facts on the basis of which plaint had been filed. Other witnesses produced by him were Radha Mohan (PW 2), Babu Singh (PW 3) and Uttam Motwani (PW 4). Shanker Singh also appeared as a witness as PW-2, and produced Smt. Sugan Kanwar (DW-1), Raghunath Singh (D.W. 3) and Jugal Singh (D.W. 4). The trial court decreed the suit on the condition of the plaintiffs deposition Rs. 21,600/- . Before the appeal could be filed or decided, the plaintiff deposited Rs. 21,600/- as directed by the trial court vide its judgment dt. 2.1.81 and the sale deed has also been executed through the court in favour of the plaintiff. The trial court decreed the suit on the condition of the plaintiffs deposition Rs. 21,600/- . Before the appeal could be filed or decided, the plaintiff deposited Rs. 21,600/- as directed by the trial court vide its judgment dt. 2.1.81 and the sale deed has also been executed through the court in favour of the plaintiff. The appeal preferred against the judgment of the trial court was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide its judgment dated 2.4.92, against which the present special appeal has been filed. (5). The first point, argued before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, was about limitation. He urged that the suit for specific performance could be filed within three years of the accrual of cause of action and as cause of action accrued when the suit for declaration of title over the land in dispute filed by the defendant and plaintiff jointly against the State of Rajasthan and the Municipal Council, Jaipur, was dismissed vide judgment dated 30.03.1966 and the appeal preferred against the same was rejected by the District Judgment on 29.03.1967. The learned counsel urged that when entitlement of Shanker Singh, defendant, with regard to the ownership of the land measuring 87.6 x 27.6 had been crystallised, the plaintiff could bring the suit for specific performance of the agreement. (6). Time for filing a suit for declaration under Article 58 of the Limitation Act will run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act provides in general terms that any person entitled to any legal character or to any right to property, may institute a suit against any person. (7). In Mt. Bolo vs. Mt. Koklan (1), the Privy Council held thus :- "There can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. No doubt Mt. Koklans right to the property arose on the death of Tara Chand, but in the circumstances of this case their Lordships are of the opinion that there was no infringement of, or any clear and unequivocal threat to her right till the year 1922, when the suit, as stated above, was instituted." (8). In Muruga Chetty Vs. No doubt Mt. Koklans right to the property arose on the death of Tara Chand, but in the circumstances of this case their Lordships are of the opinion that there was no infringement of, or any clear and unequivocal threat to her right till the year 1922, when the suit, as stated above, was instituted." (8). In Muruga Chetty Vs. Rajaswamy (2), the Madras High Court held that the cause of action for declaratory suit, based on denial of title, does not arise until the plaintiff has knowledge of the denial. (9). In Gulam Hussain Vs. Saifullah Khan (3), also similar view was taken. (10). In Kamat Reddy Narayan Reddy Vs. Kamat Narain Reddy (4), the Andhra Pradesh High Court following the decision of the Privy Council in Mt. Bolo (supra) held that there can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. (11). We have mentioned the facts of two agreements entered in between the parties. By the second agreement, the parties intended to continue with the right and liability which accrued under the first agreement and, therefore, with modifications incorporated therein, the same continued. We have already mentioned the changes which had been brought about by the second agreement. Both the parties had been jointly fighting for declaration of the right of land in question. Obviously, the interest of both of them was common. Even the second agreement recited that ^^vkt ;g bdjkjukek o rgjhj lkSnk pkyw j[krk gwWA**. The intention of the parties was to abide by the terms incorporated in the first agreement and those modified or preserved by the subsequent agreement. An agreement expresses nothing more than actually and accepted. To say that there is an agreement, generally means that two or more persons have expressed themselves in harmony. Shanker Singh, defendant, realised that the whole of the object of the agreement entered into by him with the plaintiff could not be realised till the right title or interest over the land mentioned above was cleared. Clearance of the cloud and title was in the interest of both of them. Precisely, for this reason, they had been jointly litigating against the State of Rajasthan and the Municipal Council. Clearance of the cloud and title was in the interest of both of them. Precisely, for this reason, they had been jointly litigating against the State of Rajasthan and the Municipal Council. They first attempted to get relief from the High Court by way of a writ petition but when they did not succeed, they filed the suit for declaration. Against the first appellate courts decree, a second appeal was also filed in the High Court. (12). According to the defendant as per para 7 of the first agreement (Ex.1), reading : ^^;g fd ikVhZ ua- 2 ds nks ekg ds vUnj nf{k.k dh rjQ csps gq, edkuksa ds njokts fudkyus dh btktr ugha feyh rks lkSnk dsUly gks tkosxk] vxj vUnj fe;kn nks ekg btktr nf{k.kh nhokj xUns ukys dh rjQ okyksa esa fudkyus dh fey xbZ exj rkehj djkus ds okLrs vkxs fe;kn dh t:jr gqbZ rks e;kn ,d ekg okLrs rkehj ds vkSj c<+kbZ tkosxhA ckn c<+kbZ gqbZ fe;kn ds Hkh njokts rkehj djkdj jftLVªh u djkus ij lkSnk drbZ dsUly gks tkosxk vkSj p<+k gqvk dqy fdjk;k ikVhZ uEcj 1 ikVhZ ua- 2 ls olwy djsaxhA the plaintiff having not been able to get permission to have the doors opened towards the south, the aforesaid agreement automatically stood cancelled on the expiry of period of two months thereof by 8.3.61 or at the most by another one month i.e. 8.4.61. The contention made on his behalf was that the second agreement (Ex. 7) dated 8.3.62 did not survive or could not revive the life for a dead agreement and as such the courts below committed an error in mis-applying the law and in not holding that the rights of the parties under the two agreements have extinguished. (13). In connection with the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel for the defendant contended further that in the absence of any clear agreement that his client had agreed to execute the sale-deed on the finalisation of litigation with the State Government and the Municipal Council, the Civil Judge wrongly decreed the suit. (14). We are unable to accept this submission. It is wrong to say that the plaintiff could have filed the suit after the dismissal of the appeal on 29.3.67. (14). We are unable to accept this submission. It is wrong to say that the plaintiff could have filed the suit after the dismissal of the appeal on 29.3.67. Before we deal with this point, we wish to quote a passage from the Supreme Courts judgment in Smt. Chandrani vs. Smt. Kamal Rani (5), which reads as under : — "In the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are : (1) from the express terms of the contract ; (2) from the nature of the property; and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract." The Supreme Court approved its decision reported in Govind Prasad Chaturvedi Vs. Hari Dutt Shastri (6), wherein it was said that : — "It is settled law that the fixation of the period within which the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time the essence of the contract." From the language used in the agreement dated 8.2.61 subsequently affirmed in the second agreement dated 6.3.62, it is clear that the parties did not intend to make time the essence of the contract. The arguments of the defendants counsel that the language indicated in unmistakable terms that the time was the essence of contract, does not appear to us to be correct. As to what is the intention of the parties with regard to time being essence of the contract is to be judged by circumstances of each case. In the instant case, from the beginning, the parlies did not attach any value to the time. They had been jointly fighting for a piece of land over which title and possession of the defendant had been disputed by the Municipal Council. The parties resolved to fight out the litigation with regard to that land and for this purpose, they filed the suit and the first appeal. Had the parties intended to make the time as essence of the contract, there could not be a joint fight against the State and the Municipal Council. In Smt. Chandrani Vs. The parties resolved to fight out the litigation with regard to that land and for this purpose, they filed the suit and the first appeal. Had the parties intended to make the time as essence of the contract, there could not be a joint fight against the State and the Municipal Council. In Smt. Chandrani Vs. Smt. Kamal Rani (supra), the Supreme Court quoted the following observations of the 4th edition of Halsburys Laws of England which contained in VI.4 para 1179, which runs thus : — "Where time is of the essence of the contract. The expression time is of the essence means that a breach of the condition as to the time for performance will entitle the innocent party to consider the breach as a repudiation of the contract. Exceptionally, the completion of the work by a specified date may be a condition precedent to the contractors right to claim payment. The parties may expressly provide that time is the essence of the contract and where there is power to determine the contract on a failure to complete by the specified date, the stipulation as to time will be fundamental." After the first appeal was dismissed by the District Judge on 29.3.67, the State of Rajasthan and the Municipal Council filed second appeal before the High Court, on which the matter was remanded to the District Judge, who again vide his judgment dated 22.12.79 dismissed the appeal filed by the State and maintained the judgment of the Civil Judge dated 30.3.66. Against the judgment of remand, State of Rajasthan filed another second appeal before this Court and the said second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court on 6.12.91. From the history of the suit for declaration, jointly filed by the plaintiff and defendant, relating to the land in question, it is clear that the plaintiff could wait even upto 6.12.91 for filing of the suit in as much as till that date, the title of the defendant, who agreed to sell the piece of land to the plaintiff, was in jeopardy. Cause of action accrued to the plaintiff after the judgment of the High Court in second appeal vide judgment dated 6.12.91. Consequently, the argument of the defendants counsel that the suit was barred by time, is not correct. (15). Cause of action accrued to the plaintiff after the judgment of the High Court in second appeal vide judgment dated 6.12.91. Consequently, the argument of the defendants counsel that the suit was barred by time, is not correct. (15). Another feature of the case, which is worthy of being noticed, is that the defendant himself, through his advocate, had been insisting upon the plaintiff not to file the suit till the rights of the parties had been finally decided in the litigation filed against the State and the Municipal Council. For this purpose, we may refer to the letters dated 18.12.66 (Ex. 395) and to another letter dated 18.12.69 (Ex. 399). Both these letters were sent by defendants advocate, Shri Uttam B. Motwani. In Ex. 399 the defendant requested the plaintiff that "So my client will execute sale deed only when the litigation is finally ended, findings of the court that the land towards Ganda Nala is not the ownership of the Government. Please do not make haste when limitation of the contract is still alive". From the said documents, read with statement of Uttam B. Motwani (P.W. 4), the conclusion drawn by the courts below that the suit was barred by time, is not tenable. Uttam B Motwani (P.W.4) stated that the notices were given by him on behalf of defendant Shanker Singh on his instructions. He was believed by the two courts below. There is no reason to dis-believe him. In fact, the statement made by Shri Motwani is fully corroborated by the fact that the defendant had been making joint efforts with the plaintiff for declaration of his right over the land situated near the Ganda Nala. Hence, the suit was not barred by time. We are not required to deal with Sections 15 and 18 of the Limitation Act, relied on. (16). As against the statement of Uttam B. Motwani (P.W. 4), arguments were advanced by the defendants counsel for showing that he was untrustworthy and that he was deposing falsely for the plaintiff. That does not appeal us to be correct. Not only because he was an Advocate that he should have been believed but also due to inherent correctness of the statement, he cannot be disbelieved. Even if he is not believed, the over whelming circumstances clinch the issue against the defendant. That does not appeal us to be correct. Not only because he was an Advocate that he should have been believed but also due to inherent correctness of the statement, he cannot be disbelieved. Even if he is not believed, the over whelming circumstances clinch the issue against the defendant. Cross, in his book Evidence says : — "Circumstantial evidence " has already been defined as a fact from which the Judge or Jury may infer the existence of a fact in issue. The evidentiary fact usually has to be proved by testimony, but it is an independent item of evidence because the witnesss assertion may be perfectly true, and yet the inference from the fact asserted to the fact in issue may be incorrect. Circumstantial evidence is usually contrasted with "direct evidence"~a term which is employed in two senses." (17). Learned counsel for the defendant next urged that as the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform this part of the contract within the meaning of Sec. 16, the suit was liable to be dismissed. It is admitted by the defendant that necessary averments relating to readiness and willingness have been made in the plaint. The trial court as well as the learned Single Judge after considering the evidence, concluded that the plaintiff was always ready to perform his part of the contract. That finding is supported by the circumstances. It is not the requirement of law that a person desiring execution of the agreement, should always be ready at every moment of his life with the money which the money which he would have to pay towards the same. (18). The question as to whether or not, the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the contract, was one of substance not to be resolved in any technical or narrow sense. It is important to bear in mind what is the substantial thing for which the parties contract and what on the part of the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance are his essential obligations. Substantial thing, for which the defendant bargained was the payment of the price, and, unless time be and remain of the essence, he obtained what he bargained for. (19). Substantial thing, for which the defendant bargained was the payment of the price, and, unless time be and remain of the essence, he obtained what he bargained for. (19). Apart from what we have said above, in the instant case, there was evidence, which was rightly believed by the Civil Judge and the learned Single Judge for holding that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Account-books relied upon, do not bear the scrutiny of truth. (20). Lastly, we wish to refer to is that after the decree of the Civil Judge, the plaintiff deposited the balance of the contracted amount in the Court. And, spent huge money over the constructions. In such a matter, as this one, as to whether decree for specific performance should be granted or not is discretionary with the trial Judge and as the exercise of discretion was in no way arbitrary or perfunctory, the same was rightly not interfered with by the learned Single Judge. He did not find anything justified to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court. It is settled proposition that over discretion has been exercised by the trial court relating to specific performance of contract of immovable property, normally there should be no interference called for by the appellate Court. The decisions which are relevant on this point are Raj Kumar Tejendra Singh & Ors. Vs. Dr. Sital Raj Mehta (7) and Abdul Kayum Ahmad Vs. Damodar Pikaji Kinhekar & Anr. (8). (21). For the reasons given above, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.