Judgment : The Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, having its office at No. 14, Gopalakrishna Iyer Road, T.Nagar, Madras-17, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing this petition under Secs.439 and 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, praying for the cancellation of the bail granted by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, made in Crl.M.P.No.3666 of 1993 dated 27. 1993. .2. The brief facts which led to the filing of this petition as culled out from the records may be stated as follows: .At the instance of one Seeni Syed Ahamed, one of the accused in this case, the petitioner made arrangements for procuring 1,000 grams of heroin from one Mohammed Yessean of Mandasaur in Madhya Pradesh through one Abdul Rasheed, another accused involved in this case, for the purpose of trafficking the same by the sending the same to one Subramanian of Sri Lanka and for the said purpose, the said Seeni Syed Ahamed had contacted Rafiq, another accused concerned in this case, who is known to the respondent herein who in turn contacted the respondent for getting the said heroin through Abdul Rasheed who was sent by the respondent to Madras for taking delivery of the heroin seized in this case which was brought by Mahesh Deepohand Rathod and Sanjay Kumavath, the other accused concerned in this case and after taking delivery of the same,he was to have delivered the name to Rahamathullah, another accused in this ease who in turn was to have delivered it to Rafiq and the said Rafiq was to have handed over it to Seeni Syed Ahamed for illicit export to Sri Lanka to Subramanian. 3. The above scheme of conspiracy entered into for trafficking in heroin seized in this case on 7. 1993 at Madras Central Railway Station from the possession of Mahesh Deepchand Rathod and Sanjay Kumavath who were found in the company of Rasheed. During the course of investigation, it was also found that all the above referred persons give voluntary statements admitting their roles which have not been withdrawn or repudiated when they were produced before the Magistrate for remand. It is thus been that the said voluntary statements recorded by the petitioner can be looked into for any purpose as it is not hit by Sec.25 of the Evidence Act. Then it was followed by the remand of all the persons to judicial custody on 7. It is thus been that the said voluntary statements recorded by the petitioner can be looked into for any purpose as it is not hit by Sec.25 of the Evidence Act. Then it was followed by the remand of all the persons to judicial custody on 7. 1993 and 7. 1993 after their arrest on the relevant dates. But during the remand, they did not express any of their discontent on grievance against their voluntary statements given by them. .4. In this back drop, Seeni Syed Ahamed, filed an application for bail on 17. 1973 before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras. But, however, it was dismissed on 17. 1993 followed by another appli-cation for bail before this Court filed by him on 20.7.1993 as well as an application for bail before the Principal Sessions Judge on 27. 1993. Similarly, Abdul Rasheed and Mohammed Rafiq have also filed application for bail on 20.7.1993 before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras. On 20.7,1993, the respondent herein also filed an application for bail, namely, Crl.M.P.No.3666 of 1993 before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras. It is seen from the records, a detailed counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner herein objecting the granting of bail,so seriously. 5. It is pertinent at this stage to refer to one of the grounds urged in the petition for bail on behalf of the respondent is that he was suffering from heart ailment and for which he has to take a specialised treatment from an expert Doctor. But in the counter-affidavit, filed on behalf of the petitioner, it has been stated that since the Jail Hospital and the Genera) Hospital at Madras are well equipped with the modern, sophisticated equipments to look after any sort of heart ailment in the whole of South East Asia, the petition cannot be entertained on that ground. It is thus seen, the bail sought for by the respondent herein on that ground was being seriously opposed and objected to by the petitioner herein. It is thus seen, the bail sought for by the respondent herein on that ground was being seriously opposed and objected to by the petitioner herein. Some documents stated to be the records to prove the heart ailment of the respondent were filed in the court below and the copies of which were not furnished, according to the petitioner heroin, A grievance in this regard is being expressed on behalf of the petitioner by stating that no opportunity was given to the prosecuting agency, namely, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence to address the court regarding its view upon the said documents. It is also stated that after hearing the arguments advanced on behalf of both sides, orders were reserved by the learned Sessions Judge, but however pronounced on 27. 1993, granting bail to the respondent herein by accepting the contentions placed on behalf of him. Aggrieved at this order, the petitioner herein who opposed the bail so vehemently has filed the present petition to cancel the bail as afore stated. .6. Mr.P.Rajamanickam, learned counsel for the petitioner dwells his attack mainly on the ground that the learned Sessions Judge while granting the bail on medical grounds for the petitioner has clearly overlooked and failed to consider the very tenability of the objections raised by and on behalf of the petitioner, and that so much, the learned Judge has further overlooked and failed to look into the settled judicial norm held by this Court on very many occasions as well as other High Courts and that of the Apex Court in the context of the rigor and limitations explicitly provided in Sec.37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. That apart, he would contend further that the learned Sessions Judge failed to direct the respondent to give the copies of the documents for the alleged ailment to the petitioner which again contravenes the mandatory provisions under Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act and that for the above said two reasons alone, the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is clearly vitiated by every illegality and impropriety without any justification at all. 7. 7. I have heard Mr.S.Y.Masood, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent who while controverting the very contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before me that Sec.437 of the Criminal Procedure Code clearly mandated this Court or Sessions Court which is empowered to exercise the concurrent jurisdiction over bail in cases where bail should be granted on medical grounds and on being satisfied with the materials placed before the court below, the bail was granted on 27. 1993 and if that was the position, once the accused enlarged on bail and go out of course, with certain conditions, then in the absence of any other allegations pertaining to the non-compliance of the said conditions, or his character and conduct not amounting to tampering of the prosecution witnesses for investigation, the question of the cancellation of bail does not arise as pointed out by and on behalf of the petitioner. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. 8. In the light of the above rival contentions and the facts aforementioned, the only question that arises before me for consideration is that whether the impugned order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, in Crl.M.P.No.3666 of 1993 dated 27. 1993 is vitiated with any illegality and impropriety and if so, it is liable to be set aside? 9.The Point: In this case, the alleged offence against the respondent herein and other co-accused is one under Sec.8(c) read with Secs.21 and 29 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the fact that a voluntary statement given by the respondent along with the other co-accused on 7. 1993 when they were arrested and the contrabands were seized under the cover of mahazar recorded by the petitioner in the presence of the independent witnesses with their attentions, is not disputed. Consequently, they were remanded of judicial custody by a Court mandated and accordingly, they are yet to face the trial after the investigation is over and charge sheet is filed. Consequently, they were remanded of judicial custody by a Court mandated and accordingly, they are yet to face the trial after the investigation is over and charge sheet is filed. A careful perusal of the impugned Order passed by the learned Sessions Judge would go to show that the first ground on the basis of which the was in inclined to grant the bail is that the seizure mahazar for the seizure of the contraband heroin has not been filed before that court and that the second ground which he was accepted in granting the bail is the medical ground as afore stated. With regard to the first ground, since the Investigating Agency in this case is not the regular police, but, however, happened to be the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, an another independent investigating Agency, clearly empowered to take cognizance of the offences and to proceed with and investigate the case and file the charge as per the specific provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act which is the special enactment, as held by this Court in Crl.O.P.No.8973 of 1993 on 19. 1989 the non-production of the seizure mahazar is unnecessary for the purpose of considering the bail and that in any event the same cannot be construed as a violation of the mandatory provisions of law. With regard to the second ground, after having perused the impugned order, I am at every difficulty to sustain the view held by the learned Principal Sessions Judge for the reasoning that no document with reference to the dates, details of the ailment and the nature of treatment, duration of treatment and so on, has been referred to in his order. That apart, as was justifiably contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said documents were not even adverted to the knowledge of the petitioner herein since they were already on record objecting the bail. Under such circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge ought to have confronted the petitioner with regard to the documents relief on by and on behalf of the respondent, the absence of which clearly and manifestly invalidates the impugned order on the ground of arbitrariness. 10. Under such circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge ought to have confronted the petitioner with regard to the documents relief on by and on behalf of the respondent, the absence of which clearly and manifestly invalidates the impugned order on the ground of arbitrariness. 10. Even so, as was rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the facilities with the highly sophisticated modern equipments for treatment are very much available in the Jail hospital as well as in the General Hospital, Madras, for providing any kind of treatment to the heart ailment and so on. If that is so, I am not able to find any justification for granting the bail by the learned Principal Sessions Judge on the ground of heart ailment, without any proof or document concerned. For the said reason alone, the impugned order is vitiated. Thus after having carefully considered the factual aspects on merits, I feel totally unable to persuade my self to accept the view held by the learned Sessions Judge in granting the bail for the respondent. 11. One another important aspect to be pointed out at this stage with great concern to the learned Principal Sessions Judge is that he has not even adverted into his mind to the pronouncement of law by this Court and the judicial norms and rationale clearly enunciated by this Court in very many cases as well as other Courts and Apex Court of our land, which in my firm view normally amounts to disregard of the settled judicial norms clearly adverted to by the superior courts of this country. Pertinent to at this stage to refer the enunciation of the law on this aspect by the Supreme Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v Kishan Lal and others, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53. The Supreme Court has enunciated the scope of Sec.37(b) of the N.D.P.S. Act in the following manner: "The N.D.P.S. Act is a special enactment and it was enacted with a view to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The Supreme Court has enunciated the scope of Sec.37(b) of the N.D.P.S. Act in the following manner: "The N.D.P.S. Act is a special enactment and it was enacted with a view to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. That being the underlying object and particularly when the provisions of Sec.37 of N.D.P.S. Act are in negative terms limiting the scope of the applicability of the provisions of Crl.P.C. regarding bail, in our view, it cannot be held that the High Court’s powers to grant bail under Sec.439, Crl.P.C. are not subject to the limitation mentioned under Sec.37 of N.D.P.S. Act. It can thus be seen that when there is a special enactment in force relating to the manner of investigation, enquiry or otherwise dealing with such offences, the other powers under Crl.P.C. should be subject to such special enactment. In interpreting the scope of such a statute the dominant purpose underlying the statute has to be borne in mind". Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act starts with a non-obstante clause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person accused of an offence prescribed therein shall be released on bail unless the conditions contained therein are satisfied. Consequently the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of Crl.P.C. should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. The powers of the High Court to grant bail under Sec.439are subject to the limitations contained in the amended Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act and the restrictions placed on the powers of the courts under the said sections are applicable to the High Court also in the matter of granting bail. 12. The powers of the High Court to grant bail under Sec.439are subject to the limitations contained in the amended Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act and the restrictions placed on the powers of the courts under the said sections are applicable to the High Court also in the matter of granting bail. 12. Let me advert Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act as amended in the year 1989 which is in the following terms: "Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable: (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- .(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; .(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- .(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and .(ii) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the application the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence on bail. .(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-Sec.(1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail." 13. A reading of Sec.439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisaged that the extraordinary discretionary power to the High Court in granting bail in the case of non-bailable offences is similar with regard to the powers of the Sessions Court also, by virtue of Sec.439 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If this is the position, then in the light of the specific declaration of the law by the enactment particularly Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act, and the legal ratio clearly held by the Apex Court in the above case clinches the fact that the power of the High Court as well as the Sessions Court in granting the bail for the offences under the N.D.P.S. Act rather concerned are clearly fetter limited and restricted, by virtue of the rigor and legal ambit of Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. For all Other considerations, the Apex Court has clearly considered every thing very elaborately and has thus laid down the law to be followed. For all Other considerations, the Apex Court has clearly considered every thing very elaborately and has thus laid down the law to be followed. In Sundaresan alias Meganathan alias Mega v. State represented by Inspector of Police. 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 371, a Division Bench of this Court has also held the view that Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act is a total embargo provided upon the vast powers vested with this Court as well as the Sessions Court, in granting bail for the offences under the N.D.P.S. Act. The Division Bench held that unless for the reasoning of the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of law, while the case under N.D.P.S. Act is being investigated, bail should not be granted on no other amount. But, however, and thus, the limitation provided under Sec.439 of the Code in granting the bail for the offences under the Act is limited, restricted and controlled by Sec.37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. 14. In this context, if the facts in hand is few and considered the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, does not land it any where in the category of the noncompliance of the mandatory provisions of law. The learned Judge has simply proceeded on the ground of mere sentimentality, but at the same time, totally overlooked the provisions of law and the legal norm settled by the superior courts of this land. In this case, the learned Principal Sessions Judge has adopted this method with great constraint, I have to necessarily advert to the order passed by this Court in the following cases: 1. Crl.O.P.No.8973 of 1993. 2. Crl.O.P.No.7452 of 1993. 3. Crl.O.P.No.8817 of 1993 and 4. Crl.O.P.No.8948 of 1993. In the above cases, the learned Sessions Judge, has adopted the same norm. If this tendency being adopted by the subordinate judiciary, passing orders and granting bail, without adhering to the settled judicial norms and the provisions of law then it is to be noted with great pain that despite several stringent law has been enacted, the culprits, drugglers and kingpin who are solely responsible for illegally trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances would be able to command to whole society and that the question of implementation of law and order and safeguarding the society in its larger interest has become a mere myth and that in the light of the above position. I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge has no legs to stand for a moment even at as it is vitiated with every illegality and impropriety and accordingly, it is hereby set aside. 15. In the result, the petition stands allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge in Crl.M.P.No.3666 of 1993 dated 27. 1993 is hereby set aside. Accordingly, the respondent herein is hereby directed to surrender before the court for judicial custody immediately without any delay. If not, the petitioner is hereby directed to take appropriate legal steps to arrest him and produce him before the court for judicial custody.