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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1993 DIGILAW 643 (MP)

Banwarilal Arpanga v. lndustrial Court

1993-11-24

D.M.DHARMADHIKARI, R.C.LAHOTI

body1993
JUDGMENT The petitioner at the relevant time, was working on the post of Vehicle Inspector in the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation (in short 'the Corporation'), respondent No.5. His services were terminated by order passed on 3.7.1987, without holding any domestic enquiry. The petitioner approached the Labour Court, through an application under Section 31 (3) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (in short 'the Act'). In brief the reason for termination of the petitioner's services appears to be that along with two other co-employees he blocked the entrance of depot workshop by parking a truck and taking out air from all its six wheels. The Labour Court by an award passed on 29.1.1990, directed petitioner's reinstatement in service with back wages. The Labour Court, in passing the award, in favour of the petitioner, hold in its order that inspite of repeated opportunities having been granted to the Corporation, no evidence was led to prove the alleged misconduct. The Corporation approached the Industrial Court, by way of an appeal under the Act. The industrial Court, by order impugned dated 25.7.1980 (Annexure-P3) allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Labour Court with the direction to grant opportunity to the Corporation, as an employer, to lead evidence on the alleged misconduct. An application for review was made by the petitioner of the said order of the Industrial Court, on the ground that similar orders of remand were not passed in the cases of other two employees involved in the alleged misconduct. The Court rejected the review petition, as not maintainable, by an order passed on 30.4.1991 (Annexure P6). The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner read out the relevant portions of the orders of the Labour Court and of the Industrial Court before us. It is submitted that the order-sheets before the Labour Court, which have been taken note of by the Industrial Court, in its order, go to show that at the instance of the employer several adjournments were granted for leading evidence on the question of mis-conduct. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioner that in the same incident, two other employees Mahendra Prasad Dwivedi and Rajendra Prasad Mishra were also re-instated by the Labour Court on the same ground of failure on the part of the employer to prove the misconduct in the Court. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioner that in the same incident, two other employees Mahendra Prasad Dwivedi and Rajendra Prasad Mishra were also re-instated by the Labour Court on the same ground of failure on the part of the employer to prove the misconduct in the Court. In those cases of other co-employees, the Industrial Court had refused to interfere and had made no order of remand. The argument on behalf of the petitioner is thilt no exception should have been made in the case of the petitioner by the Industrial Court, for grant of further opportunity to the employer to prove the mis-conduct. The learned counsel for the Corporation supported the order of the Industrial Court and submitted that the Industrial Court has duly exercised its power of appeal and there is no scope for interference by this Court. It is also submitted that the alleged mis-conduct was of serious nature and deserved grant of opportunity to the employer to prove the same for inflicting punishment on the petitioner. It has not been disputed that pursuant to the order of the Labour Court passed on 29.1.1990, the petitioner has been re-instated in service. The only question worth consideration before us is, whether the remand of the case, in the circumstances was called for. The only ground mentioned by the Industrial Court in making the order of remand is that the witness P.C. Malhotra, to be examined on behalf of the Corporation was present on two earlier occasions i.e. on 28.7.1989 and 29.12.1989. It is admitted that on 16.1.1990, the said witness was not present in the Labour Court and an application for adjournment was made, for leading evidence. The Labour Court closed the case on that date and listed the case for evidence of respondents on 18.1.1990. On the above facts, it is not clear from the order of Industrial Court as to how could it be said that the management was not given opportunity to prove the mis-conduct. The Industrial Court without reference to the earlier order-sheets of the Labour Court, has abruptly came to a conclusion that there was sufficient ground for not leading evidence by the management. The Industrial Court has not at all discussed what were those sufficient grounds. The Industrial Court without reference to the earlier order-sheets of the Labour Court, has abruptly came to a conclusion that there was sufficient ground for not leading evidence by the management. The Industrial Court has not at all discussed what were those sufficient grounds. The appellate Courts, therefore, in passing the order of remand, has ignored the material facts and circumstances, which were before the Labour Court in refusing to accommodate the management by adjourning the case. We also find that in the cases of other co-employees, where similar orders were passed by the Labour Court and awards of re-instatement were made, the Industrial Court had refused to interfere. One of such orders passed in the case of co-employee Rajendra Prasad Mishra, dated 27.8.1990, is on record, as annexure P4. The termination is of the year 1987 and pursuant to the order of the Labour Court, the petitioner has been re-instated in service. We do not find this to be a fit case where the order of the Industrial Court be maintained and the management be granted opportunity to prove the alleged mis-conduct of the petitioner, for the incident of 1987. For the above reasons, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order of the Industrial Court dated 25.7.1990 (Annexure P3), passed in appeal and the order dated 30.4.1991, (Annexure P6), passed in review, are hereby quashed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.