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1993 DIGILAW 647 (MAD)

Dukes Pharma v. Government of India

1993-10-06

VENKATASWAMY

body1993
Judgment :- The Order of the Court is as follows :- In all these cases, though different Notifications are mentioned in the affidavits filed in support of these petitions, the sole question of law advanced before me being common, these writ petitions are disposed of by this common Order. 2.I shall set out at the appropriate place the common question of law that arises for consideration, after narrating the facts that are necessary for appreciating and understanding the issue before us. 3.Brief facts may now be noted. Except the petitioner in W.P. No. 8 of 1989 and first petitioner in W.P. No. 8885 of 1985, other petitioners are owners of factories wherein patent or proprietary medicines (hereinafter referred to as 'P.P. Medicines') are manufactured. They also allow other manufacturers of P.P. Medicines but do not own factories, to hire shift or shifts at their factories for manufacture of P.P. Medicines. Such manufacturers who do not own their own factories, but hire shift or shifts at the factories owned by others for manufacture of P.P. Medicines are called 'Loan Licensees'. Such type of Loan Licensees are recognised under Rules 69A and 74B of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. The first petitioner in W.P. No. 8885 of 1985 and the petitioner in W.P. No. 8 of 1989 are such 'Loan Licensees'. 4.Now let me set out the common question that arises for consideration in all these cases. "Whether the clearances (of the manufactured products, namely, P.P. Medicines) of the factory owner can be clubbed with the clearances of Loan Licensees and vice versa, for the purpose of considering the exemption or concession granted by a relevant notification issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules?"* 5.Before proceeding further, it may be stated that the earliest Notification brought to my notice in connection with this issue is Notification No. 80 of 80 dated 19-6-1980, as modified by another Notification dated 25-3-1981. Similar Notifications appear to have been issued every financial year, and we are concerned with Notification Nos. 83/83, 85/85 and 175/86, as amended by Notification No. 174/89. It may at once be stated that though in all these Notifications, the ceiling limits for the purpose of exemption/concession vary, the sum and substance or basis of the Notifications is similar and, therefore, if one Notification is set out, that will serve the purpose to answer the question raised before me. It may at once be stated that though in all these Notifications, the ceiling limits for the purpose of exemption/concession vary, the sum and substance or basis of the Notifications is similar and, therefore, if one Notification is set out, that will serve the purpose to answer the question raised before me. Accordingly, relevant clauses of the Notification 83/83 are set out below :- "GENERAL EXEMPTION TO SMALL SCALE MANUFACTURERS 83/83-C.E., dated 1-3-1983 General Exemption scheme for manufacturers of 67 specified items in the small scale sector has been notified. GSR. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) No. 80/80-Central Excise, dated the 19th June, 1980, the Central Government hereby exempts the excisable goods of the description specified in column (3) of the Table hereto annexed (hereinafter referred to as the "specified goods"), and falling under such Item Number of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), as is specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) of the said Table, and cleared for home consumption on or after the 1st day of April in any financial year, by or on behalf of a manufacturer from one or more factories, (a) in the case of first clearances of the specified goods upto an aggregate value not exceeding rupees five lakhs, from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon under section 3 of the said Act; and (b) in the case of the clearances (being clearances of the specified goods of an aggregate value not exceeding rupees twenty lakhs) immediately following the said first clearances of the value specified in clause (a), from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon under section 3 of the said Act (read with any relevant notification issued under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and in force for the time being) as is in excess of seventy-five per cent of such duty; Provided that the aggregate value of clearance of the specified goods from any factory by or on behalf of one or more manufacturers in any financial year shall not exceed rupees twenty lakhs respectively in terms of clauses (a) and (b) of this paragraph. 2. 2. Nothing contained in this notification shall apply if the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods for home consumption - (i) by or on behalf of a manufacturer, from one or more factories, or (ii) from any factory, by or on behalf of one or more manufacturers, had exceeded rupees twenty-five lakhs in the preceding financial year. 3. Where a manufacturer has not cleared any specified goods in the preceding financial year, or has cleared any such goods for the first time on or after the 1st day of August, in the preceding financial year, the exemption contained in this notification shall be applicable to such manufacturer :- (a) if he files a declaration with the Assistant Collector of Central Excise that the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods by him or on his behalf, for home consumption, from one or more factories, during the financial year is not likely to exceed rupees twenty-five lakhs, and (b) if the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods by him or on his behalf, for home consumption, from one or more factories, during the financial year does not exceed rupees twenty-five lakhs. 4. Where the specified goods have not been cleared from any factory in the preceding financial year, or have been cleared for the first time on or after the 1st day of August in the preceding financial year, the exemption contained in this notification shall not be applicable if the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods from such factory by or on behalf of one or more manufacturers, for home consumption, during the financial year, exceeds rupees twenty-five lakhs.' The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the value of clearances of P.P. Medicines of Loan Licensees should not be clubbed with the value of the clearances of P.P. Medicines of the factory owners. According to the learned Counsel, by so clubbing, the factory owners as well as the Loan Licensees are denied the exemption/concession given under clause 1 of the Notification. Hence they are aggrieved. 6.When the matter was argued before me at length, I was under the impression that the matter has to be decided for the first time. However, after going through the various decisions cited at the Bar, I find that the matter is no longerres integra. Hence they are aggrieved. 6.When the matter was argued before me at length, I was under the impression that the matter has to be decided for the first time. However, after going through the various decisions cited at the Bar, I find that the matter is no longerres integra. 7.Kanakaraj, ]., while considering the constitutional validity of a similar proviso to Clause 1 in Notification No. 80/80 as amended on 25-3-1981, has discussed similar arguments before him and negatived the same, in W.P. No. 1940 of 1981, etc. batch [Smt. S. Pannadeviv.The Government of Indiarepresented by Secretary to Government, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi - Order dated 6-4-1990. The learned Judge discussed the point as follows :-" The next argument of Mr. Elamurugan is that if the impugned notification is implemented, it would result in infringement of the constitutional guarantee provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While illustrating this point, it is averred that the first loan licensee who clears his goods in advance of others would derive benefit of the exemption whereas the other loan licensees are denied the benefit. The method of assessment after the introduction of the impugned notification has been explained by Mr. P. Narasimhan, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel. According to him, if at the end of a financial year the aggregate value of the goods cleared from the factory is more than the prescribed limit, then none of the loan licensees will be entitled to exemption[1]. Thus, the basis of the argument of the counsel for the petitioners is taken away and the complaint of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India falls to the ground. "(Underlining mine) This Order of Kanakaraj was taken on appeal in Writ Appeal Nos. 233 to 236 of 1991 (C.J. Hewlett &Sons India (P) Ltd.v.Government of Indiarepresented by Secretary to Government, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi - Judgment dated 13-3-1991), and the first Bench, accepting the Order of Kanakaraj, ]., dismissed the Appeals. 8. Again, Kanakaraj, J. had occasion to consider Clause 3 of Notification 175/86 (one of the Notifications with which we are concerned). The learned Judge, on the scope of Clause 3 of the said Notification, has held in W.P. No. 16340 of 1990 [Vopak Pharmaceuticals rep. byPartnerv.The Union of Indiarep. 8. Again, Kanakaraj, J. had occasion to consider Clause 3 of Notification 175/86 (one of the Notifications with which we are concerned). The learned Judge, on the scope of Clause 3 of the said Notification, has held in W.P. No. 16340 of 1990 [Vopak Pharmaceuticals rep. byPartnerv.The Union of Indiarep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi - order dated 5-11-1990, as follows :-" The petitioner is a manufacturer of Patent and Proprietary Medicines and Drugs under licence obtained in Drugs Act. The petitioner claims to be a small manufacturer and had been claiming exemption from payment of excise duty or concessional payment of excise duty under various notifications issued by the respondents. The grievance of the petitioner is that the second respondent is refusing to release the goods manufactured from a factory wherein a number of loan licensees manufactured goods by stating that the value of the clearances will be clubbed together for the purpose of the Notification No. 175/86. The petitioner submits that the direction to club all the clearances from a factory for the purposes of applying the exemption is contrary to Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has, therefore, come forward with this writ petition for the issue of a writ ofmandamusto forbear the second respondent from clubbing the value of clearance of the petitioner with that of other manufacturers invoking clause 3B of the Notification No. 175/86 as amended by Notification No. 216/86 dated 2-4-1986. Clause 3 of the notification is as follows :- "3. Nothing contained in this notification shall apply if the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods for home consumption, (a) by a manufacturer, from one or more factories, or(b) from any factory, by one or more manufacturers, had exceeded rupees two hundred lakhs in the preceding financial year. Provided that for the purposes of computing the aggregate value of clearances under this paragraph, the clearances of any excisable goods where a manufacturer affixes the specified goods with a brand name or trade name (registered or not) of another person who is not eligible for the grant of exemption under this notification, shall not be taken into account.' I had occasion to consider the very same question in a batch of writ petitions, W.P. Nos. 1940 of 1981 and other cases and by order dated 6-4-1990, I had rejected the contention that such clubbing of all the clearances from a factory is not unconstitutional and perfectly valid. In that batch of writ petitions, the notification was attacked on several grounds including violation of Articles 14 and 19(l)(g) of the Constitution of India. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely on a Division Bench judgment in W.A. Nos. 1425 of 1987, etc. cases dated 8-2-1989. I find from the said Division Bench judgment that there is no discussion on the question of the validity of the notification on the basis of the argument now advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In fact, in those cases, only show cause notices were challenged and the Division Bench directed the parties to file their objections. Therefore, the judgment in the writ appeals certainly does not help the petitioner. Learned counsel then relies on the decision inShree Packaging Corporation, Hyderabadv. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad which is a decision of the Special Bench of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) at Delhi. The facts of the said case have no relevance to the facts of the present case, because the Tribunal was dealing with different kinds of notification. The decision inR. Suresh Jayaseelanv. Collector of Central Excise only says that in a case where the clearances of one unit are sought to be clubbed with that of another unit, it is essential that evidence should be brought on record to show that all the manufacturing operations and other business transactions in regard to the product were being managed in fact by persons belonging to one particular unit while showing the owners of the other units as merely name lenders. This decision is no doubt on a similar notification as we are concerned with, but does not deal with the point but decides the case on actual evidence that was adduced. As I have already pointed out, in the case before us, we are concerned with the validity of the notification which provides for clubbing of the clearances from more than one factory. If on facts the petitioner is aggrieved in a particular case, it is always open to him to file appeals and canvass the factual findings. As I have already pointed out, in the case before us, we are concerned with the validity of the notification which provides for clubbing of the clearances from more than one factory. If on facts the petitioner is aggrieved in a particular case, it is always open to him to file appeals and canvass the factual findings. In this case, there is no such relief asked for, but the prayer is only to restrain the respondents from applying clause 3 of the notification. I have already held that the method adopted under clause 3 of the notification is valid, in my order dated 6-4-1990. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed.'This order of Kanakaraj, J. was applied by S. Ramalingam, J. in several cases, namely, W.P. Nos. 991 of 1989, 13599, of 1988, etc. Batch - Order dated 15-4-1991 (Leennoc Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. by Director, Madrasv.The Union of India) and W.P. Nos. 5274, 7207, 8137 and 9772 of 1985 (Dooumed Laboratories Pvt. Ltd.v. The Union of India- Order dated 7-10-1991). 9.However, Mr. Alagar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended that those cases were considered in the light of arguments advanced before the learned Judges on the aspect of constitutional validity of relevant clauses. Though it is true that in those cases, the point raised was regarding constitutional validity, the learned Judge (Kanakaraj, J.) has definitely considered and found that clubbing was permissible, and as a result of such clubbing, both the factory owner as well as the Loan Licensees will lose the exemption/concession, as the case may be, if the total clearances exceed the ceiling limit. 10.Further, Mr. K. Jayachandran, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, has brought to my notice a Division Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court inIndica Laboratories Pvt. Ltd.v. Union of India. In that Division Bench judgment, the learned Judges have considered the scope and extent of clauses 1 to 3 of Notification 175/86. Though the learned Judges held that each Loan Licensee is an independent manufacturer, for the purposes of clauses 2 and 3, the clubbing was permissible, and any exemption/concession was subject to clauses 2 and 3. The learned Judges have considered the matter elaborately. Though the learned Judges held that each Loan Licensee is an independent manufacturer, for the purposes of clauses 2 and 3, the clubbing was permissible, and any exemption/concession was subject to clauses 2 and 3. The learned Judges have considered the matter elaborately. The following conclusion of the learned Judges can be usefully set out :-" However, we have to see whether the impugned clauses 2 and 3 introducing the system of clubbing the manufactured goods by different manufacturers from the same factory is in any way arbitrary orultra vires. So far as the first aspect of the matter is concerned, it has to be stated to be rejected. It is true that para 1 lays down general scheme of exemption upto a particular limit of first clearance of specified goods of the same SSI unit and then lays down concessional rate of duty beyond basic clearances upto The ceiling provided therein. But that does not mean that this is an absolute provision. It has to be read conjointly with paras 2 and 3. There is nothing like parent provision, as wrongly assumed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. This is an exemption notification and exemption can be granted by the Central Government in certain cases subject to conditions which may be laid down in the notification. In the present case, absolute exemption has not been granted by the Central Government but a hedged in concessional scheme of exemption without limiting absolute exemption given in para 1. Therefore, paras 1, 2 and 3 have to be read together in a conjoint manner and once they are so read, there would not be any question of para 1 being cut across by paras 2 and 3 or latter gettingultra viresthe so-called parent provision of para 1. Consequently, there is no substance in the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners on this aspect.So far as infraction of Art. 14 is concerned, we fail to appreciate how it can be said that wordings of notification in question with paras 2 and 3 lay down any scheme of hostile discrimination against plurality of manufacturers manufacturing their goods from the same SSI unit. The preamble of the notification and the relevant clauses of the notification lay down a clear cut scheme of exemption-cum-concession. The preamble of the notification and the relevant clauses of the notification lay down a clear cut scheme of exemption-cum-concession. All the factories which are SSI units are uniformly covered by the sweep of the said notification and the exemption attaches to the clearances of the specified goods cleared from the factory gate of such factory in a given financial year and the extent of total exemption is upto Rs. 30 lakhs and concessional exemption is beyond 30 lakhs upto Rs. 60 lakhs, with limit of Rs. 75 lakhs in a given financial year. This is the basis or heart of the notification. If one manufacturer manufactures specified goods in one financial year alone from that factory and gets the said goods cleared, he gets full exemption and concession to the extent provided by para 1. But if more than one manufacturer utilise the said factory and infrastructures during the financial year and get their goods cleared through the factory gate in the same year, then, their goods will be clubbed for the purpose of deciding the question of total exemption upto the limit prescribed and concessional exemption upto further limit prescribed. The common thread which runs through all the paras of the notification is the scheme of exemption and concessional duty in connection with total quantity of first clearances and subsequently clearance of specified goods, ex-factory gate during the financial year. Once this common thread is kept in view, then paras 2 and 3 will fall in line with para 1. If paras 2 and 3 are not countenanced, unexpected and unwarranted result would follow. From the same factory gate, goods manufactured by manufacturer A in a financial year will get total exemption upto Rs. 30 lakhs as per para 1 and manufacturer B who also utilised the same infrastructure at some other time during the same financial year will get total benefit for Rs. 30 lakhs by way of first clearance of his own goods. Thus, total exemption limit would stand inflated to Rs. 60 lakhs instead of Rs. 30 lakhs, which is the total limit of full exemption envisaged by the exemption notification, so far as first clearances of concerned goods from the given factory for the financial year go. With a view to avoiding this unexpected and uncontemplated result, the aforesaid system of clubbing envisaged by paras 2 and 3 has been brought in. 30 lakhs, which is the total limit of full exemption envisaged by the exemption notification, so far as first clearances of concerned goods from the given factory for the financial year go. With a view to avoiding this unexpected and uncontemplated result, the aforesaid system of clubbing envisaged by paras 2 and 3 has been brought in. It works as a safety valve for avoiding such unexpected result and ensures that from the same factory, permissible extent of total goods by way of first clearances as contemplated by notification are allowed to be cleared without payment of duty and, thereafter subsequent total clearances of specified goods from the same factory in the same year would earn concessional rate of duty. Thus, paras 2 and 3 instead of being arbitrary and irrational, are in full consonance with the scheme of exemption envisaged by the notification in question and but for them, the nature of exemption would be rendered arbitrary and lop-sided. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that impugned paras 2 and 3 of the notification are ultra vires Art. 14 or that they hostilely discriminate against the plurality of manufacturers manufacturing from the same factory. The second point, therefore, fails and stands rejected.'In the concluding portion, the learned Judges have held as follows :- "Final result : In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the following picture emerges. If the loan licensees who get their PP medicine manufactured at SSI factories belonging to somebody else but under their own supervision or control and from their own raw material and if they affix their trade name or brand name on these manufactured goods, they will be entitled to the benefit of exemption Notification No. 175/86 read with Notification No. 223/87 but they must be genuine loan licensees and not bogus parties who may be merely limbs of the factory owners. That question will have to be examined by appropriate authorities before making available the benefit of this exemption notification to the concerned loan licensees. It has also to be kept in view that those loan licensees who can aspire to get benefit of this exemption Notification No. 175/86 read with 223/87 must be SSI units. That question will have to be examined by appropriate authorities before making available the benefit of this exemption notification to the concerned loan licensees. It has also to be kept in view that those loan licensees who can aspire to get benefit of this exemption Notification No. 175/86 read with 223/87 must be SSI units. If they are large scale units or medium scale units, then of course they will be out of purview of the exemption notification as exemption notification is meant for SSI manufacturer only and is meant for giving fillip to their manufacturing activities.If loan licensees fulfil the aforesaid conditions, then subject to paras 2 and 3 of the notification, they can get benefit of the exemption notification to the extent provided therein subject to the condition that petitioners at whose factories they are manufacturing furnish proper authorisation before the competent authority agreeing to abide by the entire procedure of Excise Act and the Rules for the purpose of clearing the goods from their factories even though the goods may be belonging to loan licenseesand subject to their keeping relevant records as required by the said Act and the Rules and provided further the petitioners file such written undertakings in this court within one week from today. If these requirements are satisfied, then loan licensees can be said to be entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification subject to the terms and conditions laid down therein and that question has to be examined by the competent authority on merits. We cannot and we do not say anything on the merits of controversy between the parties and it would depend upon the factual data being laid before the competent authority and will have to be examined and scrutinised by the authority in the light of what is stated hereinabove.' (Underlining mine)I respectfully agree with the above view taken by the Division Bench. 11.Mr. Alagar, learned Sr. Counsel, brought to my notice several orders of Collector (Appeals) or the Tribunal dealing with Central Excise matters. I find that they relate to manufacture of electrical lighting, fittings or plywood veneers and flushdoors, where the question of manufacture by Loan Licensee did not arise and the terms of notification are not identical. Of course, inS.O.L. Pharmaceutical Ltd.v. Collector of C. Excisereported in, the Tribunal has considered the question of loan licensee clearances, but that case is distinguishable on facts. Of course, inS.O.L. Pharmaceutical Ltd.v. Collector of C. Excisereported in, the Tribunal has considered the question of loan licensee clearances, but that case is distinguishable on facts. The facts as set out in that Order read as follows :-" The brief facts of the case are that the appellants were manufacturing patent and proprietary medicines falling under Item 14E of the erstwhile Central Excise Tariff. On 1-4-1985, they filed a classification list for the year 1985-86 claiming exemption under Notification No. 85/85. They also filed a declaration that during the year 1985-86 their clearances would not be in excess of Rs. 75 lacs. On 22-10-1985, the Superintendent of Central Excise issued a show cause notice asking the appellants as to why an amount of Rs. 2, 33, 859.47 should not be recovered from them. The show cause notice alleged that the appellants were not eligible for exemption under Notification No. 85/85 since the aggregate value of their clearances including the goods acquired by them as a loan licensee from M/s. Natco Fine Pharmaceuticals Private Limited had exceeded the limit of Rs. 75 lacs. In his order dated 29-10-1986, the Assistant Collector confirmed the demand for Rs. 2, 33, 859.47 on the ground that the appellants were not entitled to the exemption under Notification No. 85/85 since their total clearances during the year 1985-86 from their factory and as a loan licensee from the factory of M/s. Natco Fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., had exceeded Rs. 75 lacs. The appeal filed against the order passed by the Assistant Collector was rejected by the Collector (Appeals). The Collector (Appeals) held that the goods cleared by the appellants as a loan licensee from the factory of M/s. Natco Fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., having been manufactured out of raw material supplied by the appellants had to be deemed as clearances on behalf of the appellants and such clearances were to be added to the clearances by the appellants from their own factory for the computation of the overall clearances of Rs. 75 lacs for the purpose of Notification No. 85/85.'On those facts, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal is as follows :- "We have gone through the records of the case and submissions made on behalf of both the sides. 75 lacs for the purpose of Notification No. 85/85.'On those facts, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal is as follows :- "We have gone through the records of the case and submissions made on behalf of both the sides. It is seen that the appellants were engaged in the manufacture of patent and proprietary medicines assessable under Item 14E of the Central Excise Tariff and as loan licensee they were also supplying raw materials for getting certain goods manufactured by M/s. Natco Fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.The short point that arises for determination in this case is whether the value of the goods manufactured by M/s. Natco Fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. out of raw materials supplied by the appellants as a loan licensee could be deemed as goods having been manufactured on behalf of the appellants for being added to the value of the goods cleared by the appellants from their own factory during any financial year for computation of the overall limit of Rs. 75 lacs for the purpose of exemption under Notification No. 85/85.In this regard it is seen that the question whether the goods manufactured by a licensee out of raw materials supplied by another independent manufacturer could be deemed to have been manufactured on behalf of the supplier of raw material was examined by the Tribunal in the case ofShakti Udyog, Jallandharv. Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh. It was held that the manufacturer of the goods is that person who actually makes the goods and not the supplier of the raw material or even the owner of the manufactured goods...."(Underlining mine) (Para 6) " From the records of this case we find that the Department has not led any evidence to establish that the appellants were carrying out the manufacturing activity under their own supervision and control and out of their own raw material by hiring shiftwise or otherwise the factory premises and equipment of M/s. Natco Fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., out of raw materials supplied by the appellants as a loan licensee could not be added to the value of the goods cleared by the appellants from their own factory for determining their total clearances during the year 1985-86 for the purpose of Notification No. 85/85. Since the value of the goods cleared from the appellants' factory during the year 1985-86 did not exceed the limit of Rs. Since the value of the goods cleared from the appellants' factory during the year 1985-86 did not exceed the limit of Rs. 75 lacs, we hold that the appellants were entitled to the exemption under Notification No. 85/85."* (Para 8) It will be seen from the above that the question to be decided before the Tribunal was different from the one raised in this case. In the case on hand, we are concerned with clearances from one factory unlike the clearances from two different factories as in the case dealt with by the Tribunal. Therefore, it will not help the petitioners. Likewise, reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the Circulars/Trade Notices issued by the Department are not helpful as they do not say anything contra to the decisions cited above. 12.In this connection, he invited my attention to W.M.P. Nos. 26177 and 26327 to 26330 of 1992. In all the W.M.Ps., the petitioners have prayed for permission for raising additional grounds, based on Circulars of the Board. The Circulars referred therein say that each loan licensee was an independent manufacturer. There is no quarrel on that aspect. But while coming to the question of exemption, the decisions are to the effect that that must be considered subject to clauses 2 and 3 in the Notifications, along with clause 4. If so considered, notwithstanding the fact that each loan licensee is an independent manufacturer, the clearances of such loan licensees will have to be clubbed along with the clearances of factory owners. Therefore, the Circulars of the Board will not help the petitioners. However, W.M.P. Nos. 26177, 26327, 26329 and 26330 of 1992 are ordered. No costs. W.M.P. No. 26328 of 1992 in W.P. No. 8885 of 1985 is for amending the prayer in the writ petition. The petition is allowed. No costs. 13.In view of the express clauses 2 and 3 in the Notification, I have no hesitation to answer the point set out above, in the affirmative. 14.Now, one important point to be considered in W.P. No. 9766 of 1985 is, whether the order impugned in this writ petition is sustainable. By the order under challenge, the second respondent has rightly clubbed the clearances of the loan licensee. 14.Now, one important point to be considered in W.P. No. 9766 of 1985 is, whether the order impugned in this writ petition is sustainable. By the order under challenge, the second respondent has rightly clubbed the clearances of the loan licensee. One other point advanced was that the loan licensee in this case has paid the excise duty on the clearances and, therefore, that should not be clubbed. That also is not correct as clause 2 does not make any distinction between duty paid excisable goods or non-duty paid excisable goods. The words used in that clause are 'all excisable goods'. Therefore, there is no substance in that argument. 15.In the result, W.P. Nos. 8885 and 9766 of 1985, 5484 and 7333 of 1988, 5484 of 1988, 7333 of 1988 and W.P. Nos. 8 and 1539 of 1989 are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. W.P. No. 7533 of 1986 16.The petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Notification No. 175 of 1986 dated 1 -3-1986, and prays for a declaration that they are ultra vires the provisions of the Central Excise Act and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Admittedly, identical question has already been answered in favour of the Department - vide order of Kanakaraj, J. in W.P. No. 1940 of 1981, etc. batch (referred to supra) and approved by Division Bench in Writ Appeal Nos. 233 to 236 of 1991 - judgment dated 13-3-1991 (referred to supra). In view of the Division Bench judgment (referred to supra), this writ petition has to be dismissed, and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.