Judgment : S. R. Singh, J. 1. THE writ petition is directed against notice dated 14-4-1992, whereby the petitioner was required to furnish the following bond as a condition precedent to allow her to appear in the IInd year B.T.C. examination: "Main Shrimati Sharma Devi likhit rup se bayau karti hun ki yadi mere vaidhanik abhyarthitwa ke virudk aek bhi arop siddha ho jata hai to mere BTC (dwitiya varsh) pariksha, 1992 ka parikshaphal nirasta kar diya jay aur vibhag/shasan dwara koi bhi dand swikar hoga tatha mai nyayalaya ki saran kadapi na lungi." 2. THE minimal facts necessary to highlight the controversy involved in the case may be stated as thus : THE petitioner was admitted to two-year B.T.C. Course in the year 1988-89. She passed 1st year examination and was thereafter admitted to IInd year. THE impugned notice dated 14-4-1992 was served on the petitioner before she could appear in the Und year examination. THE case of the respondents is that the petitioner secured admission to B.T.C. Course as a divorcee candidate on the basis whereof she was given weightage of 30 marks. It is alleged that but for this weightage being given to the petitioner as divorcee candidate she would not have been admitted to the B.T.C. Course. THE petitioner on the other hand denied that she was admitted on the basis of weightage being given to her as a divorcee candidate. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner never applied as a divorcee candidate nor was she given any weightage on that court. It is also urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents having admitted the petitioner to two year B.T.C. Course are now estopped, by principle of promissory estoppel, from holding any inquiry as to the basis on which the petitioner was admitted and from taking any action prejudicial to her in that she has spent time, money and energy in prosecuting her studies on the basis of her admission. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand urged that the petitioner was given admission on the basis of her representation that she was a divorcee candidate, for which she was given weightage of 30 marks and since she knew that she was not a divorcee, the question of estoppel does not arise. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand urged that the petitioner was given admission on the basis of her representation that she was a divorcee candidate, for which she was given weightage of 30 marks and since she knew that she was not a divorcee, the question of estoppel does not arise. Learned Standing Counsel also urged that the Registrar, Departmental Examinations, U. P. Allahabad has yet to taken final decision as would be evident from the communication contained in the letter Leksha/729-30/39-90 dated 1-6-1989 addressed by the Assistant Director of Education (Basic) 1st Region, Meerut to the Registrar, Departmental Examinations, U. P. Allahabad, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit, and therefore, urged the Learned Standing Counsel, the Writ Petition being premature is not maintainable. 3. HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties. I am of the opinion that since the matter is still under investigation, it would not be proper for this Court to express any opinion on the disputed question of fact as to whether the petitioner was given admission to two-year B.T.C. Course on the basis of being a divorcee candidate who was admittedly entitled te weightage of 30 marks. 4. SO far as the question of promissory estoppel is concerned, it may be observed that in case it is found, on inquiry by the Registrar, Departmental Examinations, that the petitioner secured admission on the basis of the forged certificate and the genuineness of which court net have been ascertained by the authorities at the time of admission, then in that event, the principle of estoppel against respondents would not be attracted and they cannot, on that basis, be precluded from cancelling the admission of the petitioner as also the results of her 1st year as well as IInd year examination in which she appeared on the basis of the interim order dated 4-5-1992. In Pickard v. Sears, (1837) 6 A and E 469 the doctrine of estoppel embodied in section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act was epitomised in the following words : "The law is clear, that where one by wards or conduct wilfully causes another to believe in a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief so as to alter this own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existed at the same time." 5. IN the instant case it is the Department which could be said to have become the victim of mis-representation, if any. made by the petitioner as to the fact that she was a divorcee candidate. IN Satish Kumar Rao v. Gorakhpur University, 1982 UP LB EC 1 the petitioners therein sought for a writ of mandamus directing the Gorakhpur University to allow them to appear at the 5th Semester LL.B. IIIrd year examination conducted by the said University and to declare their results. On a finding that the petitioners therein procured admission in the LL.B. IInd year on the basis of forged marksheets, it was, held that they were not entitled to plead estoppel against the University from cancelling their candidatures on the ground that they obtained admission to LL.B. IInd year- on the basis of forged marksheets. A Division Bench of this Court held in the aforestated case that estoppel presupposes equity in the representee and that he who raises an equitable estoppel must do equity himself. 6. THE Division Bench has placed reliance on the following observation made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Income-Tax Commissioner v. B. N. Bhattacharjee, AIR 1979 SC 1925 : ".................Estoppel is a rule of equity which forbids truth being pleaded or representation, on which faith another has acted to his detriment, being retracted................." The Division Bench held in the case of Satish Kumar Rao (supra) that "he who wants to rely on the Principle of estoppel on the basis that he acted on the representation of the other side must come to the court with clean hands." 7. IN Kumari Vandna Srivastava v. Principal, M.L.N. Medical College, Allahabad, 1986 UP LB EC 435, a Division Bench of this Court has held as under : "....................One of the many things which have to be stated in negativing her claim of estoppel is that she knew that she was given admission under a mistake. She knew and can be presumed to have known that she could not be admitted as a general candidate because her marks were much less than the last candidate of gereral category on the basis of the marks obtained. IN the case of unilateral mistake it is clear that if one party to the knowledge of the other is mistaken as to the fundamental character of the offer, if he did not intend, as the other well knew, there would be no need for any equitable relief. Such a representation would be a nullity and the person who has acted on it is not entitled to the benefit. The principle of estoppel in this way cannot apply as soon after the mistake was detected the petitioner's result was cancelled. The cancellation of the result is not malafide or due to the picking out of the petitioner from the man." 8. IN United State v. Knox. AIR 1970 US SC 73 it has been held that "a person who furnishes a false information to the Government in feigned compliance with statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the authority of the requirement itself." In Sri Krishna v. Kurukshetra. University, AIR 1976 SC 376 , it has been held by the Supreme Court, in the facts of that case, that once a candidate was allowed to take admission, rightly or wrongly, then the statute which empowered the University to withdraw the candidature of the appellant before the Supreme Court has worked itself out and the appellant could, not be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before admitting the candidate and further laid down a propositus of law that if a person on whom fraud is committed is is a position to discover the truth by due diligence, the fraud is not proved. But is evident, as observed by the Supreme Court that it was neither a case of 'suggestion Falsi nor 'suppression veri'. But is evident, as observed by the Supreme Court that it was neither a case of 'suggestion Falsi nor 'suppression veri'. In this view of the matter the Supreme Court's decision in Sri Krishna v. Kurukshetra University (supra) may be of some avail to the petitioner if it is ultimately found, as a fact, that the petitioner was not guilty of making any misrepresentation or/and that the respondents could have, by due diligence, discovered the fraud, if any, before admitting the petitioner to B.T.C. Course or at least before allowing her to appear in the first year examination. 9. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in P. K. Dubey v. University of Kanpur, 1990 AWC 1113 and urged on that basis that the respondents are now estopped by principle of estoppel from refusing the petitioner to appear in Ilnd year examination of B.T.C. Course and from cancelling her admission to the said course, in that, urged the learned counsel, it was because of the admission made by the respondents that the petitioner spent money, time and energy in prosecuting her studies. In my opinion the decision in P. K. Dubey's case (supra) is of no avail to the petitioner in as much as the admission in that case was made on the basis of marksheet incorrectly issued by the University itself and no fraud was played by the, candidate. 10. THE fact that the petitioner was admitted by the respondents to B.T.C. Course and the fact that she was allowed to appear in the 1st year examination of the said course would not constitute an estoppel against the respondents and would not preclude/debar them from cancelling the petitioner's admission if it was procured by misrepresentation of facts which the respondents could not have discovered or known even by taking due care and precaution. An equitable exception apart, the general principle is that "a wrongful or fraudulent act shall not be allowed to conduce to the advantage of the party who committed it" and is well stated in the maxim : 'nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne' See Broom's Legal Maxims Fourth Reprint, 1977, P. 104 and 197. An equitable exception apart, the general principle is that "a wrongful or fraudulent act shall not be allowed to conduce to the advantage of the party who committed it" and is well stated in the maxim : 'nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne' See Broom's Legal Maxims Fourth Reprint, 1977, P. 104 and 197. Cases in which estoppel operates to preclude a person from contradicting that which has been accepted and acted upon as truth and fact by others; under circumstances constituting wilful and culpable deception are equally referable to the maxim 'nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua -propria'-No man can take advantage of his own wrong. THE general rule, applicable alike in law and equity is that a party shall not entitle himself to substantiate a claim, or to enforce a defence, by reason of acts or misrepresentations which proceeded from himself, or were adopted or acquiesced in by him after full knowledge of their nature and quality, and further, that where misrepresentations have been made by one of two litigating parties, in his dealings with the other a Court of law will either decline to interfere, or will so adjust the equities between them, as to prevent an undue benefit from accruing to that party who is unfairly endeavouring to take advantage of his own wrong (See Broom's Legal Maxims, Page 197 Fourth Reprint 1977). In view of the above discussion as also in view of the fact that the petitioner has already appeared in IInd year examination under the orders of this Court, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned notice dated 14-4-1992 even though it seems to be bad in law in so far as it required the petitioner to give an undertaking that she would in no case, take shelter of the Court. So far as the question as to whether the admission was procured by the petitioner on the basis of misrepresentation of facts is concerned, the same is yet to be decided by the Registrar, Departmental Examinations, I am, therefore, not inclined to issue any writ in the matter except that the Registrar, Departmental Examinations, Allahabad shall, before taking any final decision in the matter, afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and that the candidature and the result of her examinations would not be cancelled except on the basis of a reasoned decision to be taken by the Registrar, Departmental Examinations in consonance with the principles of natural justice. 11. IN the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner may approach the Registrar, Departmental Examinations, U.P. Allahabad and submit her explanation. If any explanation is submitted by the petitioner, the same shall be examined by the Registrar, Departmental Examinations before taking any final decision in the matter provided the same has not already been taken. If the decision has already been taken, copy of the same be furnished to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.