JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—Appellant M/s. Vijay Traders was allotted work of supply of fire-wood, charcoal and limequick for the year 1988-89 by the respondent. In respect of the said contract a dispute arose between them which was referred to the arbitration of Lt. Col. S. M. Sood, who gave his award on 15-4-1991. 2. On the application filed on behalf of the appellant the award was filed in this Court to which the respondent filed their objections. Learned Single Judge of this Court has tried the objections and allowed them by judgment dated 26-5-1992 In the result, the award has been set aside and the parties have been directed to resort to fresh arbitration in accordance with agreement. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment of learned Single Judge and has challenged it by way of the present appeal. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The submissions made on behalf of the appellant by Mr. Bhupender Gupta learned Counsel are two-fold. He has urged that the learned Single Judge has misinterpreted Clause 21 of the contract pertaining to arbitration agreement, to come to the conclusion that after his retirement on 1-1-1991, the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to continue with the arbitration proceedings and give his award. Another argument raised by him is that the respondent is estopped from challenging the award on the ground that after his retirement the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction as they had acquiesced by participation in the arbitration proceedings without a demur and also by getting extension of four months for completion of the arbitration proceedings from this Court on 18-12-1990 in O. M. P. No. 16 of 1990. For making this submission Mr. Gupta has relied upon N. Chellappan v Secretary Kerala State Electricity Board and another; AIR 1975 SC 230 ; Prasun Roy v. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and another, AIR 1988 SC 205 and Mohinder Pal Mohindra v. Delhi Admn. and another, AIR 1989 Del 270. 4. On the other hand, Mr. C. L. Sharma, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, has supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge and has urged that Clause 21 of the contract has been correctly interpreted that only an Officer not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel could be appointed as Arbitrator, therefore, on his retirement Lt. Col. 4. On the other hand, Mr. C. L. Sharma, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, has supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge and has urged that Clause 21 of the contract has been correctly interpreted that only an Officer not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel could be appointed as Arbitrator, therefore, on his retirement Lt. Col. S M. Sood had no jurisdiction to continue as Arbitrator and give his award. Mr Sharma further submits that if by mistake the respondent continued participation in the arbitration proceedings and obtained order dated 18-12-1990 for extension of period of arbitration, they are not estopped from raising the objection of jurisdiction, which could not be conferred on the Arbitrator even by agreement of the parties. 5. Before we discuss the respective contentions of the parties, Clause 21 of the contract needs to be examined. It is :— "21. (a) In the event of any question, dispute or difference arising under these conditions or any special conditions of contract or in connection with this contract (except as to any matter the decision of which is specially provided for by these or the special conditions) the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the officer sanctioning the contract as per powers conferred by clause (i) of Article 299 of the Constitution, or any officer appointed by him not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel The award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties of this contract. (b) In the event of arbitrator to whomthe matter is referred denying, neglecting or refusing to act or resigning or being unable to act, including transfer to another place or his award being set aside by the court, or any reason, it shallbe lawful for the contract sanctioning officer to appoint another arbitrator in place of the outgoing arbitrator in the matter aforesaid. (c) It willbe no objection that the arbitrator is a Government servant provided that such arbitrator had not been associated withthe dispute or difference in question nor had expressed his views on any of the matters in such dispute or difference. (c) It willbe no objection that the arbitrator is a Government servant provided that such arbitrator had not been associated withthe dispute or difference in question nor had expressed his views on any of the matters in such dispute or difference. (d) It is further a term of the contract that no person other than the person appointed bythe contract sanctioning officer as aforesaid should act as arbitrator and that if for any reason that is not possible the matter is not to be referred to arbitration at all. (e) A demand for the arbitration shall be in writing and made within six months from the date of termination of contract. The date of termination of contract shall mean and include ;— (i) The last date of delivery of goods according to the terms of the contract. (ii) In case where the contract is cancelled wholly or partly the date when the letter of cancellation is issued. It is a\so a term of the contract that in case the contractor(s) do/does not make any demand for arbitration in writing within 180 days of receiving the intimation from the Government that the final bill in settlement of account is ready for payment or the date on which the dispute in regard to interpretation of terms of contract has arisen, the right of the contractor to claim arbitration will be deemed to have been extinguished and absolutely barred and by virtue of abandonment of the claims the Government shall be discharged and release of all liabilities arising out of the performance of the contract and the claim pertaining thereto. (f) The arbitrator may from time to time with the consent of the parties to the contract enlarge the time for making the award. (s) It is also a term of this contract that in case where the amount of claim of dispute is Rs. 30,000.00 and above, the arbitrator shall give reasons for his award. (h) The venue of the arbitration shall be in place from which the acceptance note was issued for such other place that the arbitrator at his discretion may determine. (j) Subject as aforesaid the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the rules thereunder and any statutory modifications thereof for the time being in force or in rules made thereunder shall apply to the arbitration proceeding under this clause. (j) Subject as aforesaid the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the rules thereunder and any statutory modifications thereof for the time being in force or in rules made thereunder shall apply to the arbitration proceeding under this clause. (k) It is a condition of this contract that more initiation or continuation of the arbitration proceeding shall operate as suspension or cessation of the rights and liabilities of the parties or the performance of this contract. (1) In this clause the expression "the officer sanctioning the contract" includes his successor in office or any other officer who is for the time being discharging the duties of such officer in addition to other functions or otherwise” 6. Interpreting the word officer used in sub-clause (a) of Clause 21, the learned Single Judge has held that after his retirement Lt. Col. S M. Sood no longer remained an officer and he had no jurisdiction to continue as Arbitrator, as such the award made by him is of a private person and is nullity. We respectfully disagree with this conclusion, though the word ‘officer has been correctly interpreted. The word officer has been used in sub-clause (a) of Clause 21 which provides that the dispute is to be referred to the sole arbitration of officer sanctioning the contract or any officer appointed by him not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In the event of such Arbitrator denying neglecting or refusing to act or resigning or being unable to act, including transfer to another place or his award being set aside by the court, or any reason, it is lawful for the contract sanctioning officer to appoint another arbitrator in place of the outgoing Arbitrator in the matter, is prescribed under sub-clause (b) of Clause 21.In other words under what circumstances the vacancy arises and how it can be supplied by the contract sanctioning officer, is provided in this sub-clause. Apparently, attaining the age of superannuation by the Arbitrator is not one of such occasions, but according to Mr. Sharma, appearing for the respondent, it is covered under the provision being unable to actor any reason. .We are unable to accept this submission. Had this been the intention, it would have been specifically provided, or vacating the office or superannuation as it has been done in respect of transfer. Sharma, appearing for the respondent, it is covered under the provision being unable to actor any reason. .We are unable to accept this submission. Had this been the intention, it would have been specifically provided, or vacating the office or superannuation as it has been done in respect of transfer. In fact, from the words used in this sub-clause it is clear that the contract sanctioning officer does not appoint another arbitrator unless the Arbitrator earlier appointed by him denies, neglects or refuses to act or resigns or shows his inability to act on his transfer to another place or his award being set aside by the Court or any other reason. If he does not show his inability on his attaining age of superannuation, no vacancy arises which can be supplied by the contract sanctioning officer. 7. Further, sub-clause (d) of Clause 21 provides that no person other than the person appointed by the contract sanctioning officer should act as Arbitrator and that if for any reason that is not possible, the matter is not to be referred to Arbitration at all. In this sub-clause the officer appoint ed as an Arbitrator is referred to as person, which shows that if after the appointment the Arbitrator does not remain an officer, he does not incur disqualification to continue as an Arbitrator Joint reading of sub-clauses (a), (b) and (d) does not suggest that the Arbitrator should continue holding the office till he gives his award by virtue of which office he was appointed as Arbitrator. 8. Mr. Sharma, appearing on behalf of the respondent has pointed out to an order of Supreme Court of India passed in Special Leave Petition (C)No, 13278 of 1986 titled M/s. Prestressed Concrete and Shellroofs (Pvt) Ltd. v. Union of India, a copy whereof is placed on record, to urge that after retirement from the office which the Arbitrator holds at the time of his appointment, he is not competent to proceed with arbitration proceedings. But in the Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, the sub-clause pertaining to supplying the vacancy was couched in a different language. It was that, "If the Arbitrator resigned or vacated his office or was unwilling or unable to act due to any reason what so ever, another Arbitrator would be appointed in his place". But in the Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, the sub-clause pertaining to supplying the vacancy was couched in a different language. It was that, "If the Arbitrator resigned or vacated his office or was unwilling or unable to act due to any reason what so ever, another Arbitrator would be appointed in his place". Giving meaning to the words vacated his office, which are not there in sub-clause (b) of Clause 21 in the present case, the Supreme Court has held that on his retirement the Arbitrator having vacated his office was not competent to proceed with the arbitration proceedings. Therefore, the ratio of the order of Supreme Court is not applicable to the present case where a sub-clause having different connotation is being interpreted. 9. The other argument raised on behalf of the appellant is also full of force that since the respondent had participated in the arbitration proceedings without demur after the retirement of the Arbitrator on 1-1-1991 and had also got extension of four months on 18-12-1990 from this Court in O M.P. (M ) No. 16 of 1990, they have acquiesced and are estopped from challenging the award on the ground that the arbitration proceedings held after the retirement of the Arbitrator on 1-1-1991 are void, because he had no jurisdiction to act as Arbitrator. In fact, it was the appellant who had objected to the continuation of the arbitration after the expiry of initial period of four months by filing an application dated 11-6-1990 before the Arbitrator which made the respondent to move O.M.P. (M.) No. 16 of 1990 for enlarging time by four months for giving the award by the Arbitrator. A copy of the application dated11-6-1990 is on record of O.M.P.(M ) No. 16 of 1990 as Annexure AA\ The appellant had not put in appearance in the application despite his service and the learned Single Judge of this Court proceeded to allow this application and extend period for four months by order dated 18-12-1990, from the date of order. After enlargement of time, the Arbitrator recorded statements of remaining witnesses on 5-4-1991, heard the parties and announced his award on 15-4-1991, to which proceedings the respondent acquiesced, participated and never objected that since he had retired on 1-1-1991, the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hold the proceedings. After enlargement of time, the Arbitrator recorded statements of remaining witnesses on 5-4-1991, heard the parties and announced his award on 15-4-1991, to which proceedings the respondent acquiesced, participated and never objected that since he had retired on 1-1-1991, the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hold the proceedings. It is only after the award has been made against the respondent that they have taken up this objection to challenge it, which they cannot be permitted to do so in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in N. Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and another; AIR 1975 SC 230. 10. For holding that what amount to acquiescence, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have referred to a para in Russet on Arbitration page 215, which is as under i— "If the parties to the reference either agree beforehand to the method of appointment, or afterwards acquiesce in the appointment made, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, they will be precluded from objecting to such appointment as invalidating subsequent proceedings. Attending and taking part in the proceedings with full knowledge of the relevant fact will amount to such acquiescence." Their Lordships have further referred to Chowdhri Murtaza Hussein v. Uu Bibi Bechunnissa, (1876) 3 Ind. App. 209 (PC) at p. 220, In which the Privy Council said |— "On the whole, therefore, their Lordships think that the appellant, having a clear knowledge of the circumstances on which he might have founded in objection to the arbitrators proceeding to make their award, did submit to the arbitration going on ; that he allowed the arbitrators to deal with the case as it stood before them, taking his chance of the decision being more or less favourable to himself; and that it is too late for him, after the award has been made, and on the application to file the award, to insist on this objection to the filing of the award." The conclusion arrived at by their Lordships was ;— “ Therefore, when the Board without demur participated in the proceedings before the umpire and took the chance of an award in its favour, it cannot turn round and say that the umpire had no inherent jurisdiction and therefore its participation in the proceedings before the umpire is of no avail. ...... ...... As the umpire became clothed with jurisdiction when the extended period for making the award by arbitrators expired, it cannot be said that he had no inherent jurisdiction .. .." 11. It is correct that umpire had jurisdiction by a consent order passed by the Court and also in view of Rule 4 in the first Schedule to the Arbitration Act but it did not make any difference as in the present case also there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction. The only point is whether on his retirement Lt. Col. S. M. Sood lost his jurisdiction because he was not holding the office of Lieutenant Colonel. We have already answered it in negative by interpreting sub-clauses (a), (b) and (d) of Clause 21 of the contract. Therefore, we do not agree that ratio of judgment of Supreme Court in the case of N. Chellappan does not apply in the present case in view of sub-clause (d) of Clause 21 of the contract as held by the learned Single Judge. 12. The judgment in the case of N. Chellappan was further relied upon by the Supreme Court in Prasun Roy v. The Calcutta Metropollitan Development Authority and another AIR 1988 SC 205.Besides considering the paragraph in ‘Russel on Arbitration’ and the judgment of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court also considered the judgment of Calcutta High Court in Arbn Jupiter General insee. Col. Ltd. V. Corpn. of Calcutta, Air 1956 Cal 470. and held. "Even in a case where initial order was not passed by consent of the parties a party by participation and acquiescent can preclude Future challenges.” 13 Meeting almost similar situation, the Delhi High Court in Mohinder Pal Mohindra v. Delhi Admn. and another, AIR 1989 Delhi 270 held that the Delhi Administration was estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of Arbitrator as it had participated in the proceedings without demur and had agreed in writing for extending the time form the award by the said Arbitrator even though the said Arbitrator had retired from service much earlier. and another, AIR 1989 Delhi 270 held that the Delhi Administration was estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of Arbitrator as it had participated in the proceedings without demur and had agreed in writing for extending the time form the award by the said Arbitrator even though the said Arbitrator had retired from service much earlier. The relevant clause before the Delhi High Court was;– "That Arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacate his office or being unable to act for any reason, such Chief Engineer or Administrative head, as aforesaid, at the time of such transfer, vacation of office or inability to act, shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with the term of the Contract." Comparing this clause with sub-clause (b) of Clause 21 with which we are dealing in the present case it is clear that in the clause before the Delhi High Court there was a specific provision of supplying the vacancy on the Arbitrator vacating his office which is absent in sub-clause (b) of Clause 21 in the present case. Despite this, the principle of acquiescence was applied and retirement was not held a disability divesting the Arbitrator from his jurisdiction. On the other hand, it is well settled that if there is some defect in the contract containing the arbitration clause or in the arbitration agreement itself amounting to inherent lack of jurisdiction in the na3 Arbitrator to deal with the arbitration proceedings, the parties by waiver or by participating therein would not cure the defect, make the agreement valid and confer jurisdiction on the Arbitrator. (Please refer to Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co., AIR 1963 SC 90 ; Hira Lal Pannalal v. Dalhousie Jute Co. Ltd., AIR 1978 Cal 119 ; Union of India v S.M Builders Association, AIR 1977 Gau 5). Admittedly, in the present case there is no defect in the arbitration agreement as well as in the agreement of Lt. Col. S. M Sood as Arbitrator, but there may be some irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by him after his retirement which also stood cured by the participation of the parties in the proceedings without a demur and also by seeking extension of time of four month11 17-12-1990 knowing fully well that the named Arbitrator was due to retire on 1-1-1991. In fact on the interpretation of sub-clauses (a) (b) and (d) of Clause 21 of the contract we have not even found any irregularity in con tinning holding the proceedings and giving award by the named Arbitrator after he stood retired. Therefore, we hold that in the facts and circumstances proved on record the respondent is estopped from challenging the proceedings of the arbitration and also the award on the ground that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction after he retired on 1-1-1991. 15. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the findings of the learned Single Judge that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make the award in question or he had misconducted himself or the proceedings after his retirement. No other point is urged before us nor Mr. C. L. Sharma, appearing on behalf of the respondent, has challenged the findings of the learned Single Judge on Issue No. 2 to show that the award was improperly procured or was invalid as alleged by them in their objection petition. Therefore, we make the award as rule of the Court Cost easy. Appeal allowed.