JUDGMENT 1. - Both these writ petitions are interrelated inasmuch as, while the Chief Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, has challenged the award, dated 5 December 1980, passed by the Labour Court, Jaipur, by which a declaration has been made that the termination of service of Narain Lal is unlawful, Narain Lai has filed a writ petition claiming that he should be given all benefits arising out of the award, dated 5 December 1980. 2. The facts of the case are that Narain Lai Verma was appointed as a work-charged employee by an order, dated 9 March 1960, of the Additional Chief Engineer, Health (P.W.D.), Jaipur. He was posted as assistant store keeper in the office of the Executive Engineer, District Division (Health), Jaipur. By an order of the Chief Engineer (Health), Jaipur, he was transferred from Jaipur to Ajmer and was posted under the Assistant Engineer, ' Survey and Drainage Sub-division, Ajmer. He was relieved by the Executive Engineer, District Division (Health), Jaipur, on 15 December 1962. Narain Lai submitted an application, dated 7 November 1962, for cancellation of transfer. His request was, however, turned down by the Chief Engineer and he was again told to join at Ajmer. Since he had not reported for duty at Ajmer, the Superintending Engineer (Health) issued a memorandum, dated 19 January 1963, for holding an inquiry against Narain Lai under the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (erroneously mentioned as 1950). A regular departmental enquiry was held in respect of three charges levelled against Narain Lai. A report was submitted by the Superintending Engineer (Health) in which he recorded findings that the charges levelled against Narain Lai have been proved. Notice was given to Narain Lai but, thereafter, nothing happened. Narain Lai submitted a representation, dated 27 September 1967 to the Chief Engineer (Health), Rajasthan, and in response to that representation, the Chief Engineer (Health), Rajasthan, Jaipur, informed Narain Lal vide letter dated 19 September 1967, that since he had not given any reply to letter No.H/G/-II(860)64/2795, dated 26 July 1964, the department presumed that he had nothing to say in the matter and, therefore, his service is deemed to be terminated with effect from the date of expiry of time limit mentioned in the show-cause notice. A copy of the letter, dated 21 July, 1964, was also sent to the petitioner in response to his request made, vide application, dated 28 December 1967. 3. Narain Lal then raised a dispute against the termination of his service and the Government made a reference of the dispute to the Labour Court, Jaipur, vide its notification, dated 8 September 1976. Narain Lai filed his statement of claim before the Labour Court which was contested by the employer. A number of preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the department. It was claimed that the Public Health Engineering Department does not come within the definition of the term "industry." It was also claimed that the provisions of the rules framed under the proviso to Art.309 are applicable to the case of Narain Lai and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on the dispute relating to termination of service. It was also pleaded that a regular departmental enquiry had been held against Narain Lai and after giving full opportunity of hearing to him his service was terminated by way of removal. Preliminary objections raised by the department against the maintainability of the reference and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court came to be decided on 12 October 1977. The Court held that the Public Health Engineering Department is an "industry" and also that Narain Lai was a workman. The Court overruled the objection that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. By another order, dated 9 August 1979, the Labour Court held that the departmental enquiry held against the workman did not suffer from violation of natural justice. It, however, left open the question as to whether the letter, dated 19 December 1967, can be treated as termination letter. Thereafter, the Labour Court heard arguments of the rival sides and passed the award, dated 5 December 1980, which has become the subject-matter of challenge in Writ Petition No.774 of 1982. 4. After the award was made by the Labour Court, Narain Lai submitted an application, dated 25 February 1981, and reported himself for duty. He requested that he be given posting. He repeated his request by sending reminders including Annexure 12, dated 26 November 1981, Filed along with Writ Petition No.5928 of 1992. 4. After the award was made by the Labour Court, Narain Lai submitted an application, dated 25 February 1981, and reported himself for duty. He requested that he be given posting. He repeated his request by sending reminders including Annexure 12, dated 26 November 1981, Filed along with Writ Petition No.5928 of 1992. In response to that letter, the Superintending Engineer-cum-Technical Assistant to the Chief Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, Jaipur, informed Narain Lai, vide letter, dated 1 January 1982, that against the award passed by the Labour Court, Jaipur, the writ petition was being filed by the department. 5. Writ Petition No.774 of 1982 was admitted by the Court on 11 October 1982, and in the stay application filed along with the writ petition the Court passed an interim order, dated 11 October 1982, staying the operation of the award. The writ petition was dismissed in default on 13 September 1991, because nobody appeared on behalf of the petitioner on the said date. After the dismissal of the writ petition, Narain Lai again reported himself for duty on 28 March 1992, by submitting application to the Chief Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department. He repeated his request by application, dated 24 April 1992, and then filed Writ Petition No. 592 of 1992 on 14 July 1992. 6. After the dismissal of Writ Petition No.774 of 1982, the petitioner in the said writ petition made an application for restoration. It was allowed by the Court on 20 August 1992, and then it was posted for hearing before the Court. 7. The argument of Sri Ravi Parihar, learned counsel for the department, is that the award passed by the Judge, Labour Court, suffered from error of law apparent on the face of it. Sri Parihar argued that the Labour Court has committed a patent illegality by going into the question of legality of termination of service of Narain Lai because this question had already been decided, vide order, dated 9 August 1979. He argued that once the Labour Court had passed the order, dated 9 August 1979, declaring that the enquiry held against Narain Lai was fair and in accordance with the principles of natural justice, it was not permissible for the Labour Court to have examined the same issue and to have recorded a contrary finding. He argued that once the Labour Court had passed the order, dated 9 August 1979, declaring that the enquiry held against Narain Lai was fair and in accordance with the principles of natural justice, it was not permissible for the Labour Court to have examined the same issue and to have recorded a contrary finding. Sri Parihar further submitted that the Labour Court has completely overlooked the fact that the reference was made after a lapse of almost 12 years of the termination of service of Narain Lai and there was no explanation for this long delay. Sri Parihar submitted that the service conditions of Narain Lai were regulated by the provisions contained in the service rules including the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, which have been framed by the Governor in exercise of its powers under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution of India and in respect of such employees the Labour Court could not have made an adjudication. His submission is that a person who falls within the definition of the term "workman" and who is also a civil servant cannot seek remedy before the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal. Sri Parihar then argued that the conduct of Narain Lai has throughout been contumacious. He had shown clear defiance of the orders passed by the competent authorities and when action had been taken against him after holding a proper and fair enquiry, the same should not have been interfered with by the Labour Court. His last submission is that Narain Lal must not be allowed the benefits of back-wages even if the Court was to come to the conclusion that the award passed by the Labour Court on the question of legality of the termination of service of Narain Lai is correct. Sri Rajesh Raj Kumawat, learned counsel for Narain Lai, argued that the award passed by the Labour Court must not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Sri Raj Kumawat submitted that the finding recorded by the Labour Court regarding absence of termination of service is a finding of fact and it does not suffer from any legal error. Sri Raj Kumawat submitted that the finding recorded by the Labour Court regarding absence of termination of service is a finding of fact and it does not suffer from any legal error. Sri Raj Kumawat then argued that after ;passing of the award by the Labour Court his client had promptly submitted his joining report and the departmental authorities did not give him posting for more than one year and six months. They simply waited till the passing of interim order by the High Court. Sri Raj Kumawat argued that since the departmental authorities are themselves at fault, there is no justification for denial of wages to the petitioner. 8. In so far as Writ Petition No.774 of 1982, Chief Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department v. Judge, Labour Court, Jaipur , is concerned, the question which arises for determination is as to whether the award passed by the Labour Court on 5 December 1980, suffers from an error apparent on the face of it. Even though Sri Parihar is correct in arguing that the Labour Court had decided the question of fairness of inquiry by its order, dated 7 August 1979, it is not possible to accept his further submission that in the face of the order, dated 9 August 1979 (Annexure 14 in Writ Petition No.774 of 1982), it should be treated as a bar against the consideration of the claim of Narain Lai that his service had never been terminated. In fact, in the order, dated 9 August 1979, itself, the Labour Court had left this question open as would appear from the following portion of the said order : "The Court at this stage is concerned with the domestic enquiry only. The validity of the termination order, if any, is not to be decided at this stage. The question of validity of termination and whether the letter, dated 19 December 1967, can he treated as termination letter or not is not the issue at this stage." 9. The Labour Court was, therefore, justified in examining the question as to whether it can he said that by letter, dated 19 December 1967, the service of workman Narain Lai stood terminated. 10. The Labour Court has recorded a finding of fact that the show-cause notice, dated 21 July 1964, was not served on the workman. The Labour Court was, therefore, justified in examining the question as to whether it can he said that by letter, dated 19 December 1967, the service of workman Narain Lai stood terminated. 10. The Labour Court has recorded a finding of fact that the show-cause notice, dated 21 July 1964, was not served on the workman. Its observation that the employer was obliged to prove the despatch of the said document to the workman and that in that case the employer had failed to lead any evidence sowing the despatch of show-cause notice to the workman along with requisite documents is correct. No material had been placed before the Labour Court and no such material has been placed before this Court to show that the letter, dated 21 July 1964, was sent to the workman. Narain Lai. There is also nothing on record to show that it was served on the workman, Narain Lai. Moreover, notice, dated 21 July 1964, cannot by itself be taken as an order of termination of service. The Labour Court was conscious of this situation and precisely for this reason it had in its order, dated 9 August 1979, observed that the validity of the termination order, if any, is not to be decided at this stage. Therefore, even if, for a moment the argument of learned counsel for the department is accepted that the show-cause notice had been served on the workman and he had not submitted any reply to the same, it cannot lead to an automatic consequence that his service stood terminated by way of punishment on account of filing of the reply. The employer, namely, the Chief Engineer or any other competent authority was under an obligation to pass a specific order for termination of service of Narain Lai and that was admittedly not done. A perusal of the award of the Tribunal, dated 5 December 1980, order, dated 9 August 1979, as also the writ petition show that the employer had neither pleaded nor has he established that after 21 July 1964, an order was made by the competent authority terminating the service of Narain Lai. In view of this finding recorded by the Labour Court in its award, dated 5 December 1980. deemed termination of service of the workman was illegal, is justified and does not call for any interference by this Court. In view of this finding recorded by the Labour Court in its award, dated 5 December 1980. deemed termination of service of the workman was illegal, is justified and does not call for any interference by this Court. Consequently, the finding recorded by the Labour Court that the workman continues to be in service also does not call for any interference. 11. The argument of Sri Parihar that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a dispute is based on misconceived notion that a person who is a workman and who also happens to be a civil servant cannot approach the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal for vindication of his rights. In the service jurisprudence which has developed in this country a large number of employees have dual status, i.e., they are civil servants and workmen for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The wide definition of the term "industry" brings within its fold various governmental activities undertaken by different Government departments. Persons engaged in those Government departments arc no doubt holders of civil posts but, at the same time, such persons may come within the definition of the word "workman"under the 1947 Act. These persons are entitled to the benefits under the industrial law as are admissible to other workmen. In fact, if more beneficial provisions are contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, such employee is entitled to those benefits irrespective of the fact that he is a civil servant or he is a holder of a civil post. Therefore, I do not find any justification for accepting the argument of Sri Parihar that the award passed by the Labour Court should he quashed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 12. The third submission of Sri Parihar relates to delay in the raising of the dispute. Sri Parihar argued that the workman had raised the dispute after a long delay and there is no justification for allowing him benefit of back-wages. I consider it appropriate to examine this question while considering the claim made by the petitioner, Narain Lai, in his Writ Petition No.5928 of 1992. 13. In his writ petition Narain Lal's claim is that after passing of the award it was obligatory for the respondent-department to have taken him on duty and to have given him entire back-wages. I consider it appropriate to examine this question while considering the claim made by the petitioner, Narain Lai, in his Writ Petition No.5928 of 1992. 13. In his writ petition Narain Lal's claim is that after passing of the award it was obligatory for the respondent-department to have taken him on duty and to have given him entire back-wages. Sri Rajesh Rajkumawat's argument is that the petitioner had submitted his joining report immediately after the award and the departmental authorities were clearly at fault in not allowing him to join duty. Sri Parihar argued that the petitioner had never reported for duty at Ajmer and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to say that he has not been allowed to join duty by the departmental authorities. However, a look at the documents filed along with Writ Petition No.5928 of 1992 shows that the petitioner did submit his joining report immediately after the award. He repeated his request on more than one occasion for being taken on duty. The Superintending Engineer wrote letter, dated 1 January 1982, (Annexure 13), that the Government has decided to file writ petition and only on that basis, Narain Lai was not allowed to join duty. It is, thus, clear that even though the petitioner had reported for duty, he was not taken hack in service. That stay order passed by the High Court on 11 October 1982. continued till the dismissal of the writ petition in default on 13 September 1991. Thereafter, the petitioner again made an application for being allowed to join duty. That too was not accepted. Thus, so far as the period after passing of the impugned award, dated 5 December 1980, is concerned, the petitioner cannot be said to be at fault for not working. It is the omission of the departmental authorities to have taken him on duty which resulted in the petitioner being kept out of employment. From 1982 to 1991, the stay order passed by the High Court operated and even though for about one year the stay order was not operative because of the dismissal of the writ petition in default, the departmental authorities did not take the petitioner on duty. 14. Thus, there can be no justification for denial of wages to the petitioner for the entire period for which Narain Lai had not discharged his duty. 14. Thus, there can be no justification for denial of wages to the petitioner for the entire period for which Narain Lai had not discharged his duty. There is justification to deny him wages for the period between the date of his transfer and the date on which he reported for duty in pursuance of the award. It would be quite unfair to award wages to the petitioner for this period because he is primarily responsible for remaining away from duty and the contribution of the departmental authorities is only to the extent that they acted with negligence in treating the service of the petitioner as automatically terminated. If they had passed a specific order for termination of service of the petitioner, the entire controversy may have come to a rest. 15. On the basis of the above discussion, it is held : " (i) The award, dated 5 December 1980, passed by the Judge, Labour Court, Jaipur, does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record and, therefore, does not call for interference by this Court. (ii) Narain Lai has a right to be reinstated in service. However, he is not entitled to wages between the date of his transfer by order, dated 14 September 1962, to the date of award. For the period between 5 December 1980, to the date of this order it will be appropriate to award 50 per cent. of the wages to the workman, Narain Lai. (iii) Service of Narain Lai between the date of transfer to the date of award should be regularised by grant of extraordinary leave and for the period between 5 December 1980, to the date of this order, it shall be treated as spent on duty for the purpose of fixation of pay, grant of increments, if any, and other service benefits." Both the writ petitions are decided in the manner indicated above. Parties are left to bear their own costs. *******