Judgment : The 1st defendant-judgment-debtor has filed this civil revision petition against the order in E.P.No.60 of 1993, allowing the said execution petition filed by the decree-holder-respondent for issue of warrant for delivery of possession of the suit property, pursuant to the partition final decree passed on 24. 1992 in O.S.No.576 of 1983. 2. The only contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the execution petition itself is not maintainable in view of the following facts: On 26. 1992 itself the decree-holder filed Ex.B-1 memo in the suit, praying for recording full satisfaction of the decree on the footing that the decree-holder had taken possession as per the final decree, outside court. Further pursuant to the said memo, on 30.6.1992 the court also recorded full satisfaction accordingly. Therefore, according to the said counsel for petitioner, the present E.P.No.60 of 1993 filed on 2. 1993 is not maintainable. The learned counsel also relies on the decisions in Kunhanan v. Mamma Beary, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 137 and Ramaganesan v. Rajah Ayyar, (1963)2 M.L.J. 162:A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 53: 76 L.W. 414: I.L.R. (1963) Mad. 911 (F.B.). 3. 1 also find that the petitioner filed O.E. ANo.379 of 1992 on 212. 1992 to set aside the abovesaid order dated 30.6.1992, but that the said execution application was not pressed and hence it was dismissed on 21. 1993. Further, few days prior to 212. 1992, that is on 112. 1992, the petitioner filed O.S.No.521 of 1992 for permanent injunction against possession interference with reference to the property in question and also filed I.A.No.775 of 1992 for temporary injunction along with the said suit on the footing that be continues to be in possession of the said property. In I.A.No.775 of 1992, the respondent-decrec-holder contended in his counter-affidavit dated 11. 1993-that he has already taken possession and that hence, the abovesaid memo dated 26. 1992 was filed. The said interlocutory application was, therefore, dismissed on 23. 1993 as shown by Ex.B-3. 4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the above E.P.No.60of 1993 has been filed on 2. 1993 without disclosing the abovesaid order dated 21. 1993 in the abovesaid O.E.A.No.379 of 1992 or the pendency of the abovesaid I.ANo.775 of 1992 and the Court below, though has dismissed I.A.No.775 of 1992 on 23. 1993 as shown by Ex.B-3. 4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the above E.P.No.60of 1993 has been filed on 2. 1993 without disclosing the abovesaid order dated 21. 1993 in the abovesaid O.E.A.No.379 of 1992 or the pendency of the abovesaid I.ANo.775 of 1992 and the Court below, though has dismissed I.A.No.775 of 1992 on 23. 1993, holding that the decree-holder had already taken possession pursuant to the abovesaid memo, strangely allowed the execution petition by order dated 7. 1993, holding that the order dated 30.6.1992 recording full satisfaction as per the abovesaid memo is illegal. The said counsel argues that even though the decree-holder did not contend that the order dated 30.6.1992 was illegal, the court below has allowed the execution petition on the ground that it is illegal, relying on the mere pendency of O.E.A.No.216 of 1992 filed by the decree-holder for stay of the final decree proceedings (though no stay as such was given in O.E.A.No.216 of 1992) and the pendency of O.S.No.521 of 1992. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-decree-holder argues thus: The conduct of the judgment-debtor himself in having filed O.E.A.No.375 of 1992 and O.S.No.521 of 1992 and I.A.No.775 of 1992 therein shows that delivery was actually not effected earlier, though the abovesaid memo of the decree-holder and the consequent order of the court below dated 30.6.1992 and the stand taken later also by the decree-holder that delivery was taken, show that delivery was actually effected. He further argues that the decree-holder should not be driven to another suit for possession despite the fact that he fought up to the Supreme Court in the present suit, which came to be filed as early as 1976. He also relies on K.Ramalingam v. K.N.K.Reddi, A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 325: (1974)1 M.L.J. 142 : 87 L.W. 63, which also considered and explained Kimhanan v. Mammu Beary, A.I.R. 1961 S.C 737 as well as Ramaganesan v. Rajah Ayyar, (1963)2 M.L.J. 162: A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 53: 76 L.W. 414: I.L.R. (1963) Mad. 911 (F.B.). He also submits that in the above circumstances there is no case for interference under Sec.115, C.P.C., particularly in the light of Chennichi alias Periakkal v. Srinivasan Chetriar, (1970)1 M.L.J. 234 . and Balambika v. Elizabeth, 1990 T.L.N.J. 116. 6. I have considered the rival submissions. 53: 76 L.W. 414: I.L.R. (1963) Mad. 911 (F.B.). He also submits that in the above circumstances there is no case for interference under Sec.115, C.P.C., particularly in the light of Chennichi alias Periakkal v. Srinivasan Chetriar, (1970)1 M.L.J. 234 . and Balambika v. Elizabeth, 1990 T.L.N.J. 116. 6. I have considered the rival submissions. There is great force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent-decree-holder. The conduct of the judgment-debtor in having filed O.E.A.No 379 of 1992 and O.S.No.521 of 1992 and also I.ANo.775 of 1992 shows that delivery was not actually effected earlier as per the memo of the decree-holder or the subsequent stand taken by him. In K.Ramalingam v. K.N.K.Reddi, .A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 325: (1974)1 M.L.J. 142 : 87 L.W. 63, this Court sumed up the position clearly after considering many earlier decisions, including Kunhanan v. Mammu Beary, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 137 and Ramaganesan v. Rajah Ayyar, (1963)2 M.L.J. 162: A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 53: 76 L.W. 414: I.L.R. (1963) Mad. 911 (F.B.). In paragraph 17 of its judgment, it concluded thus: "Thus it is clear from the aforesaid decision that whatever may be the conflict between some decisions regarding filing on execution petition for a second time after the decree for possession has been satisfied, one thing is certain that if on the previous occasion there was no legal, complete or effective delivery, a second execution petition was not a bar. As far as the present case is concerned, the judgment-debtors (appellants) themselves accept the fact that there was no actual physical delivery given to the decree-holder. They have come forward with a specific case that the alleged handing over of actual possession is not true and that as a matter of fact they are in possession of the property. The only persons who could object to a second execution petition if filed, on the basis that the decree has already been satisfied, themselves state that there was no legal complete or effective delivery of the property. In these circumstances, there is absolutely no substance in the argument that a subsequent execution petition will be objected to as a bar as if it will be a second execution petition filed after the decree has been satisfied." 7. In these circumstances, there is absolutely no substance in the argument that a subsequent execution petition will be objected to as a bar as if it will be a second execution petition filed after the decree has been satisfied." 7. Even in Kunhanan v. Mammu Beary, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 137, it was observed thus: "How under 0.21, Rule 35, a person in possession and bound by the decree has to be removed only if necessary, that it to say, if necessary to give the decree-holder the possession he is entitled to and asks for. It would not be necessary to remove the person in possession if the decree-holder does not want such removal. It is open to the decree-holder to accept delivery of possession under that rule without actual removal of the person in possession. If he does that then he cannot later any that he has not been given that possession to which he was entitled under the law. This is what happened in this case." So, the said Supreme Court case is distinguishable from the facts of the present case, as explained above. Likewise in K.Ramalingam v. K.N.K.Reddi, A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 325: (1974)1 M.L.J. 142 :87 L. W. 63, also the facts were different from the Supreme Court case and that is why the said A.I.R.1974 Mad. 325 also observed, after referring to the said Supreme Court decision, thus: "From the above stated Supreme Court decision it is clear that if the decree-holder is satisfied with alleged delivery of possession, whether physical or symbolical, he cannot on a subsequent date ask for actual possession by filing a second execution petition; subsequent execution petition can be entertained only in cases where there was no legal, complete and effective delivery of possession on the earlier occasion." 8. So, both K.Ramalingam v. K.N.K.Reddi, A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 325: (1974)1 M.L.J. 142 :87 L. W. 63 and the present case are cases where there were no effective delivery of possession on the earlier occasion and it would be highly unjust to drive the decree-holder to a separate suit for possession when he has succeeded in this suit, which was initiated as early as 1976. 9. Even in Ramaganesan v. Rajah Ayyar, (1963)2 M.L.J. 162: A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 53: 76 L.W. 414: I.L.R. (1963) Mad. 9. Even in Ramaganesan v. Rajah Ayyar, (1963)2 M.L.J. 162: A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 53: 76 L.W. 414: I.L.R. (1963) Mad. 911 (F.B.), it was held on facts thus: "From the principle laid down in these cases it would follow that symbolical delivery of possession effected on 27. 1957 in the instant case would have no legal effect." In the said case, this Court on to observe further thus: "But in a case where possession has been lawfully given in any one of the three kinds specified above, it would not be competent for the decree-holder or purchaser to apply again for delivery (actual or constructive) unless there was no legal, complete or effective delivery on the earlier occasion." So, there is no difficulty for me in concurring with the impugned order in the Execution petition. Further, in view of Chenichi alias Periakkal v. Srinivasan Chettiar, (1970)1 M.L.J. 234 and Balam-bika v. Elizabeth, 1990 T.L.N.J. 116 also, I will not be justified in interfering with the impugned order under Sec115, C.P.C. When substantial justice has been done by the said order. 10. The civil revision petition is therefore, dismissed. No costs.