JUDGMENT T. L. VISWANATHA IYER, J. - K. A. Nayar, J., had declined to interfere in a similar case, O.P. No. 9935 of 1988 (Nanukuttan v. Sales Tax Officer - Kerala High Court decided on November 2, 1989). The challenge is one of discrimination against manufacturers of wire-cut bricks like the petitioners. I shall just point out as to how counsel for the petitioner developed his arguments. A notification, exhibit P1, was issued on November 19, 1973 by the Government of Kerala under section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 ("the Act") exempting the purchase of firewood and clay by manufacturers of tiles for use in the manufacture of tiles within the State from the levy of tax under section 5A of the Act. Another notification, exhibit P3, was issued on March 31, 1979 by which the purchase of firewood and clay by manufacturers of country bricks for use in their manufacture of country bricks by manual labour was exempted from payment of tax, provided the turnover of the manufacturer did not exceed Rs. 20,000 in a year. Another notification, exhibit P2, was issued on the same day March 31, 1979, exempting country bricks sold by manufacturers of country bricks whose total turnover did not exceed Rs. 20,000 a year from levy of tax. Petitioners' grievance is that manufacturers of country bricks with turnover of less than Rs. 20,000 in a year have been given the benefit of exemption from payment of tax on the sale of their products as also on the purchase of firewood and clay, for use in the manufacture, but no such exemption is given to manufacturers of wire-cut bricks. This is discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution. The same argument was raised before K. A. Nayar, J., without success on O.P. No. 9935 of 1988 (Nanukuttan v. Sales Tax Officer decided on November 2, 1989 - Kerala High Court). But in deference to the arguments addressed at length by counsel for the petitioners, I shall deal with the point afresh. Counsel for the petitioners referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahant Moti Das v. S. P. Sahi AIR 1959 SC 942 , Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat AIR 1975 SC 1234 and Arya Vaidya Pharmacy v. State of Tamil Nadu [1989] 73 STC 346; AIR 1989 SC 1230 . Counsel for the petitioners referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahant Moti Das v. S. P. Sahi AIR 1959 SC 942 , Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat AIR 1975 SC 1234 and Arya Vaidya Pharmacy v. State of Tamil Nadu [1989] 73 STC 346; AIR 1989 SC 1230 . In the first of these cases the Supreme Court stated that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation, and in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. This was reiterated in the second case of Anant Mills AIR 1975 SC 1234 . The third case referred to was one in which the distinction made in Tamil Nadu between arishtams and asavas on one side and medicinal preparations on the other for the purpose of sales tax was struck down as violative of article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that arishtams and asavas are medicinal preparations, and even though they have a high alcohol content, so long as they continue to be identified as medicinal preparations, they must be treated, for the purpose of the sales tax law, in like manner as medicinal preparations generally including those containing a lower percentage of alcohol. Thus the levy of higher rate of sales tax on these two ayurvedic medicinal preparations on the ground that they contained a high percentage of alcohol was held discriminatory. The law is settled that classification by itself is not bad provided it has a reasonable basis. The State is entitled to classify the objects even for the purpose of the law of taxation, provided a reasonable basis is discernible for the classification effected by them. As was observed by the Supreme Court in Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer [1963] 48 ITR 21; AIR 1963 SC 591 if there is equality and uniformity within each group, into which the classification is made, the law will not be condemned as discriminative. Taxation law is not an exception to this doctrine. As was observed by the Supreme Court in Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer [1963] 48 ITR 21; AIR 1963 SC 591 if there is equality and uniformity within each group, into which the classification is made, the law will not be condemned as discriminative. Taxation law is not an exception to this doctrine. In view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, the Constitution permits a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification for the purpose of taxation so long as it adheres to the fundamental principles underlying the said doctrine. So long as those within the net of taxation can be legitimately classified together indicating an intelligible differentia vis-a-vis those left out and the classification so made bears a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved the classification is permissible and is not violative of article 14 of the Constitution. The question, therefore, is whether there is a reasonable classification in so far as small manufacturers of country bricks are concerned, while granting them the benefit of exemption under exhibits P2 and P3. Though the point raised is one of discrimination and violation of article 14 of the Constitution, and the writ petition was filed as early as on March 17, 1989, the respondents have not chosen to file any counter-affidavit explaining the classification which they have made between country bricks manufacturing units and wire-cut bricks manufacturing units. But I do not find any reason to brand the two notifications as discriminatory merely because of the laxity on the part of the respondents in filing an affidavit explaining the classification. The exemption under exhibits P2 and P3 is only in favour of manufacturers of country bricks whose turnover does not exceed Rs. 20,000 in a year. It is evidently intended for the benefit of the small manufacturers of country bricks which are generally used by the poorer sector of the population. The purpose of the exemption to country bricks manufacturers is firstly to the smaller units among the country brick manufacturers, and secondly to help the poorer sectors of the people who use country bricks for their purposes. It is intended to provide an incentive to the poorer sections to resort to manufacture of country bricks (especially by employing manual labour) to improve employment potential and make bricks available to poor people at reasonable rates. It is intended to provide an incentive to the poorer sections to resort to manufacture of country bricks (especially by employing manual labour) to improve employment potential and make bricks available to poor people at reasonable rates. This is the underlying idea in confining the relief to small manufacturers, that too of country bricks and that too employing manual labour. As observed in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India [1989] 74 STC 102 (SC); [1989] 178 ITR 97 (SC), in order to ascertain whether persons are similarly placed, one must look beyond the classification and to the purport of the law. Mathew, J., observed in S. Kodar v. State of Kerala [1974] 34 STC 73 (SC); AIR 1974 SC 2272 that a large dealer occupies a position of economic superiority by reason of his volume of business and to make the tax heavier on him absolutely and relatively is not arbitrary discrimination but an attempt to proportion the payment to a capacity to pay and thus to arrive in the end at a more general equality. (Kerala Hotel & Restaurant Association v. State of Kerala) [1990] 77 STC 253 (SC); AIR 1990 SC 913 . It cannot therefore be said that in granting exemption to such weaker sections of the people, or for their benefit, Government has transgressed the limits set by article 14 against classification in as much as there is a very sound rationale behind the classification, and the benefits given to the smaller country bricks manufacturing units. This is sufficient to dispel the arguments of counsel for the petitioners, wire-cut brick manufacturers whose units and investments are larger, products costlier and whose markets are expansive and among the more affluent in society. Therefore, there is no reason to brand exhibits P2 and P3 as discriminatory or as violating article 14 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter, there is no scope for considering the petitioners' prayer for directing the respondents to remove the discrimination by extending the benefits of exhibits P2 and P3 to manufacturers of wire-cut bricks also even assuming that it is possible for this Court to entertain such a request. Original petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.