Judgment G.C. Bharuka, J. This civil revision application is directed against the order dated 17.3.1992 passed by the learned Munsif, Khagaria in Title Execution Case No. 23/91 by which he has refused to stay the execution and delivery of possession as prayed on behalf of the petitioner. 2. The relevant facts pertaining to the question involved may be stated in short. The execution case in question relates to an eviction suit filed under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (in short the 'Act' hereinafter) numbered as T.E. No. 11. 90. The Suit premises was originally let out to one Sri Bindeshwari Prasad on the monthly rental of Rs.200/- Who died leaving behind his heirs being opposite party 2nd set and the petitioner of the present revision application. The opposite party 1st filed the aforesaid suit on the ground of personal necessity impleading all the heirs of the or-iginaJ tenant of late Bindeshwari Prasad. All the defendants except the petitioner appeared in the suit. On contest the suit was decreed and an order for eviction was passed. Some of the defendants filed a revision application in this Court challenging the said decree and order under section 14 (8) of the Act being C.R. No. 862 of 1991 but after notice and hearing the parties the revision application was dismissed on 1.8.1991 thereby upholding the judgment and decree of the trial court. The plaintiff opposite party no. 1 filed Execution - Case No. 23 of 1991 for recovery of possession. During the pendency of the said execution case the petitioner filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 in the eviction suit for setting aside the decree which was numbered as Misc. Case No. 19 of 1991 and also filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the execution case for staying the delivery of possession till the disposal of the said application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C. The prayer of the petitioner was rejected by the Executing Court by the impugned order, hence this revision application. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Murli Manohar Parsad Vrs. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Murli Manohar Parsad Vrs. Parwati Devi, reported in 1988 BLJ 2, the court below ought to hare resorted to its jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code and, ought to have granted the stay of the execution proceedings pending the final disposal of the aforesaid application filed by him under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. 4. On the other hand Mr. Sukumar Sinha, appearing for plaintiff Opposite party no. 1, has submitted that in the facts of the present case the decision in the case of Murli Manohar Prasad (Supra) has no application and the court below has rightly rejected the application for stay. He submitted that the decree passed in the present case has merged in the order passed by this Court in the above referred C.R. No. 862 of 1991 which has affirmed the decree of eviction passed by the trial court and therefore no application for setting aside the decree was maintainable before the trial court in support of his submission he has relied on the case of Shanker Ram Chandro Abhyanker Vrs. Krishnaji Dattatrayo, reported in AIR 1970 S.C. 1 . Mr. Sinha further submitted that even otherwise neither the application filed by the petitioner under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code nor one filed for stay of proceeding was maintainable for the reason that keeping in view the line of succession pro vided by the statute under section 2 (h) or the Act, the defendant petitioner cannot be deemed to be a tenant in respect of the premises in question and therefore, no application at his instance for resisting the eviction from the suit premises is maintainable. 5. Section 2 (h) of the Act provides as follows: "tenant" means any person by whom, or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes- (i) a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour ;and (ii) a person who occupies a building as an employee of the landlord of such building either on payment of rent or otherwise. (iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and condition specified, respectively, in Explanation I and II to this clause, such of the aforesaid persons- (a) Spouse: (b) son or unmarried daughter, or where there are both, both of them; (c) parents; (d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of predeceased son, as had been ordinarily residing: in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to he date of his death, but does not include any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made. Explanation I.-The order 80 succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be a follows:- (a) firstly by his surviving spouse; (b) Secondly, his son or unmarried daughter or both if there is no surviving 'spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily reside with the deceased person as a member of his family up to the date of his death; (c) thirdly, his parents, if there is no surviving spouse, son or unmarried daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son or unmarried daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily reside in the premises as a member of the family of deceased up to the date of his death; and (d) Fourthly his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, unmarried daughter or parent of the deceased person, or it such surviving spouse, son, unmarried daughter or parent, or any of them did not ordinarily reside in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death. Explanation II - If the person, who acquires by succession, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, was not financially dependent on the deceased person on the date of his death, such successor shall acquire such right for a limited period of one year, and on the expiry of the period or on his death, which ever is earlier, the right of such succession to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy shall become extinguished. Explanation III - For the removal of the doubts, it is hereby declared that- (a) Where due to Explanation II, the right of any successor to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy is extinguished, such extinguishment shall not affect the right of any other successor of the same category, the right for continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy shall not, on such extinguishment, pass on to any other successor specified in any lower category or categories as the case may be; (b) The right of every successor, referred to Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him/her and shall not on the death of such successor devolve on any of his heirs." 6. Without entering into the intricacies and niceties involved in the law relating to landlord and tenant, for the present purpose keeping in view the Jaw declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt, Gian Devi Anand vrs. Jeevan Kumar & ors., reported in AIR 1985 S.C. 796 , it is suffice to hold that both the contractual as well as the statutory tenancy create a heritable right on the death of the tenant and the possession of the heirs and legal representatives cannot be interfered with except in accordance with jaw. It was keeping in view this aspect of law that the legislature, possibly, to avoid hardships to the landlords has set out a statutory line of limited succession in respect of such tenancies and has specifically provided that the right to continue in possession will be the personal right of the successor and the said fight will extinguish with his death. At this stage I may observe that the expression "continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy" as appearing in Section 2 (h) (iii) is not quite unintelligible in the context of the Bihar Statute and if construed strictly it will render the entire provision almost nugatory. Therefore, keeping in view the purpose of the legislation and particularly the provisions in question, the order or succession provided by the legislature has to be held as applicable in all such cases where the tenant either contractual or statutory dies while in possession 7. Therefore, keeping in view the purpose of the legislation and particularly the provisions in question, the order or succession provided by the legislature has to be held as applicable in all such cases where the tenant either contractual or statutory dies while in possession 7. It is well settled that at times though the intention of the legislature is clear but unskilfullness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language. The Courts have always strongly lean against reducing a statute to a futility and accordingly, it has been held to be permissible in such cases to reject the surplus words to make a statute effective and workable. (Refer Salmon Vs. Duncombe, (1886) 11 Ac 627 (PC). 8. Keeping in view the necessity of a harmonious and purposive construction, the expression "after the termination of his tenancy" as used in clause (iii) of the above referred definition clause in question is held to be surplus. 9. In view the above referred provisions as interpreted in the foregoing paragraphs, in the present case since the wife of the deceased tenant was alive, she was the only tenant in respect of the suit premises and admittedly she on contest has lost her right to remain in possession up to the High Court. In this view of the matter even if the petitioner, being one of the sons of the deceased tenant, had for any reason not appeared in the suit that by itself could not have been a ground for staying the execution proceeding at his instance. 10. Further in view the facts and the circumstances of the case, the decision of this Court in Murli Manohur Prasad (supra.) has no application because refusal to stay the execution proceeding in no way could have caused in justice to the petitioner since he had no right of possession over the property in question. 11. For the foregoing discussions, in my opinion, there is no merit in this application, which is accordingly rejected with cost assessed at Rs.500/-. Application dismissed with costs.