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1993 DIGILAW 663 (ALL)

Committee of Management of Sri Maheshwar Inter College, Sasni Gate, Aligarh v. State of U. P.

1993-11-10

S.P.SRIVASTAVA

body1993
Judgment : S.P. Srivastava 1. A managerial dispute in respect of the running and management of 'Shri Maheshwar Inter College' Aligarh, which is an educational institution imparting education up to the standard of class XII and stands duly recognised under the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed thereunder, which institution is also receiving grants-in-aid and is within the purview of High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries to Teachers and other Employees), Act, 1971 (U. P. Act no. 24 of 1971) led to the filing of a large number of writ petitions, wherein the rival claimants Committees of Management. -One with Nand Lal Kela as its Manager and other with Sri Shanti Swarup Maheshwari as its Manager succeeded in obtaining various stay orders from this Court at different stages, has now finally culminated in writ petitions nos. 36699 of 1993 and 36700/1993 both of which are directed against the same order passed by the Regional Deputy Director of of Education, Agra region, Agra dated 23-9-93 where under the City Magistrate, Aligarh in his official capacity has been appointed as a 'Prabandh Sanchalak' for the institution indicating the purpose for this appointment to be the removal of the irrgegularities and compliance of the departmental as well as governmental orders as well as implementation of the provisions contained in the approved Scheme of Administration. Both the rival Committees of Management indicated hereing before claim to be aggrieved by the impugned order which has the effect of divesting a Committee of Management of the jurisdiction in relation to the management of an educational institution which under the impugned order is to vest in the 'Prabahdh Sanchalak' appointed thereunder. 2. BOTH the Committees of Management have prayed for the quashing of the impugned order dated 23-9-93 and a further relief preventing interference in their running and managing the institution. Heard Sri Ashok Khare and Sri B. B. Paul, learned counsel for parties and perused the record. In controverti by the Maheshwar Inter College, Aligarh 'referred to to above is run and managed under a 'Scheme of Administration' as contemplated in the provisions contained in the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed thereunder which is duly approved by the Director of Education. In controverti by the Maheshwar Inter College, Aligarh 'referred to to above is run and managed under a 'Scheme of Administration' as contemplated in the provisions contained in the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed thereunder which is duly approved by the Director of Education. The Director of Education had proposed several amendments in the approved 'Scheme of Administration' vide his order dated 21-7-81, the compliance whereof was sought by the District Inspector of Schools whereupon the Managing Committee Maheshwar Inter College, Aligarh through Sri Nand Lal Kela along with several other Committees of Management of various other Colleges filed a writ petition no. 6545 of 1984 challenging the proposed amendments. In this writ petition this Court had granted a stay order on 2-5-84 where under the respondents were directed not to compel the petitioners to comply with the requirements of U. P. Act no. 1 of 1981 in so far as it provided for the amendment of the Scheme of Administration in accordance with the proviso to sub-clause (3) of the third Schedule under section 8-CC. The aforesaid writ petition has, however, been dismissed on 1-11-93. 3. FROM the meterlais on record it appears that the tenure of the Committee of Management which had been recognised and was in effective control of the running and management of the institution was to expire on 2-7-89. Is is also not disputed that at least from the year 1989 onwards nothing was done to constitute a Committee of Management in accordance with the provisions contained in the duly approved Scheme of Administration and no elections have been held for the purpose. However, it may be noticed that it is alleged that on 9-6-89 a Committee of Management was elected with Nand Lal Kela as Manager. It is also alleged that a Committee of Management was elected on 16-7-89 with Shanti Swamp Maheshwari as Manager. Since no elections have admittedly been held subsequent to the year 1989 for constituting a Committee of Management, there can be no manner of doubt that the tenure of a Committee of Management as prescribed under the duly approved Scheme of Administration having come to an end by efflux of time, the alleged elections dated 9-6-89 and 16-7-89 where under the rival claimant Committees of Management are said to have come into existence have lost all their significance. 4. 4. IN connection with above it may be usefully noticed that in its decision in the case of Committee of Management Indira Gandhi Inter College v. District Inspector of Schools decided by a Division Bench of this court, 1992 UP LB EC 505, it has been clarified that where the term of the members of a Committee of Management has come to an end by efflux of time, the Committee of Management ceases to exist even though its office bearers may have been authorised by the scheme of Administration itself to continue to function till their successors are elected. This court had emphasised that such a provision does not have the effect of extending the life of the Committee of Management after the term of its members has come to an end. A perusal of the approved Scheme of Administration a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure I to the writ petition no. 36699 of 1993 indicates that the term of the Committee of Management contemplated therein was only three years, There is nothing to Indicate in the aforesaid Scheme of Administration that after the expiry of the tenure of the Committee of Management the office bearers were to continue to function till their successors were elected. In the circumstances, therefore taking into consideration the ratio of the decision referred to above the conclusion that the Committees of Management claimed to have been elected in the year 1989 as indicated above ceased to exist is inescapable. 5. THE provisions contained in section 16 A of the Intermediate Education Act stipulate that there shall the a 'Scheme of Administration' for every institution which shall, amongst other matters provide for the constitution of a Committee of Management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. Section 16-CC of the Act provides that 'Scheme of Administration' in relation to any institution shall not be inconsistant with the principles laid down in the: third schedule. Apart from other matters prescribed in the third Schedule it is laid down there that the scheme of administration shall provide for the procedure for constituting the Committee of Management by periodical 'elections'. 6. Apart from other matters prescribed in the third Schedule it is laid down there that the scheme of administration shall provide for the procedure for constituting the Committee of Management by periodical 'elections'. 6. AS indicated in the decision of this Court in the case of Committee of Management, Kisan Inter College and another v. Deputy Director of Education and others decided on 29-10-93 it is clear that the Committee of Management has to be elected in accordance with the procedure prescribed therefor in the Scheme of Administration duly approved by the Director. The word 'election' in the context of the aforesaid provisions and the approved Scheme of Administration, it seems to me, means the final selection of the candidates for constituting the Committee of Management for occupying the office of either the office bearers or the members of the Committee of Management by taking poll when polling is necessary and without taking poll when the candidate is returned unopposed. It may further be noticed that the exercise of the jurisdiction in the matter relating to the grant of recognition to a Committee of Management, even on administrative level, is a matter of considerable importance as it may, some times, result in divesting the Society of the rights to manage the institution established by it and to that extent it is bound to interfere with the institutional rights and may even involve temporary or partial deprivation of the right to manage and hold property. The determination of the question relating to the grant of recognition to a Committee of Management necessarily involves resolving a conflict between institutional interest on the one hand and the public interest on the other though on purely administrative level. It may further be emphasised that there always exists the imperative need to balance the institutional interest. The affairs of an educational institution must be conducted in accordance with law and it is of utmost importance that an atmosphere conducive to the development of education is ensured and maintained which in fact, is always the object that an institution receiving the grants-in aid from the state is supposed to serve. 7. The affairs of an educational institution must be conducted in accordance with law and it is of utmost importance that an atmosphere conducive to the development of education is ensured and maintained which in fact, is always the object that an institution receiving the grants-in aid from the state is supposed to serve. 7. IN the present case what I find is that the provisions contained in the approved Scheme of Administration referred to herein above, clearly stipulate that all the members of the Committee of Management except the ex-officio members have to be elected by the executing Committee of the Maheshwari Samaj (registered) in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 4187 of 1992 it has been asserted by Sri Nand Lal Kela that a registered Society' Sri Maheshwari Samaj, Aligarh' used to run the College but after the formation of a new registered Society in the name and style of Maheshwar Inter College Sasani Gate, the College is being run by the new Society with effect from 9-6-89. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Sri Nand Lal Kela in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 3002 of 1993 it has been asserted that the society 'Sri Mahashwar Inter College Sasani Gate, Aligarh' is a registered Society which is running the College. If has further been asserted that in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 18180 of 1989 Vineet Kela v. Assistant Registrar, Societies of 1989 Vineet Kela v, Assistant Registrar, Societies and others a stay order was issued on 16-10-89 by this court where under the Maheshwari Samaj through P. P. Maheshwari Sri S. S. Maheshwari, R, N. Maheshwari, N. Mohta and Sohan Pal Maheshwari were restrained from interfering with the management of Sri Maheshwar Inter College. Learned counsel contends that the stay order passed in favour of Vineet Kela, the sole petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 18180 of 1989 restraining Che Mahehswari Samaj through Prem Prakash Maheshwari, its secratary as well as Shanti Swarup Maehswari, Jai Narain Mohta and Sohan Pal Maheshwari from interferin with the Management of Sri Maheshwar Inter College, which stay order is still subsisting totally negatives the claim of the Committee of Management with Shanti Swarup Maheshwari as its Manager about recognition as Committee of Management as the duly constituted committee of Management for the College. The learned counsel further contends that in face of the aforesaid injunction order no recognition could be granted to a committee of Management elected by the society 'Maheshwari Samaj for the purpose of running and managing the institution in question. Learned counsel in Civil Misc. writ petition no. 36700/ 93 however, contends that the aforesaid stay order granted by this court at the instance of Vineet Kela cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner Committee of Management with Nand Lal Kela as its Manager not only because in view of the mandatory provisions contained in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution, the said stay order is to be deemed to have been vacated as inspire of the requisite conditions contemplated therein having been satisfied the application for vacation of the stay order has not been disposed of within the time limit stipulated thereunder but also in view of the fact that the aforesaid stay order has to be taken to be an order in favour of the sole petitioner in the aforesaid writ petition and in any case cannot over-ride the statutory provisions contained in the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed there under. It has been emphasised that in civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 18180/1988 the petitioner had impleaded only the Assistant Registrar Firms, Societies and Chits, Agra region, Agra and Kalyan Singh, Assistant Registrar Firms, Societies and chits, Agra beside those to which a reference has been made above and neither the State Government nor the concerned Deputy Director of Education nor the concerned District Inspector of Schools or even the Committee of Management which had been recognised by the competent authorities under the provisions of the U P. Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed thereunder had been impleaded. The contention raised by him that in such a situation the injunction order dated 16-10-89 did not bind the aforesaid authorities and they were free to act in accordance with law and exercising their jurisdiction secured under the provisions of the UP. Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed there under pass suitable orders for carrying out the purposes envisaged thereunder. 8. IN the circumstances indicated hereinbefore it appears that two Societies, one in the name of Sri Maheshwar Samaj, Aligarh and the other Society 'Sri Maheshwar Inter College, Sasant Gate, Aligarh' started laying claim regarding running and management of Maheshwar Inter College. 8. IN the circumstances indicated hereinbefore it appears that two Societies, one in the name of Sri Maheshwar Samaj, Aligarh and the other Society 'Sri Maheshwar Inter College, Sasant Gate, Aligarh' started laying claim regarding running and management of Maheshwar Inter College. The approved Scheme of Administration for Sri Maheshwari Inter College refers to the Maheshwari Samaj registered Society as a Society which was running and managing the institution. According to Nand Lal Kela himself the institution was in fact, being run and managed by the Society the Maheshwar Samaj, Aligarh' and it was for the first time in the year 1989 that a new Society in the name and style of Sri Maheshwar Inter College, Sasani, Gate, Aligarh was registered which according to him started running and managing the college with effect from 9-6-89. This Court in its decision in the case of Committee of Management of Hindu Inter College, Kosi Kalan and others v. Regional Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra and others decided by a Division Bench, 1988 UP LB EC 732 has indicated that section 16-A of the Intermediate Education Act is a complete Code by itself in so far as the constitutions of the Committee of Management of recognised institutions and the dispute pertaining to the management of the institution are concerned. It noticing in that decision that the said section begins with a non-obstante clause saying "notwithstanding anything in any law, document or decree or order of a court or other instrument'........." this Court further pointed out that the aforesaid section provided that there shall be a Scheme of Administration for every institution which shall provide, amongst other matters, for the constitution of a committee of Management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The Scheme of Administration has to be approved by the Director of Education. This court emphasised that the aforesaid provision obligates that every recognised institution shall manage its affairs in accordance with that Scheme. It was further indicated that the power of the registrar or the prescribed authority under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act to determine disputes in respect of the election of the office bearers of the society, as distinct from the managing committee of the institution run by that society, operates in an altogether different field from that with which the Regional Deputy Director is concerned. It was further pointed out that two enactments, namely, the Intermediate Education Act and the Societies Registration Act, operate in distinct fields and there is no over-lapping between the two. This Court emphasised that even if, there is, in so far as disputes pertaining to the management of a recognised institution or the constitution of its Committee of Management are concerned, the Deputy Director of Education enjoys, in view of the scheme of the Act and the non-obstante clause used in section 16- A and the clear provisions thereof, exclusive powers save to the extent that the decision of the Deputy Director of Education under subsection (7) thereof was to operate only till a court of a contempt jurisdiction directed otherwise. Obviously, therefore, so far as the District Inspector of Schools and Deputy Director of Education are concerned, the society for the purposes of election of the Committee of! Management for the School or College recognised under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act has to be taken to be that one which is mentioned in the approved Scheme of Administration unless the court of competent jurisdiction directs otherwise. Management for the School or College recognised under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act has to be taken to be that one which is mentioned in the approved Scheme of Administration unless the court of competent jurisdiction directs otherwise. Article 226 (3) of the Constitution provides as follows :- "(3) Where any party against whom an interim Order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner,, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to a petition under clause (1), without- (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order ; and (b) giving such party an opportunity off being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated." 9. AS indicated by the Apex court in its decision in the case of S. Ganapathraj Surana v. The State of Tamil Nadu, JT 1992 (5) SC 310, the principle to be followed while construing the constitutional provisions in well- settled and the cardinal rule to be applied in the interpretation is that the words should be read in their ordinary,, natural and grammatical meaning subject however to the rider that while construing a constitutional document conferring legislative power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude. It is therefore, obvious that while construing the provisions contained in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution the words used there have to be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. It is therefore, obvious that while construing the provisions contained in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution the words used there have to be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. The word 'shall' as contained in the concluding portion of the aforesaid provision has to be construed as having been used in an imperative sense Heaving no choice of action and the words 'Stands vacated' indicate that tie interim order shall cease to be operative. What persuaded the Parliament to bring in such an amendment is a matter of legislative policy the wisdom of which cannot be scanned by this Court. It must be remembered that so far as regards the efficiency and policy of the aforesaid statutory provision the Parliament is the only Judge they are responsible to a court of Justice for the lawfulness of what they do and of that the court is the only Judge. 10. IT may be noticed that there are no limitations imposed on the power of the High Court to issue writ under Article 226 of the Constitution except the limitations contained in Article 226 itself and the limitations imposed by other provisions of the constitution e.g. Article 329 or Article 323 (A). However, though no limit can be placed upon the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution yet nonetheless it must be exercised along recognised lines in the larger public interest and there always exists an element of self-ordained restraint. The word 'interim' as used in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution it seems to me referres to nothing more than 'for the time being' or 'in the meantime'. An interim order is to last only for a certain time but otherwise it is just as effective as it ex-facie purports to be. The word 'interim' as used in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution it seems to me referres to nothing more than 'for the time being' or 'in the meantime'. An interim order is to last only for a certain time but otherwise it is just as effective as it ex-facie purports to be. The provisions contained in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution were incorporated in the Rules of this court by bringing in the third proviso to Rule I of Chapter XXII of part IV of the Rules of the Court Taking into consideration the regulatory provisions contained in Rule I, third proviso, Rule 1 (4) (4-A) Rule 2 (4), Rule 5 as amended and Rule 12 of the Rules of the Court, it is apparent that the object is to ensure that no exparte order as envisaged under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution subject to the exception as contemplated under the second proviso to rule 1 of the Rules of the Court is passed against the authorities envisaged under rule 1 (4) and rule 12 of the said Rules or the authorities or persons either represented or having put in a caveat as contemplated under rale 5 of the Rules of the Court. The object behind these procedural safe-guards and the rigour thereof is to ensure that no exparte order behind the back of a respondent/opposite party without affording an opportunity of hearing to him and without supplying a copy of the petition etc, to him is passed subject, however, to the exception contained in the second proviso of rule 1 of Chapter XXII referred to above which deals with the cases of urgency where the Court may dispense with the furnishing of copies of the applications and other papers in support thereof to the other party and may pass an exparte order. If a petitioner succeeds in obtaining an interm order in a contingency evisaged under the second proviso to rule 1 of Chapter XXII of part IV of the Rules of the Court in that case the provisions contained in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution which stand incorporated even in the Rules of the Court as indicated above comes into play and irrespective of the phraseology in which the interim order is framed, the same ceases to be operative in the event the steps are taken for getting the exparte interim order vacated by the affected respondent/opposite party as provided under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution or third proviso to rule 1 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court which is an identical provision. The provisions contained in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution as well as the third proviso to rule 1 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court, in the event of the conditions referred to therein being satisfied limit the duration of the continuance of the interim order and it is rendered time bound by operation of law, provided the application for vacating the stay order is not disposed within the time prescribed. 11. In view of the requirements envisaged under rules 1 (4;, (4-A) and 12 of the Chapter XXII of part IV of the Rules of the Court and considering the cases in which interim orders are granted in the presence of caveators a very limited category of cases remain where faction is taken in view of the urgency of a situation contemplated under the second proviso to Rule 1 of the Rules indicated above where an exparte interim order may be granted. Therefore, it is only in such cases of a limited category that the stringent provisions contained in Article 226 (3) or the third proviso to rule 1 of chapter XXII of part IV of the Rules of the Court can stand attracted. 12. IT might be said that a duty stands cast on the Court to ensure that the application for vacation off the interim order is disposed of within the time prescribed and if the court for on reason or the other is not able to do so, the interim order should not be deemed to have cone to an end as no one should suffer at the hands of the Court. IT is true that no man should suffer because of the mistake of the court and if a person has been wronged then Ex Debito Justice, justice must be done to him so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice and the wrong must be remedied. However, as indicated by the Rajasthan High Court in its decision in the case of Ghisa Lal v State, AIR 1981 Raj. 65 , is is for the party who obtains an exparte order to take actives steps to get the matter listed in court to get it affirmed within the period specified after he has received a copy of the application for vacation of the interim order and that if he does not do so he can do so at his own peril. Further as observed by the Calcutta High Court in its decision in the case of Krishan Kumar Agarwala v. Reserve Bank of India, 1991 Cal. 272, nothing prevents the court to grant an interim order afresh after hearing the parties on the application for vacation of the interim order or otherwise if the Court finds sufficient ground to make such fresh order. I may, however, add that the court may also, after hearing both the parties continue the interim order which ceased to be operative as indicated herein above. IT cannot be lost sight of that the fact that an interim order granted in the circumstances indicated in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution and the second proviso to rule 1 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court which automatically ceases to be operative and has to be taken as time bound does not come as a surprise to any petitioner. He is deemed to know the consequence irrespective of the phraseology in which the interim order is framed. Consequently, the petitioner has to be vigilant. He is deemed to know the consequence irrespective of the phraseology in which the interim order is framed. Consequently, the petitioner has to be vigilant. IT seems to me that to ensure that an exparte interim order granted in the circumstances indicated in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution or in proviso 2 to rule 1 of Chapter XXII part IV of the Rules of the Court does not become an instrument to delay justice or create hurdles in the administration of law that it is rendered time bound by operation of law in view of the restrictions envisaged under the aforesaid provisions in order to prevent the abuse of the provess of court and keep the parties vigilant. In its decision in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1993 (3) JT 238 , the Apex Court had an occasion to observe that under the changed circumstance with so many cases pending in courts, once an interim order of injunction is passed, in many cases, such interim orders continue for months ; if not for years. It was further observed that at final hearing while vacating such interim orders of injunction in many cases, it has been discovered that while protecting the plaintiffs from suffering the alleged injury, more serious injury has been caused to the defendants due to continuance of interim orders of injunction without final hearing. It has further been observed that it is a matter off common knowledge that on many occasions even public interest also suffers: in view of such interim orders of injunction, because persons in whose favour such orders are passed are interested in perpetuating the contraventions made by them by delaying the final disposal of such applications. The Apex Court had emphasised that the court should be always willing to extend its hand to protect a citizen who is being wronged or is being deprived of a properly without any authority in law or without following the procedure which are fundamental and vital in nature. The Apex Court had emphasised that the court should be always willing to extend its hand to protect a citizen who is being wronged or is being deprived of a properly without any authority in law or without following the procedure which are fundamental and vital in nature. But at the same time the judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court, and it was indicated that the courts have to be more cautious when such power of the grant of injunction is being exercised without notice for hearing the party who is to be affected by the orders so passed. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has noted with approval the view of the English Courts indicating that...an exparte injunction should generally be until a certain date, usually the next motion day..........."Morover from the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of J. and K. v. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan, JT 1992 (5) SC 278, wherein proceedings for taking action for committing contempt of court were initiated by the petitioner who had in his favour and exparte interim order, for punishing the respondent for violating the interim order, it was observed that the High Court should have first taken up the stay matter without any threat to the respondents in the writ case of being punished for contempt and only after disposing it of the other case should have been taken up indicating thereby that so long as the exparte stay matter in the writ petition was not finally disposed of the further proceedings in the contempt case was itself misconceived and no orders therein should have been passed. 13. IT is by now well settled that a constitutional text must be interpreted so as to advance the policy and purpose underlying its provision and a purposeful meaning which may have become necessary by passage of time and process of experience has to be given to it. Further it should not be lost sight of that the words cannot be taken to be mere passive agents meaning the same thing and carrying the same value at all times and in all contexts. Further it should not be lost sight of that the words cannot be taken to be mere passive agents meaning the same thing and carrying the same value at all times and in all contexts. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Union of India v. Sankal Anand Himmat Lal Sheth, 1978 (I) SCR 423 , had pointed out that the words used in a statute cannot be read in isolation and their colour and content are derived from context. Therefore, every word in a statute must be examined in its context which is of great importance. In view of what has been noticed hereinabove, it is evident that an exparte interim order of the category indicated above, irrespective of the phraseology in which it is couched, is rendered time bound by operation of law and ceases to be effective unless affirmed within the prescribed time as noticed earlier or is revived either by extension or by fresh grant after hearing the affected respondents/opposite parties, disposing of their application seeking its vacation. 14. THE use of the word 'shall' as contained in the concluding portion of the Article 226 (3) of the Constitution or the third proviso to rule 1 of Chapter XXII of part IV of the Rules of the Court leaving no choice of action is clearly an over-riding mandate and appears to have been used in an imperative sense. For all the reasons indicated herein above, I am not prepared to accept the submission that the interim order dated 16-10-89 granted in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 18180 of 1989 is continuing to be In force. I am of the considered opinion that the said stay order has ceased to be in force by operation of law as It is not disputed that the application for vacation of the said exparte interim order had not been disposed of within the time prescribed and no effort was made by the petitioner to get the said order revived 15. IT has been urged by the counsel for the petitioner that on 20-4-89 the Regional Deputy Director of Education had directed the District Inspector of Schools to initiate the proceedings under Section 16-D of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and get the elections held by 2-7-89 in accordance with the approved Scheme of Administration but by an interim order dated 16-6-89 passed in writ petition no. 11147 of 1989, this Court directed the District Inspector of Schools not to hold the election of the Committee of Management in pursuance of the aforesaid order and this interim order is still continuing to be in force. 16. THE aforesaid writ petition has been filed by Sri G. K. Maheshwari and Sri Shanti Swarup Maheshwari claiming to be life members of the registered Society Sri Mahehswari Samaji Aligarh, praying for a direction requiring the respondents Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra and District inspector of Schools, Agra, to hold the election of the Committee of Management for the College from the life members as well as members of Sri Maheshweri Samaj (registered), Aligarh the registered society and for appointing a Prabandh Adhikari for managing the institution as well as for holding the election. THE petitioners in this petition have not sought for the quashing of the order dated 20-4-89 so far as it directed the holding of the election for constituting the Committee of Management. In connection with the above suffice to say that in the changed circumstances the aforesaid order of stay has lost all its significance. As has already been indicated hereinbefore no committee of Management is continuing to be in existence in view of the efflux of time and absence of a validy constituted Committee of Management in accordance with the approved Scheme of Administration after the expiry of the term of the Committee of Management subsequent to the year 1989. In these circumstances there does not appear to be any such impediment which may prevent the implementation of the provisions of the U P. Intermediate Education Act and the approved Scheme of Administration so far as the bringing in existence of a duly constituted Committee of Management for running and managing the institution is concerned. 17. WRIT Petition no. 3002 of 1993 has been filed by Committee of Management Sri Maheshwar Inter College through its Manager Sri Shanti Swarup Maheshwari as well as Sri Shanti Swarup Maheshwari who has been impleaded as petitioner no. 2 seeking quashing of the attestation of the signature of Nand Lal Kale recognising him as Manager on 20-1-93 and for a direction commanding respondents not to interfere in the functioning of the petitioners as the Management of the; College and further restraining Nand Lal Kale from discharging any function of management of the aforesaid College. 18. WRIT Petition no. 2 seeking quashing of the attestation of the signature of Nand Lal Kale recognising him as Manager on 20-1-93 and for a direction commanding respondents not to interfere in the functioning of the petitioners as the Management of the; College and further restraining Nand Lal Kale from discharging any function of management of the aforesaid College. 18. WRIT Petition no. 1034 of 1992 has been filed by the Committee of Management of Sri Maheshwar Inter College through its Manager Sri Nand Lal Kale wherein Sri Nand Lal Kale and Sri Man Mohan Maheshwari the Principal of the College have been arrayed as petitioners nos. 2 and 3 seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to interfere with the possession and control of the petitioners over Maheshwar Inter College. The respondents in the writ petition include the police authorities, education authorities and the Banks where the account of the College is maintained. Civil Misc. Petition no. 4187 of 1992 has been filed by the petitioners of Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 1034 of 1992 against the same respondents as impleaded therein praying the quashing of the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 15-1-92 where under the records of the College were required to be handed oven to Sri Shanti Swarup Maheshwari holding him to be the Manager and further praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to recognise Sri Shanti Swarup Maheshwari as Manager and Rajendra Prakash Maheshwari as Principal of the College. It has also been prayed that in this writ) petition that the respondent authorities be punished for disobeying the subsisting stay orders of this Court. 19. CIVIL Misc. Writ Petition no. 12503 of 1991 has been filed by Sri Shanti Swarup Maheshwari wherein Committee of Management through him has also been arrayed at petitioner no. 2 praying the quashing of the order dated 15-4-91 passed by the District Inspector of Schools Aligarh whereunder Nand Lal Kela was recognised as Manager but subject to the condition that the accounts of the College were to be operated singly. 20. CIVIL Misc. Writ Petition no. 29897 of 1991 has been filed by the Committee of Management, Maheshwar Inter College through Nand Lal Kela wherein Nandlal Kela has been arrayed as petitioner no. 20. CIVIL Misc. Writ Petition no. 29897 of 1991 has been filed by the Committee of Management, Maheshwar Inter College through Nand Lal Kela wherein Nandlal Kela has been arrayed as petitioner no. 2 seeking quashing of the proceedings of attestation of signature of Shri Shanti Swarup Maheshwari on 20-7-89 and a direction to restrain the respondents from giving effect to the attestation of the signature of Sri Maheshwar Inter College as a Manager of the College and for prosecuting respondent no. 2 for misuse of his powers. Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 961 of 1991 has been filed by the Committee of Management Sri Maheshwar Inter College through Sri Nand Lal Kela where Nand Lal Kela has been arrayed as petitioner no. 2 seeking the quashing of the order dared 16-11-90 and the order dated 26-12-90 where under the District Inspector of Schools required both Sri Nand Lal Kela and Sri Shanti Swarup Mahesbwari to appear and present their case, so that the decision relating to the recognition of a duly elected Manager may be taken. 21. CIVIL Misc. Writ Petition no. 14701 of 1990 has been filed by the Committee of Management Sri Maheshwar Inter College, Aligarh through its Manager Sri Nand Lal Kela seeking the quashing of the order dated 29-5-90 passed by the District Inspector of Schools where under the joint account of the College was put under single operation. 22. CIVIL Misc. Writ Petition no. 5216 of 1990 has been filed by the Committee of Management S. I. Maheshwar Inter College through its Manager Nand Lal Kela wherein Sri Nand Lal Kela has been impleaded as petitioner no. 2 seeking the quashing of the order dated 23-3-90 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Aligarh requiring handing over of the charge to the authorised controller. In pursuance1, of the order of this Court dated 20-3-90. It may be pointed out that the order dated 20-3-90 was subsequently modified by this Court on 2-4-90 providing that the parties shall maintain status quo prevailing on 20-3-90 and if authorised controller was not in charge of the institution on that date, he was not to interfere with the functioning of the persons who were running the institution. All the writ petitions referred to above were heard together. All the writ petitions referred to above were heard together. In view of the conclusions indicated hereinbefore the aforesaid writ petitions are disposed of finally with the directions that the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, respondent in writ petitions no. 36699 of 1993 and 36700 of 1993 shall ensure the constituting of a Committee of Management for Shri Maheshwar Inter College, Sasani Gate, Aligarh in accordance with the amended or deemed to have been amended (as directed under the order of this court dated 1-11-93 passed in writ petition no. 6545 of 1984) Scheme of Administration duly approved for running and managing the said institution as contemplated under the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed thereunder within a period of two months from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order before him through Prabandh Sanchalak appointed under the impugned order dated 23-9-93. 23. IT is further directed that the Prabandh Sanchalak shall continue to run and manage the Maheshwar Inter College, Sasani Gate, Aligarh in accordance with the aforesaid Act and the Regulations till he hands over the charge to the newly constituted Committee of Management duly elected as indicated above. 24. THIS order shall supersede all subsisting interim orders on the subject. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.