Judgment :- 1. These two appeals arise out of judgment of the learned Single Judge in C.S. No. 388/1977. O.S.A. No. 11/86 is preferred by the defendants 6 & 7. OSA No. 126/86 is preferred by the defendants 2 and 4. The plaintiff Bank of Baroda instituted a suit against the defendants 1 to 7 in the Original side of this Court for recovery of a sum of Rs. 9,74,736.38 from defendants 1 to 5 and for recovery of a sum of Rs. 72,647.55, on equitable mortgage, security furnished by the defendants 6 and 7. Towards guarantee l iability. The pleadings of the plaintiff and the defendants summarised by the learned judge is as follows:— “The first defendant is the firm, Raghava and Veera of which defendants 2 and 3 are the partners. The Ist defendant had banking facilities with the Plaintiff. In 1970, the cash credit facility was increased to the limit of Rs. 8,75,000/- and the same was further raised to the limit of Rs. 9,00,000/-. Defendants 1 to 3 executed a promissory note on 13.7.1970 for Rs. 8,75,000/- undertaking to pay interest at 4% over the Reserve Bank of India rate with a minimum of 9% per annum up to the limit of Rs. 3,7 5,000/- and for the amounts in excess of Rs. 3,75,00/- with a minimum of 10 per cent interest. The first defendant also executed a letter of continuing security on 13.7.1970. Defendants 4 & 5 had guaranteed the due repayment of the amounts advanced to defendants 1 to 3 and executed a letter on the same date. The second defendant had deposited the title deeds and created an equitable mortgage for the prompt and due repayment of the amounts advanced to defendants 1 to 3. Defendants 4 & 5 also have deposited their title deeds and created an equitable mortgage. After the credit facility limit was raised to Rs. 9,00,000/- on 28.9.1972, a promissory note was executed on 28.9.1972, by defendants 1 to 3 and defendants 4 and 5 had executed another guarantee letter for the enhanced limit of Rs. 9,00,000/-. Defendants 1 to 3 had written several letters between 25.2.1971. and 7.1.1976, acknowledging their liability. At the request of defendants 1 to 3, the plaintiff had also extended the bank guarantee limit to Rs. 30 lakhs. The subsisting guarantee amount on that date was raised to Rs. 15,67,500/- out of which Rs. 9,00,000/-. Defendants 1 to 3 had written several letters between 25.2.1971. and 7.1.1976, acknowledging their liability. At the request of defendants 1 to 3, the plaintiff had also extended the bank guarantee limit to Rs. 30 lakhs. The subsisting guarantee amount on that date was raised to Rs. 15,67,500/- out of which Rs. 5,70.00/- had been given on indemnity of insurance policy and the balance had been given on the counter-guarantee signed by defendants 1 to 3 in respect of the guarantees issued and on the cash margin of 25 per cent. In respect of the guarantee issued on the cash margin of 25 per cent, defendants 4 & 5 as well as defendants 6 and 7 had agreed that the four equitable mortgages created by them in respect of moneys due by Saravana Constructions and Raghava and Veera Sons, respectively would enure as securities in respect of the guarantee liability incurred (sic.) to the plaintiff. The 4th defendant and the 5th defendant had deposited their title deeds with the plaintiff on 10.8.1973. as security for the repayment of the amounts, that might become due and payable by Sri Saravana Constructions. In like manner, defendants 7 (sic.) 7 who had deposited their title deeds on 9.7.70 had agreed that the equitable mortgage created by them would enure to the benefit of the guarantee liability (sic.) to the plaintiff in respect of the first defendant. Thus the guarantee liability due to the plaintiff amounts to Rs. 72,647.55. Therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the amount of Rs. 9,74,736.38 as against defendants 1 to 3 and for Rs. 72,647.55 as against defendants 4 to 7 in respect of the guarantee liability given ( sic. ) to the plaintiff and also for a personal decree for the amounts, which could not be realised for the sale of hypotheca”. 2. 9,74,736.38 as against defendants 1 to 3 and for Rs. 72,647.55 as against defendants 4 to 7 in respect of the guarantee liability given ( sic. ) to the plaintiff and also for a personal decree for the amounts, which could not be realised for the sale of hypotheca”. 2. Defendants 1 and 2 have pleaded that the plaintiff must prove the amounts claimed in the plaint, that the promissory notes were executed only as collateral security, that the interest claimed is excessive, that the stipulation for a payment of varying rates of interest would not make a promissory note as a promissory note, that the 4th defendant is the wife of the second defendant and her signatures were obtained in a blank form, that the 4th defendant did not execute the guarantee to the plaintiff, that the second defendant is entitled to have the right of marshalling securities and contributions, that the 4th defendant did not create any equitable mortgage for the debts of defendants 1 and 2, that the bank guarantees are not admitted and that the inclusion of the plaintiff bank accounts only that the suit claim is not sustainable. 3. A separate written statement has been filed by defendants 4, 6, and 7 stating that the 4th defendant did not execute the guarantee letter for the due repayment of debts due by defendants 1 and 2, that the allegation of deposit of title deeds by defendants 4 and 5, is not correct, that the execution of guarantee agreement on 28.9.1972 by defendants 4 and 5, is denied, that the 4th defendants has not acknowledged any liability, as contended in the plaint, that defendants 4, 6 and 7 never entered into any agreement and did not agree for any extending equitable mortgage over their properties for the guarantee amount claimed in the plaint. 4. On the above pleadings, the learned single judge framed as many as fifteen issues. 5. After considering the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, the learned single judge decreed the suit as prayed for, holding that the defendants were liable in relation to the amounts due under the bank guarantee and that the defendants 6 and 7 were liable on the mortgage in respect of liabilities of the first defendant which was restricted to Rs. 72,647.55. It is contended by Mr. 72,647.55. It is contended by Mr. T.R. Mani, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants herein that a close scrutiny of evidence of P.W. 1. K. Srinivasan, Zonal Officer, Bank of Baroda, does not disclose any evidence with regard to the items covered by bank guarantee. So, no case has been made out by the plaintiff and the plaint averments have not been proved. Therefore, the suit claim with regard to the bank guarantee has to be rejected. He also contended that the entries in regard to deposit of title deeds were not made by way of equitable mortgage as alleged in three security registers marked as Exs. P16 to P18. The entry in Ex. P18 is only a self serving entry made by the bank after knowing that the accounts had become sticky and without any corroborative document. He also contended that the Bankers Books of Evidence Act, 1891, will not get attracted as far as the three security registers marked as Exs. P16 to P18 are concerned, as they are not Bankers Books. In any event, he contended that as far as the payment of interest is concerned, the same has not been proved by the plaintiff. On behalf of the respondent in both the appeals, Mr. V.S. Subramanian contended that the judgment of the learned single Judge is in accordance with law and the contentions now raised by the counsel for the appellant are unsustainable and therefore, the same should be rejected. 6. With regard to the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants to the effect that a close scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 1, K. Srinivasan, Zonal Officer, Bank of Baroda does not disclose any evidence with regard to the items covered by the bank guarantee, he referred to the following evidence of P.W. 1. “Q. Exs. P14 and P15 are the copy of the statement of accounts taken from your ledger, which you have certified under the Bankers Book of Evidence Act? A. Yes.” On the basis of the above evidence, Mr. T.R. Mani, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, vehemently argued that the plaintiff failed to establish the suit claim with regard to the guarantee and submitted that there is no legal evidence on the side of the plaintiff to prove the claims as far as the guarantee is concerned. T.R. Mani, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, vehemently argued that the plaintiff failed to establish the suit claim with regard to the guarantee and submitted that there is no legal evidence on the side of the plaintiff to prove the claims as far as the guarantee is concerned. We are unable to accept the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Even if we reject the evidence of P.W1 the suit claim cannot be rejected a s the same has been proved by the evidence of P.W1. P.W2 has categorically stated in his evidence with regard to the guarantee. In this connection, the learned single judge has observed as follows:— “Since the learned counsel for the defendants 6 and 7 requested the bank to produce the security registers of the bank, PW2. produced them and true copies of the relevant pages pertaining to the suit transactions from the three security registers, marked as Exs. P16 to P18. Defendants 4 and 5 had deposited their title deeds in 1970 and has appeared before P.W 1 on 10.8.1973. and agreed for extending the equitable mortgage in relation to the guarantee liability also. There are entries in Ex. P. 18 that defendants 6 and 7. appeared before P.W. 1 and agreed on 14.8.1973 for extending the equitable mortgage security in relation to the guarantee liability given by the bank on behalf of the first defendant.” 7. We entirely agree with the above observation of the learned Single Judge and we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. In the instant case, no doubt P.W 1 has merely referred to the suit claim regarding guarantee but has not proved the entries in the security register as per S. 34 of the Evidence Act. However, the plaintiffs have examined P.W2 who speaks about the guarantee and the entries in the books of accounts and security registers. Thus, P.W2 has given a corroborative evidence as per S. 34 of the Evidence Act. We are of the view that the evidence of P.W2 complies with the provisions of S. 34 of the Evidence act and the entries in Exs. P16 to P18 have been legally proved. 8. Thus, P.W2 has given a corroborative evidence as per S. 34 of the Evidence Act. We are of the view that the evidence of P.W2 complies with the provisions of S. 34 of the Evidence act and the entries in Exs. P16 to P18 have been legally proved. 8. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the entries with regard to the deposit of title deeds in the three security registers will not be covered by Bankers Book Evidence Act, 1891. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. Section 2(3) of the Bankers Books Evidence At, 1891 defines Bankers Books” as follows: “Bankers books include ledgers, day books, cash books, account books and all other books used in the ordinary business of a bank;” 9. The term, “bankers books is an inclusive definition. It is well settled that an inclusive definition has to be construed widely. In dealing with the definition of ‘Industry’ in the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in the case reported in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha ( AIR 1960 S.C. 610 at page 614), the Supreme Court has held as follows: “It is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. Where we are dealing with an inclusive definition, it would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation.” In another case reported in CIT, A.P. v. Taj Mahal, Secunderabad ( AIR 1972 S.C. 168 at page 170), the Supreme Court in holding that sanitary and pipe line fittings in a building which is run as a hotel, fall within the word, ‘Plant’ in S. 10(2)(vi.b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, has observed as follows: “The very fact that even books have been included shows that the meaning intended to be given to ‘plant’ is wide. The word ‘includes’ is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.” 10. When it is so used these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.” 10. We are therefore of the view that the security registers maintained by the plaintiff-bank with regard to the equitable mortgage will squarely come within the definition of Bankers Book, given under section 2(3) of ‘Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891, under the head, “All other books used in the ordinary business of a bank”. The security registers are obviously books used by the plaintiff bank in the ordinary course of business. We, therefore reject the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants to the effect that the entries with regard to the deposit of title deeds in the three security registers will not be covered by Bankers Book Evidence Act, 1891. 11. Lastly, it was contended by the learned counsel for appellants that the plaintiffs have not proved the rate of interest. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to the plaint averments in this regard and submitted that the plaintiff claimed interest at 4-1/2 per cent over the Reserve Bank of India rate with a minimum of 9-1/2 per cent per annum in respect of Cash Credit facility of Rs. 3,75,000/- and over and above the sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- at the rate of 5% over the Reserve Bank of India rate w ith a minimum of 10 per cent interest and at 18 per cent per annum on the sum of Rs. 72,647.55. The defendants have denied the rate of interest in their written statement as follows:— “The allegations in para 14 that the interest rate was increased to 16-1/2 percent with quarterly rests is denied. It is submitted that a contract to pay with specific rate of interest cannot be varied by an unilateral act on the part of the plaintiff. The increased rate of 16-1/2% claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the outstandings and the quarterly rests claimed are not valid. The claim is illegal. It is unenforceable. The allegations in para 15 that there was acknowledgment of liability on the various dates mentioned therein are denied”. The substance of the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the respondent-bank had not proved the rate of interest. The claim is illegal. It is unenforceable. The allegations in para 15 that there was acknowledgment of liability on the various dates mentioned therein are denied”. The substance of the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the respondent-bank had not proved the rate of interest. A perusal of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 shows that the bank failed to prove the rate of interest as averred in the plaint. They have not proved that was the rate of interest charged by the Reserve Bank of India during the material time to calculate the interest at 4-1/2 or 5 per cent per annum over and above the Reserve Bank of India rate with a minimum of 9-1/2 or 10 per cent per annum, if the amount exceeds Rs. 3,75,000/-. We therefore, hold that the respondent bank has failed to prove the contractual rate of interest chargeable on the suit transaction during the material time. Accordingly, the plaintiff-respondent bank will be entitled to interest on the principal amount at the rate of 10 per cent per annum as the amount advanced by the bank exceeds Rs. 3,75,000/- with regard to cash credit facility and with regard to interest, on a sum of Rs. 72,647.55 regarding the guarantee liability, the rate of interest will be 18 per cent per annum till the date of decree and thereafter at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from date of payment. Subject to the above modification with regard to the date of decree till date of payment. Subject to the above modification with regard to the payment of interest, both the appeals are dismissed. Upon the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The OSA. Nos. 11/86 and 126/86 having been posted this day along with CMP. Nos. 11434 & 11435/93 in the presence of the said Advocates the Court made the following Order: MISHRA, J.: — Heard. We are satisfied that there is a clerical mistake in our judgment in the sense that in the operative portion of the judgment we have said “accordingly the Plaintiff/respondent bank will be entitled to interest on the principal amount at the rate of 10 per cent per annum as the amount advanced by the bank exceeds Rs. We are satisfied that there is a clerical mistake in our judgment in the sense that in the operative portion of the judgment we have said “accordingly the Plaintiff/respondent bank will be entitled to interest on the principal amount at the rate of 10 per cent per annum as the amount advanced by the bank exceeds Rs. 3,75,000/- with regard to cash credit facility and with regard to interest, on a sum of Rs. 72,647.55. regarding the guarantee liability, the rate of interest will be 18 per cent per annum till the date of decree and thereafter at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from the date of decree till date of payment. 2. The trial Court however, has granted final decree and interest till the final decree and after the final decree till payment. We have in our judgment found that the rate of 10 per cent per annum instead of 16-1/2 per cent per annum on Rs. 3,75,000/- will be a proper rate of interest, and left the interest granted by the trial court on the sum of Rs. 72,647.55 as it has allowed the interest on the abovesaid sum till the final decree. Thereafter, it appears that the trial Court granted only 6 per cent per annum interest and we instead, have granted 10 per cent per annum by mistake. Since there is no quarrel as to the above, we are inclined to amend the operative portion to read as follows:— “Accordingly, the plaintiff/respondent bank will be entitled to interest on the principal amount at the rate of 10 percent per annum as the amount advanced by the bank exceeds Rs. 3,75,000/- with regard to cash credit facility and with regard to cash credit interest, on a sum of Rs. 72,647.55 regarding the guarantee liability, the rate of interest will be 18 per cent per annum till the date of final decree and thereafter at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of final decree till the date of payment. Subject to the above modification with regard to the payment of interest, both the appeals are dismissed. Upon the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.