Judgment :- SOMASUNDARAM, J. 1. This Writ Appeal has been filed against the order dated 21.7.1993 in W.P. No. 11779 of 1992 dismissing the same and confirming the order of the first respondent dated 27.7.1992 refusing to renew the ‘C’ Form licence for Sri Ganesh Theatre, Uthagamandalam, in the name of the appellant. 2. The site in R.S. Nos. 1737 and 1738 measuring 1.151/2 acres and 1.561/2 acres respectively Uthagamandalam village belongs to the Jaffer Mohammed Sait Memorial Dispensary Charity (hereinafter referred to as the Charity), Uthagamandalam. On 3.12.1969 the above site was taken on lease for a period of ten years at the first instance by the following 4 persons, who were the partners or a firm: 1. Mrs. Dhanalakshmi Ammal (the appellant herein), 2. Mr. M. Sundararajan 3. Mr. M.M. Joghee Gowder and 4. Mr. M.M. Bhojan (the 5th respondent herein) On the basis of no objection letters given by the other partners, a no objection certificate was issued in the name of the appellant to construct a permanent cinema theatre. Again, after getting necessary concurrence from the Wakf Board and Mr. N.Y. Cassion Cait, the Muthavalli of the above Charity, leased out the above site on 28.4.1980 to the above mentioned four persons for the period up to 3.3.1990. The ‘C’ Form licence for running the theatre was also issued by the licensing authority third respondent herein in the name of the appellant and the said ‘C’ Form licence issued in the name of the appellant to run the theater was renewed up to 3.3.1990, i.e. till the validity of the lease period. On 8.3.1990 the appellant again applied for the renewal of the licence in her favour for a further period of one year. Respondents 4 and 5 presented a position dated 1.5.90 before the third respondent stating that the appellant and Mr. M. Sundararajan have surrendered the site and building of the theatre on 3. 3.1990 to the Charity without the consent and without assessing the value of the movables in the theatre and that appellant is not in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment of the cinema theatre. Respondents 4 and 5 further requested the third respondent to suspend the running of the theatre until the matter is settled. 3.1990 to the Charity without the consent and without assessing the value of the movables in the theatre and that appellant is not in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment of the cinema theatre. Respondents 4 and 5 further requested the third respondent to suspend the running of the theatre until the matter is settled. The Licensing Authority, the third respondent herein, after hearing both the appellant and respondents 4 and 5 came to the conclusion that the request of the appellant for renewal of ‘C’ Form licence cannot be granted, in view of the objections raised by one of the original partners for the renewal or the ‘C’ Form licence and consequently the third respondent by order dated 9.7.90 directed the appellant and the objectors to settle the dispute in a civil court with regard to the ownership and other claims for renewal of‘C’ Form licence. Aggrieved by the above said order of the third respondent, the appellant filed an appeal to the second respondent, who by the order dated 2.4.91 dismissed the appeal. As against the order of the second respondent, the appellant filed a revision petition before7 the first respondent. The first respondent, found that the appellant was not able to establish her lawful possession of the site, building and equipment in the cinema theatre as stipulated under R. 13 of the Tamil Nadu Cinema (Regulation) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and consequently, by the order dated 27.7.1992 the first respondent dismissed the revision petition. In the above circumstances, the appellant filed W.P. 11779/92 before this Court, challenging the orders of respondents 1 to 3, refusing to renew the ‘C’ Form licence in her favour. The learned single judge, who heard the writ petition accepted the reasons given by respondents 1 to 3 for refusing to renew the ‘C’ Form licence in favour of the appellant and consequently dismissed the writ petition. As already stated, this writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single judge, dismissing th said writ petition. 3. Before us, Mr. A.S. Raman, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had fully satisfied the requirement of R. 13 of the Rules, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna Kishore Firm v. Government of A.P. & others AIR 1990 S.C. 2292 . 3. Before us, Mr. A.S. Raman, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had fully satisfied the requirement of R. 13 of the Rules, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna Kishore Firm v. Government of A.P. & others AIR 1990 S.C. 2292 . The learned counsel for the appellant relying on the agreement dated 30.9.1980 entered into between the appellant, respondents 4 and 5 and others, further contended that the appellant is in possession of the equipment and other movables in the cinema theatre pursuant to the said agreement dated 30.9.1980, that as per the terms of the said agreement, the appellant is entitled to an undivided share in the equipment and movables in the theatre and that respondents 4 and 5 along with on e Joghee are entitled to the other half share in the equipment and movables in the theatre, that the appellant having undivided interest in the equipment and movables was put in exclusive possession of the same, that her possession of the equipment and movables in the theatre cannot be considered as litigious or unlawful and that therefore, the orders of respondents 1 to 3 and the learned single judge refusing to renew the ‘C’ Form licence on the ground that appellants possession of equipment and movables is not lawful is illegal and liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra, Mr. Palpandian, learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 submitted that, factually, there was no surrender of the site and superstructure by the appellant to the Charity and that the partnership between the appellant, respondents 4 and 5 and others has not been dissolved. Relying on the decision in Champaran Cane Concern v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 S.C. 1737 , the learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 further submitted that all the partners are equally entitled to the rights and ownership of the land, building and equipment, etc., as per the agreement of lease, that the partnership is still subsisting and that the appellant cannot be said to be in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment. The learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 again contended relying on Ss. 46, 47 and 53 of the Partnership Act, that till the accounts are settled, the partnership continues and that the disputes relating to the firm have got to be decided only by a civil court. The learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 again contended relying on Ss. 46, 47 and 53 of the Partnership Act, that till the accounts are settled, the partnership continues and that the disputes relating to the firm have got to be decided only by a civil court. 5. Learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 also submitted that since the appellant has not satisfied the requirements of provisions under R. 13 of the Rules with regard to the lawful possession of the site, building and equipment, etc., in the theatre, the orders of respondents 1 to 3 and the learned Single Judge refusing to renew the ‘C’ Form licence in the name of the appellant are legal and are not liable to be set aside. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 relied on the decisions in M.C. Chockalingam and others v. V. Manickavasagam and others AIR 1974 S.C. 104 Lakshmi Ammal v. The Chief Secretary to Government & others 1989 Writ, L.R. 41 and S. Ramathevar v. V.S. Manickam & others 1990-2-L.W. 506. 6. In view of the above contentions of the learned counsel for both parties, the following point arises for consideration in this writ appeal; whether the appellant is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment the requirement of R. 13 of the Rules and whether the appellant is entitled to the renewal of the ‘C’ Form licence in her name for running the cinema theatre. 7. R. 13 provides that an applicant for the licence, if he is the owner of the site, building and equipment, he should produce to the licensing authority the necessary records relating to his ownership and possession thereof and that if he is not the owner of the site, then he should, to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, produce documentary evidence to show that he is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment. In the present case, neither the appellant nor respondents 4 and 5 are the owners of the site. The site in question belongs to the Charity. The site was taken on lease jointly by the appellant, Mr. Sundararaj, Mr. Joghee and Mr. Bhojan, who were partners of the firm. On the consent letter given by the other partners, a no objection certificate was given to the appellant. The site in question belongs to the Charity. The site was taken on lease jointly by the appellant, Mr. Sundararaj, Mr. Joghee and Mr. Bhojan, who were partners of the firm. On the consent letter given by the other partners, a no objection certificate was given to the appellant. Thereafter, the partners of the firm had jointly put up the superstructure and the ‘C’ Form licence was issued to the appellant till 3.3.1990, i.e. till the expiry of the lease period. The case of the appellant is that on the expiry of the lease period on 3.3.1990, the appellant surrendered the site, and building of the theatre to the charity as per the terms of the lease and on 27.4.1990, the appellant got a fresh lease deed executed in her favour by the Charity for a period of one year from 9.3.1990 in respect of the site and building and on the strength of the lease deed dated 27.4.1990, she had applied to the third respondent for the renewal of the ‘C’ Form licence. 8. It is seen from the records that on 30.9.1980 an agreement was entered into between the appellant, respondents 4 and 5 and other partners of the firm. In the said agreement dated 30.9.80, the appellant, one Mr. Sundararajan and Mr. Venugopal are shown as party of the fast part and respondents 4 and 5 and one Joghee are shown as party of the second party. Clause 1 of the said agreement provides that all the clauses in the said agreement shall have the overriding effect on the original partnership deed dated 23.3.1970 from 1.10.1980. Clause 2 of the agreement reads thus: “2. All accounts between the parties of the First and Second Part till this dale have been settled and no partner has any claim over the other arising out of this partnership, other than relating to the half share of the movables and Deposits as per the List attached.” Clause 3 provides that the parties of the first part will pay to the parties of the second part a monthly sum of Rs. 6,250/- or before the 10th of the succeeding month without fail and clause 4 of the agreement says that the parties of the first part will run the theatre without any interference from the parties of the second part. Clause 9 of the agreement runs as follows: “9. 6,250/- or before the 10th of the succeeding month without fail and clause 4 of the agreement says that the parties of the first part will run the theatre without any interference from the parties of the second part. Clause 9 of the agreement runs as follows: “9. On the expiry of the lease period, this Agreement will also come to termination and the Parties of the Second Part will have no claim on any of the Partnership Assets other than relating to the half share of the movables and deposits as per the list attached.” It is clear from clause 1 of the agreement dated 30.9.1980 that the said agreement shall have overriding effect on the original partnership deed dated 23.3.1970. It is also seen from clause 9, that the agreement dated 30.9.1989 itself would come to an end on the expiry of the lease period. Admittedly, the lease period expired on 3.3.1990 as per clause 9 of the agreement on the termination of the said agreement dated 30.9.1980, the parties of the second part, i.e. respondents 4 and 5 and Mr. Joghee will have no claim on any of the partnership assets other than relating to the half share in the movables and deposits as per the list attached to the agreement. Thus the agreement dated 30.9.1980 provided for winding up and settlement of the rights of parties. It is seen from clause 2 of the agreement that all the accounts between the partners till the date of agreement dated 30.9.1980 have been settled. The contention of Mr. Palpandian, learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 that the agreement dated 30.9.1980 was rescinded by respondents 4 and 5 by sending the telegram dated 29.1.1990 and therefore, the parties are entitled to fall back on the terms and conditions of the original partnership deed dated 23.3.1970 cannot be countenanced because, in our view, it is not at all possible to resurrect the partnership which was dissolved by the agreement dated 30.9.1980. Further, in view of the above factual position, Ss. 46, 47 and 53 of the Partnership Act heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents 4 and 5 will have no application to the facts of the present case. 9. Further, in view of the above factual position, Ss. 46, 47 and 53 of the Partnership Act heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents 4 and 5 will have no application to the facts of the present case. 9. As far as the site and building of the cinema theatre are concerned, as per clause 9 of the agreement dated 30.9.1980, respondents 4 and 5 have no manner of claim over the same after the termination of the said agreement which took place after expiry of the lease period on 3.3.1980. Clause 9 of the agreement specifically says that on the expiry of the lease period, the agreement dated 30.9.1980 will also come to an end and that respondents 4 and 5 and one Mr. Joghee will have no claim on any of the partnership assets other than relating to the half share of the movables and deposits. It is seen from the records that on the expiry of the lease period on 3.3.1990, the appellant surrendered possession of site and building of the cinema theatre to the landlord, namely, the Charity as per the terms of the original lease deed and thereafter, on 27.4.1990 the appellant got a fresh lease executed by the Charity in respect of the site and building for a further period of one year from 9.3.1990. The Muthavalli of the Charity had also given a letter to the third respondent, confirming the lease of the site and building of the theatre to the appellant. In those circumstances, it has to be held that the appellants possession of the site and building of the cinema theatre in question is lawful. 10. Coming to the equipment and the other movables in the theatre, as per clauses 2 and 9 of the agreement dated 30.9.1980, respondents 4 and 5 and one Joghee will be entitled to half share in them and the appellant and two others will be entitled to the other half share in the movables and deposits mentioned in the list attached to the agreement. From these clauses 2 and 9, it is clear that the appellant is a joint owner of the equipment, and the other movables in the theatre along with respondents 4, 5 and others. The movables referred to in the list annexed to the agreement include two projectors 600 seats and 12 other items. From these clauses 2 and 9, it is clear that the appellant is a joint owner of the equipment, and the other movables in the theatre along with respondents 4, 5 and others. The movables referred to in the list annexed to the agreement include two projectors 600 seats and 12 other items. Admittedly the appellant is entitled to an undivided share in the equipment and movables in the theatre and she is in exclusive possession of the same. Thus it is a case, where the appellant who is a joint owner having undivided share in the equipment and movables is in exclusive possession of the same. Such possession of the equipment and other movables in the theatre by the appellant who is having an interest in the same in her own right cannot be considered as unwarranted or contrary to law. In other words, it cannot be said that the appellant is in possession of the equipment and other movables in the theatre without any interest or right in them and that her possession is forbidden by law. At best, as seen from the terms of the agreement dated 30.9.1980 respondents 4 and 5 along with Mr. Joghee who are entitled to half share in the movables can claim only to the value of the half share in the movables mentioned in the list attached to the agreement. In these circumstances, we are unable to hold that the possession of the equipment and other movables in the theatre by the appellant is not without any excuse or litigious. As the appellant herself is entitled to an undivided interest in the equipment and movables in her possession, we have no hesitation in holding that her possession of the equipment and other movables in the theatre is lawful possession within the meaning of R. 13 of the Rules. However, we must add that it is open to respondents 4 and 5 to work out their rights if any against the appellant under the agreement dated 30.9.1980 or under the original partnership deed dated 23.3.1970, by approaching the civil court for appropriate reliefs. 11. However, we must add that it is open to respondents 4 and 5 to work out their rights if any against the appellant under the agreement dated 30.9.1980 or under the original partnership deed dated 23.3.1970, by approaching the civil court for appropriate reliefs. 11. In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of the Apex Court in Krishna Kishore Firm v. Government of A.P. & others AIR 1990 S.C. 2292 = 1991-1-L.W. 1 the appellant in that case, was lessee of the premises and was running a cinema theatre after obtaining licence under the Andhra Pradesh Cinemas (Regulation) Act. The appellant therein entered into an agreement of sale before the expiry of lease with one of co-lessors of his interest and entered into his shoes. The appellant as licensee filed all necessary documents along with the application for renewal of licence relating to his lawful possession thereof as he was not the owner. The Supreme Court, in the above decision, while holding that the appellant in that case, might not have become owner but he could certainly claim that he was in lawful possession and that his application for renewal of licence had to be considered treating him to be in lawful possession observes thus: “True the appellant was neither owner nor lessee. Yet was his possession forbidden in law? Was there no excuse for his possession? The error committed by High Court was to equate lawful with legal. Legal and lawful, normally, convey same sense and are usually interchangeable. What is legal is lawful. But what is lawful may be so without being formally legal. “The principal distinction between the terms ‘lawful’ and ‘legal’ is that former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. To say of an act that it is lawful implies that it is authorised, sanctioned or at any rate not forbidden by law”. Same thought about lawful has been brought out by Pollock and Wright by explaining that “Lawful Possession” means a legal possession which is also rightful or at least excusable. Thus that which is not stricto legalo may yet be lawful. It should not be forbidden by law. In fact legal is associated with provisions in the Act, rules etc. Whereas lawful visualises all that is not illegal against law or even permissible lawful is wider in connotation than legal. Thus that which is not stricto legalo may yet be lawful. It should not be forbidden by law. In fact legal is associated with provisions in the Act, rules etc. Whereas lawful visualises all that is not illegal against law or even permissible lawful is wider in connotation than legal. Although provision in Specific Relief Act empowering a person or tenant to recover possession if he has been evicted forcibly by the Landlord maybe juridical and not lawful or a tenant holding over is not in lawful possession unless landlord agrees or acquiesces expressly or impliedly but that does not alter the legal position about possession of a person not legal yet not without interest. The provision in Specific Relief Act is founded more on public policy than on jurisprudence. But concept of law as opposed or in contradistinction to litigious assumes different dimension. M.C. Chockalingam v. M. Manickavasagam 1974 2 SCR 143 = AIR 1974 SC 104 is of no help as it was concerned with possession which could hot be said to be warranted or authorised by law. Distinction between the nature of possession of a lessee after expiry of period of lease can better be explained by resorting to few illustrations. For instance a lessee may before expiry of lease acquire entire lessors interest resulting in “drowning” or “sinking” of inferior right into superior right. That is right of one merges into another. It has been statutorily recognised by S. 111(d) of Transfer of Property Act. Similarly a tenant after expiry of period of lease may be holding over and the lessor may acquiesce in his continuance expressly or impliedly. This is from conduct of lessor the tenants possession may stand converted into lawful. The other may be where lessor may not agree to renew the lease nor he may acquiesce in his continuance. Such a lessee cannot claim any right or interest. His possession is neither legal nor lawful. Such was the Chockalingams case (supra). The court held that continuance of lessees possession after expiry of period of lease was not lawful for purposes of renewal of licence under Madras Cinema Regulation Act 1955 obviously because lessee was left with no interest which could furnish any excuse or give it even colour of being legal. Such was the Chockalingams case (supra). The court held that continuance of lessees possession after expiry of period of lease was not lawful for purposes of renewal of licence under Madras Cinema Regulation Act 1955 obviously because lessee was left with no interest which could furnish any excuse or give it even colour of being legal. Yet another illustration may be, not very common where lessee acquires some interest in part of the undivided property as in present case. Can it be said in such a case on ratio of Chockalingams ( AIR 1974 SC 104 ) authority that possession of such lessee or to be more specific of appellant was unwarranted or contrary to law. Share of V.V. in 7000 sq. yds. was half. He had agreed to sell his half interest. V.V. was joint owner with his son and grandson. He had both single possession and a single joint right to possess”. Whether such joint owner could transfer his share even when he was not in exclusive possession and what would be effect of such transfer need not be gone into as title suit is pending between parties but when a person having physical control acquires an interest to hold or continue by virtue of an agreement of sale it cannot be said that he had no interest and his possession was forbidden by law. The High Court lost sight of the fact that by virtue of the transaction entered between V.V. and appellant which was not challenged by him nor any cloud was cast over it by creating any subsequent interest the appellant may not have become owner but he could certainly claim that he was in lawful possession. In law he was entitled to file suit for specific performance if there was any threat to his right or interest by V.V. Such right or interest could not be termed as litigious. It was at least not without any excuse or forbidden by law”. The Apex Court in the above pronouncement further points out the difference between lawful possession and litigious possession in the following terms: “Litigious and lawful possession are concepts of varying legal shades deriving their colour from the setting in which they emerge. Epithet used itself indicates the field in which they operate. The Apex Court in the above pronouncement further points out the difference between lawful possession and litigious possession in the following terms: “Litigious and lawful possession are concepts of varying legal shades deriving their colour from the setting in which they emerge. Epithet used itself indicates the field in which they operate. The one pertains to dispute in which possession may be coterminous with physical or de facto control, only, whereas the domain of other is control with some legal basis. The former may be uncertain in character and may even be without any basis or interest but the latter is founded on some rule, sanction or excuse.” The ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court can be applied to the facts of the present case. If so applied, we can safely hold that the appellants possession of the equipment is lawful. The learned single judge and respondents 1 to 3 overlooked the position that in as much as the appellant is admittedly having undivided interest in the equipment and other movables in the theatre in her own right as joint owner, her possession of such equipment and movables can certainly be considered as lawful possession within the meaning of R. 13 of the Rules and such possession cannot be termed as litigious. Thus we find that there is a manifest error of law in the orders of the learned single Judge and the licensing authorities which obliges us to interfere with the said orders in this writ appeal. 12. Now we will consider the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 in support of his contention that the appellant is not in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment and therefore, she is not entitled to renewal of ‘C’ form licence. Learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 relied on a decision in M.C. Chockalingam v. V. Manickavasagam, AIR 1974 S.C. 104 . In the said decision, the Supreme Court was concerned with the case of a lessee, whose lease expired and who wanted to get a renewal of licence under R. 13 of the Rule. In that case, the landlord was not willing to renew the lease and issued a notice to the tenant calling, upon him to deliver back possession of the property on the expiry of the lease. In that case, the landlord was not willing to renew the lease and issued a notice to the tenant calling, upon him to deliver back possession of the property on the expiry of the lease. In the above circumstances, the Supreme Court while holding that in the context of R. 13, a tenant on the expiry of the lease cannot be said to continue in lawful possession of the property against the wishes of the landlord observed as follows: “The fact that after expiry of the lease the tenant will be able to continue in possession of the property by resisting a suit for eviction, does not establish a case in law to answer the requirement of lawful possession of the property within the meaning of R. 13. Lawful possession cannot be established without the concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the land-lord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it. This court in Lallu Yeshwant Singhs case (1968) 2 SCR 203 = AIR 1968 SC 620 ) (supra) had not to consider whether juridical possession in that case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession is possession protected, by law against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawful possession.” 13. Similarly in Meenakshi Ammal v. The Chief Secretary to Government & others 1989 Writ L.R. 41, a Division Bench of this court was also concerned with a case, of a lessee who continued in possession after the determination of the lease against the wishes of the lessor. In the above circumstances, the Apex Court in M.C. Chockalingam v. V. Manickavasagam AIR 1974 SC 104 and the Division Bench of this Court in Meenakshi Ammal v. The Chief Secretary to Government & others 1989 Writ L.R. 41 held that the possession of the tenant after the determination of lease and without the consent of the landlord is possession without any legal right to possess and therefore, such possession is litigous possession. However in the present case, before us, we must point out that the appellant is the joint owner of equipment and other movables having undivided interest in them and therefore, it cannot be said that her possession of the equipment and other movables is possession without any legal right or litigious possession. Therefore, the above decision relied on by the learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 are not helpful to respondents 4 and 5. 14. The next decision relied on by Mr. Palpandian is the decision in S. Rama Thevar v. V.S. Manickam & others 1990-2-L.W. 506. The said decision also can be clearly distinguished on facts. A no objection certificate under the Cinema Regulation Rules was granted to the third respondent in that case, initially on the basis of partnership arrangement amongst 8 persons father, sons and daughters to construct and run a cinema theatre, the parties owning different plots in the entirety of the land. After a few extensions were obtained by the 3rd respondent the parties fell out and the partnership was dissolved. The order granting extension was challenged in the writ petition by contending that at the time when the impugned extension was granted, the possession of the third respondent could not be characterised as lawful within the meaning of R. 13(1) of the Rules and the impugned extension would have to be struck down. The contention was accepted in that case and it was held that the third respondent could not be stated to have had lawful possession on the date of the impugned extension. It is clear from the facts of that case that partners owned different plots in the entirety of the land and they did not assent to the third respondent for having possession of the extent of the land owned by them. In the above circumstances, the Division Bench of this Court, following the ratio in M.C. Chockalingam v. V. Manickavasagam AIR 1974 S.C. 104 held that possession of the entirety of the land by the third respondent was not lawful. However, in the present case, as already pointed out, the appellant is a joint owner having undivided interest in the equipment and other movables and therefore, it is not a case of different persons exclusively owning different items of movables. Therefore, the above decision does not in anyway advance the case of respondents 4 and 5. 15. Mr. However, in the present case, as already pointed out, the appellant is a joint owner having undivided interest in the equipment and other movables and therefore, it is not a case of different persons exclusively owning different items of movables. Therefore, the above decision does not in anyway advance the case of respondents 4 and 5. 15. Mr. Palpandian, relying the decision in V.G. Balasundaram v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan and others 1972-II-M.L.J. 566 = 86 L.W. 453 next contended that originally the licence was issued in the name of the appellant, on the basis of the no objection letters given by other partners of the firm and the last application submitted by appellant for renewal of ‘C’ Form licence cannot be granted without the consent of the other partners. It is the contention of the learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 that the application submitted by the appellant being one for renewal of ‘C’ Form licence, the renewal c an be granted only if the same conditions prevailing at the time of grant continue to exist on the date of submission of the application for renewal. We are unable to accept the above contention of the learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5. R. 13 of the Rules enjoins that the appellant who is the applicant for renewal of licence should produce evidence of lawful possession of the site, building and equipment. In the present case, we have already found that the appellants possession of the site, building and equipment is lawful and therefore, she is entitled to the renewal of ‘C’ Form licence. Further, the question of obtaining the consent of the other partners does not arise, in view of the fact that by the agreement dated 30.9.1980 the partners have settled all accounts and has per clause 9 of the said agreement, no partner has any claim over the other partners arising out of the partnership and that respondents 4 and 5 have no claim on any of the partnership assets other than relating to hall share of the movables and deposits, as per the list attached to the agreement. 16. 16. In view of the above discussion of ours, it has to be held that the appellant is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment and satisfied the requirement of R. 13 of the Rules, that she is entitled to the renewal of ‘C’ Form licence and that the order of the learned single Judge and the order of the first respondent, dated 27.7.1992 are liable to be set aside. 17. For the reasons stated above, the writ appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the learned single Judge dated 21.7.93 and the order of the first respondent dated 27.7.1992 are set aside. The licensing authority-the 3rd respondent herein is directed to consider the appellants application for renewal of ‘C’ Form licence in accordance with law, treating the appellant to be in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment in respect of the cinema theatre in question. 18. Since it is represented that a suit is pending before the civil court between the parties with regard to certain disputes arising out of the agreement dated 30.9.1980, and the partnership deed dated 23.3.1970, we make it clear that any observations made above, in this judgment shall not be treated as binding or deciding the rights of parties, except to the limited extent that the appellant shall be treated to be in lawful possession for renewal of ‘C’ Form licence subject to the final adjudication in t he civil suit. No costs.