JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J— The petitioner is a tenant of premises House No. 1/2, Property No 1, Tilak Nagar. Shimla-5 at an annual rent of Rs 312. He suffered eviction from these premises on the ground of nonpayment of rent by order dated 9th January, 1987 passed by the Rent Controller (3), Shimla. 2. The operative portion of the eviction order dated 9th January, 1987 is ;— "In view of my findings on the aforesaid issues, the petition is allowed on the ground of arrears of rent only. The respondent is directed to deposit the arrears of rent w. e f. 1-8-1985 to 30-4-1986 O Rs 26 per month with interest @ 6% per annum and also costs which are assessed at Rs 100 total amounting to Rs 322 within 30 days, from the date of this order, failing which the respondent will deliver the vacant possession of the premises in question to the petitioner....." 3. The appeal filed against the eviction order has also been rejected by the Appellate Authority (2), Shimla, by judgment dated 22nd May, 1987. The Appellate Authority framed the following points for determination;— "1. Whether Sh. K L. Bhagat, who filed the petition for eviction against the appellant is not the duly constituted attorney of the landlord ? 2. Whether the tenant had sent the rent from 1-8-1985 to 31-3-986 to the landlord through money order, as alleged and the landlord refused to accept the money for some unknown reasons ? 3. Final order." Points No. 1 and 2 were decided against the tenant holding that Sh. K. L Bhagat was the attorney of the landlord and was competent to sue on his behalf. Interpreting the endorsement on the money-order receipt by which the rent from 1-8-1985 to 31-3-1986 was sent by the tenant, the Appellate Authority confirmed the findings of the Rent Controller that since the Money-order was re-directed and later on returned to the addressee, the Rent Controller was right in rejecting the plea of the tenant that he had offered the rent for the period in question but it was refused by the landlord. 4. 4. The tenant filed the present Revision petition and Chief Justice P. D. Desai, as his Lordship then was, called for the report of the Appeal late Authority by passing the following order on 17th September, 1987 — "The Appellate Authority (2), Shimla, will submit a report in the form of a Judicial order, on or before October 30, 1987, after affording to the parties an opportunity of being heard, whether or not the petitioner-tenant has availed of the benefit of the third proviso to clause 14 (2) (i) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Ordinance, 1987, or of the corresponding statutory provision, if any, which might replace such provision, meanwhile, by paying or depositing the amount due, including the arrears of rent, within the time limit specified in the said proviso, after his eviction was ordered by the Rent Controller on the ground of non-payment of rent." 5. The Appellate Authority submitted its report on 21st October, 1987 and its findings are as under ;— "4. The order of eviction against the tenant was passed by the learned Rent Controller on 9-1-1987. The tenant applied to the learned Rent Controller for deposit of the amount found due from him to the landlord, on 13-2-1987, per deposition of the court witness, namely, the Ahlmad of the learned Rent Controller. Admittedly, the treasury was closed on account of a Gazetted holiday on 13-2-1987 and 14th and 15th were also the holidays on account of second Saturday and Sunday. It was only on 16-2-1987 that the treasury opened for the first time after the tenant made an application for the deposit of the rent in the court of learned Rent Controller……..He, however, made an application for the deposit of the amount due on 13-2-1987 or say more than 30 days after the passing of the order of eviction Therefore, he cannot be said to have made the deposit within the period prescribed by the said proviso and as such he is not entitled to the benefit thereof. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the tanant that one of the modes of payment of rent by a tenant to the landlord was by way of deposit with the learned Rent Controller and since the Civil Courts were closed from 19-1-1987 to 18-2-1987 on account of Winter Vacations, the period from 19-1-1987 to 16-2-1987, I e the date on which the deposit was made, was required to be deducted while counting the period of 30 days. This argument of the learned Counsel cannot be accented for the simple reason that the payment of rent to the landlord by a tenant, by wav of deposit with the learned Rent Controller, Is one of the several modes of payment of rent and not the sole mode. If the courts were closed on account of Winter Vacations, the tenant should have adopted one of the several other modes of payment of rent. He could visit the place of the landlord or his attorney personally or through an authorised agent and make the payment of rent to the landlord or his attorney ; or he could very easily send the arrears of rent to the landlord through money-order ; or he could send the amount due to the landlord through a bank draft So, the contention of the tenant/appellant that the period from 191-1987 to 16-2-1987 is required to be deducted while computing the period of 30 days, cannot be upheld.” 6. Hence, according to the Appellate Authority, the tenant deprived himself of the benefit of the third proviso to clause 14(2)0) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Ordinance, 1987 (now Act No. 25 of 1987). 7. When this Revision Petition was taken up for arguments, Mr. M. V. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, raised three points and this Court will deal with them one by one, 8. The first submission made by Mr. ML V. Sharma is that the tenant has deposited the arrears of rent of Rs. 7. When this Revision Petition was taken up for arguments, Mr. M. V. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, raised three points and this Court will deal with them one by one, 8. The first submission made by Mr. ML V. Sharma is that the tenant has deposited the arrears of rent of Rs. 322 In the treasury In the account of Civil Court Deposits within thirty days as directed by the Rent Controller and he is not liable to be evicted in execution of the eviction order dated 9th January, 1987 Invoking section 9 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1968, Mr Sharma urges that for computing the period of thirty days, the period from 19-1-1987 to 17-2-1987 is required to be excluded for the reason that the Civil Court in Shimla were closed for winter vacation, and vide High Court of Himachal Pradesh Notification No. HHC/Misc /6-20/77-VIII dated 13th November, 1986, limitation was not to run during the period of vacation. In support of his contention, he has referred to a number of authorities on section 9 of the General Clauses Act but this Court will notice only the judgment of the Supreme Court in (H. H Rjja) Harinder Singh v S. Karnail Singh and others, AIR 1957 SC 271. There is no dispute that the amount of Rs. 322 was, in fact, deposited on16th February, 1987 before the Civil Courts opened on 18th February, 1987. 9. On the other hand, Mr. K. D. Sood, learned Counsel for the landlord, has urged that the tenant is liable to be evicted and not entitled to benefit of proviso to sub-section 2 (i) of section 14 of the Act, as he had not paid the amount due within 30 days from the date of order. The tenant cannot take the shelter of the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller in which he had directed him to deposit the arrears of rent with interest and cost because such a direction was not in consonance with the statutory mandate. The tenant cannot take the shelter of the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller in which he had directed him to deposit the arrears of rent with interest and cost because such a direction was not in consonance with the statutory mandate. Mr Sood has tried to take support from latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan and another v Krishan Kumar Sood, JT 1993 (1) SC 162, wherein the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have expressed their complete agreement with the view taken by R.S. Pathak, C. J. (as his Lordship then was) in Shri Krishan Kumar v. Gurbux Singh, 1979 RCR 62, that neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority has the powers to vary the period of 30 days provided in statute for payment of arrears of rent. On the same analogy Mr. Sood argued that direction to deposit amount due is of no effect when in the statute the provision is of payment which could be by other modes also, such as payment in cash or by money-order or by bank draft etc. etc., directly \o the landlord or his duly constituted attorney or agent. He further submits that as payment by deposit is not the only mode prescribed under the Act, the tenant cannot be given benefit of section 9 of R.P. General Clauses Act !n computing period of 30 days for payment of arrears of rent to save his eviction. For this submission he has relied upon Judgment in Ram Kinkar Singh and another v Smt Kamal Basini Devi AIR 1938 Patna 451 and ft Krishna Chandra Sharma and others v. PL Ramgulam and another, AIR 1958 MP 295. 10. This Court has given Its best consideration to the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties. It is correct that the third proviso to sub-section W (\) of section 14 of the Act provides for payment of the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. The said proviso is as under— "14. It is correct that the third proviso to sub-section W (\) of section 14 of the Act provides for payment of the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. The said proviso is as under— "14. (1) (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied — (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the building of rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable; Provided that;. Provided further that Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller has made an order for eviction on the ground of non payment of rent due from him, shall not be evicted as a result of his order, if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order ; or (Emphasis supplied) 11. It is also correct that payment could be made by different modes as suggested by Mr. Sood, learned Counsel for the landlord, and payment by deposit in the treasury is one of them. In the ordinary course, a tenant cannot have the defence that he wanted to make the payment by way of deposit in the treasury which he could not, because of the closure of the Civil Courts and he may be given the benefit of section 9 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act in computing the period of 30 days, but in the present case a peculiar situation has arisen It is that when the Rent Controller has made a direction to make payment of arrears of rent by one mode, that is, by deposit which could be by Civil Court deposit in the treasury, was the tenant justified in waiting for the opening of the Civil Court to make the payment ? 12. In the opinion of this Court, the answer to this is in the affirmative. 12. In the opinion of this Court, the answer to this is in the affirmative. It is correct that every tenant is supposed to know the law but in a case where a specific direction of the court is there, the tenant will prefer to comply with the direction instead of finding out what is the law in this regard. If the tenant is justified in making payment by way of deposit only, he is entitled to the benefit of section 9 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act in computing period of limitation of 30 days. In the present case admittedly the Civil Courts were closed from 19-1-1987 to 17-2-1987 and 30 days from the date of order/, e. 9-1-1987 had expired on 8-2-1987 during the vacation. From 19-1-1987 to 8-2-1987 the deposit could not be made. Therefore, had he deposited on the first day after the opening of the Civil Courts, in fact he had made deposit on 16-2-1992 the arrears of rent would, deemed to have been paid in due time i e. within 30 days from the date of the order, as provided under section 9 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act. 13. Section 9 of Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act is pari materia to section 10 of General Clauses Act, which has been interpreted by Supreme Court in the case of (HH Raja) Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh and others, in following terms ;— “ Broadly stated, the objection of the section is, to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a court or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then according to the section the act should be considered to have been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the court or office is open. For that section to apply, therefore, all that Is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed, and that period should expire on a holiday” 14. The requirements of section 10 of the General Clauses Act as laid down by learned Judges of Supreme Court are fully complied with in the present case. For that section to apply, therefore, all that Is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed, and that period should expire on a holiday” 14. The requirements of section 10 of the General Clauses Act as laid down by learned Judges of Supreme Court are fully complied with in the present case. As already stated above, the limitation of 30 days had expired during winter vacation, hence the tenant was entitled to make deposit on the opening of Civil Courts on 20-2-1987 but being vigilant, he found the Rent Controller available on 13th February, 1987, got the Treasury Challan initialled and stamped from him and thereafter deposited the amount of arrears of rent on 16th February, 1987, as 14th and 15th February, 1987 were gazetted holidays This Court need not go into this enquiry whether the Rent Controller was available before 13th Febrary, 1987 or not. 15. So far the judgments in Ram Kinkar Singh and another and Pt. Krishna Chandra Sharma and others are concerned, those are in the facts and circumstances of those cases and are not applicable in the present case. The case of Ram Kinkar Singh and another was not a case in which the defaulted instalment was to be deposited in the court or an office in pursuance to some provision of law or direction of the court but in a compromise decree. It was held that a compromise decree was an agreement between the parties in which time was the essence of contract and on the expiry of the due date a right had accrued to the Decree-holder and the judgment debtor could not be given the benefit under section 10 of the General Clauses Act. Similarly, in Pt. Krishna Chandra Sharma and others on the principle that the provision of section 10 of the General Clauses Act apply only to a case where the act itself is directed or allowed to be done or taken by an Act of the Parliament. Where a party has two courses open before Mm one of depositing the amount in the court and other of paying the amount directly to the other party, he is not entitled to take advantage of section 10 of the General Clauses Act. Where a party has two courses open before Mm one of depositing the amount in the court and other of paying the amount directly to the other party, he is not entitled to take advantage of section 10 of the General Clauses Act. This case is distinguishable on the ground that in the present case this Court has held that the tenant had only one course open to him to deposit the arrears of rent in the court as directed by the Rent Controller, therefore, he was entitled to the benefit of section 9 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act. 16. The analogy that in view of legislature providing period of 30 days to pay the arrears of rent, the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority have no jurisdiction to vary this period, does not apply to the direction of making payment by way of deposit only, because the legislature has not prescribed any particular mode of payment The tenant is left free to adopt any mode of payment but he must make the payment within 30 days from the date of the order. If the Rent Controller make a direction to make payment by a particular mode it is not in contravention to statutory provision. Such a direction may be necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case to bind down the parties to comply with the provisions of law. 17. Another point raised by Mr. M. V. Sharma is that both the courts below have wrongly held though concurrently, that Shri K.L. Bhagat was the duly constituted attorney of the landlord and the eviction petition filed by him on behalf of the landlord was maintainable. According to Mr. Sharma the power of attorney in favour of Shri K. L Bhagat Ex r-l was not proved in accordance with section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. According to Mr. Sharma the power of attorney in favour of Shri K. L Bhagat Ex r-l was not proved in accordance with section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. He has referred to a number of authorities oi section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, to which this Court need not refer to, as this argument is not available to the tenant because it was not raised in the same tone and tenor in the reply to the eviction petition before the Rent Controller as well as in the grounds of appeal before the First Appellate Court and there is not an iota of evidence on record to substantiate this submission, in plea taken in the written statement in this regard is m preliminary objection No. 1, which is ;— "That the application has not been signed and verified by the petitioner nor the power of attorney in favour of the Counsel has been signed by the petitioner and hence there is no legal and valid presentation before this Honble Court and hence the application is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.” There is no rejoinder filed by the respondent to the reply of the tenant but an issue was framed that, "whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the present petition?" K. L. Bhagat appeared in the witness-box as PW 1 and stated that he is the general attorney of the landlord and placed on record a photo copy of the power of attorney Ex.P-1. He has also placed on record his letter Ex. P-2 which was sent to the tenant by registered post on 20th May, 1985 informing the tenant that he was authorised by Balwant Rai Gotra landlord of the premises occupied by him and he should pay the rent including taxes to him and also to deal wim him directly. The postal receipt of sending the Regd. letter and Postal Certificate are Ex. P-3 and Ex P-4 on record. In cross-examination, he has admitted that the landlord Balwant Rai Gotra had not given any notice to the tenant that he had become owner. Not a single question has been asked from this witness K, L. Bhagat that Balwant Rai Gotra landlord had not executed power of attorney Ex. P-l in his favour or it did not beat his signatures. The evidence of the landlord consists of only the statement of this witness. Not a single question has been asked from this witness K, L. Bhagat that Balwant Rai Gotra landlord had not executed power of attorney Ex. P-l in his favour or it did not beat his signatures. The evidence of the landlord consists of only the statement of this witness. 18. On the other hand, the tenant had also examined himself as RW I in support of his case but he had not stated that K. L. Bhagat was not duly constituted general attorney of Balwant Rai Gotra landlord and he bad no authority to file the petition against him. On the basis of this type of evidence, the Rent Controller was right in deciding the issue against the tenant holding that the locus standi of K. L Bhagat general attorney of the landlord was proved by Ex P-l, copy of the general power of attorney brought on record without any objection, whose execution was not disputed by the tenant in any manner. 19. In the grounds of appeal before the first Appellate Court though the tenant did assail the findings of the Rent Controller on Issue No 2 and also stated that the power of attorney Ex P-l was not duly proved in accordance with law but the Appellate Authority could not go into this point for want of proper pleadings and evidence on record, This seems to be an afterthought of the tenant when he lost the case before the Rent Controller. Moreover, the proviso to section 68 of the Evidence Act is very clear that unless the execution of any document, except the will, compulsorily register able is specifically denied by the person by whom it purports to have been executed, it is not necessary to call an attesting wit ness in proof of the execution of that document as required under section 68. Since there was no specific denial of the execution of the power of attorney by its executant the landlord, section 68 of the Evidence Act is not attached at all In the result, this Court does not find any force in the second submission raised on behalf of the tenant. 20. The third point raised by Mr. Since there was no specific denial of the execution of the power of attorney by its executant the landlord, section 68 of the Evidence Act is not attached at all In the result, this Court does not find any force in the second submission raised on behalf of the tenant. 20. The third point raised by Mr. Sharma is that in view of the stand taken by the tenant and the evidence on record that rent for the period 1-8-1985 to 30-4-1986 was sent by the tenant by money-order but it was refused by the landlord Balwant Rai Gotra, the eviction order could not be passed against him. According to Mr. Sharma, under sub-section (2) (i) of section 14 of the Act, the tenant was required to only tender the rent which he had done in the present case. Though both the authorities below have considered this argument and concurrently decided against the tenant, and this Court need not interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, yet, it has perused the documents Ex. R-6, Ex. R-7 and Ex, R-8 to find out whether both the authorities below have correctly read and interpreted these documents to hold that in fact there is no endorsement of refusal by the landlord and since the money-order was redirected, it shows that the original address given therein was not correct, hence, it was not a valid tender. This Court does not find any infirmity in the findings of both the courts below and agrees with them. The refusal of the land lord has not been proved by the tenant by examining any witness from the Post Office. Mr. Sharma submits that in fact, it was for the landlord to come forward and deny that the money-order was not received or refused by him. This Court does not find any substance in this submission. The third submission raised on behalf of the tenant is rejected. 21. In the result, the revision petition succeeds to the extent that since the tenant has deposited the amount of arrears of Rs. 322 within a period of thirty days (by deducting the time from 19-1-1937 to 15-2-1987 due to closing of Civil Courts for winter vacation) he is not liabla to be evicted in execution of the eviction order dated 9th January, 1987. No order as to costs. Revision petition allowed. -