ORDER S.K. Chawla, J. 1. This is a revision by an accused directed against an appellate order of his re-trial. 2. The prosecution story in brief was that on 10-10-1985 a Food, Inspector by name R. C. Mishra (P. W. 1) had visited along with flying squad the shop of accused Samaliya and purchased a sample of black pepper corns (whole) from him. The sample on being sent for analysis was found to be adulterated. The trial of the accused was held in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shivpuri, Shri O. P. Sharma, who tried the case according to warrant-case procedure instead of summarily. The accused was convicted on conclusion of the trial of the offence under Section 7(i)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 6 months and fined Rs. 1,000/-, in default to further rigorous imprisonment for 6 months, vide judgment dated 64-1989. The accused went in appeal to the Court of Sessions, Shivpuri. The First Additional Sessions Judge, Shivpuri, Shri W. A. Shah, who heard the appeal, held that section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, was attracted. The Chief Judicial Magistrate was specially empowered under that provision to try the case in a summary way. But the said Magistrate tried the case as a warrant case even without recording an order in terms of the proviso that it was undesirable to try the case summarily. The mandate contained in Section 16A was that the case shall be tried summarily. That was a mandatory provision which had been infracted. The entire trial was therefore, vitiated On that view, without considering the merits of the case, the learned appellate Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused but at the same time directed re-trial of the accused for the same offence by remanding the case, vide judgment dated 2-12-1989. Aggrieved by that judgment, the accused has now come in revision. 3. Arguing in support of the revision, Shri B. M. Singhal, learned counsel for the petitioner, stated that sample in the present case was taken on 10-10-1985. The prosecution was started on 30-12-1985. The accused underwent ordeal of trial for around 3 1/2 years, when judgment was delivered by the trial Court on 6-4-1989. 3. Arguing in support of the revision, Shri B. M. Singhal, learned counsel for the petitioner, stated that sample in the present case was taken on 10-10-1985. The prosecution was started on 30-12-1985. The accused underwent ordeal of trial for around 3 1/2 years, when judgment was delivered by the trial Court on 6-4-1989. Direction for retrial was made by the appellate Court on 2-12-1989, i.e. after a lapse of about 4 years of the institution of the prosecution against the accused. A fresh trial may take a couple of more years, let alone the time that may be required in appeal and revision, if found necessary. It was sought to be stressed that the accused had already suffered enough for no fault of his own because adoption of the wrong procedure during trial was not his mistake. Re-trial would amount to harassment of the accused, who has suffered enough and should be left in peace. It was also argued that the proper course would have been to acquit the accused rather than directing re-trial. It was submitted that a principle could be culled from various decisions that if an accused has had to face the agony of trial, over a period of 3 years or more, there could be no justification to remand the case for fresh trial and the proper order to be passed would be one of acquittal. Reference was made to the decisions in Nand Lal v. State of Haryana in 1987 (II) FAC 95, Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana in 1987 (II) FAC 256 . Thakur Das Babu Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh in 1989 (I) FAC .143. Shital Prasad v. State of Haryana in 1989 FAJ 414, Brij Pal v. State of Haryana in 1989 FAJ 120 and Dharam Chand v. State of Haryana, 1991 (II) FAC 100. 4. It will be seen that Chapter XXIX of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, deals with appeals. Powers of appellate Court are described in Section 386 contained in that Chapter. The appellate Court has undoubtedly power to direct a re-trial in an appeal from an order of acquittal as well as in an appeal from a conviction. Reference may be made to Clauses (a) and (b)(i) of Section 386. Such power may be exercised even in an appeal for enhancement of sentence vide Clause (c)(i). The appellate Court has undoubtedly power to direct a re-trial in an appeal from an order of acquittal as well as in an appeal from a conviction. Reference may be made to Clauses (a) and (b)(i) of Section 386. Such power may be exercised even in an appeal for enhancement of sentence vide Clause (c)(i). At the same time, it is an established legal principle that power ordering re-trial should be sparingly used and only for grave reasons. The considerations which should weigh with an appellate Court for directing re-trial cannot be mathematically enumerated. There is however, preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the view that re-trial should not be ordered where there has been a long delay between the commission of the offence and the trial, in consequence of an order of retrial. If the sword of Damocles was kept hanging for a long time, the accused should be permitted to rest in peace without a further trial. In this regard, it may not be possible to lay down any rigid limit as was sought to be contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, that if the original trial had lasted for 3 years or more, the re-trial should not be ordered. It was inordinate delay which led the Supreme Court in S. Guin v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 289 to take the view that proceedings should have been ordered to be dropped rather than re-trial ordered. In that case, accused persons were acquitted of the charge of obstructing bank officers from entering bank premises and transacting normal business. The Grindlays Bank Ltd. went in appeal against the acquittal before the High Court. That appeal remained pending before the High Court for 6 years. While disposing of the appeal, the High Court felt that the trial Court had missed the essence of the offences with which the accused had been charged and, therefore, there was failure of justice. The High Court, therefore, set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Magistrate and remanded the case for re-trial for offences punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 or 149, Indian Penal Code. The High Court, therefore, set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Magistrate and remanded the case for re-trial for offences punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 or 149, Indian Penal Code. In appeal by special leave by the accused persons, the Supreme Court held that having regard to the inordinate delay of nearly 6 years that had ensued after judgment of acquittal, the nature and magnitude of the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellants, and the difficulties that may have to be encountered in securing the presence of witnesses in a case of that nature nearly 7 years after the incident, it would have been proper for the High Court to have dismissed the appeal rather than to have ordered re-trial. The termination of criminal proceeding in that way would have secured the ends of justice. The Supreme Court in those circumstances set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the order of acquittal passed by the Magistrate. Again, in Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 1729 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where appellant Srinivas Pal was accused of offences under Sections 279, 304A and 338, Indian Penal Code. The accident had taken place on November 20, 1976 in a jeep, which was said to have been driven by the appellant. Delivering judgment on July 19, 1988, the Supreme Court observed that: "..... Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the appellant i.e. 9 1/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving, is too long a time. Quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution ... it is just and fair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further....." 5. Reference to a case of our own High Court Food Inspector, Agar v. Tarachand Bhuralal, Cr. A. No. 710 of 1978 decided on 24-2-1981 [short-noted in 1981 (Vol. II WN 68)] may also be made. It was an appeal against acquittal. The report of Director, Central Food Laboratory was in favour of the accused, inasmuch as it showed that groundnut oil was not below standard. A. No. 710 of 1978 decided on 24-2-1981 [short-noted in 1981 (Vol. II WN 68)] may also be made. It was an appeal against acquittal. The report of Director, Central Food Laboratory was in favour of the accused, inasmuch as it showed that groundnut oil was not below standard. But the report of Director, Central Food Laboratory also showed that sample of groundnut oil upon chemical examination revealed that the test for castor oil was positive. On this ground it was urged in the appeal that the groundnut oil was adulterated and the respondents were liable to be convicted for the offence charged. This contention did not find favour with the Court on the ground that the report of Central Food Laboratory was not put to the respondents and they were not afforded an opportunity to explain the said circumstance. The prayer by the counsel for the appellant that the case be remanded to the trial Magistrate for re-trial was also not allowed by the High Court. R. K. Vijaywargiya, J. (as he then was) observed as follows : " In my opinion it is not a fit case in which re-trial should be ordered after such a long time. The sample was taken in the present case as stated above in the year 1974 and there is no indication in the report of the Central Food Laboratory regarding the proportion of the castor oil contents in the groundnut oil. In the circumstances, in my opinion, it is not a fit case in which a re-trial is called for after lapse of such a long time." In the above case appeal against acquittal was dismissed and the acquittal of the accused/respondent was maintained. 6. In the present case, the sample was taken a little more than 7 years back. The applicant/accused ran through the gauntlet of trial lasting 3 1/2 years. The trial was vitiated for no fault on the part of the accused. Direction for re-trial was made by the appellate Court after more than 4 years of the institution of the case. The direction for re-trial was stayed in this revision. Now, a direction for re-trial after a lapse of about 7 years from the time of the incident would clearly operate harshly on the accused, who has already suffered enough. Direction for re-trial was made by the appellate Court after more than 4 years of the institution of the case. The direction for re-trial was stayed in this revision. Now, a direction for re-trial after a lapse of about 7 years from the time of the incident would clearly operate harshly on the accused, who has already suffered enough. Considering the entire circumstances of the case, this Court is definitely of the view that re-trial of the applicant/accused is not at all warranted and would further be not in the ends of justice. The direction in the circumstances for re-trial contained in the impugned judgment is set aside. In addition, the accused-applicant is acquitted of the offence charged. The revision is accordingly allowed.